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

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

THE

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OF

## RELIGIOUS THOUGHT AND LIFE.

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THE

# THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

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## I.—GOD, DUTY AND IMMORTALITY.

THE Rev. Charles Voysey has begun this* year with some sermons on Atheism. His first discourse lays down the state of mind in which we are to approach Atheists,—not with an air of superiority, not with the imputation that their doctrine *necessarily* leads to immorality, but with complete candour. Most of his warnings are, no doubt, sorely needed by Christian divines; nay, and perhaps by some pure Theists, if one is to judge by the tone in which Mr. Peter Dean, the last biographer of Theodore Parker, assails Mr. G. J. Holyoake. Great controversies are sometimes well typified by combatants of no great distinction; yet Mr. Dean has already obtained much praise for his Life of Theodore Parker, whose doctrine he not unworthily represents; and Mr. Holyoake, though without pretension to high attainments or commanding intellect, is a man of so much modesty and moral worth, attested in a long life before the public eye, that when the calamity of total blindness threatened him, men of widely different opinions made it an occasion of testifying their practical respect.

Mr. Dean's attack on Secularism, as held by Mr. Holyoake, does but afford a convenient motto introducing a great subject. The new name, Agnosticism, best defines Holyoake's position. He refuses the name Atheist; he simply asserts that he knows no adequate proof, and no adequate disproof, of any moral and overruling God. Mr. Dean seems to disallow this intermediate position, and insists that whatever is not Theism is Atheism.

* Written early in 1878.

He seems to mean that an Agnostic has no moral advantage over an Atheist, and writes as if not aware that we have a right to go farther, and say, Neither has such a Theist as Anaxagoras or Zeno, Cato or Cicero. Mr. Dean (herein agreeing with the present writer) desires a Theism which shall be an aid to morality. That appears to be the sum-total of his complaint, that "Secularism" is defective. But, by the way, he puts forth utterances concerning Immortality as indissoluble from Theism, in which if he stood alone, no notice might have seemed needful. But he is a type of a school. Lord Herbert of Cherbury was perhaps the first who formulated a creed in the three words, God, Duty and Immortality. The late Lord Brougham, in nearly the earliest tract of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, distinctly put a belief of Immortality on the same level as a belief in God, and perhaps as a belief in Duty. Mazzini equally made Human Immortality co-ordinate with God in his creed. Theodore Parker followed to the same effect: so does Theodore Parker's warm admirer, Frances Power Cobbe. Thus Theodore Parker's last biographer by no means stands alone. Indeed; it may seem that he has with him the whole body of novel Indian Theists who call themselves Brahmos. Thus it happens that Mr. Dean conveniently affords material for discussion on this whole subject.

"A *genuine* Theist," says he,* "*in order to be a Theist*, must study to live well now, if he would not lose both present *and future* life." Thus he assumes that no Theism is *genuine* which does not embrace a belief in future life. Secularism (says he), "ignoring future life, takes away the force of the moral government of the world. For if there be no future life, morality must be founded on secular motives and temporary results rather than upon eternal obligation. The second article of Mr. Holyoake's creed is: The adequacy of the Utilitarian rule which makes *the good of others* the rule of duty. According to this, if there were no 'others,' there would be no morality! Robinson Crusoe has no obligation to be moral until Man Friday comes upon the scene." He proceeds to denounce the

* The Deficiencies of Secularism, p. 6. London: Smart and Allen. 1877.

doctrine as mere expediency which makes it our rule of duty to seek the good of others, and says that it "sets up mere expediency as a standard." The quantity of mischievous error in these sentences is lamentable.

A Theist who disdains to accept as Revelation the words of any sacred book, and assumes the tone of superiority to rebuke a modest and candid Agnostic, is bound to have thought accurately on the relation of Duty to belief in a God. Mr. Dean does not seem to understand the fundamental fact, that until Duty is *paramount*, dictating to men and angels, there can be no worthy Theism. Without it, the belief in an authoritative Great Spirit is apt to be pernicious. It leads to such enormities as acquiescing in Moloch-worship and the Mexican immolation of all prisoners of war. It justifies massacre of entire nations. If we are at all to criticise alleged divine precepts, we must have a knowledge of Duty which is prior and superior to any theology. In fact, it is quite obvious *how* moral notions arise, how they are developed, and how they are confirmed. If a savage kill a stag or plant a field, he feels (and therefore judges) that he has a RIGHT to the fruit of his toil; hence if another man despoil him, he accounts himself WRONGED, and the despoiler UNJUST. Here is the first germ of a whole code of morals. Perceiving that other men, equally with himself, feel resentment if *their* rights (as they account them) are invaded, he learns that he *ought* to practise towards others the justice which he expects from them, and mutuality is recognized. We see all the process in young schoolfellows. Further, when, besides the property which individuals claim, a tribe has common property, as in pastures and cattle, joint effort is needed to *defend* the common rights; then one who skulks away and refuses his aid, is judged to wrong the whole tribe. Selfish fear and cowardice are stigmatized, and bravery is praised. Thus to the virtue of justice, without which society cannot begin to cohere, is added the virtue of bravery, without which no community can be safe and permanent. Children also are the hope of every people, the pillars of the State; hence rightful nourishing and training of them is esteemed a

social duty, and neglect a social wrong. Again, one who from gluttony is heavy in body and unapt for martial service is scorned and insulted, perhaps is forced to run races under the whip, until his size is reduced: thus sensuality is denounced as a form of injustice. As numbers multiply and industry becomes complex, virtues and vices also multiply to the thoughtful mind, and the Judges of every people transmit collective moral thought: thus Ethics grow up as a branch of positive knowledge. Each little people has its own errors in morals; but collision with the foreigner destroys one class of errors, public calamity exposes another. In the long run, human morality in every country and age *converges towards agreement*, and each corroborates each. But Religion (i.e. speculation concerning superior Spirits or an after-life of the individual man) neither contributes nor *can* contribute a single article to morals. It can only *corrupt* morals by the attempt. Its function is wholly different, viz. *to intensify the desire of being virtuous.*

Mr. Dean is as undiscerning (it would seem) of this natural history of Ethics, as his doctrine is untrue. When he quotes from Holyoake the assertion that "Conscience must be held higher than consequences," and that "the good of others is our rule," it is marvellous that he does not discern that he is attacking a man whose morality is high, noble, and grounded on the only true basis. When he further asserts that, to men holding such views as Holyoake, "*Good* can hardly mean truth, honour, kindness, love or justice, but the absence of pain, or ease and the enjoyment of pleasure," and that, "more or less refined, the principle must be, Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die," he forces me to say, I must accept from him all these imputations as falling on myself. If he had simply said, Mr. Holyoake has unawares renounced Utilitarianism, he would have said truth; but that is the worst he could justly say, and it is very small, when one sees how even Paley refines the word Utility into everything Good.

But Mr. Dean is very bold, and goes further. "If you ignore a future life," says he, "you take away *the moral govern-*

*ment of the world.*" Yet he is not unacquainted with the Old Testament. He is not ignorant that Moses, David, Isaiah, and all the great Hebrew teachers, emphatically taught the moral government of the world by the supreme Jehovah, yet never proclaim any future existence for individual man. A doctrine current in Egypt cannot have been unknown to the Hebrews: the total suppression of it in the law and the prophets is equivalent to a rejection, to a denial of it, in every form of the doctrine known to *them.* Bishop Warburton constructed an elaborate argument for the divine authority of Moses, based upon the fact (which he regarded as obvious and certain) that the Mosaic system ignored a future state as much as does any modern unbeliever. King Hezekiah's joy at his restoration from sickness is recorded in the book of Isaiah; his solemn hymn of thanksgiving demonstrates his utter disbelief of any future existence. This was a pious king who listened to the instructions of Isaiah and Micah. His hymn of unbelief was incorporated with the prophecies of Isaiah by the pious keepers of Hebrew prophecy. No fact of national belief is clearer than that the doctrine of future life *for the just* grew up among the Hebrews gradually after their Babylonian captivity. The Sadducees of the New Testament did not accept it at all; they were conservative of the old Mosaic doctrine, to which the Pharisees (the *advanced* party of Judaism) had added; but whether many even of the Pharisees believed in the resurrection *of the wicked,* is not easy to decide. When Paul, a disciple of Gamaliel, solemnly avows that God alone has immortality, he seems to deny the *natural* immortality of the human spirit, and elsewhere attributes any future life to the specific will of God. The same idea pervades the fourth Gospel. From the Hebrew sages have traditionally descended to us the first elements of spiritual religion and of moral theology; how can Mr. Dean shut his eyes to the fact that these fathers of our noblest aspirations, these our spiritual ancestors, based nothing whatever on the future existence of individuals,—nevertheless, in most emphatic, unhesitating and joyful faith, proclaimed and glorified the righteous and universal government of God?

If any one's mind is unequal to a metaphysical analysis, we need not wonder; for on metaphysics very clever men battle unceasingly: but surely we have a right both to disparage and to censure one who ignores a historical fact so broad and unquestionable as the doctrine of the Hebrews from Moses to Jeremiah. In all Jeremiah's prophecies, ample as is the book, whether he denounce, warn and threaten the wicked, or address innocent and pious sufferers with hope and consolation, no hint appears that he contemplates a future existence for either class. His book, also, of Lamentations is in the same tone. He sees nothing in futurity but the present earth, with misery or happiness upon it. Hence, and hence alone, the material of his threats and consolations is drawn. Yet this same Jeremiah shews a profound sense that Jehovah controls and ordains everything,—that He reads the secrets of the heart and punishes sin; moreover, that there is an intimate personal relation between this mighty God and the individual soul. If a religious teacher now look down upon Jeremiah's creed as "deficient," no one will blame him; but not to see that the deficiency was no bar to belief in spiritual duty and God and the Divine Rule, is more than a slight fault, especially when such blindness to facts that are on the surface of a book which he is bound to have studied maturely, emboldens him to vilify those of our day who no more attain a belief in human immortality than did Moses, Isaiah and Jeremiah.

But the fact here before us is no way confined to the ancient Hebrews. Mr. Dean is pleased to inform us that "belief in God *and immortality* has proved itself *in all history* to be an instinct of the *human race*." This rash and random assertion can be found in Theodore Parker also, who fancies he can build upon it; but it certainly is a very rotten foundation. The Hebrew doctrine, already alluded to, sufficiently refutes it at once. But what is to be said of Confucius and the Chinese, no small fraction of mankind: are we to be told that *they* had an instinctive belief in immortality? Without pretending to any deep knowledge of Oriental lore, it may be permitted to accept as true, what is on all sides asserted, that

the established Chinese morality is both destitute of religion and ignorant of any future state. How can it be pretended that any "instinct of the race" has carried these myriads of myriads into a belief of their immortality? But since the time of Confucius, many of these have imbibed a distinct religion, that of Sakya Muni. This system, which we call Buddhism, has had as many transformations as Christianity; differing, it seems, as widely as the doctrines of Ignatius Loyola, Calvin and Swedenborg; yet, as far as we can learn, none of them have displayed an instinctive belief in a separate immortality for each human soul. The blissful futurity of a Buddhist consists in absorption into the Deity, which appears identical with the poetical formula of Sophocles, "Returning thither, whence one came;" but prosaic Englishmen interpret this as annihilation. Absorption into the Deity evidently means the loss of separate existence. As the late Archbishop of Dublin (Dr. Whately) was fond of putting the similar case of Plato's doctrine: "When Plato based future immortality on the assertion that the soul had existed before its human birth and was essentially indestructible, he overthrew all identity between the soul as it is and the soul as it is to be; so that virtually he did not maintain the immortality of the individual, but only the indestructibility of the substance out of which he supposed the individual to be constituted." We may fill up this argument by what Cicero puts into the mouth of a disputant, to this effect: "If my soul existed while king Agamemnon was beleaguering Troy, about which soul I know nothing and care nothing, why the more should I care about my soul which is to be after death?" To quote such beliefs as an instinct of mankind striving and longing for immortality, is a gross and deceptive fallacy. If three hundred millions of mankind have for ages been satisfied with the idea of absorption into the Deity as our blissful end, this is an enormous deduction from the alleged instinct of the race. The writer of these lines has done his best to put forward such arguments as seemed to him presentable in favour of a future life, arguments based entirely on a belief in God; but bad arguments damage any good

cause, and he feels bound to deprecate this violent perversion of history.

Theodore Parker somewhere (but the passage is not at hand) alleges barbarian notions in corroboration of this argument; but when the wild fancies of barbarians have no basis of fact, it is monstrous to quote them as any omen of truth. The North-American Indian imagines fine hunting-grounds in a future world, and a chief sometimes has his favourite horse killed to accompany him. So the ancient kings of the Scythians (the Scolotæ of Herodotus) claimed as companions in death a whole retinue. A body-guard of young men and their horses, one of his wives, his groom and his cook, with other attendants, were slain at the funeral. To the same effect, it may be presumed, are the murderous customs of Dahomey on the king's death. The fantasy of the ancient Greeks was not so cruel. The kings were supposed to migrate by death into the Elysian fields, and to have a royal exterior even below the earth; but this shadowy grandeur was so undesirable, that Achilles in the Odyssey is made to declare that he would far rather be an ignoble slave on earth: indeed, the feebleness ascribed to the shades, and their consequent craving for blood to drink, stamp the whole notion as fundamentally contemptible. Nothing is plainer than that the inventors of these follies had no desire to exist as naked souls, nor in a world different from this. They simply would have been glad to live on as they were, in the barbarism which they knew and could appreciate,—a wish very natural, but obviously very futile. To quote such dreams as a *præjudicium* that there *is really* a future existence of individual man, merely betrays either rash haste or the weakness of understanding which will snatch at a silly argument. Nay, it is damaging to the cause, for it seems to imply a dearth of trustworthy support. What is peculiarly to be observed, these barbaric fantasies neither proceed from nor tend to moral elevation, nor have they any connection at all with belief in God. They are like day-dreams of childhood, which infallibly fade into nothingness with the cultivation of intellect.

Among the Greeks and Romans this fact is abundantly clear; concerning the natural decline of other barbarism, our information is defective. With the very earliest philosophy of Greece —that is, with the earliest coherent and earnest thought—all belief in Elysium and Tartarus vanished; beatification became a poetical ornament or a political hypocrisy as time went on. Some noble poets, like Pindar and Æschylus, tried to moralize the wild mythology; but epitaphs sufficiently shew that no serious idea existed that individuals have a future life. No hope, no fear, no aspiration for it appear. No comfort is tendered to mourners based on any such possibility. Archbishop Whately justly comments on the same fact, observable in Servius Sulpicius, who, in comforting his friend Cicero for the death of his daughter Tullia, takes for granted that death is a final end to her, simply because she is a human being. So Cæsar, in the discussion on the Catilinarian conspirators, argues to the Senate against their capital punishment, on the ground that death is nature's repose and each man's release; hence it is no fit penalty of crime. In no cultivated Greek or Roman can we find any consistent and serious conviction of human after-existence; nor can we tell whither to look for an *aspiration* after any other immortality than that of being gratefully remembered in later ages. The most earnest and pure-hearted of the Stoics are like-minded with the statesmen in this respect. Cato, Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, remain on the same platform as Cæsar. The philosophic Euripides mildly reproves, more than once, the desire of future life, as a foolish aspiration of a mortal to be immortal. Individuals then, as now, probably had such desire; but the assertion that it was general, that it pervaded the Greek or Italian nation, that it is an instinct of the human race, and is a valuable index of truth, could only be prompted by indiscreet zeal to support an argument.

Worse still is the error—the blunder, it must be called—of treating the idea of Duty as dependent on belief in a moral God. As shewn above, this inverts the order of thought altogether. Mr. Dean speaks slightingly of persons who "*somehow*

*make out* that there can be religion which is not morality." A very little knowledge of human history shews that in its origin Religion is as independent of Morals, as Morals of Religion. Each grows up separately, and perhaps they have a long existence separately. Reverence, or even fear, directed to an unseen superior Power, undoubtedly is Religion, though it is not at once a religion that we now value or indeed respect. We claim that the Power which is worshiped should be believed by the worshiper to be Just, Good and Wise, as well as Powerful; and what the words *Just, Good, Wise,* are to mean, Religion cannot dictate; independent Morals must define. This, I repeat, is essential to the purity and value of the religion. Mr. Dean began his career as a Unitarian minister, and is now one of their most "advanced" preachers; yet here he has stepped back astonishingly into the confusion of the most fatuous Calvinistic school, which bases Morality on Religion, and carries one back into the theory of Paganism. No doubt, as Religion becomes beneficial when its ideal of God includes pure moral attributes, so Morality is ennobled, stimulated and strengthened for practice, when it is married to Religion. But that does not make Religion to be its *basis*, nor to be at all essential to its soundness. The apostle Paul certainly did not depreciate the theoretic morals of the Gentiles, although he saw the abounding corruption, and entitled the people "without God in the world." Notwithstanding, he addressed the Philippians in the justly admired and glorious exhortation: "Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, are honest, are just, are pure, are lovely, are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things." He could not have had common ground in preaching to unbelievers, had he not recognized the common basis, human morality. He did not scold at the Gentile ideal virtue as mere "expediency," although it had scarcely any connection with their religion, nor with the belief in a future existence. Mr. Dean does but slander the moral system which rests on "the Good of one's Neighbour" as its rule, which also appeals to "Conscience" to decide *what* is good, when he entitles it mere

"expediency" because it ignores future life. Mr. Dean's objection to a morality which presupposes the existence of "others," is another blunder. Undoubtedly the first idea of Morals lies in Duty of man to man. Man cannot *really* be isolated; but if, for argument's sake, we put a hypothesis which we know to be impossible, that a Robinson Crusoe grew from infancy to manhood alone in a secluded island, he could have no idea of Duty except such as might arise from his relation to surrounding *animals*. To an affectionate dog he might understand that he *owed* something in return. But if no such idea of Duty towards animals arose, then he would have no idea of Duty at all. Then no religion which he might excogitate from the discernment of superior Power guiding the elements and the seasons, could give him any idea of morality in that Power. His idea of God would be void of moral attributes, and his religion would be powerless to animate his conduct, just because he would not know that he *ought* to guide his conduct. He would follow the impulses of desire, as a stag or a tiger. A Man Friday coming to him would make all the difference: it need hardly be added that in De Foe's story Robinson was not *reared* in isolation, nor was restoration to the human world ever to be despaired of. Nevertheless, so long as our imaginary man is isolated, many vices and many virtues are impossible to him. He cannot be a thief or a liar; he cannot be just; he is under no obligation to be brave; he has no opportunity to be loving or forgiving,—unless, considering his relation to animals, he conclude that he ought not wholly to deprive bees of honey or calves of milk, or ought not to kill animals for food if he can live well on fruit. Duty of man to God cannot be imagined (especially since God does not need anything from us), until out of the relations of men to men the idea of Duty has first grown up strong and sharp. Even then (and after the noblest idea of Religion as yet open to us has been reached) the *principal* duty of man to God consists in behaving rightly to our brother-men and our fellow-creatures. Duty to God admits of no wise form of *action* other than this; but is exhausted in a few simple states of *internal feeling*, such as

Reverence, Admiration, Gratitude, Trust. In his zeal to depreciate "Secularism" and "Utilitarianism," Mr. Dean misdirects his attack, and overlooks the really weak point, which is logical, not moral. As Aristotle insists in the first chapter of his Ethics, *something* must be desired for its own sake, else desire would be vain. What we desire as a *means* to a further *end* is called Useful; but the end which is desired for itself is called Good. To call the intrinsically Good Useful, would disparage it. Evidently, then, the Good is better than the Useful, and Utility can never be a sufficient standard to settle what things are Good. G. J. Holyoake frankly says that "Conscience" guides him, and does not know that he (like so many other persons) is better than his creed; but Mr. Dean ought to see this. Bentham scorned the very idea of a man having a conscience. J. S. Mill improved upon Bentham when he said it was better to be a discontented Socrates than a contented fool, hereby disavowing happiness as the chief good. Hereby likewise he shews that the imputation which Mr. Dean casts on all who ignore future existence, namely, the imputation that ease and comfort is with them the highest good, is quite out of place and very unjust.

Still we are not at the bottom of this topic. What has a future life, and the belief in it, at all to do with the soundness of basis in a moral system? Mr. Dean says (p. 7), that "if there be no future life, morality must be founded on secular motives and temporary results, rather than upon eternal obligation. Hence expediency has to be the basis of morality." To treat human morality as of *eternal* obligation is mere thoughtlessness. It can only be *coeval* with human nature. With a change of that nature, widely different virtues or vices in detail would arise, and many others would vanish. Only those virtues can be eternal which we ascribe as attributes to God. Mr. Dean does not explain how morality is affected by duration of life. If it be debated whether one ought or ought not to do a deed, it is not at all visible that the reply will be changed from Yes to No, or from No to Yes, by the agent being about to live again in another world. Moreover, how Mr. Dean

connects expediency (in its current low sense) with a good deed, because the doer knows or cares nothing about his own future, is quite unintelligible. Surely we must not impute to him Paley's curious weakness (perhaps a slip of the pen) which accounts no deed virtuous unless it be done "for the sake of everlasting happiness." If a dark Pagan, who is hungry and exhausted, give half his dinner to a starving man, shall we scold at him for acting "on secular motives and expediency"? shall we deplore his ignorance of "eternal obligation"? Rather we must pronounce that the less a man thinks of *himself*, whether of his prospects, his reward, or even his obligations, when he does a right deed, the simpler and sounder is his virtue. Mr. Dean cannot hold, with the Thirty-nine Articles, that the good deeds of the unregenerate are displeasing to God and have the nature of sin. What, then, does he mean? One may conjecture that he wants not only a Divine Ruler and Governor, but a Divine Avenger (after death) of wrong-doing, and Rewarder (after death) of right conduct; and he requires it after death, *only* because he does not see it in this life. There are many reasoners who interpret Responsibility as Liability to Punishment, and they do not admit that the degradation of soul which bad men suffer in this life is any punishment at all. Thus punishment is identified with the infliction of pain. If there is no *body* to suffer, then they must have *mental* agony as a retribution. But if a man, in order to be more virtuous, must look forward to such penalties or rewards in reserve, it may seem that he thereby is bound to act from "expediency" and from selfish considerations; nor is it at all easy to exculpate the deferring of dreadful punishment to a distant unknown future from the very gravest objection. It certainly cannot elevate our notion of Divine Wisdom.

If unselfishness inhere in high virtue, as dire selfishness in the worst crimes, it is impossible to set any just stigma on good deeds which are done simply from good impulse and deliberate purpose, but in total unconcern for the agent's future. Therefore unbelief in a future life can never make a good deed less good; but belief in a future life *may* make a deed selfish

which would otherwise have been unselfish. The idea that present duty in this world, which is certainly open to our knowledge, can be altered by beliefs or speculations concerning a world which is certainly not open to our knowledge, is rather a gratuitous paradox than an axiom to be propounded didactically.

In short, it is sufficiently clear that of the three grand words at the head of this article, the true order is, Duty, God and Immortality, the first being earlier established and more sharply known than the second, and the second than the third; moreover, the knowledge of the first being the most important and the supreme, while the knowledge of the last is necessarily the least important, as it is certainly the least distinct. But this topic admits further development. The ideas of Duty and of God grow up, as has been pointed out, from separate roots, and of course are in the early stages variously defective. Yet from the very first the idea of Duty is in practice highly valuable, defective as it must be; it is indeed so indispensable, that man would not be man without it, but at most a gregarious animal. Moreover, through devotion to Duty men become estimable and just objects of love, whether they have or have not obtained as yet any idea of supernatural power. Such indeed is the state of an obedient and amiable child. Each man is pronounced good, not for the extent of his knowledge, but for his unselfish sentiments and for his eagerness to perform Duty. On the other hand, when men first obtain the idea of superior power, which they entitle God or gods, this idea at first and in its crudeness has no certain or trusty value; but oftenest brings with it many pernicious results, being so full of wild fantasy, as to have in it more of falsehood than of truth. The deity is discerned to be powerful, but no other attribute than Power is uniformly ascribed to him; and to worship mere Power is virtually to worship a Devil. Nothing is commoner in low Paganism. Unless the god be glorified by the attribute of Goodness, which we obtain through moral thought, that is, through the experience and study of Duty, the idea of godhead is of no advantage to man, but

rather a mischievous and perverting influence, ever liable to turn into Moloch-worship, whether in Mexico or Tyre, among Scythians, Druids or Africans. Thus from the study of Duty alone does Theology become beneficial. Ethics, as the *higher* science, corrects, shapes, and finally glorifies Theology, the *lower*. Further, as it is only because and in proportion as we believe God to be good, that we love or can love him; so, because and in proportion as man is good, we naturally love and certainly ought to love man, whatever his deficiency in theological or other knowledge. Only in so far as Atheism or Agnosticism is evidently accompanied by qualities which justly lower the moral estimate of a man, ought our esteem for him to be lowered; and then only because of those qualities, not because of his defective creed. Common sentiments of Duty pervade the human race so as to be the real cement between us; hence rises a harmony as to all the underlying principles, which so confirms our convictions of truth that nothing can shake it. The harmony of bodily sense attesting the material world, is scarcely more complete and more intense than our unanimous conviction that some sentiments, some motives, are nobler, better, more praiseworthy, than others; as, Generosity than Selfishness, Justice than Caprice, Love of Knowledge than Gluttony and Idleness. These primary judgments of Nobler and Baser, Better and Worse, are precisely what no arguments of Utility can ever generate in any of us nor in Mr. Holyoake; but happily he has them from his "Conscience," as have all nations of men. Thus devotion to Duty is to mankind in all stages a uniting and spiritual force. But can we say the same thing concerning a belief in God? Alas! the appeal to history will elicit a most painful reply, that Religion often perverts fatally the sense of Duty. Enmity, violence, intense cruelty, bigotry, have in past ages so often issued to mankind from Theology as such, that the argument with the Atheist on this head becomes extremely difficult. He is able to assert, and it is hard to confute him, that when good appears to come from a theology, it really comes *solely* from the moral truths that *happen* to be taught along with the theology. Of course we

admit and maintain that only so far as the theology is *pervaded by* a pure morality is there any certain advantage from it. Perhaps even when it is purest, we must not point to any *propositions* which it can establish, as the core of its animating influence; but rather to the ennobling, enlarging, stimulating force of mighty ideas drawn from contemplation of a boundless universe and time unlimited, and sympathy between a finite and an infinite mind. Mere Duty gives nothing of this. If men could live in caverns or under roofs without ever seeing the sun or stars,—if generations could be born and pass away, unable to see or know that in any direction the world reached more than a few miles,—mutual intercourse might develop as sound a knowledge of Duty, as perfect a theory of Morals, as anywhere has by any one been hitherto attained. Yet the minds of all would be dwarfed. Few indeed would be able by mere inference and imagination to grasp at a boundless world and a mighty incomprehensible Power pervading it. Earlier than science, and without scholastic philosophy, speculation on superhuman powers imparts to the multitude these conceptions of the infinite, in time and space; so that while Morals purify elementary Religion, even elementary Religion may ennoble Morals. Nevertheless, this is not by any *propositions* which "Theology," as distinct from the science of Nature, can lay down; for the sense of Infinity, which is the influence here concerned, permeates both alike; nay, Science, by its searching instruments,—eminently by telescope and microscope, and before their invention by its patient observations,—adds this element of grandeur to human thought, enlarging and stimulating the human mind itself, thus ennobling both Religion and Morals. But Religion, as such, begins to act upon Morals as soon as a Deity—we need not say, morally perfect—is conceived, but a Deity moral enough to concern himself with human morality. So the Jupiter of Homer, however unbridled himself, was believed to be wrathful against judges "who gave crooked verdict" and otherwise slighted "the ordinances of the gods,"—a phrase denoting more generally the belief that *human morals are matter of divine concern.* This perhaps is

the proposition which, more than any other in Theology, strikes like an electric flash through the conscience, and, without altering a single judgment of Ethics, acts with vast force upon the mind of the moral agent. Poor Euthyphron,—whom Socrates in Plato so unmercifully knocks about, caring only to shew him that he is a fool,—felt thoroughly the importance of the truth that Virtue is acceptable to the gods, shallow as were his studies on the foundation of morals. He understood that the gods approve of virtue: he had not gone farther, so as to say, the gods approve of virtue, not from any arbitrary caprice, but because it intrinsically *deserves* their approval. However, the fact is, that to believe we are under the eye of a wise, righteous and observant Being, is a new power for virtuous action, and makes the cultivation of a heavenly intercourse possible. Thus Religion, when purified by Morals, ennobles, stimulates and enriches Morals. Nevertheless, in the order of origination and authority, Morals take the lead.

It is difficult to understand how any can make a belief in human Immortality co-ordinate with a belief in God. First, as not every religion is beneficial, but that only which attributes righteousness and goodness to God, so neither is every form of belief concerning man's future existence beneficial. Allusion has been made to the barbarian Elysium and its murderous fantasies; but it may not be amiss to particularize a people remarked in antiquity for their obtrusive belief in immortality. The epithet by which Herodotus defines them has no English parallel—Getai *athanatizontes*—"Goths who hold themselves immortal." What came of their belief? Every five years they killed one of themselves, in order to send by him a message to their god! To kill a man was to send him to heaven (as we call it), and did not at all shock their conscience. This comes of allowing Religion to dictate to Morals. Herodotus calls this tribe "the noblest and justest of the Thracians." A belief in immortality seems to conduce to contempt of life and to bravery. So Tacitus says of the Jews, that they believe the souls of those who fall in battle or by the Roman axe to be eternal: "hinc generandi amor *et mori-*

*endi contemtus.*" The great bravery of Moslims in a religious war is imputed to their belief that death in such combat ensures Paradise to them: yet we do not in general allow that their belief in Paradise is ennobling or purifying. All depends on the image which is formed of Paradise and of the Future State; and if the Moslim Paradise is too definite and too low, the Christian idea is certainly too indefinite. It gives us words which cannot be interpreted. It is a life of perfect holiness and perfect freedom from pain and grief; yet holiness is a negation, if it be not spiritual virtue; and virtue implies action; action implies something to be *done*, which in turn implies deficiency and need; moreover, high virtue in the finite being implies effort and sacrifice; all advance in virtue seems to demand self-denial; yet, where all are "lapped in Elysium," self-denial seems to have no opportunity or reasonable occasion. No one can attempt even a rude and approximate picture of that which may be expected, without seeming to present a most undesirable condition of monotony and stagnation, of life without action, or action and research without any practical purpose—suggesting ennui and slumber as in endless sunshine. In vain is it entitled "heavenly glory," if something definite is not propounded to the imagination. Through this defect it seems undeniable that the anticipation of the Christian heaven has scarcely any perceptible effect on the life of the happy. While life here is serene, indeed until vital powers are evidently gone, even the most pious cling to life: not to do so could only be morbid and would tend to fanaticism. Strange to add, it is common for pious kinsfolk, who believe (or believe they believe) that one beloved is gone to a happier and glorified state, to speak of the departed as "my *poor* father," or "my *poor* child," just as did the Romans around Lucretius and Cicero say, "Ah miser!" These phenomena seem immensely to deduct from the supposed influence of the belief in a future state on the vast majority, not merely of nominal Christians, but even of the undeniably pious. There are subjects on which it is important to collect mental facts; on which, therefore, it is not egotistic to make personal dis-

closures: hence it may be allowed to add, that when I supposed myself on a bed of death, and had a full (intellectual) belief that death was to me an entrance into heavenly bliss, I had no sensible joy in the expectation nor desire to die, but simple resignation; and I have observed the same phenomenon in others. To ascribe to a belief in Immortality any emotional force on the soul commensurate or comparable to that produced by a belief in God, seems to be a fancy without adequate ground. How far the anticipation of heaven really comforts those who suffer the pinch of poverty, the pangs of disease or wounds, grief from the loss of dear ones, or the far worse grief from their wickedness, it is less safe to assert; but as far as facts may aid conjecture, very little relief is thus gained by sufferers. In the last case, how is it possible? A mother has an undutiful, vicious and heartless son: will she comfort herself by saying, "Ah! sad fellow! it is very grievous: but never mind! I shall go to heaven"? The comfort of an ancient Greek mother would run otherwise, and might be thought more amiable: "Alas! my wicked, cruel son! woe is me! how shall I be comforted? Only by death. "Welcome death, welcome darkness; welcome eternal oblivion of these miseries!" Nor ought we to forget that for seventeen or eighteen centuries the vast mass of Christendom has believed in an eternal hell; and so long as that doctrine was received as one side of human Immortality, Immortality could not be a vivid idea without one of two results—either a selfish hardening of the heart, or an agony driving believers mad. Thus we seem driven to the conclusion, that nearly from the beginning of the second century of our era, Immortality has been to the Christian Church either a noxious doctrine or a dead faith. In the bitter agony of cruel martyrdom, the expectation of heavenly bliss may have imparted supernatural endurance; but such cases are quite exceptional: nor is it clear how far the mere sense of an approving God was the real support. Under correction, and to stimulate inquiry, I propound the opinion, that a belief in *one's own* immortality has in general no *emotional* force at all.

The general doctrine stirs neither desire nor hope nor fear nor curiosity; but its whole effect is *intellectual* and *speculative.* First of all, it adds to man a signal element of infinity. It seems to claim for him in strictness that he is "a partaker of the divine nature:" it ennobles every individual of the race, if it be extended to all: it makes every soul enormously important: it raises the mean to higher rank, and in some sense equalizes mankind. It makes divine communion and aspiration appear to be more than ever reasonable, and intensifies the superiority of *man* over the *animal,* of the nobler passions over the appetites. Besides, it soothes the deep and constant aching of the heart at the unrelieved sufferings of the innocent, if a door is opened for the hope that their sufferings may tend to some good future result. Hence the belief is coveted for the vindication of Divine Rule, not for any personal selfishness. These are reasons why all should treat the doctrine (as Mr. Holyoake does) with grave respect, whether or not they are able, on the whole—viewing the argument on all sides—to attain any definite, unwavering conviction which can be vehemently uttered. A powerful writer, Miss Cobbe, has lately tried to base the *certainty* of our immortality on its absolute necessity to justify the Divine Rule. This, in so far, is in harmony with what has been here advanced; for her argument is, that it is needful for the *intellectual completeness* of Theism. But even so, it is insufficient for the completeness. Our earnest yearnings (I understand her to urge) and our sense of Justice demand that the tortures of martyrs, the life-long toils of the degraded millions, shall have wrought out some good result *for themselves;* and that those who by hard circumstances and unavoidable ignorance have been morally debased, shall have some new sphere in which their ruin may be repaired. A natural wish: a pious wish. But is it less natural, less pious, to wish that the unceasing, frightful, innumerable miseries inflicted by man on the innocent brute creation, may be somehow recompensed to the poor brutes themselves? Shall we then, with Bishop Butler, ascribe immortal souls to *all*

brutes? or where shall we stop? The argument breaks with its own weight, if we carry it out to completeness; and if we do not, it gives very imperfect relief to the terrible strain on our faith caused by human cruelties. It need hardly be added, that few of us feel sufficiently confident in our mental powers to argue: "This or that *must* be true; *else* God is unjust." We cannot thus, like giants, take the tribunal of heaven by storm.

For all these reasons, and for others which cannot here be produced, it seems undeniable that the doctrine of human Immortality is not established so firmly, is not so important in practice, is not so high in rank, as the doctrine that God exists, who ordains Virtue for man and sympathizes with human effort for Virtue. Further, it seems undeniably an error, an injustice and a mischief, to pretend that the moral certainties of Duty are dependent on the greatly minor certainty of Immortality. If Immortality is to enter a creed at all, it is in a very subordinate position. When we do not know any circumstances whatever of a life that is to be, who can vehemently desire it? We cannot have been intended to think much of it: it can hardly be said that we have any *certainty* of it given us. Is it not purposely shrouded in a dense haze? Yet to believe it possible may have some effect; and if the belief of it grows with spiritual life, it may hereafter attain greater establishment. But in the present low moral estate of man, it seems very unbecoming in those who profess no superhuman means of knowledge to treat this doctrine as essential to goodness and sound morality.

F. W. NEWMAN.

## II.—THE ARCHAIC SOLAR-CULT OF EGYPT.

### PART II. UASAR.

### I. THE SOUL AND THE SUN-GOD.

HAVING noticed the Sun-power viewed as an individual personage, and also in a purely physical aspect as the solar photosphere, we have next to consider the same great potency in relation to the individual man, and as kosmically extended in accordance with the principles of pantheism. I have elsewhere* shewn the identity of Dionysos and Uasar, and have to a considerable extent illustrated the concept of the latter as the Kosmic Sun-god and life-soul of the world. I shall here consider Uasar in his most important aspect, namely, as a great and good Being, judge of mankind, leader, friend and rewarder of the righteous, and enemy and punisher of the wicked; and this phase of Kamic belief resolves itself, in the main, into a view of the relations between the Sun-god and mankind after death. For, be it observed at the outset, death is never regarded either as the termination of the individual existence or as the commencement of a period of suspension of the sentient power; and thus, for instance, *The Litany of Ra* commences with a noble declaration of faith, worthy of being inscribed in letters of gold: "Whoso is intelligent upon the earth, he is intelligent also after his death." The first point for consideration is, whether the Uasarian myth really forms part of the archaic Kamic Solar-cult, or whether it is an addition to primitive faith, an overgrowth. This fortunately is not a doubtful point, the proof of the archaic character of the Uasarian concept being absolutely conclusive. Thus, to notice a few opinions of experts, Mr. C. W. Goodwin observes: "The two legends of the contest of the Sun with Darkness, and of Osiris with Set, the enemy of truth, were parallel the one to the other, and we find them in the seventeenth chapter of the Ritual placed side by side and identified. In our hymn [i.e. that to Amen-Ra already

* Vide The Great Dionysiak Myth. London: Longmans and Co. Vol. I. 1877; Vol. II. 1878.

noticed] the solar religion is alone conspicuous, but without being in opposition to or exclusive of the Osirian dogma."* So indissolubly interwoven in the human mind is the cognizance of physical and moral truth, and so early did Ra and Uasar exist in idea as distinct phases of the One, but yet as identical, as will be noticed. Bunsen concludes a review of the *Funereal Ritual*, the vast antiquity of great part of which has already been referred to, with the remark: "These hymns, like those mentioned by Plato as being 10,000 years anterior to his time, imply not only the worship of Isis and Osiris, but the whole of the mythological philosophy connected with their myth."† The Kamic religion is indeed one and indivisible; it was not the product of various distinct beliefs arising at different local centres, but of one similar belief impressed with numerous local peculiarities; and the learned Egyptologist concludes some admirable remarks on the point with the observation, that "upon closer investigation the demonstrability of the various local origins of these mythological forms is only a proof of the force and unity of the idea which was working in the minds of the people." Again, he observes that "the great fact connected with Menes is that he established the unity of the empire upon the worship of Osiris." On the coffin of Menkaura of the fourth dynasty, is an inscription shewing "that the worship of Osiris had assumed greater importance" in his reign; "for not only does the deceased king bear the name of that god, but the whole prayer refers to the myth of Osiris, his parents, and his triumph over his enemies or accusers."‡ Menkaura, the Hellenik Mykerinos, was the builder of the third pyramid. Kakau, a monarch of the second dynasty, is said to have invented the Hapi-bull-cult, which was connected with Uasar.§ The Asiatic origin of Uasar,‖ and his identity with Dionysos, also demonstrate the truly archaic character of his cult.

* Trans. Soc. Bib. Archæol. ii. 251.
† Egypt's Place, v. 95.
‡ Birch, Egypt from the Earliest Times, 40.
§ Manethon, in voc. Kaiechos.
‖ For the views of Sir G. Wilkinson, Bunsen, M. Lenormant and others on this point, vide The Great Dionysiak Myth, i. 190.

Satisfied of this, and as there is but one sun and one Sun-god, we must next observe the real identity of Ra and Uasar; and also the mysterious union, to be further noticed subsequently, between Uasar and each justified mortal or Uasarian, who, clothed in the glory of the Sun-god, is made a partaker of the divine nature. Again and again is the identity of these two great forms of the solar power asserted in *The Litany of Ra.* Thus we read:

"Hail Ra! the royal Uasar is thyself and reciprocally.
Thy spirit is that of Uasar,
Thy course is his in the empyrean.
Such as thou art, such is the royal Uasar.
Thy intellect, Ra, is his.
The royal Uasar is Ra himself,
The great inhabitant of the heavens."

So in the *Funereal Ritual* it is said:

"I know the great god who is in the West;
He is Uasar, Soul of the Sun is his name."*

So of Har, "the child of the sun in his semi-human form as Osiris,"† we read:

"Har says to Ra: Let me see the same as thou seest with thy eye.
Thus he sees it."‡

That is to say, Ra and Har are equally connected with the solar eye, and Uasar is said to be

"Eternal Ruler, Lord of the Age, the Bull, the Sun."§

Let us next consider the relations between the Sun-god in his phase as Uasar, and the Uasarian, his faithful servant, striving to obtain divine union and communion with him. Experience having taught that such a state can be only very distantly approximated by the individual during his earthly life, his triumphant approach to this goal is necessarily placed subsequent to his death. Man, according to Kamic ideas, is compounded of (1) Ba, the Soul, "greatest of things created,"‖

* Funereal Ritual, xvii.
† Cooper, Archaic Dict. in voc. Horus.
‡ Funereal Ritual, cxii.
§ Ibid. cxlii.
‖ Ibid. xci.

"represented by a hawk with human head and arms, to personify its volatile and solar character and human intelligence;"* (2) Khu, the Intelligence; (3) Ka, the Existence, scholastically the Ens or Being, as distinct from its attributes or adjuncts; (4) Khaba, the Shade; and (5) Kha, the Body; and the first matter to be gained by the Uasarian after death is to obtain admittance into the Under-world. For this purpose he offers up solemn prayer to Uasar, and a grand chorus of already justified Uasarians join in on his behalf, the result being that he is at length allowed to "enter the gate." Once in Kerneter, he beholds with adoring wonder the Uasarian sun; "ce soleil infernal prenait plus spécialement le nom d'Osiris;"† and to this divinity he commences a solemn address, which I have already partly quoted. Chapter lxiv. of the *Funereal Ritual*, already specially referred to, is styled "the Chapter of coming forth as the Day;" and the vignette connected with it represents the "Deceased walking to the Disk shedding rays." In obscure and esoteric language, the Uasarian exclaims at its commencement:

"I am the Yesterday, the Morning,
The light at its birth the second time.
The mystery of the Soul made by the gods,
Making the food of the hidden ones of the West of heaven."

The justified Solar-soul is "Yesterday," or the sun-marked time past, and "the Morning" as the aspiring Sun; it is also the sun-issuing light which is born again after death and darkness. "The first death of the soul was its birth into the world imprisoned in the human form."‡ The West is the happy region to which the Uasarian must hasten. "A false boatman, the emissary of the Typhonic Powers, endeavours by deceitful words to get him into his boat, so as to mislead and take him to the East instead of to the West, his proper destination, the shore where he ought to land and rejoin the sun of the lower world."§ Chapter xciii. treats of "not causing a

* Egypt's Place, v. 135.
† Lenormant, La Magie, 75.
‡ Egypt's Place, v. 134.
§ Cooper, Serpent Myths of Ancient Egypt, 45.

person to go to the East from the Kerneter," or Hades. The Uasarian prays, "Let him not waylay me, nor make me go to the East to do the festival of the impious." The justified souls are hidden away in the blessed regions of the West; they have been supported by "heavenly bread with supernatural stores of sustentation."

"The hidden ones pass rejoicing to the secret place,
The Sun has hastened to it; he is I, I am he;
I who know to the depths is my name.
I come justified.
Shu causes me to shine as a living Lord.
I return from the mysteries of creation;
He informs the Bennu of the things of the Gate."

The Uasarian has become in a measure identified with the Sun, who is "the Hawk of hawks;" he joins the happy Uasarians concealed in the secret solar chambers, knows mysteries, and shines in glory. Uasar informs the Bennu-Phœnix, the Uasarian Soul-bird, of the things of "the Gate of the West, the region of Bliss."* "It is," observes Mr. Tylor, "by the simplest poetic adaptation of the Sun's daily life, typifying man's life in dawning beauty, in midday glory, in evening death, that mythic fancy fixed the belief in the religions of the world, that the Land of Departed Souls lies in the Far West or the World Below."†

"Oh strong mysteries in it;
I have returned from the West of the heaven;
The Spirit shines in the shrine as light.
I have made good my path through the doors of the Gateway.
I am a god in Kerneter.
Har has made his eye illumine the world.
His name is my name.
Let me not be surpassed by the Lion-god;
I am the Lord of Life.
I have come, I have rejoined the eye:
Oh the Lion of the Sun who lifts his arm in the hill [of heaven],
Thou art as I, I am as thou art, and in thy shape;
My transformations are made of Tum."

* Egypt's Place, v. 147.

† Primitive Culture, ii. 44.

"The Sun, invisible in darkness, from whom all being proceeded, and to whom the deceased is indebted for the vital principle of breath."*

"I have departed from the shrine;
I have come out as a Spirit.
I am the Uasar;
I behold the forms of men for ever."

The justified votary is thus ultimately identified with his leonine, solar and kosmogonic divinity, and enjoys his likeness and potency.

Chapter ix. treats of "passing through the West as the Sun does, and of passing the Doorway" into the Under-world:

"Oh Soul, greatest of things created,
Let the Uasarian go.
Having seen, he passes from the gate;
He sees his father Uasar;
He makes a way in the darkness to his father Uasar;
He has come from the mummy, a prepared Spirit.
Oh gods and goddesses, give way."

The soul of the Uasarian then, as noticed, goes in through the Doorway and comes out in the Under-world:

"I went in as a Hawk,
I came out as a Phœnix.
I have made me a path.
I adore the Sun in the happy West.
Glory, glory to Uasar!"

The splendour of the telluric and subterranean Sun breaks upon the Soul, and he exclaims:

"Shine thou in the face of the Uasarian.
His soul comes forth with thee to the heaven.
It moves as the never-resting gods in the heaven.
Hail, O Sun, creator, self-created!
I am one of thy great types on earth;
I combine with the noble Spirits, the wise of Kerneter;
I come forth with them to see thy perfections.

* Egypt's Place, v. 136.

The great light shining in the heaven,
Making festive all countries, daily supported by thy goodness.
Thou illuminest the Uasarian in Kerneter,
Thou lettest him be in the West,
Placing him out of sin,
Letting him be with the blessed.
Hail, thou judge of the gods,*
Weighing words in Kerneter!
Hail, thou over the gods!
Hail, thou greater than the gods,
Rising in the heaven, ruling in the gate!
Hail, thou who hast cut in pieces the Scorner and strangled the Apep!"

"This fearful monster, called also the Giant, the Enemy and the Devourer, was believed to inhabit the depths of that mysterious ocean upon which the Baris, or boat of the sun, was navigated by the gods through the hours of day and night in the celestial regions."† He is at times identified with Set-Typhon, the murderer of Uasar, opposes Khepra-Ra, "the benevolent creator," is the impersonation of spiritual evil, and sends animals and monsters to attack the Uasarian when in the Under-world. Amongst these are eight crocodiles, the viper Ru, various serpents and divers "Apophic monsters," who in vain attempt to stay the progress of the triumphant Uasarian, who repels them with his spear.

"The Uasarian says, in adoring the Sun,
The Har of the Two Horizons,
Glory to thee, O Sun! Glory to thee, O Tum!
In thy course perfected, crowned, prevailing!
Thou hast perambulated the earth.
Lord of Heaven, Ruler of Kerneter,
Lord of Terror, greatest of the terrible.
For the Uasarian justified in peace is the Sun himself."

In cap. xvii. of the *Ritual*, which treats of "the Egyptian Faith," we read:

* The Dian-nisi, or "Judge-of-men," the Sun-god being the particular divinity appointed by divine selection to judge.

† Cooper, Serpent Myths of Ancient Egypt, 23.

"I am the Soul in his two halves.
*Let him explain it.* One and the other are united.
The Soul in his two halves is the Soul of the Sun and the Sou of Uasar.*
O Sun who hates sins,
Without an equal among the gods:
Save thou the Uasarian.
Hail, O Uasar, Lord of Light,
Dwelling in total darkness!†
My hands are pure behind thee.
I shine as the [solar] Egg in the Hidden Region.
I never die in the West,
I flourish as a Spirit there for ever.
I equip myself with thy spells, O Sun!
I am the Sun protecting himself.
No evil thing injures me.
I stand in the course of the boat of the Sun:
I live again after I die, like the Sun daily.
The Sun is at peace, he goeth forth in peace:
I am Time, or Renewal, coming of himself.
I live after I die.
I am the Sun preparing the obedient.
The face of the Uasarian is in shape of that of Ra."

And his various limbs are in the shape of those of different divinities, the phallus or principle of renewal being like that of Uasar himself.

"He is in the Eye and the Egg;"

namely, mystically united with the solar eye and egg.

"He is belonging to the Eye:
He is the Day for race after race of men.
The Eye of Har takes me:
My face is that of the Sun.
I know, I am the Sun who made himself.
I do not perish, nor am I taken away.
I am thy son, very glorious, seeing thy mysteries.

* As the Sun-power is divided into two halves, Ra and Uasar, so the perfected Soul equally represents these.

† i.e. in the gloom of the Under-world. Cf. Apuleius, De Asino Aureo, xi.: "At midnight I saw [in the initiation] the sun shining with its brilliant light."

I am crowned as a King, I do not die again in Kerneter.
I pass from the heaven.
I have passed through the earth.
I am the Sun coming forth from the horizon against my enemies.
I have stood as Har, I have sat in the heaven.
I am strong as Tet, I am powerful as Tum.
I am a Bull sharpening the horns.
O Tum! give me the delicious breath of thy nostril."

Tum, "the Solar demiourgos or creator,"* imparts the "breath of life" as his "especial gift."

"I am the Perambulator of the heaven,
I am the Lions. I am the Sun.
I have been made a Lord of the age who has no limit,
For I am an eternal substance.
I am Tum, made for ever.
To the Uasarian are given the winds of the blest,†
To eat and drink the food of those belonging to the Sun.‡
I am the Hawk of the Southern heaven,
The Ibis of the Northern heaven."

As the Uasarian is equal to and even mystically united with Tet§ and Ra, so he becomes identical with their symbolical birds. Nothing can stop the course of changing changelessness of the Kosmos. The "Lords of truth without fault, who are for ever," will continue "cycling for eternity."

"Oh Soul, greatest of created beings,
Let me come, having passed the Gate, to see my father Uasar.
I have made my way through the darkness to my father Uasar.
I am his beloved son.
I have come from the dead an instructed Spirit.
I make myself entirely as a good hawk of gold,
Whose head is in the shape of a Phœnix.

* Egypt's Place, v. 136.

† In "the happy West," where

"Ocean ever, to refresh mankind,
Breathes the shrill spirit of the western wind."—Moore's Pindar.

‡ So the saved Assyrian soul is fed by the gods themselves with "angels' food."

§ "I am Tet" (Funereal Ritual, cxxiii.).

O Sun! Soul! greatest of things created,
Let me pass the empyreal Gate.
I am the Sun who proceeds from Nu."

Nu is "the Primordial Water,"* i.e. the principle of moisture so conspicuous in kosmogonies.

"My Soul is the God.
I am the creator of perception.
I am Perception, who never perishes under the name of the Soul.†
I am the orb; what I hate is repose.
I am the oldest of the Dæmons,
The Souls of the gods, the Souls of eternity.
I am the creator of darkness.
The soul of my body is an Arau:
I am created for ever, Lord of years, Eternal Ruler.
He [the Uasarian] has been judged before the Sun;
He has been judged before the gods of the [solar] Circle.
I have gone through the disk,
I have come out through Tum.
I have touched truth when I wished it.
I am the Spirit more prepared than all Spirits."

Having passed successfully the great ordeal before Uasar himself and the forty-two Assessors in "the Hall of the Two Truths," the justified Uasarian continues his successful progress towards the solar "gods of the Orbit," i.e. the Sun-path.

"The Uasarian has been crowned as the living Soul of the Sun in the heaven;
He has made all the appointed transformations.
He has passed through the Gate on heaven and earth like the Soul of the Sun.
The Deceased says: I have opened the Gate of heaven and earth.

* Egypt's Place, v. 161.

† Exceedingly fine. That the Soul is the "greatest of things created," is a sentiment for all time.

"Tho' world on world in myriad myriads roll
Round us, each with different powers,
And other forms of life than ours,
What know we greater than the soul?"
Tennyson, Ode on the Death of the Duke of Wellington.

The Soul of Uasar rests there.
I go along; no evil or defect is found in me.
The Uasarian serves the Sun.
Glory to the Sun, Lord of the Horizon!
Uasar, Lord of the West!"

Cap. cxxxi. of the *Ritual* treats of "the Uasarian, the servant of the Sun," proceeding in the heaven as "a divine hawk of time," and "towed in peace to the happy West;" whilst the solar orbit, "the road of fire," is compared to a flaming "serpent of millions of years," i.e. the endless solar revolutions.

"Hail, O thou Sun in his ark!
The Creator in the midst of his boat.
The Uasarian is the Sun as he is conducted along;
Uasar, eternal Ruler, illuminating the night after the day;
Uasar, the Sun, Lord of the Horizons."

The reconciliation and union of the Soul with Divinity,—what grander subject can man treat of, what nobler hope can he enjoy? But he who aims at this is necessarily conscious of variance and separation. Whence does this arise? Why hides the Adamite in the garden from Yahveh-Elôhîm, why trembles the servant in the presence of his "austere" (i.e. burning) Lord? And Kam answers, Because the Sun-god "hates sins," and each who cherishes the hope of this divine consummation must purify himself even as He is pure. The scene in the judgment-hall of Uasar is comparatively familiar; the Soul has at length reached the presence of his Master. Uasi and Har introduce and support him; he comes before the scales of justice; in the one is placed his heart, in the other the goddess of Truth. Anupu, guardian of the dead, superintends the weighing, whilst Tet records the result in his book of life. Hard by is a dread pylon, monster-guarded, leading to the region of woe and punishment. Weighed and not found wanting, the deceased is clothed in the white robe of justification,* and, conducted by Har, is led to Uasar. The

* "A long white linen robe" (Serpent Myths of Ancient Egypt, 51).

Genii of the body, standing before the King, plead for the deceased, and the deceased himself, protesting his purity, concludes an impassioned appeal:

"I have done what the gods wrote upon earth;
I have no sins.
Place me before thyself, O Lord of Eternity;
Let me pass through the roads of darkness and dwell with thee for ever."

And the Good Being replies:

"Go forth; thy food, thy drink, is from the eye of God.
Go forth, O Uasarian, justified for ever."

The great work is thus accomplished; the Uasarian has beheld the face of his Lord in splendour, has conquered the wicked and kept the faith. Yet, dowered with immortal life, unclouded perception, solar brilliancy, unchecked power of transit, there can be no idle future for him. As his Divine Father has worked hitherto and now works, so shall he still follow in the steps of the Sun-god, not to toil and agonize, but to achieve and overcome.

"Thou art purified of all sin, of all crime.
Stone of Truth is thy name.
Thy soul is received in the barque with Uasar;
Thy soul is divinized in the hall of Seb.
Thou art justified for ever and ever.
Thine individuality is permanent.
Thy face is illuminated near the Sun:
Thy soul liveth near to Amen.
Thy body is rejuvenated near to Uasar.
Thou dost breathe for ever and ever.
Thy flesh is on thy bones, like unto thy form on earth.
Thou livest for ever and ever.
Amen is with thee each day to render thee life.
Thou seest with thine eyes:
The soul of Ra giveth life to thy soul.
Thou dost follow Ra, thou dost follow Uasar;
Thy soul liveth in heaven for ever and ever."*

Enter thou into the joy of thy Lord.

* P. T. de Horrack, The Book of Respirations.

## II. The Kosmic Sun-god.

The grand spectacle of Kosmic harmony, the systematic working of a potency altogether ultra-human in the material and external universe, the subtlety and variety of the myriad manifestations of life, coupled with the absence of a Divine appearance and the belief in Divine power, working on an inherent infirmity of the human mind as at present constituted, have invariably tended to produce a pantheistic belief. Now it is very important to notice that this is always a later form of faith; for just as our definite and sharply-cut consciousness of individuality precedes any ideas we may entertain of forming part of, or being in any way mixed up with, the boundless and countless systems of space, so a belief in a definite and personal God-power is ever anterior to philosophical theorizings on the universal force of things. The world lived long ere it produced Spinoza; but in this as in many other matters, *Qui prior est tempore, potior est jure.* It would, however, be giving an account of Kamic faith altogether incomplete, were I to omit its pantheistic element; and as the preceding extracts have exhibited the Sun-god, whether Ra or Uasar, as an individual personage, I will now quote several which shew the solar potency pantheistically extended as Erikepaios.* I need not refer at length to the familiar episode of the murder of Uasar by Typhon, which is related with crude Euemerism by Diodoros, and with considerable philosophical insight by Ploutarchos; but may remind the reader, in the words of Mr. Cooper, that Uasar "was considered to have reigned in Egypt, and to have been dethroned and slain by Typhon, who cut him to pieces, scattering portions of his body throughout the country."† His son, Har Teti, "the Conqueror," avenges him, and his sisters Uasi and Nebthi collected his scattered remains, raising temple-tombs over them. The connection of the slain and mutilated Uasar with kosmic life is well shewn in the

* i. e. "Spring-time-garden-growth," an Orphik phase of Dionysos, the life-potency.

† Archaic Dict. in voc. Osiris.

incident mentioned by Ploutarchos, that when the coffin containing his remains was washed ashore near Byblos, the foliage grew up rapidly all around, so as entirely to conceal it.*

The following quotation is from a papyrus of the time of the Hellenik rule in Kam, and which was "found in the ruins of Thebes, in the interior of a statue representing Osiris." M. de Hossack, who has translated it into both French and English, remarks that it refers "to the resurrection and renewed birth of Osiris (the type of man after his death), who, in this quality, is identified with the Sun, the diurnal renewal of which constantly recalled the idea of a birth eternally renewed."† The two divine sisters invoke Uasar and beseech him to appear, as his enemies are vanquished, and Nebthi is with him and "protects his members eternally," an allusion to his dismemberment by the wicked Set-Typhon. At length he appears to them under the form of the grand visibilities of creation, Sun and Moon, and Uasi exclaims:

"Hail, O god An!‡
Thou in the firmament shinest upon us each day.
Thou hast taken possession of the heavens;
Thou dost illuminate us like Ra each day;
Thou shinest upon us like Atumu.
Gods and men live because they behold thee.
Thou givest light to the Two Worlds;§
Thou dost navigate in the heights.
Hail to the divine Lord!

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* Peri Isidos, xv. † Records of the Past, ii. 118.

‡ As Amen-Ra is "the Bull in An" or Heliopolis, so Uasar in his solar phase is the god An, lord of the solar city, the Semitic title of which was Beth-shemeah (cf. Jer. xliii. 13), i.e. "the-house-of-Samas," the Sun-god, whose priest was Pati-para (Potipherah, Gen. xli. 45), "the-Devoted-to-Ra." There are some curious resemblances between various important archaic names of divinity. An reminds us of the Akkadian An, Ana, or Anna; Assyrian Anu; Gk. Anos, "The High god." Uasar, too, recalls the Assyrian Asur, whose prototypes appear to have been the kosmic Diad, or divine couple, Ki-sar and A-sar, called Kissare and Assôros by Damaskios, and representing the expanse lower and upper, or together all space, just as Uasar (Osiris) is the kosmico-solar demiurge.

§ i. e. to both Upper and Under-world, as the diurnal and nocturnal sun.

There is no god like unto thee.
Heaven hath thy soul;
Earth hath thy remains;
The lower heaven is in possession of thy mysteries."

Here we see the kosmogonic Uasar-Dionysos assimilated with Ra; not, however, as an individual personage, but because the sun is the customary protagonist of the material universe.

So Uasi continues her invocation:

"I have come to contemplate thee.
Thy beauties are in the midst of the sacred Eye.
Thou who comest to us as a child each month,
We do not cease to contemplate thee.
Thine emanation heightens the brilliancy
Of the stars of the firmament.
The glorious emanation which proceedeth from thee
Giveth life to gods and men, reptiles and quadrupeds.
Thou comest to us from thy retreat at thy time,
To spread the water of thy soul,
To distribute the bread of thy being,
That the gods may live and men also."

Thus the living Soul of the World, enshrined in materiality, is the general support; as "all kinds of profitable grain and corn were produced from" the body of the primeval and kosmic Iranic bull.* The above-quoted invocation of Uasar was acted as a kind of Mystery Play, one of the stage directions being, "Two women [representatives of Uasi and Nebthi], beautiful in their members, having been introduced, are made to sit down on the ground at the principal door of the Great Hall."

Closely allied with the last extract is *The Book of Respirations*, also translated by M. de Hossack, and which "probably dates from the epoch of the Ptolemies."

"Commencement of the Book of Respirations
Made by Uasi for her brother Uasar,
To give life to his soul,
To give life to his body,
To rejuvenate all his members anew;

* Bleeck, Avesta, ii. 30.

That he may reach the horizon with his father, the Sun;
That his soul may rise to heaven in the disk of the Moon;*

* We seem here to have an instance of the well-known doctrine of the Ascent of Souls. According to the theory set forth in the tractate of Ploutarchos, *Concerning the Face in the Moon's Orb*, man is composed of body, *psyche* (soul), and *nous*. After the first death, or separation between soul and body, the former, which contains the *nous*, is purified by an aerial penance, and at length, in the case of good souls, enters the Moon. After a lengthy sojourn, there occurs the separation between the *nous* (mind) and the soul, the former flying upwards to be re-united with the Sun, as the Uasarian is mystically made one with Uasar, whilst the soul becomes absorbed in the Moon. But evil souls may not enter the tranquil lunar region, being driven away by the dread face in the orb. This myth of the face was archaic, for Epigenes of Sikyon, "the most ancient writer of tragedy" (Souidas, in voc. Thespis), in a lost work, called *The Poetry of Orpheus*, says that the Theologer called "the moon Gorgonian on account of the face in it" (Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata, v. 8); and Serapion, an Alexandrine physician of the third century B. C., thought that "the face seen in the moon isthe soul of the Sibylla" (ibid. i. 15. Sibylla, i. e. "counsel of Zeus," is a general name given to various shadowy and prophetic females of classical antiquity, to whom the composition of divers late and anonymous verses was attributed). Okellos, the Lucanian, who lived earlier than Platon, in his tractate *On the Nature of the Whole*, observes: "The moon is the isthmus which connects the immortal life with generated existence," for the psychical existence, as above noticed, is unable to pass this last and lowest of the heavenly circlers into the purer noetic region beyond and above. The moon, according to Platon (Laws, x.), has a soul like the sun ("This soul of the sun, which is better than the sun, ought by every man to be deemed a god"—ibid.), and he treats of the Ascent of Souls in his vision of Er the Pamphylian (Republic, x.), which "is converted by Cicero into the 'Somnium Scipionis'" (Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, iii. 185). Clemens, commenting on Platon's account of Er, remarks: "Perhaps Platon alludes to the fact that the path for souls to ascension lies through the twelve signs of the Zodiac" (Stromata, v. 14; vide also Macrobius, In Somnium Scipionis). I do not doubt that the ancient Hymn-writer, alluded to by Epigenes, called the moon Gorgonian, for I think the moon herself was the original Gorgo, from which name various words signifying terrible in appearance are derived. The word is akin to *orge*, which is connected with "a notion of swelling with emotion or desire" (Liddell and Scott, in voc. *Orge*), and seems to apply to the waxing moon, the Akkadian Enzuna, or "Lord-of-growth." As there is but one Moon, so originally there was only a single Gorgo; but imagination, once aroused, rapidly multiplies monsters. All the myths which recount the antagonism between the Gorgo and bright day-powers, such as Athene and Perseus (cf. Mythology of the Aryan Nations, ii. 350 et seq.), will apply equally to the Moon as to the Darkness, and indeed far more suitably; for this *view* reveals the reason of the dread beauty of Medousa, whose surrounding serpents are the lunar rays of light (as to the Aryan Serpent of Light, vide ibid. i. 428). The Moon, like the Sun, is both kindly and terrible, Hecate as well as Selene, and in her dread Gorgonian phase is indissolubly linked with the terrors of the night, the horror of darkness, evil dreams, "wicked apparitions" (Akkadian Hymn), lunacy and witchcraft.

That his body may shine in the stars in the bosom of Nut."*

Here Uasar is the mysterious life-spirit which animates the universe, specially connected with sun and moon, but also appearing all around, and particularly in the starry splendour of space. It will be observed that the work is of late date. As the progress of Uasar is applied to and followed by every Uasarian, the writer continues:

"Hail to the Uasar *So-and-so!*"

namely, the particular deceased individual whose obsequies are being celebrated.

"Thou art purified of all sin, of all crime;
Stone of Truth† is thy name.
Thy soul is received in the barque with Uasar;
Thy soul is divinized in the Hall of Seb.‡
Thou art justified for ever and ever;
Thine individuality is permanent.§
Thy face is illuminated near the Sun.
Thy soul liveth near to Amen.
Thy flesh is on thy bones like unto thy form on earth.
Thou receivest bread, with the souls of the gods.
Thy heart is the heart of Ra.
Thy members are the members of the great God.
Thou livest for ever and ever.
Thy soul liveth in heaven for ever.
Thou dost follow Ra,
Thou dost follow Uasar.
Thy soul liveth for ever and ever."

Here it is most interesting to notice how the two antagonistic principles of individual existence and kosmic life meet

"Her own form becomes more and more fearful. Like Kerberos, she assumes three heads or faces" (Mythology of the Aryan Nations, ii. 142), three Gorgon sisters, one of which is drakontic.

* The Upper Hemisphere of heaven personified. Cf. Daniel xii. 3.

† Cf. Gen. xlix. 24.

‡ i. e. the vault of heaven formed by his consort, Nut, who corresponds with the Akkadian Ziku, Gk. Sige, the primitive substance of the universe, celestial ocean, "mare magnum sine fine."

§ A grand truth; the death-blow to all "remerging in the general soul."

and clash. But although the writer, whether wittingly or not, contradicts himself in pantheistically uniting the Uasarian to "the great god," or Uasar, yet the former and better view on the whole triumphs grandly: the justification of the soul, its likeness and approximation to the Sun-god, the resurrection of the body, the permanence of form and of individuality, are all asserted with unfaltering belief.

In the *Neapolitan Stele*, "an inscription of the Persian period," translated by Mr. C. W. Goodwin, we have the kosmic Sun-god thus invoked:

"Ruler of the districts, who risest to enlighten the earth,
Whose right eye is the Solar Disk,
Whose left eye is the Moon,
Whose spirit is the Dawn,
From whose nostrils issues the North Wind."

This is the full-fledged, later great kosmic god of pantheism, who also appears in that "highly pantheistic hymn," the Inscription of Daryavush I. at El-Khargeh, already quoted. The adorers who pray to their father "are the four elements divided into the male and female principle," and represented as "snake-headed and frog-headed, holding their hands up in adoration."* The solar god in his kosmic character is thus addressed by them:

"Thy soul is the ark and four pillars of the two heavens.
Thou art youth and age.
Thou givest life to the earth by thy streams.
Thou art heaven, thou art earth,
Thou art fire, thou art water, thou art air."

In a *Hymn to Uasar*, which probably belongs to the reign of Thothmes I., perhaps about B.C. 1550, or 1000 years earlier than the last quotations, it is interesting to observe the progress towards pantheism, and to see how easily the idea of universal potency glides into belief in a pantheistic divinity.

"Hail! Uasar, king of the gods,
Of many names, of holy transformations,

* Records of the Past, viii. 135.

Mysterious soul, Soul of the Sun,
For him the ground brings forth in abundance;
In obedience to him is the upper heaven and its stars.
The morning constellations are his dwellings,
As also the reposing constellations.*
He has made this world with his hand.
He shines at the horizon;
His diadem accompanies the stars.
He judges the world as he likes.
The circuit of the solar disk is under his management,
The winds, the waters, and all vegetables.
A god of seeds, he gives all herbs and the abundance of the ground.†
He affords plentifulness and gives it to all the earth.
Every one is in adoration, every one glorifies his goodness.
Mild is his love for us; his tenderness environs our hearts.
Both worlds are at rest:
Evil flies, and earth becomes fecundant peaceably under its lord.
Mild is thy heart, O Ounnefer,‡ son of Uasi."

It is manifest at a glance how vastly superior is this Hymn to that of El-Khargeh. The great Divinity has made and judges the world; he is not the animated kosmos; the starry heaven obeys him; even the mysterious solar disk is "under his management;" whilst his divine goodness and tender regard for his creatures are beautifully set forth. But yet he dwells in the stars and shines at the horizon, and his transformations can scarcely be distinguished from those of the all-surrounding matter; and thus a descent to a mere god-world, a mighty indwelling potency, Power without Intelligence, is easy, and has, indeed, already begun.

Lastly, in the *Funereal Ritual*, the kosmical aspect of the Sun-god, though comparatively subdued, is yet quite apparent. In an enumeration of the names and titles of Uasar, we read:

"Uasar, the good being, the living,
Dwelling in existence, dwelling in grain,
In the south, in the north, the great soul,

* The fixed stars. † Cf. Dionysos Karpios and Erikepaios.
‡ "The good being."

In heaven, on earth, in the secret place,
In the ark, eternal ruler, in all lands,
The bull, the sun, who dwells in the west,
Uasar in all his creation, in all his disguises,
In all his crowns, in all places."*

And such is the kosmic Sun-god of Kam.

## III. Basis and Result of Kamic Solar Religious Thought.

In summarizing Kamic ideas respecting the Sun-power, we observe a distinct dual line of thought, in the main harmonious. Firstly, the mighty star is regarded physically as the solar photosphere; and, secondly, as the abode or manifestation of a divine personage, king, ruler and judge. The physical power by degrees is pantheistically extended into an indwelling soul of the world, and the divine personage is brought into immediate relations both with the human race collectively, and also with each individual member of it. All these ideas are archaic, but some certainly precede others. Thus the pantheistic divinity is a comparatively late ideal; this is equally apparent both from the texts cited, and still more so from the necessities of the case, for more complex concepts invariably succeed the simpler. If, according to a dictum of Professor Max Müller, "It was by a slow process that the human mind elaborated the idea of one supreme Godhead,"† still more tardy must have been the process which, grasping the unity of the Kosmos, endowed it as a single animal‡ with supreme inherent potency, to the degradation of all higher power. For this theory of being necessitates the consideration and negation of the former belief; it is eminently unanthropomorphic, and therefore almost the last at which man's natural cogitations would arrive. Again, the idea of the unity of the

* Funereal Ritual, cxlii.

† As a clear and sharply-defined dogma, I presume; for a general belief in a divine Father of unlimited authority is as old as the hills.

‡ Cf. the Platonic language: "The Creator intended that the animal should be as far as possible a perfect whole" (*Timaios*).

sun arises primarily and naturally; it is subsequent arbitrary thought which divides the luminary into the diurnal and the nocturnal,—Ra the mid-day sun, Kheper the prolific sun, Haremakhu the horizon sun, Tum the setting sun, Mentu the rising sun, Fenti the climbing sun, Atumu the chthonian sun, Harpakrut the new-born wintry sun, Aten the power of the solar disk, Uasar the suffering sun, and the like. We find, then, as a most archaic residuum, the purely physical and the purely mental. It cannot be shewn from ancient Kam that man's ideas of divinity, justice, the soul, good and evil, were derived from his cogitations upon the material universe around him. Go back to the dawn period of this venerable civilization, and you will still find belief in the Invisible uncompromisingly held. The introduction of animal worship—that is, its formal and public sanction—is by a tradition of great authority ascribed to king Kakau of the second dynasty; but no period can be named when a ruling Mind was not revered, and abstract principles, such as justice, good and evil, fully accepted. It is a familiar characteristic of the untrained intelligence to be surprised at that which differs from its own ideas and customary method of procedure; and the inquiry, Why do you do this? or, Why do you not do that? generally means no more on analysis than, Why do you not do as I do, or should do under similar circumstances? All wonder, though by no means necessarily ignoble, is yet essentially childish; and such infantine capacities as I refer to may very probably be astonished at Kamic peculiarity, and marvel that the mental standpoint of the inhabitants of the Hapi Valley differed so widely from their own. But the trained and patient inquirer, though he may be both surprised and amused at the apparent vagaries of thought, will neither be puzzled by them nor repelled from a careful consideration of the problem, will penetrate its labyrinthine intricacies, and reveal a common belief as the necessary product of a common humanity. At first apparently inexpressibly intricate, the Sun-god in all his names and disguises now stands before us, identical with the kosmico-solar and psychical Dionysos of Assyrians and Hellenes; and the

result of the analysis of the sun-myth of the Hapi will be found to be not inharmonious with that of the Perath Valley. The treatment, the local colouring, of this picture are Kamic; the burning luminary and cloudless sky, pylon and portico, ibis and hawk, ape and serpent, cat and crocodile, manners, customs and modes of thought. These external circumstances and influences, here as everywhere, produce those strongly developed peculiarities which constitute special national religions. But although the visible world must influence the form of the expression of man's mind, yet the intrinsic character of the latter remains unchanged. As the same sun shines on many lands, so the same spirit gazes on many surroundings. In Kam, as elsewhere, the Sun appears as both physical and spiritual; but by ancient Neilos the things of the Soul, the splendour of its possible destiny, and the occult mysteries of existence, display themselves in overpowering proportion, whilst the physical aspect is justly treated as comparatively secondary and unimportant.

Amongst many errors which connect themselves with an inquiry like the present, there are two to be especially avoided. The first is the opinion that the entire inhabitants of this planet prior to the Christian era, with the exception of a very small body of Israelites, and perhaps some half-dozen Hellenik philosophers, were miserable Pagans, sunk in the grossest idolatry, who knew nothing or scarcely anything of truth, and who can consequently teach us nothing. Thus in works written to assist the Biblical student, I have seen the religious belief of the ancient world described, in the words of Job, as "a land of darkness, as darkness itself, of the shadow of death, without any order, and where the light is as darkness," when in truth such a description only applies to the writer's ideas on the subject. The second error, one held by a very different body of individuals, asserts that man's religion has invariably arisen from his contemplation of the visible, that so-called Paganism, though interesting as a study, is yet essentially childish and trivial, and that Christianity is one of its later phases. And Kam, with her gigantic span of history and her grand grasp on divine realities, shall answer these vain theo-

rists; and by her inestimable jewels of belief, "that on the stretch'd forefinger of all Time sparkle for ever," shall shew the former class that in her hoary age she has forgotten more than perchance they ever really knew; and shall prove to the latter that far back as the historic telescope can reach, mind and things spiritual are first and reign for ever. It was when archaic faith was banished, and truth concealed beneath cobwebs, that the divine Father, who in sundry ways and divers manners spake in times past unto the sires of the human race, at length, in the continuance of the same expanding scheme of revelation, spake alike unto Kam and unto ourselves by His Son. And He, the one God and Father of all, who once called His Son out of Egypt,* has called sons thence in every age, though Abraham might be ignorant of them, and Israel acknowledge them not. When we read those grand, unwavering declarations of the surpassing nature and certain immortality of the soul, the permanence of individuality, the consummation of bliss in the presence of the glorified Sun-god, the everlasting triumph of good over evil, of Kosmos over Chaos, disfigured and degraded though the faith undoubtedly became, we cannot but deem that princes—of belief as well as of building, of concept as well as of conquest—have come out of Egypt, and that Ethiopia has stretched out her hands unto God.

ROBERT BROWN, JUN.

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## III.—SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY.

IT may be assumed that Social Democracy in Germany is of sufficient interest to English people generally to make an acquaintance with its principles desirable. Of the 5,401,021 votes recorded at the Imperial Elections in the year 1877, more than 493,288 were given by Social Democrats for their candidates. These candidates were 43 in number, of whom 12 were returned. At the elections last year, though conducted under panic, 9 Social Democrats were successful, in

* Cf. Hosea xi. 1 with S. Matthew ii. 15.

spite of the combined efforts of all other parties, aided by the vast influence of the Government; and although the party confined its exertions to a much smaller number of seats than in 1877, no fewer than 450,000 votes were given by its members. Taking into account infractions of the secrecy of the ballot, and such influence as the Government can bring to bear upon their opponents, this number of votes will represent at least two millions of German people—men, women and youths —who must be considered earnest Social Democrats. Nor is it for its numbers merely that the party commands attention. Its ideas are much more than the baseless dreams of enthusiasts, or the shallow philosophy of untaught demagogues. They are ideas that have been thought out by logical and acute minds, and the treasures of ancient and modern social philosophy and history have been laid under full contribution in their support. Social philosophers and political economists of an entirely different school have at last perceived that the social principles of Social Democracy must be seriously reckoned with. Nor are the men who represent these principles—Rodbertus, Ferdinand Lassalle, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels—economists of a calibre whom social writers can afford to despise. Their modesty might be impaired, but the fact could not, were they all to declare, with Lassalle, that they wrote every line armed with the entire culture of their century. Recent events in Germany itself have brought into what foreigners think too clear light, the estimate Germans have formed of the importance of the movement. The Anti-Socialist Bill of 1878 will remain a very distinct historical index of the height to which the national fear of it once rose. And although the International Association of Labourers is no longer a force as an association, the social and economical ideas of its most philosophical and learned leaders, who are Germans and the leaders of the Social Democrats, still remain the social philosophy and political economy of millions of the working people of Europe, and will sooner or later have to be seriously dealt with, particularly if the political and industrial heavens long continue as dark as they now are. Times of distress are also times of silent, if not violent, revolution.

This paper will pass unnoticed the history of Social Democracy in Germany, and confine itself to an account of its principles, following as a guide the programme adopted by the whole party at Gotha in May, 1874. This programme is the joint product of the two sections into which the party had up to that time been divided—the followers of Lassalle and the more advanced section who may be called the disciples of Marx. It is important also to observe that the Social Democrats are not the only Socialists in Germany. There are two or three sections of Christian Socialists, with organizations and a literature of their own, and their principles and labours also deserve careful study. We now confine ourselves to radical Socialism.

### The Gotha Programme.

"I. Labour is the source of all wealth and all culture, and inasmuch as to constitute it a general benefit it requires the co-operation of society, it follows that its entire product, under a system of compulsory labour, belongs to society, that is, to the whole of its members by equal right, to every one according to his reasonable necessities.

"In society as now constituted, the instruments of labour are monopolized by the capitalist class; the dependence of the labouring class thereby produced is the cause of misery and thraldom in every shape.

"The emancipation of labour requires the conversion of the instruments of labour into the common property of society and the associated management of collective labour, together with the employment of its product for the public weal, and the division of that product according to principles of justice.

"The emancipation of labour must be the work of the labouring class itself, in relation to which all other classes are only a reactionary mass.

"II. Starting from these principles, the Socialistic Labour Party of Germany endeavours by all lawful means to bring about the free state and socialistic society, deliverance from the iron law of wages by the abolition of the system of hired labour, the cessation of unjust advantages (*ausbeutung*) in every form, the removal of all social and political inequality.

"The Socialist Labour Party of Germany, although primarily confining its efforts to its own country, is alive to the international character of the Labourers' movement, and determined to fulfil all

the duties that its international character imposes upon this class in order to make the brotherhood of all men a reality.

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"The Socialist Labour Party of Germany demands, with a view to prepare the way for the solution of the social question, the formation of Productive Co-operative Associations with State aid under the democratic control of the labouring people. The Productive Co-operative Associations must be started for industrial and agricultural operations on such a scale, that the Socialistic organization of labour in general may arise from them.

"The Socialist Labour Party of Germany demands as bases of the State:

"(1.) Universal, equal, direct suffrage for all members of the nation, who have reached their twentieth year, at all municipal and parliamentary elections, voting being compulsory and secret, and to take place on a Sunday or a holiday.

"(2.) Direct legislation by the people. The declaration of war to rest with the people.

"(3.) Universal military training. National defence instead of standing armies.

"(4.) The abolition of all exceptional legislation, particularly laws limiting the freedom of the press, association, and public meetings; in general, the abolition of all laws which limit the free expression of opinion, free thought and enquiry.

"(5.) Judicial decisions to lie with the people. Justice to be administered gratis.

"(6.) Universal and equal education by the State. Universal compulsory school attendance. Free education in schools of every grade. Religion to be declared a private matter.

"The Socialist Labour Party of Germany demands under the existing order of society:

"(1.) The greatest possible extension of political rights and privileges in the sense of the above demands.

"(2.) In the place of all existing taxes, especially of indirect taxes, which press so heavily upon the people, a single progressive income-tax for the State and the municipality.

"(3.) Unlimited freedom of association.

"(4.) A legal labour-day answering to the necessities of society. Prohibition of Sunday labour.

"(5.) Prohibition of children's labour, and of women's labour as far as it is injurious to health and morality.

"(6.) Protective laws for the life and health of the labourer;

sanitary control of labourers' dwellings; inspection of mines, factories, workshops, and home industries, by officers chosen by the work-people. An effective law of compensation for injuries.

"(7.) Regulation of prison labour.

"(8.) Complete self-management for all labourers' provident societies."

Before proceeding to the examination of this manifesto, it may be best to give a brief account of three of the primary terms of the political economy of the party. These terms are value, capital, and the wage-law.

Value as belonging to commodities, wares, &c., Marx and his followers say, is labour, and nothing else than the labour they have cost constitutes their value. The measure of labour is time, and time is the measure of value. The value of a commodity is, therefore, the amount of human labour it has cost to produce it. And as human labour varies in productiveness with different persons and different advantages, the measure of value must not be any man's labour, but the labour demanded to produce the commodity by the average workman with generally available helps. The present value of linen is determined by the amount of time now needful for its production with the aid of machines of average power. Before the invention of power-looms, its value was fixed by the average amount of time consumed in its production by the hand-loom. The sum, expressed in time, of the labour required in any condition of society for the production of an article, constitutes its value. Marx and Lassalle borrowed this theory of value from Adam Smith and Ricardo, though it seems that Smith did not hold it consistently.* The deduction of it and its Socialistic application are the original part of Marx's treatment of the theory. The French Socialist Proudhon had, however, before Marx, deduced the more obvious Socialistic inferences that it readily supplies.†

* Marx's laboured and somewhat obscure statement and proof of his theory is given in his large work, *Das Capital, Kritik der politischen Oekonomie*, von Karl Marx (2nd ed.), Hamburg, 1873, Vol. I. pp. 9—47.

† Rossbach, *Geschichte der Gesellschaft*, vii. p. 114 sq. (1875); Schäffle, *Kapitalismus und Socialismus*, p. 375 sq. (1870).

The definition of capital accepted by Marx and Lassalle is less orthodox than their definition of value. Ordinary political economy defines capital as wealth appropriated to reproductive purposes, or as wealth that is necessarily consumed in creating more wealth. This definition Marx and Lassalle reject. The latter maintains* that the whole school of liberal political economists have failed to state the real nature of capital. Lassalle produces† the following case as a test of the received doctrine. There is an Indian in the primeval forests of America, with his bow in his hand as his means of livelihood. Is he a capitalist? Is his bow capital? It must be, if the common idea of capital is correct. It is wealth applied to the production of wealth. Yet the reader is unwilling to pronounce the Indian a capitalist. But suppose he overcomes his first objection to do so, and decides that the Indian's bow is capital and himself a capitalist. He must then be shewn his error. Let him suppose himself for a moment in those primeval forests, with his bow at his side. Let him suppose, further, that he gets tired of chasing the fleet prey, and throws down his capital—his bow. Would he find any way of so depositing his capital as to make it bring him in an income? Surely not. And it is precisely this power of yielding income that constitutes capital. It may be supposed, further, that the bow is given to an Indian in exchange for some of his prey, or a skin, or a nugget of gold. But none of these things can be deposited in the backwoods so as to yield an income. That they may be made productive, interest-bearing, they must be taken to countries where European conditions are found. But, again, those conditions were found as little in ancient times, when the labourer himself employed his own wealth for further production. They arose when the division of labour was introduced; when production for the world's markets commenced; when labour was employed by those who did not themselves own it, but simply found the money to pay for it. Capital, therefore, is the money that is employed in the production of

* *Herr Bastiat-Schulze von Delitzsch*, p. 54. † *Ibid.* p. 130 sq.

wares for the world's markets, under a system of free competition and hired labour. Under such conditions, money becomes capital, bears interest, multiplies while its owner sleeps. But such conditions are comparatively modern. It was only after the French Revolution that they were fully realized.* This is, in brief, Lassalle's account of the nature of capital. Marx† says tersely, quoting an old English economist, "It is money that begets money;" Schramm,‡ "Only those commodities are capital the possession of which procures income without labour." If their account of capital is accepted, of course Marx and Lassalle are right when they pronounce it a "historical category" which arose under certain conditions of society and may disappear when they are changed.

We now come to the wages-law, which holds such a prominent place in all Socialistic writings. It generally goes by the name under which Lassalle first proclaimed it to the working men of his country, "the iron wages-law." It forms one of the great agitator's most effective battle-cries. The statement and illustration of it were the most irresistible portion of his appeal to the working classes. When he first stated it to the working men of Leipzig, he said: §

"This iron and cruel law, gentlemen, you must above all things engrave deep, deep into your hearts, and in all your thinking you must make it your starting-point. I may take this opportunity to indicate to you and to the entire labouring class an infallible means by which you may once for all escape being deceived and led astray. To every one that speaks to you of the amelioration of the condition of the labouring class, you must at once put the question, whether he acknowledges this law or not? If he does not acknowledge it, you must at the very commencement say that this man either intends to deceive you or has the most miserable acquaintance with the science of political economy. For there is not even in the liberal school a single political economist of note who denies this law."

Lassalle states this fundamental law of his system thus:‖

"The average wages of labour remain always reduced to the

* *Herr Bastiat Schulze von Delitzsch*, p. 147. † *Das Capital*, p. 138.

‡ *Grundzüge der National-Oekonomie* (Leipzig, 1876), p. 47.

§ *Antwortschreiben*, p. 14. ‖ *Ibid.* p. 13.

means of subsistence that are required, according to the habits of a nation, for the support of existence and the propagation of the species. This is the point around which the actual day's wages always oscillate, without being ever able for long either to rise above or to fall below it. They cannot rise permanently above this average, for in that case there would result from the comfortable and improved condition of the labourers an increase of population, and therewith of the supply of hands, which would reduce wages again to and below their former level. Neither can wages fall permanently below the necessary means of existence, for in that case there would arise emigration, abstention from marriage and procreation, and finally a diminution of the number of labourers by their wretched condition, producing thus a falling off of the supply of hands, and as a consequence the rise of wages to their former level."

The political economists of Germany have found it easier to discover weak places in this law than to disprove its general validity.* In the teeth of the present wide-spread fall of wages in this land of trades' unions, Brentano's powerful argument against it, derived from the supposed ability of combinations of working men to keep up wages, seems only too likely to form a striking confirmation of its substantial truth. Certainly Mehring is greatly mistaken when he supposes that "the iron wage-law is in England an idle bugbear." But while holding to the general validity of the law, subsequent Socialist economists have corrected Lassalle's statement of it in important respects. Marx no longer looks for the source of surplus labour, with its immediate effects in lowering wages, to an absolute increase of population consequent upon high wages.

"The course of life that characterizes modern industry, which takes the form of a decennial cyclus, interrupted by smaller variations, of periods of moderate activity, production under high pressure, crisis and stagnation, is based upon the constant creation, greater or smaller absorption, and fresh creation of an industrial reserve army, of surplus population. In return, the vicissitudes of the industrial

* Franz Mehring, *Die deutsche Social Demokratie*, 2nd ed. (1878), p. 189; Lujo Brentano, *Die Arbeitergilden der Gegenwart* (1871), II. ch. iii.; F. A. Lange, *Die Arbeiterfrage*, 3rd ed. (1875), p. 189 sq. This latter is an admirable little book by the lamented author of the *Geschichte des Materialismus*, which deserves to be translated.

cyclus recruit surplus population, and become one of its most energetic agents of reproduction."*

Having given some account of three of the most important and frequently occurring terms of Social Democracy, we now come to our programme. It falls into two main sections. The first of these presents the fundamental principles of the economical theory adopted by the party, in the first place, and then goes on to state the reconstruction of society which is contemplated in accordance with that theory. This section deals with general principles, and states theoretical claims and distant hopes rather than immediate expectations and present work. It is the second section which deals with the latter. It describes the political, economical and industrial reforms which are to prepare the way for the Socialistic State, as well as the fundamental principles of that State itself.

The first clause of the programme introduces the Socialist theory of the real origin, the proper ownership, and the just distribution of wealth. The source of wealth is labour, its rightful owner is society, and the principle of righteous distribution is that of the labourers' reasonable necessities.

The proposition that labour is the sole source of wealth is the corner-stone of the Socialistic system. We have already given an account of Marx's theory of value, and may now pass at once to some of the economical and social consequences of it which appear in the allied theory of wealth. If labour is the sole source of wealth, only labourers are useful members of society. If labour is the sole source of wealth, it is an injustice that the labourers should not themselves enjoy the entire produce of their toil. Hence two great demands: society must suffer no drones, and the reward of labour must be its undiminished product. These demands imply a radical reconstruction of the existing economical system. As things now are, the toiling millions create the world's wealth, and the idle drones enjoy it. And when the possessors of the world's wealth are not altogether idle, their share of the produce of

* *Das Capital*, Vol. I. p. 657; comp. Most's adaptation of Marx's book, *Capital und Arbeit* (2nd ed.), p. 47.

labour is wholly out of proportion to their share of the toil expended in its production. In fact, they to whom by right the good things of life belong, say the Social Democrats, are the disinherited millions, while they who are in actual possession of them are the few whose claim is at best no higher than that of lucky adventurers. In the good time that will arrive with the Socialist State, those that convert the products of nature into objects of human desire, directly or indirectly, by the labour of either the hand or the brain, will divide in just proportions their own creation.

But here comes in another important principle. Wealth is not simply the creation of human toil. It is the creation of human toil in society. The individual standing alone is helpless in such a world as this. It is by the co-operation of his brothers that he produces anything valuable. The thing he produces belongs therefore, not to him, but to society. He may not call it his own, but only enjoy a common share in it. The Gotha programme proposes that the individual's share of the product of common labour shall be awarded "according to equal right and his reasonable necessities." This language is most likely intentionally obscure. The theory of distribution is one of those points which Socialists find it hard to settle. They propose various principles upon which it may be done, always "with justice." Some will have all to fare alike, neither ability nor indeed virtue being anything else than Nature's sovereign gift; others will have each man to reap according to the work he has done; but a third and a fourth party object to payment by results, and dispute between themselves whether the labour expended shall be paid for by the time or by the self-denial it has cost; and, finally, in our programme, we find yet another view, "to each according to his reasonable necessities." Moreover, when the principle of distribution according to necessities has been accepted, there arises the difficulty of deciding what necessities shall be considered reasonable.* Still it would be neither generous nor just to press

* Mehring, pp. 257, 273, 281; Schuster, *Die Social-Demokratie* (Stuttgart, 1876, 2nd ed.), p. 146 sq.

unduly the disagreement of Socialists on this point. The existing principle of distribution cannot be justified on either rational or moral or religious grounds, but has to be put up with as a hideous necessity, to the distress of all right-thinking people from Job's days downwards. On the other hand, something can be said in harmony with reason, morals and religion, for almost every one of the principles suggested by Socialists. Whether any of them could be adopted in such an imperfect world as this is at present, is another question.

The second paragraph of the programme asserts that capitalists have monopolized the instruments of labour, that the dependence of the working classes is the consequence of that monopoly, and that this dependence is the cause of misery and slavery in every form. Each of these statements needs some explanation. By the term instruments of labour, or, as we sometimes have it, instruments or means of production, Socialists understand whatever labour requires to enable it to be productive; for instance, land, water, roads, raw material, machinery, the necessaries of life. It will be seen that this is another name for what political economists generally denominate capital. But Socialists, as we saw above, give a much narrower definition of capital. By the monopoly of these means of production, two things appear to be understood. There is the general fact that already the instruments of production are practically, though not theoretically, placed beyond the reach of those whose only wealth is their hands. The few exceptional instances of poor men becoming capitalists, when the fortunate circumstances that helped them are taken into account, only tend to prove the rule.* And then there is the cumulative power of capital, its tendency to concentration in larger masses in fewer hands. The owners of land become fewer, and the few "lay field to field." The great industries of the country are driven by the necessities of competition into gigantic masses. The class of small master-workmen, like the class of small farmers, is dying out. The small capitalist him-

* See Lange's noteworthy discussion, *Arbeiterfrage*, ch. iii.

self falls a prey, in times of industrial calamity, to his greater and stronger competitor. By the existing system of our industrial life, under which capitalists themselves are absolutely powerless, the millions that toil and produce wealth are themselves the great class of "disinherited ones."* Moreover, the genesis of the first stocks of capital, by which it obtains such hopeless advantages over labour, cannot be forgotten by the Socialist.† The case of labour would not have been as strong against its terrible antagonist, had they entered on the struggle upon equal and just terms. Lassalle says:‡

"It is as if a few individuals had pronounced gravitation, the elasticity of steam, the heat of the sun, their property! The masses are fed by them just as the steam-engines are oiled and heated by them, in order that they may be kept in a working condition, their maintenance coming into consideration only as a necessary item in the cost of production."

The dependence of labour upon capital, following necessarily from the exclusive possession of the instruments of production by the latter, is a theme upon which Socialist writers enlarge with endless reiteration. They describe the dependence as not less than that of the slave upon his owner, and the misery resulting therefrom as in many respects greater. Lassalle§ and his followers are quite at one with Carlyle as he pronounces "Gurth, born thrall of Cedric the Saxon, happy in comparison with many a Lancashire and Buckinghamshire man of these days."

"The relation of the capitalist to the labourer," says Lassalle, "under the reign of free competition, is exactly the same as his relation to any other commodity. The labourer is his labour, and labour is the product of its necessary cost of production. All earlier relations, lord and slave, in ancient times, feudal land-lords and villains, or serfs, or clients, were more or less *human* relations! The cold, impersonal relation of the capitalist to the labourer as to

* Lassalle, *Antwortschreiben*, pp. 10 sq., 19 sq.; *Bastiat-Schulze*, p. 165 sq.

† Lassalle, *Arbeiterlesebuch*, p. 35; *Bastiat-Schulze*, pp. 84 sq., 171; Marx, *Das Capital*, I. pp. 745—787.

‡ *Bastiat-Schulze*, p. 167. § *Ibid.* pp. 78 sq., 155—158.

a thing, this it is that constitutes the specific, wholly inhuman, physiognomy of the bourgois period."*

With the increasing transformation of private firms into joint-stock companies, this impersonal relation becomes complete. The labourer is to the company a "hand," an impersonal force, to be employed when wanted, cast aside when this is not the case, paid for at the lowest market price, which in periods of commercial depression is so low that it barely suffices to keep body and soul together. Hunger is a cruel slave-driver, and compels men to accept a wage which they know is insufficient to provide the necessaries of life, and although they know that their acceptance of it must reduce the wages of their fellow-workmen. The dependence which is thus produced, Socialists further depict as the source of misery in every form. And under misery they generally include vice also. They are in the habit of tracing all evil up to bad social conditions, the very worst of which is the capitalist method of production. Nor is it so difficult for them as it would be to some to view things thus, owing to the fact that they are materialists in philosophic creed. They hardly recognize any personal defects of will. Men are what their circumstances make them. They are not responsible for their actions in any true sense. The world is out of joint, and its inhabitants with it, from no fault of theirs. Let the world be improved, the capitalist superseded by the Socialist method of production, and misery and vice will disappear. There is a series of articles in the last numbers of the Socialist Review, *Die Zukunft*,† which may be referred to in illustration of this point. Having traced various classes of crimes to defective social conditions, and proposed as remedies social reforms, such as the recognition by the State of *le droit du travail*, of its duty to educate the people, and advocated the necessity of a reform of the prevailing methods of dealing with the criminal classes, the author proceeds:

"The social frame is sick, sick unto death, and at every point old

* Lassalle, *Bastiat-Schulze*, p. 155. † Nos. xxi.—xxiv. (1878).

wounds break out; it is covered with a hateful eruption, its blood is diseased, it is sick and wretched from head to foot, and what men call crime is nothing else than the manifestation of this corruption of the social frame .... All crimes would be impossible if the State and Society were perfectly organized."

And again, at the end of the last article:

"Social circumstances determine the actions of men. Man is therefore not free to act or not to act; whence follows the untenableness of the retributive theory of punishment."

Quotations might be made on this point from almost any Socialist newspaper, pamphlet or larger work. But we must abstain. Schuster has collected a mass of characteristic utterances bearing upon it.*

Our programme proceeds to state the things that are required to set labour free from a bondage which entails such evils. In the first place, the instruments of labour, land, machinery, roads—in a word, as we have seen, what is commonly called capital—must not be suffered to remain in the hands of private individuals. They must be converted into national property, into the public capital of the State. Just as the State in many countries already holds the railroads, canals, telegraphs, postal service, a portion of the mines, forests, and other instruments of production, in the future it must extend its rights and take into commission, for the good of all its members, everything that is now considered capital. Private capital must be converted into collective capital. As the whole of capital is nothing but the result of the combined labour of the past, that is, crystallized toil, so it must be placed in the hands of the State, the representative of society, for the common good. "The total product of labour is a social product," and must be a social possession. The very opposite of a community of goods, in the sense of their equal division amongst all, is intended. Schäffle,† no Socialist, gives the wise and just caution: "Let people beware of conceiving Socialism as a system of periodic division

* Pp. 71—85, 217—240.

† *Die Quintessenz des Socialismus* (1875), p. 18. See also Scheel, *Unsere Socialpolitische Parteien* (1878), p. 137.

of private possessions! That is to charge windmills, and every page of a Socialist newspaper justly castigates such a conception as stupid ignorance." Our programme next prescribes that this nationalized or socialized capital shall be employed under the direction of the State for the common good. Labour will have to submit to socialization as much as capital, its instrument. Individualism must cease in regard to both. As capital will be organized, so also labour. Productive associations, of greater or less magnitude, must be formed by the State, either at its central or some of its communal offices.* The wants of the people must be estimated, as the wants of a million of soldiers are now estimated. Production will be directed so as to supply those wants. The terrible evil of overproduction will be thus avoided. And labour will not be expended upon luxuries until necessary wants have been provided for. Nor will the control of the economical authorities end with the direction of production. The product of common labour will also be justly apportioned. It will be from the first, not the property of individuals, but of the whole community. The principle that will regulate its distribution must be the public good. The necessities of the community, therefore, in its collective capacity — what would now be called expenses of the State, which will, however, be vastly greater—must first be met. When this has been done, individuals will receive their proper shares of the product of their toil. With regard to the principle on which this division is to proceed, we have already seen that there is much difference of opinion among Socialists.

Before we go on to consider the views of Social Democrats as to the way in which this great revolution—the conversion of all private capital into public property and the organization of labour—is to be effected, the opportunity may be taken of explaining a current Socialist phrase connected with the point we have just been examining. Lassalle was always telling working men that they did not get what they ought to have—

* *Die Zukunft*, I. p. 530 sq.

*the full product of their labour.* The gist of Marx's tremendous onslaught upon capital is, that it robs labour of its full product. It is the Socialist theory of value, which was stated above, that lies at the basis of the complaint that labour is mulcted in its own creation. If the labour embodied in a product of human toil is the measure of its value, the person that comes in and appropriates a portion of its price without doing anything towards producing it, can only do so by filching his portion from those whose labour alone produced the commodity. The only thing that constitutes the value of an article of exchange is the expenditure of brain and muscle it has cost. When that has been fully paid for, there remains nothing for anybody else. But as a fact, say the Socialists, numberless other persons appear in the market to seize a share of the payment, and often the biggest share, though they contribute nothing to the value of the article. These are the idle shareholders, sleeping partners, landlords, and men of business who pay themselves for their own labour in gold and their work-people in copper. In a word, interest on capital and profits of trade, as distinguished from the payment for the real labour of direction, are treated by Marx and Lassalle as deductions from that product of labour which belongs solely to the labourers in their collective or individual capacity. They are far from denying the right of the directors of industry to their just proportion of reward, and they do not forget that the labourers of one generation enter into the labours of former generations. But they dispute the claim of those who add nothing in any way to the wealth of society, to hold as private property the fruits of past toil, and to take shares, often large ones, of present toil from which they idly stand aloof.*

We now return to our programme, and to the consideration of the way in which, according to the expectations of Social Democrats, the conversion of private into public capital and the organization of labour may be effected. As might be supposed, this is a point on which there is neither unanimity nor

* Lassalle, *Bastiat-Schulze*, pp. 158—164; Schäffle, *Quintessenz*, p. 15.

very clear and full exposition. There is much uncertainty as to Lassalle's private, "esoteric" beliefs on this head.* In public, as a leader of the working classes, he professed to expect to win the Socialistic paradise by the aid of universal suffrage and the establishment of productive associations on a large scale.† His project of founding productive associations by means of a loan guaranteed by the Government, was in essential respects similar to the proposal of Louis Blanc in 1839. He maintained that these associations, when once started on a scale of sufficient magnitude, would by their industrial superiority drive from the field the establishments in which capital and labour were in different hands. By competition, he held, the labourers would get the day. By Beelzebub he promised to drive out Beelzebub. And Prince Bismarck's recent account of his intercourse with Lassalle shews that the great statesman was almost won over to his view of the valuable functions which productive associations may have to perform in the elevation of the working classes. Lassalle's hopes, whether exoteric or esoteric, from this comparatively mild measure, were not shared by other Socialists at the time, and of late little has been said by them in favour of it. It has evidently been allowed to fall into the background, as hardly likely to accomplish the great end desired, and perhaps, as some think, really inconsistent with Socialistic principles. Marx and his disciples evidently anticipate a less easy—perhaps, as they would think, a less inglorious—transition from the old to the new world. It is true the programme before us continues in its second half to demand the creation of productive associations by means of State aid. It must, however, be borne in mind that this document is an eirenicon between the followers of Lassalle and Marx, and that this very question of the value of productive associations was one of the points of difference between them. Moreover, the form of these associations as here demanded is very unlike that proposed by Lassalle. He

* Mehring, p. 211.

† *Antwortschreiben*, p. 19 sq.; *Arbeiterlesebuch*, p. 43 sq.

guaranteed with a loan of fifteen millions sterling to call his co-operative establishments into existence, and to overthrow with them the capitalist method of production. In this Gotha programme, the demand is for "Socialistic productive associations with State help, under the democratic control of the labouring people." And these associations are to be formed upon such a scale that the Socialistic organization of labour generally may originate from them. We have evidently here a much more ambitious project than a Government guarantee for the interest on a loan of fifteen millions. The language is intentionally vague, but it clearly points to much more radical processes than Lassalle's loan and its creations. This reading of the programme is fully justified when we turn to Marx and later Socialist writers. We find that Lassalle's proposal is either positively rejected or passed over in silence. In one of the last numbers of the organ of the party, *Vorwärts*,* now suppressed, the editor says: "It is true Lassalle was in earnest when he advocated productive associations, yet not as a solution of the social question, but as an amelioration of the condition of the working classes..... As a means of agitation, we still continue to make use of these associations, and also as a means of improving the condition of working men."† Marx's work on Capital and the writings of other representatives of the party warrant the conclusion that it is by political rather than economical measures, and by turbulent rather than peaceful revolutions, that they expect the transformation in question to be carried through. As this is an important point, it may be well to supply the reader with one or two passages from Marx and other Socialist leaders, that he may judge for himself. But it may not be out of place to preface these quotations with the remark, that the authors quoted take care to say that they are only describing a social process which neither they nor other men can stop, and that the decision of the question whether it shall take place violently or otherwise, rests with those who oppose it, and not with those who welcome it. The

* No. cxviii. (1878). † Comp. Mehring, p. 207.

first passage is from Marx.* He is sketching what he calls the historical tendency or goal of capitalist accumulation.

"That form of production in which its instruments are the private property of the labourer is compatible only with limited and primitive conditions of production and society. When it has reached a certain stage, this form of production gives rise to the material means of its own destruction. From that moment, forces and passions begin to stir in society which feel the pressure of this form of production. It must be destroyed, it is destroyed. Its destruction, the conversion of individual and divided means of production into those that are socially concentrated, is the first chapter in the history of capital. It is the conversion of the puny property of many into the vast property of a few, the expropriation of the great mass of the people from the possession of the soil and means of life and instruments of labour. And this first chapter is a terrible and painful instance of expropriation. It comprises a series of violent measures, the most important of which only we must pass in review as methods of the first accumulation of capital. The expropriation of the immediate producers is accomplished by the most unsparing vandalism, and under the influence of the most infamous, filthy and despicable passions. The private property that the individual labourer has won for himself, and which rests, so to say, upon his coalescence as an isolated, independent workman with the conditions of his work, is thrust aside by the private property of the capitalist, which is based upon the exploitation of other people's labour, though formally it may be voluntary. As soon as this metamorphosis has disintegrated ancient society sufficiently in depth and breadth, as soon as workmen have been transformed into a proletariat, and their conditions of labour into capital,—as soon as the capitalist method of production is fully established,—a new form is given to the further conversion of labour into a social institution and the further transformation of the earth and other instruments of production into instruments of labour to be used for the good of society, and therefore made a common possession, including the further expropriation of their private owners. What remains now to expropriate is no longer the labourer working on his own account, but the capitalist who has plundered many labourers. This latter expropriation is effected by the play of the immanent laws of capitalist production itself, by the growing concentration of capital. Every single capitalist ruins many

* *Das Capital*, I. p. 791 sq.

others. Hand in hand with this concentration or the expropriation of many capitalists by a few, the co-operative form of the process of labour is being developed from stage to stage. This will take place by the technological application of science, the systematic and joint use of the treasures of the earth, the conversion of the instruments of labour into instruments of labour that can be only used for common purposes, and the economizing of all instruments of production by their use as common instruments of production for combined and associated labour. With the constantly decreasing number of capitalist magnates, who usurp and monopolize all the advantages of this process of transformation, the sum of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, plundering, increases; but there increases at the same time the indignation of the labouring classes, which are constantly growing, and being schooled, united and organized, by the mechanism of the capitalist process of production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes the fetters of that method of production which has flourished with and under it. The concentration of the instruments of production and the conversion of society into a labouring class attain a point at which they become incompatible with this capitalist shell. It is burst. The last hour of capitalist private property strikes. The expropriators are expropriated.

"The capitalist method of production and appropriation, and therefore capitalist private property, is the first negation of individual private property as based upon personal labour. The negation of capitalist production is brought about by itself, with the necessity of a process of nature. It is the negation of the negation. This restores individual property, but upon the basis of the acquisitions of the capitalist era, of the co-operation of free labourers, and of their common possession of the earth and the instruments of production produced by labour itself.

"The conversion of divided private property, with its basis in the personal labour of individuals, into capitalist private property, is naturally an incomparably more wearisome, severe and difficult process than the conversion into social property of capitalist private property, as capitalist property already actually rests upon a social method of production. In the first case, the thing to be done is the expropriation of the masses of the people by a few usurpers, while in the second it is the expropriation of a few usurpers by the masses of the people."

This quotation from Marx is long, and the translation must unhappily only add to the sufficient obscurity of the original, with its Hegelian "negation of the negation." The pas-

sage is, however, brought forward by both F. A. Lange,* the well-known author of the History of Materialism, and Professor Scheel,† as containing the clearest statement in a few words of his "communistic theory" that Marx has given to the world. It may be taken as Marx's answer to the question we are now dealing with. Bebel and Liebknecht, members of the Reichstag and prominent leaders of the party, have returned partial answers in a more concrete form; but they also, as might be expected, leave much to be desired in point of fulness and clearness. Bebel‡ appears to expect the establishment of the Socialistic State as the condition of the creation of the productive associations. The means will then have been provided, as that State will save the expenditure of war and of the civil list, for instance. Perhaps also the inquiry would then be started, how far national debts have been incurred in the interests of the whole of the people. Those who had incurred them for their own benefit might be compelled to pay them, or they might be simply liquidated. The wealth of churches and pious foundations would be confiscated. At the end of his pamphlet, Bebel§ says:

"There are two methods only by which our end is to be attained. The first is, the gradual removal of private capitalists by legislation after we have established the Democratic State. This way would be taken if the parties interested, against whom the Socialistic movement is directed, became wise betimes, and sought in the way of compromise to bring about their own extinction as plundering classes, and their transition as equals into the common ranks. The other method, the decidedly shorter one, but at the same time the more violent method, would be the forcible expropriation, the removal of the private capitalist, by one blow, no matter by what means. Accordingly, the issue of the crisis depends on the capitalist classes themselves: the nature of the crisis will be determined by

* *Die Arbeiterfrage*, p. 247, 3rd ed. (1875).

† *Unsere Socialpolitischen Parteien*, p. 140 (1878).

‡ *Unsere Ziele*, p. 23 (4th ed. 1874).

§ *Ibid.* p. 43. This essay, as nearly all the Socialistic works quoted in this article, have been recently suppressed, in accordance with the Anti-Socialist Law of 21st October of this year. The same fate has befallen Professor Schäffle's *Quintessenz des Socialismus*, though Schäffle is not a Socialist, and his book is an unfavourable critique of the Socialistic system.

the manner in which they apply the forces which are in their hands. If it comes to physical force, there can be no doubt upon which side, in case of such a trial of strength, the victory will finally lie. Numbers are on the side of the labouring people, and the moral right too. Let only the needful perception be brought into the masses, and the struggle is decided."

Liebknecht, in dealing with the question of the conversion of land from private into common property, writes:*

"We know that the existing relations of property are a temporary, which must develop into a higher, form of society. But we do not know what acceleration or what hindrances this process of development will meet with. If the State emancipate itself from its present class character voluntarily, that is, in consequence of more correct views on the part of the governing classes; if the State become what it ought to be—the people's State, the expression of the will, the accomplishment of the interests, of the whole community—the transformation will proceed gradually, without any violent injury to private interests, even to those that cannot be justified, though they have hitherto been sanctioned, by law. We should then have *Reform*. But if, on the other hand, the State remains an obstinate class State, it closes the way of peaceful reform; a time will come when the intolerable condition of affairs will leave men no other alternative than to perish, or to break up the State which deprives them of the conditions of existence. In such circumstances the decision is never doubtful, nor is the result. We have then *Revolution*. Reform or Revolution—the goal will in both cases be won. Reform or Revolution applied to the land question means expropriation or confiscation. Expropriation is the full compensation of the owners; confiscation is seizure without compensation, as the punishment of unjustifiable resistance. . . . . Expropriation, when proposed as the demand of land reform, however, does not mean that the entire land of the country shall be taken all at once from its present owners and converted into the property of the State. It is true that in England the state of things is so far advanced, that, to use Marx's phrase, 'the expropriation of the expropriator,' expropriation *sans phrase* and without transitional measures, is on the carpet, and will undoubtedly be one of the first acts of the English proletariat when the overthrow of class rule

* *Die Grund-und Bodenfrage*, p. 91 (1874).

takes place. . . . . The question will be more difficult in France and Germany. The small holder, although as a matter of fact belonging, or inevitably advancing, to the ranks of the proletariat, clings for the most part very closely to his property, although in most cases it is only nominally, in imagination, his own. A decree of expropriation would undoubtedly excite the majority of small holders to the most violent resistance, probably to open rebellion. It is needful, therefore, to proceed in this case with caution, and with the greatest possible consideration for prejudices and imaginary interests."

Our programme, like the leading Socialists whose views we have just given in their own language, expects that these great changes will meet with the determined opposition of all other classes than the working class itself. "The emancipation of labour must be the work of the labouring class itself, with respect to which all other classes are only a reactionary mass." On this sentence we remark that it is difficult to frame a satisfactory definition of a working man. The Socialists cannot therefore be blamed for not supplying a definition of the labouring class. Of course they mean primarily that immense class of working people, created by our modern system of industry, which lives by wages.* Opposed to this class are the aristocracy, the professional class, and the employers of labour. Lassalle's ambition was to form what he called the fourth estate, the labouring class, the disinherited proletariat, into a great united political party. He taught that in the French Revolution of 1789, the third estate, *le tiers état*, the middle class, *la bourgeoisie*, the representatives of capital, won the victory over the privileged classes above them, the nobles and the clergy; and that with the Revolution of 1848 the era of the fourth estate, of the lowest classes, commences. With February 24, 1848, when manhood suffrage was made law in France, broke forth the first rays of the dawn of a new era in the world's history. Henceforth the fourth estate forms the dominant principle of society. This estate is the last, claims no privileges, is synonymous with the whole human race. Its rule is the rule of all. "Labourers are we all, in as far as we

* Scheel, p. 22.

have the desire to make ourselves useful in any way to human society."* The higher classes have interests opposed to those of society as a whole, but the lower class has no interests that are not common to all. Such are Lassalle's descriptions of the labouring class.† It must, however, be borne in mind that the movement, as it has progressed, has drawn into it a considerable contingent who do not belong, in the commonly accepted sense, to the labouring class. The less comfortably situated of the professional classes, as well as clerks, schoolmasters, journalists, and, again, small manufacturers and tradesmen, have joined the movement; while its ablest representatives are from the wealthier and professional classes, Lassalle and Marx being instances. The youth of the Universities also have been captivated by its ideals.‡ At the same time the movement is

* *Arbeiter-Programm*, p. 29. † *Ibid.* p. 34.

‡ Meyring, p. 131; *Zukunft*, I. p. 187, gives the following instructive table, based on the statistics of occupations in Prussia for the years 1867 and 1875:

*Opponents of Socialism.*

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | Farmers and landed proprietors | 200,000 |
| 2. | Servants of the Court and gentry | 10,000 |
| 3. | Medical men and artists | 20,000 |
| 4. | The clergy | 29,000 |
| 5. | The Court | 1,000 |
| 6. | *Rentiers* | 116,000 |
| 7. | Large manufacturers, merchants, &c. | 49,000 |
| 8. | Small ditto | 500,000 |
| 9. | Servants of 7 and 8 | 67,000 |
| | Total | 992,000 |

*Natural Allies of Socialism.*

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | Connected with agriculture | 2,560,000 |
| 2. | Connected with forests | 34,000 |
| 3. | Servants | 430,000 |
| 4. | Medical men and artists | 20,000 |
| 5. | Schoolmasters | 58,000 |
| 6. | Government and other officials | 104,000 |
| 7. | Small manufacturers, merchants, &c. | 800,000 |
| 8. | Workpeople in small concerns | 550,000 |
| 9. | Workpeople in large ditto | 1,007,000 |
| | Total | 5,563,000 |

The total given in *Zukunft* is 4,563,000. The error appears to be in the total, and not in the items.

essentially an "organization of the proletariat," and the propertied classes are as such banded against it. This can be the case, and yet individuals of other classes, rising above class interests, may enrol themselves on the side of the proletariat. That, however, the majority of the German upper classes are a "reactionary mass" as regards the demands of the Social Democrats, has been sufficiently proved by the passage of the Anti-Socialist Law; and how fierce and violent the distrust and animosity of Social Democrats towards the wealthier classes may be, is exemplified only too clearly on almost every page of their literature and in every meeting of their members. Indeed, one of the most repulsive as well as most dangerous aspects of the entire movement is its fierce declaration of an internecine, if bloodless, war of classes.*

We must leave the rest of the programme to speak for itself. The fundamental principles and aims of Social Democracy have been stated, and their applications and consequences as afterwards defined in the programme will be sufficiently intelligible. But the readers of this Review will naturally look for some statement of the attitude Social Democracy assumes with regard to religion; we must, therefore, add a comment upon the important but unhappily vague clause in the programme, *Erklärung der Religion zur Privatsache.*

"Religion shall be pronounced a private matter." Both Positivists and Evangelical Dissenters are found agreeing in England to a similar declaration, but from very widely differing motives. Such a declaration requires explanation. In the case of Social Democrats the explanation is not far to seek. It was at their congress at Mainz, in 1872, that they first adopted a resolution on the matter of religion. The proposition had been made that all Social Democrats should be required formally to leave the National Churches. The form which the resolution finally took is significant: "Members of the party are to be recommended formally to leave ecclesiastical communities, inasmuch as by accepting the

* Schuster, pp. 151—164; Meyer, *Emancipation des 4ten Standes*, I. p. 94.

party programme they have *de facto* renounced every religious confession." The programme referred to as a matter of fact contained no clause the acceptance of which was tantamount to a rejection of a religious belief. But this resolution is itself a rejection of religion by the party. It must, however, be borne in mind that it was the advanced section of the party that met at Mainz. The more moderate section, the followers of Lassalle as distinguished from those of Marx, would not have committed themselves to such a declaration. But it would have been motives of policy, and not love of religion, that would have restrained them. And when the two sections combined at Gotha, it was beyond doubt simply considerations of a prudential nature that led to the substitution of the clause found in our programme for a declaration plainly unfavourable to religion.* This fact is frankly acknowledged in the scientific organ of the party. We are told that the reasons that led to the adoption of the clause "were primarily reasons of policy. It was considered that the progress of the principles of the party would be impeded if the majority of the party should without any concealment urge their convictions on religious matters. It was not deemed desirable to deprive the party of a minority holding different views on this point only, and of accessions of the same class in the future; inasmuch as it was considered natural that atheism would of itself continue to keep the upper hand in the party, and in the end leaven the minority also."†

We need not produce many passages from Socialistic writings in proof of the anti-religious position of the party. Though Lassalle and Marx have not thought it prudent or needful to make any set and direct attack upon religious beliefs, their whole philosophy of history and social system are based upon materialism; while their writings, especially those of Marx, abound in irreverent and often ferocious witticisms at the expense of religious sanctities. Marx coolly assumes, as a

* Meyer, I. 239; Mehring, p. 237.

† *Die Zukunft*, I. p. 550; Mehring, p. 237.

thing no longer to be disputed amongst intelligent people, that religion is the product of an unscientific past. "As in religion," he says, "man is ruled by the creature of his own brain, so in the capitalist method of production he is ruled by the creature of his own hand."* His large work is disfigured with the most bitter and contemptuous hits at Theism, Christianity, the Bible, and almost every object of popular religious regard.† Lassalle, like his disciples, is more reserved in his opposition to religion; but it is probably not less real than Marx's.‡ From minor writers and official organs of the party, Schuster§ has made a hideous selection of passages in the same anti-religious strain. Without quoting or adding to them, a more recent and in some respects more instructive illustration of the attitude of the party towards religion may be produced. The Socialistic Review, *Die Zukunft*,‖ contains an exceedingly able and noteworthy article by one of the religious minority, on *The Church in the State of the Future.* It is a vigorous protest against the habit of the majority of the party and the official organs of preaching atheism, and of reviling the Christian Religion and Church in the name of the party. The writer maintains that the line pursued in this respect by their leaders is intolerant, impolitic and unphilosophic. He pronounces the fanatical hatred of Christ exhibited in Social Democratic meetings and newspapers the more strange, as Social Democrats often speak of Jesus as the first Socialist. He then insists upon the elements in Christianity that are akin to the principles of Socialism. And coming to the question of Church or no Church in the Socialistic State, he pronounces the Church a necessity, and claims for religion and theology provision in that State on the same grounds as science and law will have to be provided for. The State must provide for the common higher necessities of the whole people and of larger groups of them, and religion is one of these necessities. If the future

* *Das Capital*, pp. 57, 646.

† *Ibid.* pp. 7, 54, 56, 82, 84, 262, 428, 493, 637, 705.

‡ *Arbeiterlesebuch*, p. 31 sq.; *Arbeiterprogram*, p. 39; *Bastiat-Schulze*, p. 127.

§ Pp. 188—216. ‖ For June 18, 1878.

State should refuse to treat it as a necessity because the majority of the members of the State do not feel it to be such, it will not be a *democratic* State, but only an ochlocratic tyranny. Such a State would be the reign of mediocrity. This paper is exceedingly instructive, and its admission into the scientific organ of the party does it credit. The reply to it in a subsequent number of the same periodical* is no less instructive. It is an official utterance. After a futile attempt to deprive the anti-religious activity of the leaders of the party of an official character, and a mild condemnation of the anti-religious declarations of the official organs, the reply proceeds to the astonishing *petitio principii* of denying that "religion is a higher necessity." It is a necessity only as "the better kinds of tobacco" are a necessity to some. What distinguishes a "higher" from an ordinary necessity is, that the latter does not benefit society, while the former does. Art, literature, science, confer innumerable advantages upon society, but that is not the case with religion. "What does it profit his fellow-men if their neighbour goes to church or is married by the parson?" And with regard to the "so-called religious necessity," "is not the probability great that it will disappear in proportion as the scientific conception of the universe spreads, and *as human misery diminishes?* At last, will anything be left of religion further than the impulse which it contains to form clear notions of the first principles of things, to solve the riddle of existence by the aid of more or less probable hypotheses? And if this is the case, who would then need churches and theologians? In such an age, and we hope the State of the Future will arrive at it, philosophy will have been substituted for religion in all layers of society." There is no room to doubt the charge which Todt and Schuster bring against the representatives of Social Democracy, with the overwhelmingly larger proportion of their followers, that their creed is atheistic and materialistic. At the same time, such voices as that heard in the *Zukunft* on the side of religion are significant, though they

* No. xxii. Aug. 1878.

are as of those crying in the wilderness. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that men like Schäffle and Todt admit that a rejection of religion is not an integral part of the social system of the party.* There is also another aspect of the anti-religious attitude of Social Democracy which the thoughtful mind will not fail to recognize. Schiller's paradox contains profound truth:

"Welche Religion ich bekenne? Keine von allen,
Die du mir nennst.—Und warum keine? *Aus Religion.*"

In reading the literature, in listening to the speeches, in witnessing the enthusiasm and ready sacrifices of this party, it is impossible to fail to see that with many it is "aus Religion," though it is not the Christian religion, that they reject the ecclesiastical systems and faith of their fathers and rulers. It is true they are not inspired by the religion of love, but by that of hate, indignation, destruction. Yet it will be allowed that that was one side of the religion of all destructive reformers—Mohammed, for instance. Moreover, there is another side of the Socialist's religion. It is the side that leads him to call Jesus the first great communist. It is the side that helps him to suffer so severely for his class. The human heart will not deny its divine instincts, even though the head and passion may be all against them. And even in the intellectual respect, the Socialist cannot be as irreligious as he thinks he is. As in the passage just quoted from the *Zukunft*, he is constantly confessing that he cannot leave the riddle of the world alone. And as long as men cannot do that, religion will not leave them alone.†

We have in this paper described and not criticised Democratic Socialism. It was impossible to do both in the space allotted to us. But we cannot conclude without indicating in general terms what appear to us the merits and the defects, the value and the dangers, of the movement. We should say,

* Schäffle, *Quintessenz*, p. 63; Todt, *Der radicale deutsche Socialismus und die Christliche Gesellschaft* (1877), p. 78 sq.

† Schweizer, *Die Zukunft der Religion* (1878), pp. 18—20.

Social Democrats deserve well of humanity for mercilessly tearing the covering from the hideous wrongs and woes that are incident to our present industrial system. They have done good work, too, in proclaiming with terrible emphasis the doctrine of the solidarity of mankind. Future ages will also record in their honour that they asserted the eternal rights of labour. Nor will a philosophy that can be fair to both sides of human nature, the material as well as the spiritual, fail to recognize the services they have rendered in demanding for man better physical conditions as the foundation of progress. The political work of the party runs pretty much on the lines of English Radicalism, and needs no special criticism. The defects and dangers of the movement are not less marked than its services. Even its best services are too likely to issue in calamity, owing to the fierce exaggeration with which they are rendered. What ought to be works of love, have already become works of hate. The vindication of right has become at the same time the instigation of wrong. The just and needful emancipation of the flesh has been attended by the denial of the claims of the spirit. And, further, supposing Social Democracy had done its good work well, that work would still be but a poor solution of the social problem. It fails at the most critical points to shew the practical possibility of the better state of things the necessity of which it so forcibly proclaims. Nevertheless, its defects and vices are not in any sense so many or so great as they are popularly represented; and its merits are such, that a purer movement could become its heir and might carry on its work. That movement ought to be "Christian Socialism." Social Democracy is one phase of the social chaos in which we still live. Its efforts are wild and Titanic. But they are forerunners of a more peaceful and better-ordered social world.

J. FREDERICK SMITH.

## IV.—ON ECLECTICISM.

A Lecture delivered at the Opening of the Moral Philosophy Class, in the University of St. Andrews, Nov. 1878.

I propose to discuss some of the features of Eclecticism, a system of philosophy which has received but scant justice from its critical successors.

It is both a system, and a tendency; a formal philosophical doctrine, and a spirit of philosophizing. For my present purpose, it is not necessary to consider it historically, either in its strength or weakness, as it appeared in the third century at Alexandria and Rome, at Athens in the fourth and fifth, or at Paris in the nineteenth; nor to deal with its secondary developments in social organizations, artistic schools, or religious systems. What I wish to put before you is its general speculative drift, its leading features, and permanent tendency. These may be seen, not only from the phases it has assumed as a coherently developed doctrine, but even more characteristically from its unconscious presence, within the lines and under the limits of the systems which have ignored it. Wherever the effort to reconcile the claims of rival doctrines has taken the place of a one-sided advocacy of special views, the result, to the extent of the reconciliation, has been eclectic.

The term, however, is unfortunately misleading, as it seems to indicate the really elementary process of gathering together bits of systems, and arranging them, in what must be at the best an artificial patchwork. No wonder that the result of a mere collection of *memorabilia*, however carefully made, should be a product without unity, coherence, or vitality. A system that resolved itself into a 'golden treasury' of elegant extracts would deserve the neglect of all competent logicians, and of every serious thinker.* And this is the ungenerous and inac-

* On the same day on which this lecture was delivered, Dr. Martineau, in a profound and noble utterance from the Principal's Chair in Manchester New College, spoke of "an eclectic commonplace-book of favourite beliefs" as "the last resort of superannuated philosophy." This remark will be appreciated perhaps most of all by those who most carefully distinguish between "the commonplace-book" and the system and spirit of Eclecticism.

curate charge to which Eclecticism—the system suffering from its defective title—is sometimes exposed. It is difficult, however, to find a better word to describe it than this confessedly inaccurate and misleading one. The name of no system of philosophy is altogether adequate. The words 'Experientialist' and 'Ontologist,' however convenient as indicating a certain philosophical tendency, are both inappropriate in some of their applications, and cannot be used with absolute rigour. Even the terms 'Intuitionalism' and 'Utilitarianism' are each misleading. The inadequacy of the word used to describe it is thus a misfortune which Eclecticism shares in common with every other system of opinion.

Keeping in view, therefore, what has already been said, viz., that its essential features exist in many systems which disown it, we shall find that the propositions which lie at the basis of Eclecticism are so self-evident, that in enunciating them we may seem to be stating a series of truisms. Out of their simplicity, however, profoundly important issues arise. Eclecticism originates in the elementary but constantly forgotten fact, that there is always some truth on both sides of every great controversy that has divided the thoughts and feelings of mankind; that error has its origin, usually, if not always, in the abuse of truth, in the exaggeration or travesty of fact; that no intellectual doctrine is absolutely and entirely false, or, root and branch, a delusion; that extravagance in opinion usually proceeds from the eagerness of devotees who carry true principles to false conclusions, and, in their enthusiasm for a particular doctrine, forget its obverse. It is not that they are wrong in the emphasis they throw on any special truth or group of truths, but only in ignoring the fact that each has a context dissimilar to itself, though complementary and equally valid; and especially in forgetting that all major truths are arranged in pairs, or may be placed in the scales over against others of equal weight and value; so that corresponding to every important doctrine there is one equally great, which balances it, on the opposite side. When it is said of rival systems that they are each "resistless in assault, but impotent in defence" (although I

would prefer to say, resistless in defence while impotent in assault), what is meant is, that there is a citadel of strength (because a residuum of truth) at the heart of the most erroneous and extravagant, and that there is an element of weakness (because a tendency to bias or excess) associated with the truest that a progressive civilization has evolved. Thus the principle of Eclecticism contains a very obvious theory of the nature of truth and of error, and it offers an explanation of their origin respectively.

Let us suppose two minds of different type or idiosyncracy dealing with the same problem,—be it the origin of knowledge, or the conditions of responsibility, a doctrine of the beautiful, or a theory of life,—their hereditary intellectual tendencies vary, their temperaments are not the same, and their education has been different. They therefore approach the problem from opposite sides. Necessarily, they survey it in a different manner; and their interpretation, however accurate, must be dissimilar. One will throw the stress on the subjective side of human knowledge, the other on the objective. The former, starting from the Ego, is idealistic throughout; the latter, beginning with Nature, is materialistic to the close. Or the one looks at man as a determined element in the material cosmos, and his ethical system is necessitarian; the other regards him as a free autonomous personality, and his system is libertarian. These different interpretations of the same problem, both true at their root, generate controversy. The differences increase; and schools of opinion arise, in which the opposite conclusions of the masters are intensified by their less original pupils. The chasm between them gradually widens, and as the conflict grows, the partizans of each system retire to its strongholds, till the truth which each most loudly asserts is denied by its antagonist. The doctrines which were at the first mutually accepted (on the one side as major, and on the other as minor) become party badges, and on both sides there is a fierce and sectarian denial of the opposing system. In intellectual and speculative theory, it is as in matters personal, social and national,—a minute divergence between two

persons who are perhaps both in the right, widens into a gigantic misunderstanding, or a slight diplomatic difference ripens into an international quarrel. And if in most national quarrels both nations are to blame, and in the majority of political party contests neither side has a monopoly of justice, it is precisely so in the strife of the philosophical sects, in the controversies between artistic schools, and the warfare of religious parties.

Now suppose that the controversy between two philosophical sects has been protracted and keen. As with every other form of strife, the antagonism at length dies away, and, in the calmer and juster mood which succeeds, a desire springs up to reconcile, if possible, the opposite claims. A retrospective study of the controversy shews that the whole truth lay with neither party, that each had something real to defend, something worth defending, and that the strife between them was philosophically illegitimate; although, had there been no collision, the characteristic merits of each would not have been so prominently signalized. In the case of diametrically opposite theories which negative each other, the excess of both is neutralized; and while each may establish the truth of its own affirmation, its negative or aggressive tendency is held in check by the mere presence of its opposite. Thus the antagonism of the schools preserves the philosophical world from the intolerant usurpation of any one, and brings out the special excellences of each.

But a state of perpetual controversy amongst the sects would do no particular good, if it did not lead to a better appreciation of their respective merits; and we find that an eclectic or reconciling movement generally follows, and is produced by, the controversies of the schools. It is gradually seen that each, if "right in what it affirmed," was "wrong in what it denied," right in so far as it was positive, and wrong only in its negation of the *locus standi* or *jus vivendi* of the systems it sought to annihilate.

The human mind cannot find repose either in the onesidedness of a partizan system, or in the absolute repression of partizanship, and the substitution for it of such a kind of

eclecticism as shrinks from the experience of difference. The eclecticism I am expounding is assuredly not one which would adjust differences, and end controversy, by the adoption of mild and hazy commonplaces, which no sect or school could possibly deny. It conserves every intellectual difference that is the outcome of distinctive thought, and of a true interpretation of the universe; only, it makes room, alongside of each interpretation, for others that have usually been held to be inconsistent and incompatible with it.

As it is, however, in the union of one or two historical facts with sundry psychological phenomena that Eclecticism may be said to find its stronghold, I pass to the consideration of these. First, there is the historical fact of the incessant rise of new systems, their inevitable decay, and their perpetual reappearance. Why do systems of opinion pass away from the thought and the allegiance of mankind, but from the radical imperfection which necessarily characterizes them? from their adequacy for a time, their inadequacy for all time? Why do they re-appear again, but from the root of truth which they contain? The mere fact of the resurrection of old and apparently exploded doctrines, is a historic proof of their superiority to the assault that seemed to lay them low. It shews that the conflict of opinion (however interesting as mental gladiatorship, and however valuable as a means of developing knowledge, and sifting truth from error) is after all a conflict which leaves no one absolute master of the field. If the controversy is renewed, if the strife begins again, it is because the forces on neither side were silenced, and because each can return to the combat with unexhausted courage and fresh resource.

The next fact is, the impossibility (judging by analogy) of uniformity of belief, and therefore of the cessation of controversy, ever occurring in the history of the world—a consummation which is probably no more possible, and no more desirable, than the cessation of physical storms, and the substitution of perpetual calm and sunshine. This—the necessity of fresh controversy—though generally recognized as a feature in the progress of civilization, has perhaps never been adequately

appraised, and its corollaries have certainly not been always seen. It involves the certainty of the rise of new types of philosophical thought and belief, while the human race continues to advance. With every new cycle will come a new phase of insight, and a new attitude of feeling towards the universe. Does any one, except the merest tyro in historical knowledge, expect the advent of a time when speculative controversy will cease, and the opposition of the schools disappear? It would imply either a radical alteration in the structure of human nature, or the extinction of belief in an ideal, and the collapse of effort to reach it. It would be the very dullest and dreariest world in which every man agreed with every other man upon every conceivable topic. It would imply the decadence of the intellect, the withering of the imagination, and the stoppage of the pulse of the human heart. It would amount, in short, to an arrest laid on the mainsprings of human civilization. And where are we to draw the line between an agreement on every possible problem and a general concurrence in the greater problems as finally solved for the human race? Is not the distinction only one of degree? If absolute uniformity of opinion is impossible, is general concurrence less utopian?

But *why* must systems of opinion run through their cycles and re-appear? Why are the intellectual differences, which culminate in opposing doctrines, destined to remain as permanent and indelible tendencies of human nature? Are there any psychological facts which explain how they have hitherto existed, and justify the inference that they will continue to characterize the future evolution of humanity?

One explanation is, that every developed opinion, no matter how contorted and extravagant it may be, has sprung from some real root in the soil of human nature. It has been evolved; and if evolved, its formative principle cannot have been mere vagary, hap-hazard, or blind caprice. Grant that it was often a crude guess, a surmise, a thought casually thrown out at an object, that gave rise to primitive belief. These guesses were the offspring of some previous intelligence, and the precursors of genuine knowledge. The surmises which

grew out of vague, unillumined gropings, were disciplined by degrees into real insight, definite and verifiable. But, of necessity, each separate surmise, directed towards a particular aspect of Nature or of Life, was different from the rest; and the result of the difference is seen in the various "doctrines of knowledge," and "systems of the universe," or "theories of existence," which now divide or distract the world. The source of difference is chiefly within the individual theorist. It is due to temperament, and hereditary intellectual tendency, though also, in a minor degree, to the education and surroundings of the system-builder.

Given a certain temperament and ancestral tendency, a certain education and surrounding influences, it is quite possible to predict the system that will naturally emerge; to say whether it will be intuitional or experiential, idealist or realist, *a priori* or *a posteriori*. Up to one-half of the result, it is altogether beyond the individual's control, and it is as rigidly determined for him as is the colour of his hair, or the height of his stature, his nationality, or his mode of speech. Diversity will therefore necessarily characterize the future systems of human opinion and belief. It is due to the immense variety and latent force of human nature, which is a fact of equal magnitude and significance with its underlying unity,—a variety which is not only not opposed to the unity, but which illustrates it, and goes on developing alongside of it. On the one hand, the unity of human nature, and on the other its variety, constitute the root or ground of eclecticism. If the race is one in organic structure, in mental endowment, in moral tendency, in imaginative capacity, and in spiritual possibility—despite the thousand varieties which proclaim our separateness and individuality—the outcome of this unity, in the endless systems we construct for the explanation of the abiding mystery of the universe, must in every instance possess a greater or a less degree of truth. On the other hand, the variety which marks us off from one another, the individual differences which separate us—despite our organic unity and the solidarity of the race—must of necessity give rise to fresh forms of dogma

and belief; our doctrines being sifted and refined by controversy, and our frames of theory corresponding more and more adequately to the truth of things, while they differ from the older ones which they supersede. We may thus expect a simultaneous development and deepening both of the unity and the variety of human nature, its diversity in opinion, feeling and practice, its unity in aspiration and aim.

Here I may put a question, which, however simple, deserves consideration. What is the meaning of the belief that the two antagonist systems can be reconciled, and of the attempts made to effect the reconciliation?—for example, that the philosophy of experience can be reconciled with that of intuition, or even that the claims of Religion and Science can be adjusted? that there is no necessary collision in the nature of things between the two, but only between sundry mistaken versions or interpretations of each? If the experiential and the *a-priori* systems of knowledge can be harmonized, if the intuitional and the derivative theories of morals can be reconciled, it is because every system of the universe that has been evolved from the brain of man, past, present and to come, must arise from some germ of reality, and its error and extravagance are simply distortions of the truth. Add to this that a published system of opinions, or that part of it which can be epitomized and exhibited in a reasoned treatise, is only a small portion of it. A large context is never exhibited to view; and just as a man may be intellectually refuted without being convinced, because what has been refuted is only that portion of his opinions which was revealed and expressed in words —the context lying within his mind undivulged being also untouched by argument—so the vital part of every dogma may be a subterranean element, a root unconscious to the individual, and never exposed to view. If its upper growth is cut down, like those plants of which the root survives, it sends forth flowers next season freshly as before.

We may thus see how action and reaction is an inevitable and abiding feature in all human opinion and belief; how the truth and the error of 'systems' is a question of degree; how

their vitality is due to the truth they contain, and their longevity to the amount of that truth; how immortality, in the sense of abiding continuity, is the prerogative of none; but resurrection and rehabilitation may be the destiny of each. It is impossible for an individual or a generation to have an equally clear grasp and an equally firm hold of the opposite and balancing sides of any truth; and the prominence which the individual or the age may give to a special view always leads by reaction to a corresponding predominance in the next age of some other view. So soon as any truth is generally recognized, and its novelty has passed away, it falls by a natural process into the background of the human consciousness. Another truth, which could not get full justice during the ascendency of the former, is brought to light, is disinterred if not discovered; and its advocacy has the charm of novelty for a time, till it too shares the fate of its predecessor, and sinks into the shade, to make room for its perishable successor. But this is not the mere rise and fall of systems, and their re-appearance precisely as they lived before. Nothing ever wholly dies; but nothing returns to visible life exactly as it was before. It is changed, both by its previous existence in the field of the human consciousness, and by its temporary absence from it, by its departure and its return.

Besides, as every dominant doctrine tends at once and insensibly to become sectarian, the best antidote to the evil is usually a counter movement towards the other side, even although it be a movement in excess across the dividing line. Thus the error of idealism is met by materialistic reaction, and *vice versa*. The evils of extreme necessitarianism are counteracted by an extreme doctrine of liberty. The enthusiastic advocacy of a truth long disesteemed is not only sure to provoke hostility, but its excess is best counterworked from a position on the other side of the golden mean. Enthusiasm for a particular truth is always beautiful, and always useful; but as its advocate often becomes its idolater, the bias of his enthusiasm is best restrained by a counter enthusiasm for some other truth. Its exaggeration is inevitable, and excellent

while it lasts; it becomes pernicious only if it lasts too long.

The student of the history of Philosophy may at first be perplexed by the number of opposing systems, and the curious hostilities of the system-builders. But so soon as he turns from the field of history to investigate the human consciousness, and discovers the number of conflicting elements and tendencies that are there, he ceases to wonder at the diversities of the schools. The latter are but a sign of the fertility, the resource, and the wealth of human nature. The disparagement of the labours of predecessors, however, which is a failing of many philosophers, will surprise and disappoint the student of their works; more especially if he observes how much they have been indebted to these predecessors, if not for the hints which they have expanded, at least for the direction which their labours have taken. The explanation, however, is easy. The ability to do justice to past systems of opinion is a rare intellectual quality, especially if it be combined with original genius and actual discovery. The ambition of founding or completing a system disinclines the mind to admit the humbling fact, that very much of what seems new has been already said in another form, and that there is exceedingly little that is new under the sun. But the illusion of originality has its uses. The original mind is spurred to research by the prospect of discovery. Were the re-appearance of an old system in a new dress or dialect to be surmised beforehand, one stimulus to continued speculative labour would be removed. In other words, the illusion of originality is a spur to philosophical activity. The misrepresentation of former systems, however, to which I have alluded, itself explains the rise of new ones. Misconception of the nature or tendency of any doctrine usually provokes a reaction in its favour, and a desire to do it justice; and so, the old opinion returns in a new form. It is probably true of systems as of individuals; they must be misconstrued, before they can develop their finest characteristics. They take deeper root in the storm of adverse criticism. If all men spoke well of a speculative doctrine, it would be as inju-

rious to its development, as universal praise would be hurtful to the character of its founder.

It is to be farther noted, that many philosophical systems differ in appearance more than in reality. Their antagonism is on the surface; deeper down they unite. The difference may, as I have remarked, be simply one of emphasis, or the particular point at which the stress of the system is laid. And this fact seems to me so important, that I return to it. Two systems, let us say, start from the same first principle. There they are at one. But the agreement is hidden, is subterranean. They proceed to develop what they hold in common; and what seems major to one, is minor to another, and *vice versa*. This sense of difference, renewed with every fresh glance made to the first principle, by slow degrees widens the breach. The emphasis repeated—like the slow modifications of organic structure, of which science has told us so much, and by which it has explained so much—results in the formation of a new opinion. If any one wishes to realize the latter process, let him study the law of natural selection and the survival of the fittest in physical nature; and if he wants to find that law confirmed, let him watch by the light of history the evolution of human opinion. If the stress continues to be laid on one side of a truth which has two sides equally important, that which is thus emphasized will beget a new type of opinion, which may grow into a product widely different from its parent. And so you will find that the most distinctive feature in each of the philosophical schools is admitted, in some form or other, by the rest, only it is *subordinated* to other features which have the front place of honour. For example, Socrates and the Sophists held much in common, and their original conflict was due to the importance which the former attached to truths which the latter only subordinated. This is seen still more significantly in the conflict between the Stoics and the Epicureans, and pre-eminently in the great ethical controversy of the ages as to Freedom and Necessity.

And thus, when you criticise a particular system, and say, "What So-and-so holds in A (meaning one part of his doctrine)

cannot be reconciled with what he holds in B (meaning another part of it), his system is inconsistent," what does the criticism mean but that he has taken more facts into account than his system can rationally explain, or than he can make coherent? In other words, the man is larger than his system, his humanity is wider than his interpretation of human nature.

It may and has been said, however, that whenever Eclecticism ceases to be a mere spirit of philosophizing, and becomes a system of philosophy, it is false to its own principle. In the very act of laying the foundations of a school, the eclectic becomes a sectarian, and thus commits an act of intellectual suicide. It is affirmed that Eclecticism should be a regulative principle in all systems, and the outcome of all, without being the distinctive badge of any one; that it should be a tendency rather than a school, a way of looking at systems of opinion that is sympathetic and friendly, rather than antagonistic and critical. We must consider this objection. That it should be a prevailing spirit in all philosophy, and that Eclecticism cannot crystallize into a dogma without belying its own principles, is undoubted. And farther, if it exists as a tendency or attitude, though ignored as a system, it is practically of the greatest value. Hence its immense importance to the student of history, because it supplies him with a double key, explanatory at once of the philosophy of History and the history of Philosophy. But if, while the spirit of eclecticism guides the constructive labour of the system-builder, he still keeps to the groove of his system and declines to assume the *rôle* of the eclectic, he remains sectarian. Either one of two things must result; he must keep to his system as a distinctive party badge, and disown what he will doubtless consider the vague position of the eclectic, or his eclecticism must conquer his system. The intellectual quality of fair-mindedness has a front place in the hierarchy of the virtues; but it may exist as a tendency, without penetrating to the very core of the constructive reason, and moulding the system that results. The highest merit of eclecticism is its doing full justice to the systems that

partially understand yet formally repudiate it. As it is the supreme triumph of charity to include the uncharitable within the area it traverses, and to see something good even in the intolerance that is persecuting, and that would if possible extinguish what it cannot comprehend, so it is the crowning excellence of Eclecticism that it sees some latent good in the most *outré* and distorted system that has ever disfigured the annals of civilization. But in its effort to do justice to every other doctrine, it has not always been just to itself. It has sometimes become a martyr to its own generosity. Hence it has been stigmatized as mild and diffusive, as the glorification of a weak live-and-let-live system. Even those who esteem its tendency, despise it as a formulated theory; and while the world refuses permanently to adopt any sectarian theory of knowledge or of life, it has never cordially welcomed the eclectics. It has shewn a greater repugnance to acquiesce in this doctrine as the last word of Philosophy, than to adopt the sectarian extremes which Eclecticism tries to unite and reconcile. How is this? Can it be explained? Yes; the eclectic can explain it.

There can be no doubt that in proportion to the width and elasticity of a system is its want of fitness as a working theory of human knowledge and life, as a doctrine that can be applied to human affairs. So true is the maxim of Goethe, "Thought widens, but lames; action narrows, but animates." This is owing to the fact that all human action is, and must be, carried on in grooves. If we are to work in a world of limitations, we must submit to our limits, and not chafe under them. We may "sit apart, holding no form of creed, but contemplating all," but then we retire from our place and our duties, in a world of imperfect action, and of necessarily incomplete fulfilment.

Now, constituted as we are, it is impossible for our intellectual vision, however wide the horizon it may sweep, to take in more than a very few and limited group of objects at the same time. Observe what results from this. It is the temporary prominence of one truth or fact or law, or of one group

of truths, facts and laws, that strike the eye of the beholder, arrest his attention, and rouse him to action. If he saw the other and bordering truths that balance the ones he sees, mitigating their force and regulating their sway,—truths which other eyes are seeing while he does not,—he could scarcely be roused to the defence or upholding of the former ones. His enthusiasm would certainly cool, and his energy might collapse. Does any one imagine that if the child had in his childhood a presage of the wisdom of the man, he would shew any ardour in the pursuit of those "childish things" which age sees to be illusory? So if the experientialist, the utilitarian, the ontologist, the idealist, were more eclectic than they usually are, if they saw the full merit of the systems they oppose,—while their denunciations would be less loud, and their antagonism less pronounced,—inaction and perhaps indifference might take the place of their former energy. It is not difficult to see why catholicity often leads to inaction; why toleration and supineness go hand in hand; and why with the narrower vision of the sectarian thinker is usually associated the propagandist ardour of the partizan. From this we may deduce a corollary. In criticising extremes of opinion, which in their ultra forms are to be condemned, the main point is to recognize the mean, and intellectually to return to it for the preservation of intellectual harmony; but to understand departure from it, not merely for the sake of action, but for the comprehension of the mean itself. Every time we act we depart from the mean, for the mean state is one of torpor and repose; but as in this world we must act in one way or another, we must vibrate from the equilibrium, crossing the line between extremes, while we never lose sight of this line, never permit the intellectual eye to be closed upon it. If, as I have already remarked, monotony would characterize the beliefs of mankind were all the members of the human race to see eye to eye, the dreariest and most appalling results would follow if all men equally shunned the 'falsehood of extremes,' because it is the extremes that make the mean intelligible. Thus the seemingly illogical position is reached, there is an advantage to the

human race in its partial glimpses of truth, in its temporary, if it be not a stationary, onesidedness in thought and action.

Here I must allude to a doctrine of Jouffroy, the distinguished follower of Cousin in the French eclectic school. He says that as truth and error are mixed in every system, if truth be one and error various, the variety of the systems is due to their departures from truth; and he even affirms that the succession of the schools is owing to the error they contain, each being a fugitive mirror of an out-reaching and over-reaching reality. I do not think that systems of opinion differ only in the erroneous elements they include. I would rather say that the distinctive badge of each is the particular truth which it is its merit to have signalized and made emphatic. The wise man searches for truth everywhere, and finds its fragments everywhere, but its entire presence nowhere. In every system he sees partial truth, dismembered, isolated; hence he is both a believer in evolution, and necessarily a student of history. Eclecticism and evolution go hand in hand. No consistent evolutionist can be other than eclectic. All systems having been evolved out of antecedent ones, and it being his function to trace the lineage and genealogy of each, they should equally claim his reverence and respect; a result quite inconsistent with the railing of some evolutionists against certain intellectual products that have been evolved. According to their theory, as the glacier shapes the valley and the sea its beach, ancestral tendencies and uncontrollable contemporary forces shape the beliefs of the untoward generation that refuses to accept their doctrines. And why should they be more irritated at the philosophy or religion that surrounds them, than at the excavations of the valley, or the raising of the sea-beach?

To return from this digression, I must rebut the charge that Eclecticism and Scepticism go hand in hand. The two admissions, that no system is final, and that none is exhaustive, carry with them the fundamental postulate of eclecticism; but this does not give to every system an equal rank, because an equal hold upon reality, or an equivalent value as a theoretical embodiment of the truth of things. It is true that if I

call no philosopher 'master,' it is because *all* are masters within their respective spheres; and because other masters will yet arise to teach the generations of the future; while the sphere of truth itself outreaches every possible chart of it which any of them may construct. And one system or chart of the universe is truer than another, not in proportion to the number of the elements it embraces, but in proportion to the accuracy with which it expresses and interprets the realities of the universe. Perhaps the most signal service which Eclecticism has rendered to the cause of human progress is the new way of looking at history and the historical schools which it has introduced. It is often out of a study of history that Eclecticism has arisen; and although all historians may have their bias, no study is more helpful to width of mental view, or is more emphatically the parent of fair-mindedness. But the benefit is reciprocal. If historical study promotes Eclecticism, by shewing that its basis is broadly laid in the region of fact and event, the eclectic spirit is one of the best safeguards to the historian. It preserves him from the taint of partizanship. It animates the study of the driest details with living interest, by connecting them with their causes and their issues. It has thus done immense service by shewing that the true function of the historical critic is not so much to expose illusions, as to ascertain their origin; to rise above, by getting behind them; and to discover the living root whence error has sprung, and of which it is the distortion. It is thus opposed to iconoclasm. In so far as our liberal teachers and thinkers are iconoclasts, in so far as they are irreverent towards the past or towards the present, they are non-eclectic, sectarian, revolutionary; and the practical merit of the system I have been expounding is its large tolerance, its spirit of conciliation rather than of compromise, and its detection of truth underneath all the exaggeration, distortion and caricature of the systems that have emerged.

WILLIAM KNIGHT.

## V.—THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY.

*The Evolution of Morality.* By C. Staniland Wake, Author of "Chapters on Man." 2 vols. London: Trübner and Co. 1878.

WHEN the new birth from above of modern science occurred some twenty years since in the publication of Mr. Darwin's "Origin of Species," and men heard the wind blowing as it listed, yet could not tell whence it came or whither it went, they were haunted by plentiful evil forebodings. Astronomy had given them an infinite universe in exchange for a seven-storied heaven, and the parvenu earth had been discovered to possess an ancient and august history; but in spite of these experiences, they continued to scent danger in unfamiliar ideas. Natural Selection was supposed to be a new-fangled kind of atheism, only lacking the outspokenness of the Baron D'Holbach. The Descent of Man was regarded as a degradation of the image of God. Natural Selection implies an intelligence that selects, and the significance of the descent of man from hairy progenitors in the tropics is the after-story of the ascent of man. But neither these considerations, nor the fact of Mr. Darwin's own reverent Theism, sufficed for a long time to clear the atmosphere of superstitious terror. Happier times have now come. Another revolution in our creed has, as often before, prepared the way for the reception of another revelation from God. Some old conceptions have been dropped and many old-fashioned phrases have become obsolete, but, for the rest, Darwinian theories are helpful handmaids of theology.

Doubtless the new ideas have in some cases been pushed to extravagant lengths, and made to account for everything. This was to be expected, for science, as well as theology, is often disposed to ride its hobbies too far. Mr. Darwin himself makes out an admirable and apparently unanswerable case in favour of the physical origin of man in lower animal forms. But we search his pages in vain for an adequate genesis of the imagination of Shakspere or the conscience of Christ, except we

are to attach more value to the living energy of God in nature and history than he seems willing to grant. Haeckel is a scientific dogmatist who wantons in the vituperation which theologians have largely abandoned. We are indebted to Mr. Herbert Spencer for a development of Darwinian principles of rare suggestiveness and value in many ways. He has made the happy word Evolution common property; and we also owe to him, from the French of Comte, what has been called the barbarous word Sociology. Mr. Spencer's ambition and confidence are great, almost terribly so. We frankly confess that the origins of world-systems and the beginnings of life are to us unknown and practically unknowable. When man, however, is once fairly present on the planet, Mr. Spencer's evolutionary and sociological hypotheses are of genuine service, and his collection of facts is an important addition to the general stock of knowledge. The works of Sir John Lubbock and Mr. E. B. Tylor may also be traced to Darwinian ancestry. The last two writers deal with the general growth of civilization. Mr. Spencer grasps creation in his span. Mr. Wake's "Evolution of Morality" is an application of the same principles, with special variations of his own, to one branch of inquiry. While we take it as our basis, we shall bestow occasional side-glances on some of its companions.

For good or for evil, Evolution is now the dominating idea of scientific men, and theologians and moralists must settle accounts with it as they best can. In the end, we believe they will find themselves gainers; and Mr. Wake's book is an able attempt to interpret the new doctrine in harmony with this belief. We shall accompany him in a spirit of friendly criticism through the earlier stages of the evolution where he encounters the chief speculative difficulties, and we shall also estimate the bearing of his conclusions on morality itself, and incidentally on religion and theology. The Evolution theory has Janus faces: one looks before and traces savagery up to civilization, the other looks behind and traces civilization back to savagery. The question is, is their eyesight straight or squinting? and, if straight, does it reach far enough either way?

We must first settle where we are to begin, and we decide to choose our starting-point in man. It is from germs, however rude and primitive, in him that we have to mark the growth onward to the exalted ideals of the moral sentiment at the present day. The divine action in nature is not what we mean by moral until the activity of man comes into play. The speculations as to the connection between sympathy and chemical affinities, and the forces which multiply cells and so build up organisms, would serve no practical purpose in our inquiry, even if we could be sure that we were on safe ground. Nor should we solve the problems of morality by carrying them before the tribunal of the animal creation. After all, the half-reasoning elephant is less than half-reasoning in the human sense, because it wants that better half of reason by which indefinite personal progress becomes possible. The same deficiency characterizes the quasi-moral capacities of the lower forms of existence. The charming narratives of naturalists, the stories they tell of animal affection and mutual helpfulness, and sometimes too of satisfaction and remorse of conscience, do not enable us to detect trustworthy human likenesses there. The animals must transcend their animal nature and be human in order to possess morality. It was born when man was born, no matter how. Then, for the first time, the slumbering potentiality woke up; and, at any rate, the historical evolution of morality is concerned solely and simply with human morality.

But after determining that we will start our inquiries into the worth of the doctrine of moral evolution with men, we are at once encountered by the different ideas as to what morality really is.

> "Ask where's the North? At York 'tis on the Tweed;
> In Scotland, at the Orcades; and there,
> At Nova Zembla, or—the Lord knows where!"

So we seem chasing a will-o'-the-wisp. But evolution helps us mightily here. Different practices may represent different stages of development, and the moral law may be everywhere

the same, although all peoples do not perceive it with equal clearness. No doubt there is a wide gulf between the authoritative dictates of our consciences now, and practices which were once reckoned right and honourable and even supposed to be sanctioned by God. And no doubt also theories as to what constitutes actions right or wrong are various and contradictory, and there is no likelihood of intuitionalists and utilitarians agreeing to meet on a common ground. They diverge from one another as soon as they begin to reason, and get farther apart as they go on. But the importance of these differences has been over-estimated. There is an evident tendency to one code of moral practice. In the slow processes of Providence, the lower forms are eliminated one after another, and the races among whom they prevail either pass away, leaving the fittest to survive, or they mingle with the races of a higher type, and so are lifted up. It would appear therefore as if men of necessity, when once their moral self-consciousness is quickened, grow into the recognition of one law of right practice, and the intellectual explanations of the sanctions of the law remain the only permanently varying elements. If we appeal to the representatives of opposite schools of thought, we find this conclusion borne out. They are not opposite to one another in their ideas of the life of righteousness. Mr. Mill and Bishop Butler would tell us how we ought to behave ourselves in much the same way. Nothing that any intuitionalist ever said breathes a more heroic spirit than Mr. Mill's determination to go to hell sooner than lie. Comte is as altruistic and as passionate in moral enthusiasm as any Christian can be. Dr. Martineau and Professor Tyndall teach a common doctrine of practice. The fact is, that all minds of a certain elevation read similar lessons on the tables of duty, though in one case they may be received direct from God on some Sinai solitude, and in another they may be written by inheritance, custom and expediency, and by instinct that comes at last to know and feel what it is about.

Mr. Wake defines morality thus:

"What is called morality is the product of the evolution of the

divine idea in man under the conditions imposed by his present life, to be perfected only when man's higher being has proved itself victor in the conflict it is ever sustaining with the malign influences of material existence."*

What he means by this theological presupposition of a divine idea, the evolution of which constitutes the history of moral development, is not very clear beyond an implied Theism, and the identification of himself with the intuitionalist school. He proposes to reconcile the best elements of Herbert Spencer and Kant by it, and arrives at it after an examination of the eternal reason or fitness of things of Cudworth and Clarke, the love of order and the love of being of Malebranche and Edwards, the moral sense or conscience of Butler, Hutcheson and Mackintosh, the sympathy of Adam Smith, and the intellectual recognition of moral beauty by Stewart. Its main recommendation seems to be, that its language is borrowed equally from theology and natural science. The former gets justice in the divine idea, and the latter in the magic word Evolution.

It may be desirable here to explain the sense in which we accept the definition ourselves. The divine idea may be one of God's ideas dwelling in man, in which case it is perfect in God himself, and its evolution consists in a growing clearness of human self-consciousness. Or it may be man's idea of God, in which case evolution is the passage from lower to higher forms of religious conception. From a theological standpoint we need both definitions. Regarded again on its moral side, or the side of conduct, and theories of what conduct ought to be, the evolution of the divine idea involves a wider perception of primitive personal and social relationships, and the gradual extension of right, duty and affection, to the universality which is implicitly contained in any idea of God whatever, whether His idea in us or our idea of Him.

The definition also fixes for us the method of inquiry we must pursue. Poetry, especially religious poetry, begins history with a Garden of Eden or a Golden Age, where humanity was innocent and perfect and then fell, or it lapsed through

* Evolution of Morality, Vol. I. p. 71.

successive degenerations of silver and bronze into an age of iron. The Golden Age is now sheer poetry to everybody. On the other hand, the Garden of Eden has entered theological systems and coloured historical interpretations. It is a Hebrew Utopia thrown backward; and that which men hoped some time would come to pass, they fabled really had been the primitive condition of mankind. Thus progress consists in regaining what we have lost, and we are better in proportion as we get nearer to where our ancestors were. To Evolutionists, however, the Golden Age and the Garden of Eden are equally poetic fancies, and the return to either of them, supposing them real for a moment, would be eminently undesirable. Instead, then, of ending where our ancestors began, civilization pursues an opposite course, and we measure our progress by the distance that we leave our ancestors behind. The divine idea has always been incompletely apprehended, and always must. We see through a glass darkly, but there was more smoke on the glass in the early ages than there is now. Natural Evolutionists describe the phenomena of the onward movement in the mere order of succession; and religious Evolutionists add to this description inspiration, or the sustaining energy of God, and revelation, or the intuition of God. They both postulate primitive savagery, and both maintain there has been no fall on the part of the race, but a continuous ascent.

We first seek the data of the Evolution theory with respect to morality in the life of man during the historical period. But that enables us to journey only a little way back. All our historical knowledge is concerned with people who already possess a language and literature, and even have a philosophy of religion and tolerably uniform moral ideas, not far removed from our own. There is no difficulty in tracing our own features among them. The Greeks of Homer's days, the Hebrews of Abraham's days, and the Egyptians and Babylonians and other nations whose trustworthy records seem to make Adam and Eve modern personages, were all civilized, and they give us no information of the earlier stages still through which morality must have passed. It is true that we find customs

prevailing among them which seem to point to original savagery. Their languages also have indications of a similar character. And they have besides traditions of barbarous forefathers. All these facts are significant as far as they go. But they stop short of the beginning, and the mythical beginning in perfection is of course inadmissible. They serve to illustrate the evolution of morality after its birth and after a long prehistoric period. Literature, religions and settled governments, however, imply a developed morality, and we need, if possible, to get lower down, and to see morality coming into existence, and to trace its early growth.

The prevailing morals of savage races must therefore be appealed to in order to furnish us with a lifelike picture, or as accurate a picture as we can now procure, of the morality of primitive men. Sir John Lubbock, Mr. E. B. Tylor, Mr. Herbert Spencer and others, have proved, as far as such a theory allows of proof, that savages shew in a rude form the characteristics which now appear among civilized races in a higher form, and that in fact civilization is the long-descended offspring of savagery. Mr. Wake adopts their conclusions, and goes over much the same ground. But here we meet at once with several difficulties, and are compelled to move warily. Conflicting as ancient history often is, it is not more conflicting than accounts of savage customs and morals. Perhaps this is not to be wondered at. Travellers and missionaries, to whom we are mostly indebted for our information, see just what they take with them—the capacity for seeing, and they easily misrepresent things when they mean to be quite honest. So we have to sift the truth from the error in their narratives as well as we can. The first duty of a sociologist is to allow for the prejudices, the haste, or the incompetency of the observers from whom he receives his facts. When a missionary or a traveller describes the moral and religious ideas and customs of savage races on the strength of knowing a few words of their language, we cannot accept his statements in the same way as we may accept Mr. Darwin's statements about the breeds of pigeons. Verification becomes important; and scepticism until verifi-

cation is the proper attitude of the mind of the inquirer. Some sociologists seem to be deficient in the matter of verification, and manifest an excess of credulity. Still, after sweeping away the wild stories with which Othello tickled the youthful fancy of Desdemona, and distinguishing between credible anthropophagi and incredible "men whose heads do grow beneath their shoulders," we have a valuable residuum left, and there we may plainly see the glimmerings of morality.

The interpretation of the facts of savage life, when we have concluded what they are and were, an interpretation that will explain the power and sanctity of existing moral ideas, is beset with fresh difficulties. Here we must seek for the meaning of the earlier stages of development in the later stages, and appeal to the abiding laws of intelligence. The mind has always operated substantially according to the same methods. No new faculty has been conferred upon it. Primitive moral instincts are dim prophecies of moral laws since discovered, and always there. In the "Midsummer Night's Dream," Theseus gives a rational genesis both of morality and religion. Immediately when the imagination

> "Apprehends some joy,
> It comprehends some bringer of that joy."

The bringer of the joy is first included in the apprehension of the joy, and then, by a process of mental transformation, the bringer of the joy is seen to be logically included, involved or comprehended, in the mere possession of the joy. The inclusive comprehension is complete at the beginning. The logical or mental comprehension is never complete. Always

> "On the glittering summits far withdrawn,
> God makes Himself an awful rose of DAWN."

And the process of evolution is the discovery of what is comprehended in our original apprehensions.

We turn now to savage races. The Australian aborigines seem to be on the lowest level. With them, the words good and bad simply refer to tastes and bodily concerns. The whole tendency of their system is to give everything to the strong, to

the prejudice of the young, and more particularly to the detriment of women. The tribes on the Murray River were accustomed to bait their fish-hooks with fat taken from the bodies of little boys whom they killed for the purpose. Other tribes found a curious utility in murder, from their belief that the spirit of the slain man entered the body of the slayer, and warned him of danger by tickling him in the neighbourhood of the liver. They appear shrewd and quick-witted to a degree that surprises Europeans who have associated with them. But this is mainly animal cunning in the perception of the suitableness of means to ends in providing for their bodily wants. Nor do any undeveloped capacities they may possess, either intellectual or moral, shew any signs of being quickened by intercourse with white colonists. The Veddahs of Ceylon are of opinion that it signifies little whether they do right or wrong. "Conscience," says Captain Burton, "does not exist in Eastern Africa. Repentance expresses regret for missed opportunities of mortal crime. Robbery constitutes an honourable man. Murder—the more atrocious the midnight crime the better—makes the hero." When a Bechuana was asked what it meant to be good, he was much puzzled, but finally answered, "To be good is to possess a wife and cows, and to steal the wife and cows of one's neighbour." A Pawnee said, "He is a good man who is a hunter sly, crafty as a fox, and strong as a wolf." This is the shady side of the picture.

On the other hand, a competent observer like Mr. Alfred Wallace dips his brush in brighter colours. His experiences in the Malay Archipelago brought him into contact with savages of a rare sweetness of character. Mr. Winwood Reade and Dr. Livingstone also frequently met with instances of savage generosity. And the well-known story of Mungo Park and the African women who befriended him is now classical.

On the whole, however, the conclusion that savage morals are prevailingly low is forced upon us. And the hypothesis is, that the morals of our ancestors were the same. The significance of Mr. Wallace's experience retains its full weight, and lends help to the doctrine of Evolution. No matter how lag-

gard the civilization may be in other respects, no matter how science and literature may be absent, and no matter how small may be the influence of the higher races when the sails of white-winged commerce flutter in these distant seas, there is still a moral germ in the savage, and under favourable circumstances it grows into the proportions of a real conscience, gladly serving an ideal law and a divine Lawgiver.

This moral germ, this rudimentary conscience, is in all savages. In some form or another it is inseparable from the conception of man. As we have seen, there are quarters in which its existence even in the rudest shape is bluntly denied. We set these hasty verdicts aside. For the judges who deliver them also mention facts which require a moral postulate in order to be understood. It is an easy matter for travellers who look at customs by which they are properly shocked and revolted, and who have had no practice in philosophical thinking and are unacquainted with historical phases of morals, to conclude that no conscience at all is present when their own fails to hear a distinct echo. But evolution cannot get something out of nothing, any more than theology can. And as they are mostly evolutionists who deny the primitiveness of conscience, they need to be reminded of the law they have forgotten. The moral potentiality must be present at first. It may be a mere stream of tendency, but it is dominated by a divine idea. It is a groping after God in the darkness, sustained by the more than half unconscious faith that a revelation will finally break forth from Him.

Fundamentally, Mr. Wake is "a rational moralist of the intuitive school," to use his own words. He starts his constructive business, however, with a very limited capital. One instinct, one primitive faculty, is sufficient for him. But this is of so pregnant a character, that he finds little difficulty in drawing out of it a transcendental system of morals, and fairly harmonizing humanitarian and transcendental theories. His *terminus a quo* is the sense of right. His *terminus ad quem* is an epoch in which "God in man will be constantly revealed, and the teachings of conscience will supply a perfect standard

of right conduct."* Between the two comes the chaos of savagery and imperfect civilizations, and rude and growing religions, which it is the function of the moralist and sociologist to account for and interpret.

After an exhaustive examination of savage tribes and uncultivated peoples generally, so far as we have particulars of them, both in the Old World and the New, he concludes that the one element invariably present is a sense of right. It manifests itself first as a sense of right to personal life, and afterwards, or it may be contemporaneously, as a sense of right to personal property. That the savage feels his right to life is shewn by the passion with which he defends it, a passion into which he breathes a quasi-moral indignation against attacks which he is conscious are wrongs attempted to be done to him. In the same way he equally feels a right to personal property, to the game he has caught, the produce of the ground he has cultivated, the skins of the animals with which he clothes himself, and the hut he builds to shelter himself from the elements. He may not, and he does not endeavour to give any rationale of his feelings. However, they are there, original factors, and he abides by their dictates without questioning their authority. He can have no other idea than that it must be right to maintain his life and property, and he resists whoever attempts to deprive him of them as a sinner against the constitution of things, which in the savage consciousness is bound up with himself and his personal possessions. His only notion of crime is killing and stealing, and he has no condemnation for anything else. Nor does this condemnation originally go beyond these crimes when he feels the annoyance of them in his own person. He may kill others and he may steal from others, and he may have admiration for successful killers and stealers, but he will not be killed or stolen from. He is a pure egoist.

The extension, however, of rights kindred to his own into a wider circle soon follows. He is prompted to this in the first

* Evolution of Morality, Vol. II. p. 442.

place by family bonds, and afterwards interest and considerations of expediency give him an additional impetus. Wife, or wives, and children are regarded as the personal property of the savage. He lends them, he sells them, he has supreme authority over them. He does not see that they have any rights in relation to him, but of his own rights in relation to them he has an infallible persuasion. As they are his property and, so to speak, external parts of himself, the shadow of his rights spreads over them, and any interference with them, save with the consent of their lawful proprietor, is equivalent to a declaration of personal warfare, and resisted accordingly. So personal right becomes family right; and as each savage boy attains manhood, he at once shares the benefit of the common rights of the family, and acquires fresh rights for himself by virtue of his strength. As for the women, they remain under a protectorate. Tribes and clans are formed by the multiplication of families, and the tie of blood holds them together. They are the family itself extended on a larger scale. They are clusters of families, and the sense of right immediately embraces the opportunity for development thus afforded. From being personal it becomes a family sense, and then a tribal sense, and passes more and more outside egoism. Still, so far there is no distinctively ethical factor present. Propriety is determined by the sense of right only; and though we are bound to believe that the sense of duty is latent, circumstances have not yet occurred to wake it up into activity. The tribe recognizes no rights belonging to other tribes, and killing and stealing, objectionable within the borders, ceases to be so when practised beyond them. The Hebrew commandments, Thou shalt not kill, and Thou shalt not steal, were no protection to the Egyptians and Canaanites.

"How is the sense of duty evolved out of the sense of right?" It is plain that we have not yet reached morality, properly so called. We have hardly got beyond the instinct of self-preservation, and if a savage in this stage were to use Archdeacon Paley's plea, and say "he could not afford to keep a conscience," we should be puzzled how to reply to him with-

out appealing to a sense of duty, apparently not there. Topsy's philosophy in Uncle Tom's Cabin, "I specs I growed," is a true account enough of the matter externally, but it is not complete enough. Duty has grown. The chronological order suffices to prove so much. We want, however, to see the logical order, for there we shall discover the genesis of the moral idea. The passage already quoted from the "Midsummer Night's Dream" seems to throw light on this problem, which Mr. Wake passes by. As in the apprehension of a joy we implicitly comprehend the giver, feeling one must be somehow there where the other is, so in the apprehension of right we implicitly comprehend duty. The savage is conscious that he has rights, and he is conscious also that it is right for him to maintain his own rights. And is not this really another way of saying that he feels it is his duty to maintain them? It is true that the duty is only to himself. It is egoism, and not altruism, after all. Yet its evolution goes on side by side with the evolution of the sense of right, though more slowly, no doubt, because its connection with the advancement of self-interest is never so plain. Obedience to it always involves more or less of an act of faith, otherwise it would be calculation, and its moral beauty gone. Like the sense of right, however, it is extended by degrees to the family and the tribe and the fraternity of tribes. And thus it becomes a duty to protect the rights of all who belong to the same community. Here we appear to have the two sides of conscience at the very initiation of human development, and they are excited one after the other. Right comes first, then the maintenance of right as a duty owing to the individual, which is duty circumscribed within the limits of self. Then follow the rights of the family and tribe, and the maintenance of them as a duty owing to others, which is duty emancipated from personal limitations and grown conscious of wider relationships. In the original apprehension of right, all these future developments, and many more, are implicitly comprehended, and the sense of duty is just the sense of right making itself objective by virtue of its inherent potencies. Stretching outward, it

ultimately embraces the solidarity of mankind, and in its aspirations it catches glimpses of an ideal to which it gives the name of God. These, however, are outcomes to which we must still in many races look forward. They are prophetic rather than historical; but the history, so far as we know it, warrants the prophecy, and the prophecy is simply telling beforehand what evolution will bring to pass when it proclaims on the house-tops the harvest season already pre-determined.

We have now seen the sense of right as a dominant factor in savage life, and we have also seen how the sense of duty is comprehended in the sense of right, while it waits for experience and opportunity to transform the implicit comprehension into a mental and conscious comprehension. The experience and opportunity are provided by religion—superstition we might perhaps call it if we were considering it apart from its after-growths. But with these after-growths in our mind, we avoid the word. We do not care to style those things common or unclean which, imperfect though they were, were yet the best help our parents had in their struggles upward from primitive barbarism.

The savage has no notion of death. What he calls his spirit seems to go on living in dreams, to pass through varied adventures, and to wander wherever it pleases, crossing rivers without getting wet, and climbing mountains without fatigue, while the body lies devoid of sensation and of all signs of life beyond breathing, in sleep. So death seems a kind of sleep, and the spirit continues to live as it had formerly done in dreams. When the body is buried, hunting implements and food are often put away with it; for it is supposed that the spirit will be sure to want them in its new career. When the man is, as we say, dead, he still does not lose his old rights to life, and the means of maintaining life, and the members of the family and tribe respect them the same as before. Then the causal instinct comes into play, and they feel bound to discover by what agency the spirit and the body have been separated. They fix on a personal cause. Some other man,

some enemy, by sorcery or other evil means, must have sent the spirit forth on its bodiless and lonely pilgrimage into the unknown world, and the dead has a right to vengeance, which is the rude conception of justice. If this vengeance be not executed, it is supposed that the spirit will be troubled, and probably be induced to afflict the neglectful members of the family or tribe with dying cattle, blasted crops, domestic calamity, or defeat in war. In this way the sense of duty is extended, and receives a religious sanctity. The early religion is—what Mr. Arnold says all religion is—morality coloured by emotion. But it is emotion in the direction of the supernatural, by which we mean the extra-ordinary, and it is created by the belief in the continued life somewhere of immortal dreamers. Mr. Herbert Spencer says, "among other agents whose approbation or reprobation are contemplated by the savage as consequences of his conduct, are the spirits of his ancestors."* We are not concerned here with Mr. Spencer's attempted explanation of all worship by the primitive worship of ancestors, of which latter fact there is no doubt. It is enough to draw attention to the wider extent and more powerful sanctions that religion in its barbarous beginnings gave to morality. By its means, the ideas of right and duty transcended death. Men feared evil, according to their own notions of evil, not only because of the inconvenience they might suffer from their living fellows, but because of the retribution they expected from the spirits, and the shame that would sit on their faces when they themselves joined their forefathers in the abodes of the dead who were yet living elsewhere. So right waxed more rightful, and duty more dutiful. But intellectual and social development went on slowly, and morality and religion had to keep company with their tardy companions.

Family and tribal, and even national and racial boundaries, were overleapt by brotherhoods or fraternal associations. The origin of these early institutions is obscure, but they seem to have been in some way connected with religious ideas and

* Fortnightly Review, 1871, p. 428.

observances in their primitive stages, however far away they may have departed from their source in later times. They were an extension of the tie of blood-relationship to strangers, who thus were enabled to share all the privileges possessed by their new-made brethren, and imparted a share in their own privileges in return. The Areoi of the South Sea Islands were once a religious fraternity consecrated to the service of the tribal deities, and gathered indiscriminately, or by a spontaneously operating sense of fitness, out of tribes whose members were at deadly enmity with one another. They are now a degenerate set of actors and sorcerers, and the mixture of many tribes among them is almost the sole relic of better days that they retain. Similar fraternal associations were met with by Spaniards in Mexico and Peru. They are also still found exerting a civilizing and humanizing influence both in savage and semi-cultured races. The remembrance of the blood-relationship of the family from which all social progress has sprung, is significantly present in some customs of initiation. In Madagascar, for instance, a small portion of blood is drawn from near the heart, and each party swallows some of that taken from the person who is henceforth constituted his friend and brother for life and death. By this act it is thought that each partakes of the very life of the other, and is mystically one with him. A long form of oath is repeated, and the priests consecrate the new bond by the solemnities of religion. Among the North American Indians, smoking through the same pipe constituted brotherhood between men of different tribes. With the Bedouin Arabs, the relationship is established by partaking of salt together. In other cases, an exchange of names answers the purpose. White men are frequently adopted in this way into the families of powerful chiefs in the South Sea Islands, and afterwards share the honours and privileges belonging to dearly cherished sons. These fraternal associations tend to lessen the evils of a chronic state of warfare. When a man has brothers whose lives are sacred in the camp of the enemy, he becomes a counseller of peace in his own tribe and a friendly ambassador to other tribes. Naturally the growth of

the institutions would be assisted by interest. Everything was in their favour when they made life and property safe through a larger area. But there must also have been an unreckoning and generous sympathy in them as well. They are a confession that, in some sense inexplicable to the savage mind, we are all members one of another; and their legitimate development is the universal brotherhood of mankind, which, in their quaint fashion, they foretell.

"Too much of duty and too little love," said Ulric to his father, in Lord Byron's play of Werner. Hitherto right and duty have occupied us mainly. The strength of morality is, however, in passion, in enthusiasm, and in self-abandonment to the service of others; altruism is its guiding genius and the fulness of the "divine idea." So far as we have gone, we find this only breaking in fitful flashes through the moral night, and then giving way to self again, to egoism, the king with many servants, the deity with many worshipers, now as in olden days. Whence, then, is love, the deliverer from the bondage of self-seeking, and the creator of active beneficence and the enthusiasm of humanity? Pursuing his method of tracing existing human faculties back to their potential germs in the soul of primitive man, Mr. Wake discovers the root of love, sympathy, service, all the tenderer side, and all the sweeter charms and graces of morality, in the maternal instinct. During the dependent and suckling period, the children live on and from their mother, and she lives as much in and by means of them. The longer duration of this period in the human family than in any other members of the animal creation, gives time for the ripening of peculiar affections present nowhere else; and it is not too much to say that it is the maternal instinct which has rendered possible the family, the tribe, the nation and the sentiment of universal fraternity. Savage fathers may and do eat their children, either when pressed by hunger or too indolent to hunt or fish. But there are numberless instances on record where the mother defends her children at the risk of her own life; and when she at last yields to cruel masculine strength, yields with protests, lamen-

tations and tears. We quote one case given by Mr. Wake, sad and terrible enough in all reality, but yet one which shews the yearning of the mother's heart, even while she shares the husband's feast. He says that in Australia, when a man kills his child, "the mother is not permitted to make loud lamentations, else she is beaten. She may, however, express her grief by uttering low stifled moans. It becomes somewhat assuaged when the head of the victim, the mother's legal perquisite in all such cases, is thrown to her, and this she proceeds to eat, sobbing the meanwhile."* If we are asked where here is the maternal instinct to whose creative power we have ascribed so much, we answer, in the low stifled moans and sobs. They are the cry of natural affection, the low beginnings of what hereafter rises so high, and they belong to the woman. It is a microscopic germ of love truly, but it is enough for evolution to start with. Potentialities of growth are in it, and with the times and seasons the ideal mother is born.

We have not left ourselves space to follow Mr. Wake into his exposition of the morality of historical nations. He treats the subject in nine chapters crowded with facts and characterized by vigorous and healthy criticism. We give their titles and a summary of their contents only. Ch. i., "Special Development of Altruism," deals with the Peruvians, the Chinese and Japanese, and the moral teaching of Confucius. Ch. ii., "Positive Phases of Morals," explains the influence of the reflective faculty over the development of the moral idea, and discusses the Hebrews, Greeks, Romans and Egyptians. Ch. iii., "The Doctrine of Emanations," deals with primitive notions of the relation between the soul and God, mysteries, incarnations and new births. Ch. iv., "Hinduism," considers the morality of the Vedic age and the laws of Menu, together with modern Hindu morality. Ch. v., "Buddhism," deals with the character of Gautama, Nirvana, the morals and the supposed atheism of Buddhism, which, however, he thinks is a form of Pantheism. Ch. vi., "Mithraism," is devoted to the

* Evolution of Morality, Vol. I. p. 71.

Zend-avesta and the twelve grades of trial in the Mithraic mysteries. Ch. vii., "Christianity," traces many Christian conceptions to the influence of preceding systems, but attaches peculiar importance to the work of Jesus, and concludes that Christianity embraces the best features of Buddhism and Mithraism. Ch. viii., "Positivism," is concerned with the merits and demerits of Comte's moral teaching, and points out the failure of Positivism as a religious system. Ch. ix., "Religion and Morality," sums up the process of moral development through the rude phases we have described and the higher phases which were evolved. In this he insists on the intimate relation between Religion and Morality, and distinguishes between Religion and Theology. He identifies God with Nature, yet speaks of the Personality of Nature. Finally, he concludes that conscience is the expression of the divine consciousness, and that the true aim of human life is the perfect development of the divine nature in man. This perfection he thus describes:

"Moral perfection is the attainment by the human soul of the highest degree of internal illumination of which it is capable, accompanied by the complete performance of all the moral obligations which the laws of its nature require, for their own sake merely and without any reference to the pleasurable consequences attendant upon virtuous action. Possibly this perfection will never be attained by the race during the existence of man on this earth, and, if at all, it must be looked for in the future life of immortality which the individual rather than the race is undoubtedly born to."*

We have purposely confined ourselves to the initial stages of moral evolution, because we felt that there we encountered all the crucial questions, and that if we succeeded in laying a solid foundation there, the historical and upper stories would be easily built. Mr. Darwin's natural selection and survival of the fittest, Mr. Herbert Spencer's inherited customs growing into a sense of moral authority, Mr. Mill's cultivated utilitarianism, which ends by leaving utilitarianism out in the cold, and the other theories that play so important a part in the

* Evolution of Morality, Vol. II. p. 442.

education of conscience, may all be accepted as co-operating forces when once a germ of conscience is taken for a starting-point. They fail as creative factors, not as factors of evolution. In the same way, intellectual advancement, which Mr. Buckle credits with omnipotence, the growth of science, and the increased complications of the social organism, have sharpened the vision and increased the power of the moral faculty by giving it a wider sphere to work in and multiplied materials on which to operate. And commerce, the intercourse of nations in different stages of development, and the incorporation into the life of lower races of ideas and influences belonging to higher races, have each in turn served as schoolmasters, and trained men through a rough apprenticeship for better things to come. Finally, great characters have appeared, at once of their age and so far its creatures, and above their age and so far new creators, men of God we may call them, founders of religions and apocalypses of the ideal; and humanity has reaped, it may often have been ungratefully, what they have sown in tears.

Some survivals continue to tell of our origin. In some cases they are now harmless, in others not altogether so. Polygamy has become the second marriage of men, and polyandry the second marriage of women. Savage brotherhoods are Masonic lodges. Human sacrifices in religion are represented by the divine sacrifice of Christ, which is interpreted as putting an end to the necessity for all further sacrifices. War is a survival of the ancient tribal animosities not yet conquered by the spirit of Christianity. And these survivals in various ways account for the slow progress of some savage races. It is not that the races are incapable of development, but they are crushed and extirpated before they can shew what their capacities are when they come into collision with ourselves. We have treated them too much after the fashion of the Methodist missionaries who recently killed eighty savages as compensation for the loss of three Englishmen; and if this is to be the proportionate value we set upon them, they cannot last much longer. The apparent unimprovability of the Australian abo-

rigenes, mentioned by Mr. Wake, may only be that we have preferred using them for our purposes to teaching them how to avail themselves little by little of the advantages offered by European civilization. Negroes in the United States and elsewhere are a standing proof of the possibilities inherent in the lower races. And Kaffirs who are hostile to the ruthless colonists of the Transvaal may be converted by Bishop Colenso.

We frankly accept the hypothesis, for it is yet no more, of Evolution. It is a Theistic hypothesis, and neither theology as a science nor religion as life suffers from it at all. God remains the Alpha and Omega. Applied to morality, it is full of inspiration. The divine idea was in man, and man had a yearning after God which ultimately shaped itself into an idea of Him from the beginning, from the time that man was man. The sense of right implicitly contained the sense of duty. Both flourished under family and tribal institutions. Brotherhoods and fraternal associations secured for them an extended area of activity. Religion strengthened and sanctioned right conduct with the approbation of invisible powers, and with everlasting consequences following upon the actions done here. Evolution does not perhaps paint portraits of our ancestors that we should care to hang among our family pictures. People who would be glad enough to acknowledge descent from Robinson Crusoe, would indignantly disclaim the remotest connection with Man Friday. But the theory of development from a primitive savagery akin to Man Friday's, is more hopeful than the theory of a fall from perfection to start with, and slow upward struggles, only partially successful, afterward. We begin low, yet with a descent from God, and in less than Adam to grow into more than Adam, and we proceed to the man who is to be. "What a piece of work is (this) man! How noble in reason, how infinite in faculties, in form and moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a God, the beauty of the universe, the paragon of animals!" Surely it must have been some such dream of the humanity to come, to be fulfilled by the evolution of the divine idea, that the Hebrew cosmogonist

had when he heard the morning stars sing together and the sons of God shout for joy, and that afterwards possessed the souls of the shepherds of Bethlehem when they watched their flocks by night, and heard angels singing in the sky. Physical science justly prides itself on the results of the inductive processes it has pursued with triumphant energy. Theology and religion are the idealization of the moral sense; and while they accept induction and all it can give, they venture also upon deduction which flies boldly forward when induction folds its wings. They find God involved in the constitution of the human mind, and the veracity of consciousness vouches for intercourse between Him and us. And their deductive deliverance is that to our growth in the knowledge of the perfections of God there is and there can be no end. Inductive reason follows in their track, and one by one finds their prophecies true. John Sterling makes Sir Harry Vane say to Cromwell:

> "If at once we may not
> Declare the greatness of the work we plan,
> Be sure, at least, that ever in our eyes
> It stand complete before us, as a dome
> Of light beyond this gloom,—a house of stars
> Encompassing these dusky tents,—a thing
> Absolute, close to all, though seldom seen,
> Near as our hearts and perfect as the heavens."

And these are the utterances of Evolution. The ideal exists, and we attain to it by trusting it.

There is an anecdote told of the young Goethe which is significant alike of the future man in the boy, and of the manhood of the race slowly rising out of childhood. Mr. Lewes tells the story thus:

"Unable to ascribe a form to the Deity, he resolved to seek Him in His works, and in the good old Bible fashion to build an altar to Him. For this purpose he selected some types, such as ores and other natural productions, and arranged them in symbolical order on the ranges of a music-stand; on the apex was to be a flame typical

of the soul's aspiration, and for this a pastille did duty. Sunrise was awaited with impatience. The glittering of the house-tops gave signal; he applied a burning-glass to the pastille; and thus was the worship consummated by a priest of seven years old, alone in his bedroom."*

The moral history of the world and the moral aspects of the world to-day may be interpreted so as to bear out a farther development of the doctrines evolved by Calvin from dyspepsia, and make all men reprobate. We may detect everywhere the trail of the serpent. We may reduce civilization to its lowest denominator. We may define man by his savage attributes solely, as we may define the music of a violinist as "the sound produced by the scraping of the tails of horses over the intestines of cats." But this is a poor business, and we feel that evolution so expounded takes us in. On the other hand, we may belong to the old Commonwealth sect of seekers, as Sir Harry Vane did, and, like the boy Goethe, we may let the flame of the pastille illuminate the dark, dull base of ores, and merge in the daylight that it symbolizes. Then universal reprobation is universal election, and evolution is the scientific name for the indwelling life of God outwardly manifesting itself from age to age. It means the constant putting off of the old man, and the constant becoming of the new creature. So we have one idea, whether we say "Evolution" or "Alleluia."

WILLIAM BINNS.

* Life of Goethe, Book I. ch. iii. p. 23.

## VI.—RECENT EDITIONS OF THE EPISTLE OF BARNABAS.

*Heydecke: Dissertatio qua Barnabæ Epistola interpolata demonstretur.* Brunsvigæ. 1875.

*Skworzow: Patrologische Untersuchungen.* Leipzig. 1875.

*Braunsberger: Der Apostel Barnabas: sein Leben und der ihm beigelegte Brief wissenschaftlich gewürdigt.* Mainz. 1876.

*Güdemann: Religionsgeschichtliche Studien.* Leipzig. 1876.

*Rev. W. Cunningham: A Dissertation on the Epistle of S. Barnabas.* London. 1877.

*G. H. Rendall: Edition and Translation of the Epistle of Barnabas appended to Cunningham's Dissertation.*

*Hilgenfeld: Barnabæ Epistula, integram Græce iterum edidit, veterem interpretationem Latinam, Commentarium criticum et adnotationes addidit A. H.* Lipsiæ. 1877.

*Gebhardt and Harnack: Barnabæ Epistula Græce et Latine.* Lipsiæ. 1878.

*Funk: Opera Patrum Apostolicorum: Editio post Hefelianam quartam quinta.* Tubingæ. 1878.

THE list of works on Barnabas at the head of this article is proof of the interest which is taken in the study of early Christian literature. And the list is by no means complete. Besides several articles which have appeared in periodicals, special notice should be made of Professor Milligan's able account of Barnabas in Dr. Smith's Dictionary of Christian Biography, and of Harnack's in the new edition of Herzog's Real-Encyclopædie. The theology of Barnabas's Epistle has also been discussed in Pfleiderer's Paulinismus, and in the work of Prof. Engelhardt just published, "Das Christenthum Justins des Märtyrers."

It is with peculiar pleasure that we note among the monographs on Barnabas one from an English scholar. Mr. Cunningham's treatise is a valuable contribution to the discussion of the questions connected with the Epistle of Barnabas. It is

well written and marked by thorough independence, mastery of all requisite knowledge, and a genuine spirit of investigation. Rendall's edition of the Epistle is also worthy of great praise. The editor shews conspicuous ability in dealing with his authorities and in his selection of readings. And both dissertation and edition awaken the feeling of regret that Oxford and Cambridge, with their vast resources, do so little in this department when they might do so much. We trust also that they are a happy augury for greater results in the future.

Mr. Cunningham is mistaken in attributing to me the translation of the Epistle of Barnabas in the Ante-Nicene Christian Library. It was made by Dr. Roberts. I think that his remark in regard to that translation, that "it is not in all respects a satisfactory rendering," is uncalled for. No one who has translated a Greek book has ever given a translation in all respects satisfactory. The feat is impossible. The translator can only attempt to bring the English reader as near to the thought of the Greek writer as the peculiarities of the languages will permit him. And it seems to me that in the circumstances Dr. Roberts performed his task with great success. It is indeed rather curious that, where a sharp critic might find fault with Dr. Roberts's translation, he will generally have the same fault to find with Mr. Rendall's. Thus in the first chapter the opening sentence is in Rendall, "Joy be with you, sons and daughters, in the name of the Lord who loved us in peace;" in Roberts, "All hail, ye sons and daughters, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, who loved us in peace." Rendall takes care to punctuate in both his Greek and Latin in such a way that no one can doubt the meaning to be, "All hail in peace." And yet both translations plainly connect "in peace" with "who loved us." Roberts translates συγχαίρω ἐμαυτῷ, "I inwardly rejoice;" and Rendall, "I rejoice in my own *heart*." But συγχαίρω with the dative almost invariably means, "I congratulate," and therefore the Latin "gratulor mihi" is more likely to be correct than either of the English translations. Lightfoot points out that in a passage less clear than this, Phil. ii. 17, συγχαίρω with the dative means "to congratulate,"

and quotes this passage in confirmation. Rendall has translated two aorists in the first chapter, ἐξέπληξεν and ἔλαβον, by English perfects, "hath moved" and "I have received." Roberts has done the same. A third aorist occurs in the chapter, ἐσπούδασα, which Roberts translates, "I have hastened," but Rendall, "I made haste." The entire passage deserves attention. The Greek is, ἐσπούδασα κατὰ μικρὸν ὑμῖν πέμπειν, ἵνα μετὰ τῆς πίστεως ὑμῶν τελείαν ἔχητε τὴν γνῶσιν. Roberts translates, "I have hastened briefly to write unto you in order that along with your faith ye might have perfect knowledge." Rendall translates, "I made haste shortly to send unto you, that ye might have your knowledge perfected with your faith." If the context be read, I think it will appear that of the three aorists ἐσπούδασα is most appropriately translated by the perfect. κατὰ μικρὸν can scarcely mean "shortly;" but most likely Mr. Rendall means "shortly" to be equivalent to "briefly," a meaning which, though legitimate, would not strike the ordinary reader in the connection in which it stands in the passage. The word τελείαν does not contain a participial idea, and Dr. Roberts is therefore more correct than Mr. Rendall. And, finally, both have rendered the subjunctive "might," when the idea plainly is "may." The Greek, of course, admits the translation "might," but the writer is evidently looking from the present to the prospective benefits of his letter: "I made haste to write, and now I have written that ye may have." In all points the old Latin translation is in our opinion strictly accurate, if we remember that *consummata* is used continually as an adjective: "pauca vobis mittere ut fidem vestram consummatam habeatis et scientiam." We have confined ourselves to the first chapter, and only to a portion of that, but we think we have said enough to shew that an acrid critic can easily find material for fault-finding in any translation, if he is inclined. Both Dr. Roberts and Mr. Rendall shew themselves perfectly competent to deal with the text. None of the points adduced involves an ignorance of Greek. And it will be found that sometimes Dr. Roberts has been happier in his translation than Mr. Rendall, and sometimes the case stands the other way.

Heydecke's book is a prize essay revised. It is remarkable for great ingenuity and most minute study of his author, but is unsatisfactory. Braunsberger's work is also a prize essay, and has deservedly gained the prize. It is graceful in style, accurate in its authorities, and temperate in tone. The author is a Roman Catholic, and therefore looks on the Council of Trent as settling doctrinal questions, but within certain limits he investigates with great fairness, freedom and good sense. In regard to the Epistle of Barnabas, he has devoted special attention to two questions. The first is the history of the letter after the second century, and the bearing of that history on its canonicity. To a Catholic, this inquiry is of great importance and interest; but to one who does not feel bound by the decrees of the Council of Trent, it is the opinions held in the second and third centuries that awaken the greatest curiosity. Did Clement of Alexandria and Origen regard the Epistle as inspired? If they did, and Braunsberger does not deny this, then the question arises, Were not Clement and Origen as good critics as any that afterwards arose in the Church? And had not these men access to as good, if not better, sources of information than any that lived in the fourth century? If, however, they were wrong in attributing inspiration to Barnabas, might they not be wrong in attributing inspiration to other canonical writings? To one who believes that the Church was infallibly inspired to pronounce what books are infallibly inspired, the problem is not difficult; but to those who have not this faith, the interest of the question in regard to books believed to be inspired, centres around their history during the first ages of Christianity. The other subject which Braunsberger has minutely discussed is the knowledge which Barnabas possessed of Jewish customs. Güdemann's article is entirely occupied with the same subject, and at a subsequent part of this paper I shall discuss both their contributions to our knowledge of this matter. I remark here only that Braunsberger and Güdemann seem to have written independently of each other.

Hilgenfeld's edition marks an era in the text of the Epistle

of Barnabas. Bryennius, the Macedonian bishop who discovered the MS. of the Epistles of Clemens Romanus in Constantinople, sent him a collation of the same manuscript's text of Barnabas—a compliment which he well deserved for his services to patristic literature—and he thus gives us a text based on the Constantinopolitan MS. as well as on the Sinaitic and other MSS. which had been previously used. Hilgenfeld has prefixed short dissertations, has subjoined a full critical apparatus, and has added explanatory notes. His edition is indispensable to every student of the Apostolic Fathers. Gebhardt and Harnack, who had already edited the Epistle of Barnabas, determined to revise their work after Hilgenfeld had published his collation of the Constantinopolitan MS. And their edition is a model of thoroughness, accuracy and wealth of illustration. Gebhardt has done the critical work with great diligence and skill, and Harnack has illustrated the text, and discussed the questions as to authorship, date and such-like matters, with an extraordinary knowledge of all that has been written on the subject, and with great sobriety of judgment and clear insight. Funk's edition is Hefele's fourth edition brought up to date. The introductory notices are short but comprehensive. The notes on the text are also concise, but good. In the Epistle of Barnabas, Funk has not given the old Latin translation, but a modern one, a procedure which seems to us not profitable for the purchasers of the book.

In most of these publications we necessarily come upon a discussion of questions which have already been discussed without much new light being thrown on them. There are, however, a few new points which we shall proceed to examine.

The first new problem which demands solution is the comparative value of the Sinaitic and Constantinopolitan codices. In the case of the Epistle of Barnabas we find very nearly the same phenomena as we found in the Epistles of Clement. There are, for example, a considerable number of differences where there is no difference in meaning, and where therefore one or other of the transcribers must have altered the word. We give a few in parallel columns:

| S. | C. |
|---|---|
| ὑπερβολήν | ὑπεροχήν |
| ἄνευ | ἄτερ |
| περί | ὑπέρ |
| τρώγειν | ἐσθίειν |
| ἐπί | εἰς. |

Somewhat similar to these are the instances where the one manuscript gives a simple word, the other a compound of it.

| S. | C. |
|---|---|
| καταφθοράν | φθοράν |
| βλέποντες | ἐμβλέποντες |
| ἐπιτίθησιν | τίθησιν |
| περιέτεμεν | ἔτεμεν. |

Among those differences in which the transcribers thought they made no change, is specially to be noted the alteration of κύριος into θεός, or of θεός into κύριος. In many instances, κύριος and θεός meant the same thing, as in the passages quoted from the Old Testament; but the transcribers did not hesitate to make the alteration when Christ is referred to as Lord, believing the words in his case to be identical in meaning; and by the addition of θεός to Χριστός in a manuscript, or by its substitution, the orthodox no doubt felt in Arian times that they were asserting the truth and glorifying Christ. Unquestionably the opposite change would sometimes be made by Arian transcribers. Accordingly, manuscripts abound in the substitution of the one term for the other. In the Epistle before us we have noted seven instances. It is remarkable that in all these cases the Sinaitic has θεός, and that it converts even οὐ into θεοῦ, xii. 11, a circumstance which ought to have considerable weight in determining its famous reading in the First Epistle of Clement and some readings of the New Testament, such as John i. 18. In one, it substitutes θεοῦ for Ἰησοῦ. All the other authorities, the Constantinopolitan, the Greek Vulgate and the Latin translation, are against it, and the corrector of the Sinaitic has changed the θεοῦ into Ἰησοῦ. In another instance, the Sinaitic stands alone in reading θεῷ, in opposition to the same

authorities. In one passage, C is alone in reading κυρίου, all the others reading θεοῦ. In other two passages, S and C read θεῷ, where the Greek Vulgate and the Latin translation in one instance, and the Greek Vulgate and Clemens Alexandrinus (the Latin translation failing us here), read κυρίῳ. The other two instances are found in the parts where either the Greek Vulgate or the Latin translation fails us. The Sinaitic has θεῷ once against C and the Latin translation, and once it has θεοῦ against C and the Greek Vulgate.

A difference which was seen distinctly in the Clementine Letters, comes out even more plainly in the Epistle of Barnabas. The Sinaitic manuscript abounds in itacisms—what we have a right to call misspellings—and has grammatical forms, such as σάρκαν, which belong to a late age and are characteristic of the vulgar. The Constantinopolitan is on the whole very free from these, and where S is ungrammatical, it observes the rules of grammar, and where words are treated irregularly, it has the regular forms. Thus S has ἐπιποθήτη, C ἐπιπόθητος; S ἐραννῶντας, C ἐρευνῶντας; S ἐπισωρεύοντες, C ἐπισωρεύοντας, where the accusative is grammatical, and the nominative is not. S has continually a future form, as δείξει, where a subjunctive would be used in classical Greek. C is invariably correct in these cases. Other such phenomena present themselves on every hand. Which manuscript deserves our confidence? I have no hesitation in pronouncing generally in favour of C. The scribe of the Sinaitic was unquestionably an ignorant person. He did not know Greek as every cultivated man knew it down even to the latest times. If, therefore, he committed gross mistakes in spelling and declension such as no editor now admits into his text, what guarantee have we that such forms as ἐραννῶντας, or ἥξει after ἵνα, or βλέπετε after ὅταν, were in the original manuscript? Such are exactly the forms which we might expect in an illiterate person's writings. Have we any right to attribute them to the writer of the Epistle of Barnabas? If he was an Alexandrian, as there is some reason to conjecture, then such a form as ἀπροσωπολήμπτως is probable; but we may well hesitate to accept any of them on the autho-

rity of one manuscript against all the others, even though it is older.

When we come to those passages in which there is a difference of meaning in the readings, we are led to the conclusion that neither S nor C is entirely to be trusted, but that on the whole C is safer than S, probably because the scribe of C took more interest in what he was copying. There are mistakes in both. C has *συμφοράν* for *προσφοράν*, *ἀετός* for *Μωϋσῆς*, *ἐνδοξάζουσι* for *ὃν δόξουσι*, *ἡμᾶς* frequently for *ὑμᾶς*, several omissions, and some other slight mistakes, which Gebhardt has collected in a note, Prol. xxxii. note 5. But the mistakes are quite as numerous in the Sinaitic manuscript. Hilgenfeld has given a list of the most important in his edition and in his Zeitschrift. There is this difference between some of them and those of C, that they render the text utterly obscure. Thus in i. 6 occurs an important passage which is not found in the Latin. It is at least something like sense in C; it is confused nonsense in S. In c. iii. the reading of S, *ἐπίλυτοι*, led Weizsäcker into a vain effort to extract a peculiar meaning. C restores *προσήλυτοι*, so as to harmonize with the Latin, ut non incurramus tanquam proselyti ad illorum legem. Both Greek MSS. give *προσρησσώμεθα*, which Rendall translates, "that we be not as proselytes dashed in pieces against their law." It seems to me more likely that the genuine reading was *προσρεησώμεθα*, for an aorist *κατερρεύσατο* is found in Anna Comnena (Veitch, Irregular Verbs, p. 308), and *προσρέω* is found with a dative in Plutarch. Again, in the famous passage about the Testament in the fourth chapter, S omits the important words, *ἐκείνων καὶ ἡμῶν*. Sometimes both agree in the same errors and the same omissions. One instance of this appears to us to occur in a corrupt passage, not translated in the Latin. The Greek has *ὁ ἀλγῶν σάρκα διὰ τοῦ ῥύπου τοῦ ὑσσώπου ἰᾶται*, where it seems to me that both have omitted *διὰ* before *τοῦ ὑσσώπου* on account of the previous *διά*—a common omission in MSS. in similar circumstances.

An editor has therefore in all doubtful cases to weigh carefully all the evidence. In one of these, which is considered of great

importance in determining the date, νῦν καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ὑπηρέται (xvi. 4), the Sinaitic alone has the second καί. All the others, the Constantinopolitan, the Greek Vulgate and the Latin, omit it, and it seems to me that their weight is overpowering as against the simple testimony of the Sinaitic.

The recent editors shew decided partiality in their use of the manuscripts. Hilgenfeld has an unmistakable affection for the Constantinopolitan, which he calls the Jerusalem manuscript, and has adopted some readings, such as τὸν νεκρόν after τὸν ὄφιν, which have no support elsewhere, and are not likely in themselves. Gebhardt adheres still more closely to the Sinaitic, retaining many readings which are found only in that manuscript, and which are decidedly objectionable. Both editors, however, exercise their judgment, both shew great critical skill, and both have given good texts. For the reasons we have already adduced, we think that Hilgenfeld's is nearer the original.

The next point that demands consideration is the value to be assigned to the Latin translation. In regard to this matter difference of opinion exists, some thinking that the translation is of an early date and of high authority, and others expressing an opposite conviction. But Gebhardt is the only one that seems to have fully weighed its claims, and he pronounces strongly against it. He asserts that the translator took very great liberties with his text, omitting large portions and making alterations according to his fancy. He is cautious, however, not to deprive it of all value, and he has used it to good purpose in the constitution of his text. I think that his estimate of its value is too low, and arises from a failure to consider fully the circumstances in which it must have been made. No one in those times had a clear conception of what a translation should be. No one thought of reproducing exactly the ideas of his original. The translator thought rather of the benefit his readers would derive from the translation. The translation of the Epistle of Barnabas was made at a time when the personality of the writer was considered of no consequence, and when a great change had taken place in the

mode of viewing certain questions. Accordingly, the translator omits many passages which are of a purely personal nature. He also omits passages where he cannot make out the meaning, or where there seems to be unnecessary repetition. And he omits phrases which appear to him to have become obsolete, such as calling the Christians a "new" people. But if we make allowance for these defects, then in other respects the translation must be considered valuable. The translator has in most places translated word for word, and he has sometimes done so where the grammatical construction must have seemed confusing. Thus he has, "ad summam docens populum Judæorum et magna signa et monstra faciens non crediderunt nec dilexerunt eum." Neither Sinaitic nor Constantinopolitan nor any other of the Greek codices give so good a sense. The Sinaitic has, *πέρας γέ τοι διδάσκων τὸν Ἰσραὴλ καὶ τηλικαῦτα τέρατα καὶ σημεῖα ποιῶν ἐκήρυσσεν καὶ ὑπερηγάπησαν αὐτόν.* C reads, *οὐχ ὅτι ἐκήρυσσε.* Probably the right reading is, *οὐκ ἤρεσε καὶ οὐκ ἠγάπησαν αὐτόν.* But possibly the Latin translator conjectured that the reading was *οὐκ ἔπεισε*, the manuscript being indistinct. While it is true that there are almost no correct passages in the Latin which are not supported by some Greek manuscript, it is equally true that there are very few passages in which the Latin is not as correct as the others, making allowances for the omissions and for palpable corruptions in the text, such as aram for eremum, pascentem probably for proficiscentem, and similitudine for simplicitate. Wherever the Latin differs widely from the Greek, there is good reason for suspecting that the Greek is corrupt; and indeed in most of such cases it is plainly corrupt.

To pass from textual criticism to what is called the higher criticism, we encounter the first novelty in Heydecke's treatise. It is to some extent a revival of Schenkel's theory, but with considerable modifications. Heydecke maintains that the original Epistle contained chapters i. to iii., then chapters xiii. to xvi., then iv., and finally xvii. to xxi.; that this portion was written by a Jewish Christian to Jewish Christians; that, in fine, it was written by Barnabas in the reign of Vespasian.

He maintains that the other chapters, v. to xii., are an interpolation written by a Gentile Christian to Gentile Christians, in a spirit of bitter animosity to the Jews, in the reign of Hadrian. His arguments are based almost entirely on the supposed connection between the various parts. He thinks that by his own re-arrangement he gets one subject continuously worked out. He moreover believes that the genuine portion affirms that the Jewish rites were wisely practised by the Jews, were preparatory to Christianity, and were abrogated only by the appearance of Christ on earth. To lead the Jews to see in Christ the fulfilment of the law, is one great object of the genuine Epistle. On the other hand, the interpolated portion cuts off all connection between external Judaism and Christianity. The Jews were deceived by an evil angel into the practice of the rites, and if they had not been great sinners, they would have seen that Moses wrote in the spirit, and that the prescriptions to external observances were in reality commands only to purify the spirit of man. This interpolated part has also a different purpose. The writer wishes to prove the divinity of Christ against the Ebionites.

The answer to Heydecke is, that there is not one single passage in the so-called genuine Epistle which positively asserts that the observance of the Jewish rites was a duty; that it is unreasonable to expect in a writer like the author of the Epistle a strict continuity of thought; that the main object of the writer was to explain to his readers what was able to save them, and not merely to expound the past and the present; and that it justly exposes a theory to suspicion when, as in this case, the author of it has to suppose interpolations even in the genuine part, as Heydecke does in chapters xv. and xvi. Moreover, the style is throughout the whole work the same. And we may also affirm that Heydecke is so intent on his theory as to shut his eyes to points of connection that plainly exist. Thus the end of the fourth chapter and the beginning of the fifth are closely connected. The writer has stated that the Jews lost the covenant, for they were not worthy. Their crowning sin was their rejection of Jesus. They

had seen his miracles and had rejected him; for such we take to be the meaning of the last sentence of the fourth chapter. And now God had abandoned them. What then, the question would naturally arise, was the object of Christ's coming? And the fifth chapter answers that it was to save the Christians, the new and true people of God, and to bring the sins of the Jews to a culmination. The fifth chapter is thus an essential part of the structure, and flows out of the fourth. That the writer should discuss the saving power of Jesus at some length, was natural in an Epistle that was to seek "the things that can save us," iv. 1, xvii. 1. How well the whole subject coheres, may be seen in the admirable chapters which Mr. Cunningham has devoted to the theology of the Epistle.

The next subject which calls for attention is the date. Here there is really nothing new. Braunsberger and Harnack shew a wise moderation in judging of the evidence for a date. But all the others venture on conjecture, and the diversity of their conjectures is almost a demonstration that they are on the wrong track, or at least labouring in barren soil. The passage on which these chronological speculations are based is in the fourth chapter. Rendall thus translates it: "The final offence is at hand, concerning which it is written as Enoch saith. For to this end hath the Master shortened the times and the days that his Beloved might hasten and come unto the inheritance. And the prophet too saith thus: 'Ten kingdoms shall reign upon the earth, and there shall rise up after them a little king, who shall bring low three of the kings under one.' Likewise concerning the same thing, Daniel saith: 'And I saw the fourth beast, evil and strong and fiercer than all the beasts of the earth, and that out of it arose ten horns, and out of them a little horn growing beside them, and that it brought low under one three of the great horns.' Ye ought then to understand." Of this passage Barnabas gives no interpretation, and therefore there is no solid basis for any chronological inference. Indeed, from what we have of the writer's interpretations of other parts of Scripture, we may conclude that it is impossible to conjecture what his interpretation of these passages might be. Those

who make chronological inferences must first conjecture his interpretation. They suppose that by the ten horns ten Roman emperors are meant. But a difficulty arises at the threshold. In counting, are we to include Julius Cæsar among the emperors, or are we not? Have we any means of conjecturing which method Barnabas would adopt? Then comes the little king. Is he one of the ten, or is he an eleventh? It seems to us that the text plainly implies that he is the eleventh, but interpreters in their straits have made him the tenth. Then are we to suppose that Barnabas looked on the prophecy as completely fulfilled, or did he imagine that only a portion of it had been fulfilled, but a sufficient portion to shew that the rest would be in due time accomplished? To add to the difficulties, it may be safely asserted that there was no Roman emperor in the first two centuries that brought low at one time three of his predecessors. The history of the Roman emperors does not fit in with the prophecy. Notwithstanding all these difficulties, the love of conjecture has prevailed over the critics, and most have hazarded their conjecture, and out of their conjecture come to a conclusion. Professor Milligan, Heydecke and Cunningham, think that Vespasian is meant; Skworzow believes that Domitian is the little king; Hilgenfeld upholds the claims of Nerva; others are for Hadrian; and Volkmar thinks that the three kings are Nerva, Trajan and Hadrian, and that Barnabas was expecting the little king to come and bring them low. Conclusive objections can be urged against all these conjectures. Vespasian can by no possibility be counted the eleventh. It is not fair to count him even the tenth, for the appeal to the Sibylline books is unsatisfactory, and Julius Cæsar was no more emperor than Sulla. Vespasian certainly did not humiliate three kings at one time. He had no connection with the death of Galba and Otho. Nor can it be Domitian. It is impossible to name three kings whose humiliation could be ascribed to Domitian. Skworzow understands by the three kings, Britain, Dacia and Germany! Nor can it be Nerva; for to say that he overthrew the three Flavians is utterly contrary to the facts of history. He had not even a

hand in the death of his immediate predecessor. And still less admissible is it to make Nerva, Trajan and Hadrian, the three kings; for this is the purest conjecture, without the semblance of a basis. But even could we have found one emperor whom we could fix on as the one intended by Barnabas, we should still have difficulties before us. We have next to identify the emperor with the τέλειον σκάνδαλον, but the term suits none of them. Domitian is the only one of them who was a persecutor, but his persecutions were confined to Rome, and therefore it is impossible to suppose that an Alexandrian writer would look on him as the incarnation of evil. There is no reason whatever for imagining that the Christians had any dread of Vespasian, or Nerva, or Hadrian, or any other that fancy may select. A closer examination of the passage adds to the difficulties which I have already mentioned. τὸ τέλειον σκάνδαλον is not adequately rendered by the words, "the final offence." τέλειος does not signify "final," but complete, perfect. The τέλειον σκάνδαλον is the stumbling-block that is perfect or complete, the cause of offence that has reached the highest or culminating point of intensity. Now it is extremely unlikely that such a term would be applied to an emperor, however persecuting he might be. The Christians did not fear persecution. It was error, delusion, unrighteousness, that they feared; and σκάνδαλον is associated with these, and not with mere material power. To take one instance from the Epistle of Polycarp, which has many features in common with the work before us, σκάνδαλα are associated with "false brethren, and those who bear the name of the Lord in hypocrisy, who lead astray vain men" (vi. 3). But I think that we can go somewhat further in our interpretation of this passage with considerable probability of being right. The τέλειον σκάνδαλον appears to me to be well translated in the Latin *consummata temptatio*, and the idea seems to be, not one particular cause of sin, but the period when temptation would be most severe. It is in this sense nearly equal to the lawless time, or time of error, so frequently mentioned in the Epistle. I think further that the sense of the sentence in which it occurs is, that the

period of fiercest temptation and greatest sin had drawn nigh, and God, in order to shorten this period, had sent His Son. The quickening of His Son therefore refers to the coming of Christ, and the entering on the inheritance is the gathering of the elect from all the nations of the earth after Christ's death, and the rescue of them from the realm of the evil one, from the present evil age. It seems to me that Barnabas would construe the prophecy in Daniel as rather referring to the period of Christ's first coming, and the fulfilment of it as proof that the severest trial of Christians under the ruler of the powers of darkness was in his own day taking place. The same idea is contained in the words that occur in a subsequent section of the chapter, translated by Rendall, "Wherefore let us take heed in the last days; for the whole time of your faith will profit you nothing, unless now in the iniquitous time, and in the offences that are coming (τοῖς μέλλουσιν σκανδάλοις), we resist as becomes sons of God." The offences to come are evidently a feature of the culminating period of offence.

It is useless to conjecture how Barnabas might interpret the words of Daniel, but we may venture to assert that if he lived in Alexandria he would be more likely to find the fulfilment in the circumstances of his own city than in the history of Rome. He would be, at any rate, as likely to see in the extinction of the Macedonico-Egyptian monarchs in Cleopatra, the eleventh of her line, an indication of a fulfilled prophecy, as in any line of Romans. It is true that history does not assign to her the subjugation of three of her predecessors, but she certainly humiliated several of the great ones of the earth. But, as we have said, all is conjecture here, and Harnack is justified in affirming, "Itaque nostrum est missis ambagibus confiteri in tempore confectionis epistolæ Barnabæ definiendo loci, c. iv. 4, 5, usu esse supersedendum."

The last subject which we shall here discuss is the new light thrown on the acquaintance of the writer of the Epistle with Jewish practices. Most commentators in this century have been inclined to accuse him of gross ignorance; but

Braunsberger and Güdemann have tried to shew that they were wrong in this. They have certainly added somewhat to our knowledge, and the recent editors have introduced the results in their editions. We shall attempt to value the new materials in regard to the two prominent rites in the treatment of which the writer was believed to shew great ignorance—the day of Atonement and the red heifer.

Barnabas's words in regard to the day of Atonement are these. We give Rendall's translation. "What then saith he in the prophet? 'And let them eat of the goat which is offered at the fast for all sins.' Give heed carefully. 'And let the priests alone all eat of the inwards unwashen with vinegar.' .... Give heed then now he maketh commandment. 'Take two fine goats like to each other, and offer them, and let the priest take the one for a whole burnt-offering for sins.' But to the other one what shall they do? 'Accursed,' it saith, 'is that one' .... 'and spit ye all upon it, and pierce it, and put the scarlet wool about its head; and so let it be cast into the wilderness.'"

The new interpretation, which is a revival of an old one, affirms that Barnabas had in his mind three goats; that in fact a third goat was sacrificed on the day of Atonement, as on other feast days; and that this was the only one eaten by the priests. Güdemann infers from this that the writer was intimately acquainted with Jewish rites; for here is a part of the ceremony which would certainly escape a Gentile. But the words of Barnabas will not allow the inference made by Güdemann. The words are, "Let them eat of the goat which is offered at the fast for all sins." Here only one goat can be meant. It is "*the* goat that is offered," not one of the goats, and it is offered on the fast for all sins. Güdemann is forced to translate, "Let them eat of the goat which is offered also on the day of Atonement, as well as on other feast days, for all sins." But not only is the translation inadmissible, but the context plainly is against Güdemann. The writer quotes the passage applicable to the day of Atonement: "Whosoever keepeth not the fast, shall be utterly destroyed with death"

(Lev. xxiii. 29). And after a few explanatory remarks, follows the passage which we have quoted above. He evidently intends that we should notice the contradiction. The fast was to be strictly obligatory, and yet the priests were to eat. The contradiction must have been evident to the writer; and the contradiction would be a proof to him that the injunctions were never intended to be carried out literally, but were throughout symbolical. So far, therefore, is Güdemann from having proved that the writer was intimately acquainted with Jewish rites, that he has convicted him of another instance of ignorance or negligence; for if he had known of the third goat, he would certainly have not contrasted the obligation to fast with the command to break the fast by eating this third goat.

Güdemann confesses that nowhere is any injunction to be found that the priests were to eat "the inwards unwashen with vinegar." But from the Mischna he adduces a passage which states that, if the day of Atonement fell on a Friday, the Babylonian priests ate the goat raw, because they were not nice. And Jochanan explains that it was not Babylonian, but Alexandrian, priests that did this. Now here we have really no elucidation. There is no eating of the inwards; there is no vinegar. And yet these are the absolutely essential points. The precept to the priests to eat the inwards foreshadowed Christ's receiving gall; and the accompaniment of the vinegar foreshadowed that Christ was to receive vinegar with the gall.

The only illustrations that Güdemann can adduce of the verse, "And spit ye upon it," &c., are two statements—one, that the Babylonians pulled the goat by the hair, and cried, "Take [our sins] and go, take and go;" and the other, that by the Babylonians were meant the Alexandrians.

The result is, that after all the new matter that has been brought forward, the case remains substantially as it was before. Many and great discrepancies still exist between the Epistle of Barnabas on the one hand, and the Bible and the Talmud on the other. Neither Bible nor Talmud know anything of eating the inwards with vinegar, nor of maltreating the goat

sent forth into the wilderness. The Bible knows nothing of the similarity of the goats, nothing of the wool and most of the other particulars given in the Epistle; and when the Talmud does mention any of these, there is generally a marked discrepancy in the special features.

The passage in regard to the red heifer is translated by Rendall thus: "But what type think ye it is, that it hath been commanded to Israel that those men, in whom sins are at the full, should offer an heifer, and slay and burn it, and that children should then take up the ash and cast it into vessels, and bind the scarlet wool upon wood (behold again the type of the cross and the scarlet wool) and hyssop therewith, and that after this manner the children should sprinkle the people one by one, that they may be purified from their sins."

If the reader turns to Numbers xix. 1—10, where an account is given of the ceremony, he will see that the two books cannot be reconciled. The priest who offered up the heifer must be clean. Güdemann explains that the writer confounded the state of the priest after the sacrifice with his state during the sacrifice. There is only one priest in Numbers. Güdemann replies that Barnabas is thinking of the circumstance that all who touched the heifer were unclean. Boys are not mentioned in Numbers, and we know that their services were prohibited. Güdemann replies that boys were occasionally employed to draw the water used in the ceremony, and that therefore Barnabas must have been extremely well acquainted with the ceremony, since he must have known this fact. In one word, Güdemann adduces a number of passages which merely convict Barnabas of greater perversion of the facts than he has been accused of before.

In the case of this rite, we think that in one of the points in regard to which the writer is accused of ignorance there is no legitimate cause for the accusation. Barnabas was not thinking of the rite, but of the allegorical interpretation of the injunction. He must have found somewhere a command that full-grown men should offer and slay the heifer, and that children should collect the ashes. The writer seized on this

feature. He plainly contrasts the ἄνδρες with the παιδία. Rendall does not seem to me to have rendered the article (τοὺς ἄνδρας and τὰ παιδία) accurately. The words I think mean, that it was given as a commandment to Israel that it was the full-grown men that were to offer the heifer, and that it was the children that were to take up the ash. A deep meaning lay under this. In full-grown men sins had reached their maturity. Children were innocent and pure. The full-grown men were types of the Jews of the time of Christ who caused his crucifixion. One of the purposes of the coming of Christ was to bring the sins of the Jews to a culmination (ἵνα τὸ τέλειον τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἀνακεφαλαιώσῃ). But the children are the preachers of the gospel of peace, the messengers of redemption. Hence the words which have puzzled commentators so much are inserted, εἶτα οὐκέτι ἄνδρες, οὐκέτι ἁμαρτωλῶν ἡ δόξα, which I take to be a parenthetical note to παῖδες. It was full-grown men that offered the sacrifice; but when we come to spreading the benefits of the sacrifice, then we no longer have full-grown men; the glory does not belong to men who have grown hardened in sin, but now it is children, the children of the new kingdom, that are entrusted with the benignant mission. If this interpretation is correct, then the writer makes no reference to the ceremonial uncleanness of those who offered the sacrifice. ἐν οἷς εἰσὶν ἁμαρτίαι τέλεαι, is a statement true of all men not saved by faith, whether Jews or Gentiles. With the years of a man his sins grow; and when he becomes τέλειος, or full-grown, his sins also become τέλειαι, or full-grown. And probably Barnabas associated with the idea of culmination, the idea also of permanent hardening; for this permanent hardening seems to be associated with the word ἁμαρτίαι τέλειαι in the Pastor of Hermas, Vis. i. 2.

How are the additions and discrepancies of Barnabas to be explained? Braunsberger thinks that if we knew more of the traditions of the Jews, we should probably discover that Barnabas followed some of these. But there is great unlikelihood in this supposition. It has to be noted that some of his statements are in direct contradiction to the Bible and the Talmud,

and it would be a singular circumstance if all notices of the ceremonies recorded by Barnabas had escaped the Jews, if these ceremonies really existed. Besides this, Barnabas was evidently perfectly indifferent to the traditions of the Jews. The observance of the rites was in his view an entire moral mistake, into which the Jews were beguiled by an evil angel; and any additions which they might make to these rites as originally prescribed, could in his eyes proceed from none but the powers of evil. What alone interested him were the injunctions contained in the prophets.

Güdemann thinks that Barnabas was a renegade or converted Jew, that he knew extremely well about the Jewish rites, but that he deliberately perverted his account of them, and that the passages of Scripture to which he appeals were made by himself. He thinks that the writer had an intense dislike to the Jews, and wrote his Epistle in order to prevent Hadrian carrying out his intention of rebuilding the temple for the Jews. But not one of the arguments that Güdemann has brought forward proves that Barnabas had a minute acquaintance with Jewish ritual or with Jewish writings. He has adduced several parallels to statements in the Epistle from Jewish writers, but similar parallels can be adduced from Christian writers. He cannot prove by a single extract that the writer had any personal ill-will to the Jews. If he had desired to express such dislike, his letter would have taken a different line of thought, and we should have been in no uncertainty about the matter. And if he intended to denounce the Jews and prevent Hadrian rebuilding the temple, he has carefully concealed his intention, and has supplied the emperor with arguments which would be totally unintelligible to him. Besides, it is plain in every line, and often affirmed in unmistakable language, that the writer's supreme interest was in his allegorical interpretations, and every chapter is in full harmony with his expressed design to search out those things which could save.

The explanation seems to me to be contained in a passage of Justin Martyr, Dial. c. Trypho, c. 71. He affirms of the Jews that "they have altogether taken away many scriptures from

the translations effected by those seventy elders who were with Ptolemy, and by which this very man who was crucified is proved to have been set forth expressly as God and man, as being crucified and as dying."

Barnabas quotes Scripture for all his injunctions, and he must have found them there. He would have been satisfied with nothing but passages in Scripture. I do not think that he could have found them anywhere else than in Leviticus or Numbers. I do not know that there is any apocryphal book in which one would expect precepts in regard to Jewish rites. And the fact that the injunctions seemed to contradict each other would only intensify the conviction of the writer that it was never intended that the rites should be practised, and that the injunctions were purely spiritual directions as to the mode in which man was to be saved through Christ. It seems to me that the only theory that can explain the phenomena of the Epistle of Barnabas is, that the writer used a copy of the Five Books of Moses, largely interpolated by some Christian writers.

It is a curious question how these interpolations were introduced. Güdemann's quotations tend to shew that some of them may have had a slight basis in the practice of the Alexandrian Jews.

JAMES DONALDSON.

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## VII.—MISCELLANEA THEOLOGICA.

### 1. BIRKS ON THE TEXT OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

MR. BIRKS'S main contention* is, that the later authorities for the text of the New Testament make up so much for their derivativeness by their number and agreement as to outweigh the earlier ones, not only when these are much divided, but even when they are comparatively unanimous. But what chiefly distinguishes his essay is the use of the statistical method. The non-statistical part

* Essay on the Right Estimation of Manuscript Evidence in the Text of the New Testament. By Thomas Rawson Birks, M.A., Knightsbridge Professor, Cambridge, and Honorary Canon of Ely. London: Macmillan and Co. 1878.

takes up the greater space, but is not likely to convince; it is too palpably not founded on experience of the phenomena actually presented by the texts. But the statistical or mathematical part, although many will be ready enough to brush that sort of thing aside as irrelevant, is certain (if I may judge by the only review I have seen) to impose upon others by an appearance of exactitude and objectivity. I proceed to justify the word "impose."

There are two lines of mathematical reasoning in the essay, one forming the main argument, the other confined to ch. vii. The first is to this effect (§ 33—35, 39—42). A series of copyists, each transmitting unaltered, say, 40 out of every 41 parts of the text before him, would in the end transmit unaltered 40-41sts of 40-41sts, and so on, according to the number of steps, of the original. After ten steps, about 7-9ths would remain unaltered, and it would be about 7 to 2 for a given reading. Suppose we have several such tenth copies by different channels of transmission, what are the odds in favour of a reading they agree in? The rule says $7 \times 7 \times 7$, &c., to $2 \times 2 \times 2$, &c., according to the number of agreeing tenth copies; giving about 150 to one even if there are only four. At this rate, numbers evidently far more than compensate for loss by length of pedigree. The result partly depends on the particular rate of corruption, 40-41sts, we chose to begin with. But it would be of the same kind unless we chose an outrageously rapid rate. In short, agreement proves overwhelmingly what it does prove, namely, not correctness (unless we know the channels of transmission to be in the fullest sense independent), but *some* cause common to the agreeing authorities. Only nobody ever doubted this: here, therefore, Mr. Birks's mathematics contribute nothing to the argument. Yet, qualifications and numerical details apart, this is the whole of his first line of reasoning. It depends on the assumption of independent lines of transmission from the original, and thus on the Lateral Independence which he expressly makes a principle of. The principle will be scouted by all non-biblical critics, and is supported by arguments not worth citing (ch. viii., compare i.). Its application is qualified (ch. ix.) rather sweepingly, and yet inadequately, by a method of which it is enough to say that it calculates the probable number of MSS. now existing, which are derived from other MSS. now existing, but does not take account of MSS. derived from common lost sources later than the original (§ 110—112), or, naturally, of less obvious causes of agreement, though Mr. Birks does not forget these when

he considers them to make in his favour—I mean corrections, collations, recensions, and memory of copyists (ch. iii.).

A special modification of the simple rule of a uniform rate of corruption is Mr. Birks's ingenious theory of what I will call *virtual age* (§ 36—38, ch. iii. vi.). When, as in the first two centuries, copying went on fast and lightly, there was a rapidity of corruption which may be expressed by exaggerating the *age* of the resulting text, in the sense of its distance in time from the original; and when criticism and recension were in operation, a contrary effect will have been produced. By very precise inference on these matters from very vague data, the result is obtained that the virtual age of texts reached a maximum of ten centuries about the actual year 300, and then fell gradually to a minimum of eight centuries about 600, after which the virtual age is found by adding *one* to the actual century number. This theory should be borne in mind as we pass to the second line of reasoning.

The second line of reasoning (ch. vii.) is founded on the numbers of disagreements between the Vatican, Sinaitic and Received texts of the four Gospels, by way of depreciating the two MSS. into accordance with their virtual age. It must be allowed that this argument starts from positive facts. We may count up disagreements, not quite unequivocally indeed (how many are there, in Matt. ix. 18, between εισελθων and εισπροσελθων?), but more so, I confess, than I should have expected; and from the number of disagreements we may learn not much, but something, about numbers of errors. How much is to be learnt from these latter numbers will appear later.

I do not know why it is, but Mr. Birks's figures imply that there are no places in which all three texts disagree.* Such places are in fact not so numerous as they would be if there was anything in the principle of Lateral Independence, and perhaps it was thought there would be no harm in setting them aside first of all. Taking what we are given, and calling the three texts V, S, R, we have first 3658 disagreements between V and S. Therefore, so many times at least, V or S is wrong. "On the hypothesis most favourable to the two MSS., that they are invariably right when they agree" (§ 86), Mr.

* Let V.S, S.R, R.V, denote the numbers of disagreements between two texts; V.SR, S.RV, R.VS, the numbers of times two agree against the third; and V.S.R the number of times all three disagree. We have three such identities as V.S = V.SR + S.RV + V.S.R, and Mr. Birks gives (§ 85, 86) V.S = 3658, S.R = 4941, V.SR = 1708, S.RV = 1950. Hence V.S.R = 0, R.V = 4699, R.VS = 2991. Mr. Birks gives the last, but ambiguously.

Birks tries the effect of distributing the 3658 errors between them in more or less plausible ways. Distribution itself tacitly involves the further charitable supposition that the MSS. are never both wrong when they differ; and this is partly advantageous to R, because when they differ we have seen that one always agrees with R. And there is nothing to prevent our extending to R the like charities, and supposing it also right when supported by one of the others; in fact, if we confine ourselves to our data, this even-handed method is the only one guided by any principle. But if so, the question of distribution is decided at once; for the result is to make each text wrong when, and only when, it has the two others against it. V, S, R, will thus go wrong 1708, 1950, 2991 times. Mr. Birks, on the contrary, thinks it plausible to distribute the 3658 errors of V and S between them "in the ratio of their divergence from" R; and in doing this he actually confounds the divergence of either from R simply with its divergence from R *and the other* jointly (§ 86).* The result of this oversight is mere confusion, of course.

Mr. Birks goes on (§ 87) to point out that the above assumptions are much too favourable: it is "preposterous," he truly says, to suppose R always wrong when it differs from V and S; but it does not appear that he thinks it even equally preposterous to suppose V or S always wrong when it is in a minority. For this is his way of amending the assumptions: he treats as errors of V and S respectively the 1708 and 1950 readings peculiar to them, and gives to each MS. as additional errors one-fifth (§ 87) or one-third (§ 88) of the 2991 peculiar to R. Either mode of distribution, besides the absurdity of being a mere distribution, has the fatal fault of being what mathematicians call unsymmetrical: the data concern V, S, R, alike, and the solution offered does not; the additional errors attributed to each MS. depend not on *its*, but on R's, relation to the two others. But the oddest thing is, that the latter mode of distribution, which puts V and S each in the wrong about 800 times oftener than R, is given as the result of supposing R "provisionally of equal weight to" V or S. The true result of the supposition would be, I think,

* He forms $V.S\,\frac{R.VS}{R.VS+S.R}$ and $V.S\,\frac{S.R}{R.VS+S.R}$, which have no significance. He probably meant

$$V.S\,\frac{R.V}{R.V+S.R} \quad \text{and} \quad V.S\,\frac{S.R}{R.V+S.R};$$

but this is quite arbitrary, and makes a symmetrical treatment lead to inconsistent results.

to give 2850, 2960, 3440, as the most probable numbers. But why suppose three texts of equal weight, provisionally or definitively, when you see one to be in a minority half as often again as either of the others?

Of course it is right to add something to 1708, 1950, 2991, if we are to seek, on the present arbitrarily limited data, the most probable numbers of errors in V, S, R. But the principle of the whole chapter is that disagreement is a sign of error; therefore the addition ought to be the least for V, which is least often in a minority, and greatest for R, which is oftenest. Beyond this we cannot go, without further data, to any serious purpose. But it will be curious to take Mr. Birks's general assumptions* quite seriously, and treat them, as I wonder he has not done, by the theory of judicial probabilities according to the French mathematicians and Mr. Boole; for it happens that these assumptions just supply what is wanted to make that theory rigorously applicable. We should then obtain 1761, 2759, 4272, as the most probable numbers of errors in the three texts.†

These numbers do not differ enormously from those obtained by Mr. Birks, as concerns V and S. Nor would it matter if they did. Any such result is at once harmless and useless, because deprived of all significance by the impossibility of passing satisfactorily from number of errors to quantity of error as a fraction of the whole text. If a text of the Gospels is wrong 2000 times, how often is it right? How many opportunities has a copyist of going wrong? About 11,280, says Mr. Birks; for he chooses to assume that each error vitiates the "clause of six words" containing it, and there are about six times 11,280 words (§ 77, 84—86). Six words may be about the average length of a sort of natural unit of language, but Mr. Birks's assumption is that 2000 errors will on the whole affect about 2000 clauses, and this is mathematically wrong, unless, what is not alleged and evidently not assumed, the enumerators really counted, under the name of disagreements, disagreeing sections of six words.‡ It is plain, and Mr. Birks points it out himself (§ 77),

* Including the assumption that there is only room for 11,280 errors; but not the assumption that the three texts are never all wrong at once.

† See Cournot's *Exposition de la Théorie des Chances*, &c., § 195.

‡ Even if there is only room for two or three errors in one 11,280th of the whole, 1900 is about the most probable number of such sections affected by 2000 errors. See Todhunter's *History of the Theory of Probability*, § 410, where, however, the demonstration is elliptical or the enunciation ambiguous.

that in proportion to this unit, as he calls it, six words or one word or whatever it is, will vary the nominal defectiveness of a text having a given number of errors. He quietly says, as if it did not make nonsense of both his lines of reasoning, that in a case considered in § 86 it makes nearly two centuries' difference whether the six-words clause or the στίχος of the Cambridge MS. is taken for unit. How he can allow himself to use the six-words clause, without a shred of argument to recommend it, and apparently regarding it as a matter of choice, I have quite failed to make out. It is not worth while to discuss how many errors there is really room for in the Gospels. I estimate at about 16,000 the occasions of actual variation as noted in Tischendorf's eighth edition.

The results of this chapter are brought into form by saying that either MS. is worth so many of such a century. Every such estimate is at least three-deep in fallacy. Depending on the first line of argument, it involves the fallacy of "independence;" by the method of this chapter, it involves the fallacy of the six-words clause; more directly it involves one of the arbitrary or unsymmetrical assumptions just exposed, and in one case a mere blunder. This last unlucky instance I have seen cited by a reviewer as something quite formidable. Would the reader care to see in what centuries Mr. Birks's principles, taken seriously as above, would place the three texts? That depends on the rate of corruption we assume. But, taking the rate which, without saying why, he represents as the average or somewhat above (§ 76—78, 86, 106 ff.),* I find that the Vatican, Sinaitic and Received texts are about as good as average MSS. of the sixth, eleventh and nineteenth centuries respectively. I have nothing to say for this discovery, except that it is mathematically the irresistible consequence of Mr. Birks's principles, and that it is rather amusing.

As in the rest, so in his list of writers who give evidence on the text by quotation, Mr. Birks outdoes his fellow-paradoxers. They stop wonderfully short of writers who may have used printed editions, or, to speak more appropriately, editions of derivation known to us; but here is a list which ends with Gregory the Great.

C. J. Monro.

* One part altered in a virtual century for 40 parts unaltered.

## 2. The Original Form of the Book of Jonah.

In commenting upon this curious prophetical narrative, too great stress has, I think, been laid upon the episode of the whale, or upon the character of the psalm recited by the prophet in the whale's belly. The psalm put by the writer of the book of Samuel (1 Sam. ii. 1) into the mouth of the pious Hannah—originally a hymn for a victorious king—hardly suits its situation better than the song of praise, doubtless composed by some one saved from drowning in the open sea, converted by the author into a prayer of Jonah. True, it bears many reminiscences of the book of Psalms, and so does ver. 9 of ch. iii. reiterate a sentence of the late book of Joel (ii. 14). Nevertheless, and notwithstanding a few other traces of a post-exilic age, I think all the modern critics were too rash in ascribing the book to the ages succeeding the Restoration. Not merely does the broad, cosmopolitan spirit of divine love and mercy ill accord with so late a composition, but the language and style of the *main part* of the book reminds us rather of the book of Job and of the prophetical tales in the book of the Kings.

But there are many traits besides of an older age. The conception of the Godhead is not yet a purified and spiritual monotheistic one, as in post-exilic writings. The prophet is represented as believing Yahveh's dominion to be confined rather to the land of Palestine and Syria, without extending over the sea, and Yahveh appears invested with mythical attributes, as in the book of Job and the older historical books, as the Ruler of the storm by which He arrests the ship on the sea to bring Jonah back to the dry land. On the other hand, the sharp boundary-line between Heathenism and Monotheism is surely wanting when Nineveh is called (iii. 3) a city great unto *the Godhead* or the *gods* (אֱלֹהִים), in the same sense in which the Hebrews used to call giants and angels, sons of the Godhead or the gods, and sacred mountains and trees, hills and trees of the Godhead; or in which Cain was originally represented in Genesis iv. 1 as an אִישׁ אֱלֹהִים *man of divine power*, and Nimrod as *a giant-hunter among the sons of the Godhead*, Gen. x. 9 (read בִּבְנֵי אֱלֹהִים for לִפְנֵי יְ׳). And similarly the whole description of the heathen mariners betrays a *naiveté* unlike the Persian age. Nor does the story of the whale or of the castor-oil-plant offer any sufficient reason for assuming so late an origin as this, since it rather belongs to the category of prophetical narratives like that of

Balaam and his ass, and that of the Judean prophet and his ass (1 Kings xiii.), and Elijah at the juniper-tree, in which animals and plants are introduced as divine monitors of disobedient or despairing prophets.

On closer observation, however, our little book betrays the hand of a late reviser, who has made alterations, interpolations and transpositions of verses and sentences, which have hitherto entirely escaped the eyes of inquirers. There is at the very beginning of the story a perceptible *lacuna* in the second verse, where we are not told what Jonah was to announce to the men of Nineveh. The same obvious hesitation in giving the substance of the commission is again exhibited in the second part of the story, iii. 1, where the language presents anything but a clear Hebrew style. And when at last the prophet's announcement is actually given, we are struck by an important divergence in the Greek version, which, instead of *forty days*, has, "*Yet three days* and Nineveh will be overthrown."

*That this was the original reading there can hardly be any doubt.* It corresponds exactly with the three days' journey of Jonah through the city, and his then sitting down in front of the city to wait for the immediate execution of the divine message. Nowhere is there any mention made of the lapse of so long a time between Jonah's preaching and his leaving the city. On the contrary, the three days in Nineveh also correspond with the three days in the belly of the whale, spoken of in the first part. And it is quite easy to guess why a late reviser of the book should have felt induced to change the three days, which hardly give one day of repentance and fasting to those living in the furthest part of Nineveh after Jonah's arrival there on the third day, into *forty days* of fasting and repentance, which were more in accordance with the late Jewish custom in Palestine. Considerations like these were of course foreign to the original author.

The mention of the *unnamed* king of Nineveh and his royal edict* coming rather *post festum* after verse 5, and no less the introduction of beasts as sharing the fasting and the mourning of the people, *independently of peculiarities in style and language*, prove, vv. 6, 7, 8a, to be a later insertion. And this, no doubt, caused the *original* mention of *Jonah's wandering through the city on the second and third day* to be left out by the writer. So not merely ver. 9, but also the first four verses of ch. iv., interrupt the context of the nar-

* An Aramaic word טַעַם.

rative and spoil its harmony. In fact, after having once in a state of anguish formed the conviction that Nineveh will be saved, there was no reason for the prophet to look for the destruction of the city and to repeat the scenery of self-execration. And here, too, the language testifies against the genuineness of the passage.

Now the same features of interpolation can be detected in the prayer of Jonah, ii. 2—10 [A.V. 1—9], where the form דָּגָה ii. 2 [A.V. ii. 1], instead of דָּג ii. 1 [A.V. i. 17], betrays a later hand; in the latter part of i. 5, and the whole of verse 6, recognisable by the Aramaic word סְפִינָה *ship* in i. 5c, instead of אֳנִיָּה in i. 5a, and other suspicious expressions; in the latter part of i. 9 and in i. 14. Besides, there are later emendations visible in i. 9, where the original reading must have been, *I am fleeing from the face of Yahveh the God of heaven*,* corresponding to the question of the mariners, "And what is thy business?" The rest is likewise spurious. The same is the case with the words, לָבוֹא עִמָּהֶם *to go with them*, in i. 3, where the original read לִבְרֹחַ *to flee*. The latter part of i. 8 has been recognised to be a spurious gloss, and the passage iv. 5—8 is likewise full of insertions and variants.

Purging the text from all these late additions and enlargements, we arrive at the following original story, which no doubt formed part of a book of prophetical narratives, and therefore commenced with *And*.

i. 1. And the word of Yahveh reached Jonah the son of Amittai, saying: 2. Arise, go to Nineveh the great city, and announce against her: *Yet three days more, and Nineveh will be overthrown!* for their wickedness has risen unto my face. 3. But Jonah rose to flee to Tartessus away from the face of Yahveh; and he went down to Joppa and found a ship going to Tartessus, and he paid the fare thereof, and went down into it *to flee* to Tartessus away from the face of Yahveh. 4. And Yahveh impelled a great wind *against* the sea, and there arose a mighty tempest on the sea, and the ship threatened to founder. 5. And the mariners were afraid, and called each unto his god, and they threw the articles that were in the ship into the sea to lighten *it* unto them. 13. And they rowed hard to bring *it* back to the land, but could not, for the sea grew ever more tempestuous unto them. 7. And they said to each other: Come, let us cast lots, that we may know for whose cause this evil has happened to us. And they cast lots, and the lot fell upon Jonah. 8. And they said

* מִלִּפְנֵי יי ... אֲנִי בֹרֵחַ; see the following verse.

to him: Tell us, pray, what is thy business, and whence comest thou? 9. And he said to them: I am a Hebrew, and I *am fleeing* before Yahveh the God of heaven. 16. And the men feared a great fear of Yahveh, and offered sacrifice unto Yahveh and made vows. 11. And they said unto him: What shall we do unto thee, that the sea may be calmed for us? 12. And he said unto them: Lift me up and throw me into the sea; so shall the sea become calm before you, for I know well that because of me is this tempest upon you. 15. And they lifted Jonah up and threw him into the sea, and the sea ceased from its raging.

ii. 1. And Yahveh ordered a large [monster] (fish) to swallow up Jonah; and Jonah was in the belly of the fish three days and three nights. 11. And Yahveh spoke unto the fish, and it vomited Jonah out upon the dry land.

iii. 1. And the word of Yahveh reached Jonah the second time, saying: 2. Arise, go unto Nineveh the great city, and announce unto her: *Yet three days more, and Nineveh will be overthrown.* 3. And Jonah arose and went to Nineveh, according to the word of Yahveh. But Nineveh was a great city *unto the divine beings*, three days' journey long. 4. And Jonah began to go through the city one day's journey, and he called out and said: Yet *three days* more, and Nineveh shall be overthrown; *and so he did on the second day, and so he did on the third day.* 5. And the men of Nineveh believed in *Yahveh*, and they proclaimed an assembly, and put on sackcloth from the greatest to the smallest. 8. And they called unto *Yahveh* with might and turned away each from his evil way and from the violence in their hands. 10. And *Yahveh* bethought himself of the evil, which he had spoken to inflict on them, and he did not inflict it.

iv. 5. And Jonah was gone out of the city, and sat down *in front* of the city, until he could see what should become of the city. 6. And *Yahveh* ordered a castor-oil-plant, and it grew up over Jonah *to offer him shade.* And Jonah greatly rejoiced because of the plant. 8. But at the dawn of the morning Jahveh ordered a *hot wind*, and it smote the castor-oil-plant and it withered. And as the sun arose, the sun struck Jonah's head and he became faint, and he offered his soul unto *the death* and said: It is better for me to die than to live. 9. And *Yahveh* said unto Jonah: Art thou very wroth on account of the castor-oil-plant? And he said: I am very wroth, even unto death. 10. And Yahveh said: Thou wouldst have spared the castor-oil-plant, for which thou didst not labour, nor make it to grow,

which rose up in one night and perished in one night. 11. And shall I not spare Nineveh, the great city *of the divine beings?*

*Explanatory Notes.*

i. 6. רַב חַחֹבֵל (instead of חַחֹבְלִים) is an Aramaism shewing a late age.—Verses 13 and 16 are not now in their right place, but the interpolation of vers. 5c and 6 accounts for the removal of the former, and v. 10 presents itself as a *late substitute of a very problematic nature* in place of v. 16.—The alteration of the word עִבְרִי (v. 9) in the Greek version stands also in connection with the Massoretic emendation of the latter part of the verse.

iv. 5. The words: *And he made unto himself a tent there and sat under it in the shade*, are an obvious interpolation, recognisable by the style, made only for the purpose of facilitating Jonah's stay there for *thirty-seven days!*

In v. 6, after וַיַּעַל, the original text had only מֵעַל יוֹנָה לְחַצִּל־לוֹ; the rest is spurious. In v. 7, the word תּוֹלַעַת *worm*, owes its origin to a copyist's changing the following word גִּבְעֹלוֹת into תּוֹלַעַת, whereas the worm is really entirely superfluous, and is not even said to have gnawed at and bored a hole in the leaves of the plant, as would have been expected. The fact is that the words וַיְמַן יי רוּחַ חֲרִישִׁית originally belonged to v. 7. The word קָדִים is also spurious. חֲרִישִׁית means a dry *hot wind*, derived from חֶרֶס *the sun* in its glowing or burning state (whence also חֶרֶשׁ DRIED clay). In consequence of this parching hot wind, the plant was dried up and withered.

Now if there is any definite purpose and tendency discernible in the narrative before us, it can hardly consist in a mere defence of unfulfilled prophecies in general, as has been asserted, since it is too much of a castigation of the prophets. I believe it is much nearer the truth to suspect a practical question to have been at stake. And if we only realise the momentous question raised by Jeremiah, whether the city and the temple of Jerusalem are to sink into ruin, as was predicted by Micah, or shall be saved from the fatal network drawn around them by Nebuchadoroser's army, we may imagine how welcome a testimony for the anti-Jeremianic party our narrative must have been. *The threatened city of Nineveh reflects the fate of the Judean city of God. If those heathens could by repentance and fasting avert the announced doom from their city, why should not the people of Judea be able to do the same?*

Still the work does not seem to have formed a book by itself until a far later time, when it was used as a lesson of penitence in days of public calamity, as may be seen from the Mishnah (Thaanioth ii.). With this view, many of the alterations and interpolations were then made reflecting the notions and usages of the age. It is interesting to notice that the custom of putting signs of mourning also on *beasts* is particularly *Persian*,* and was most probably learned from them by the Jews. Finally, after having been used in public prayer-meetings, especially in times of drought, and expounded by prominent leaders of the class of the Essenes, among whom Jonah grew into a *typical* feature,† it was introduced as a lesson for the Atonement-day in the Synagogue.‡

DR. K. KOHLER.

## VIII.—NOTICES OF BOOKS.

IN the space of a two-shilling pamphlet, Dr. Pünjer presents a very fair and useful summary of the chief doctrines of Serveto.§ The account, drawn up, we believe, as the author's *Habilitationsschrift* for the position of *Privatdocent* at Jena, has the advantage of being written in easy Latin. Though the author's Latinity is not in itself very classical, he is careful, as a rule, to introduce Serveto's tenets in their original phraseology. Hence we should recommend all lovers of Serveto, who may not have at hand his own works, to possess themselves of this useful compilation. Dr. Pünjer is much stronger in extract than in criticism, yet his remarks are often just. Unfortunately, he has committed himself to some statements which, owing to the defects of his information, are not up to the mark. This is notably true of his scepticism in regard to the influence of Paulus Burgensis (printed Bourgensis, p. 97) on Serveto's opening mind. The misprints in this little treatise are far too numerous; the punctuation, too, is extremely careless.

Tollin's‖ masterly digest of the entire theological writings of the

* See Herodotus ix. 24, and elsewhere.

† See Thaanioth 15a, and the New Testament. ‡ See Megilla 31a.

§ De Michaelis Serveti Doctrina Commentationem Dogmatico-Historicam. Scripsit G. Ch. Bernhardus Pünjer, Theol. Lic., Phil. Dr. Jena: Gustav Fischer. 1876.

‖ Das Lehrsystem Michael Servet's, genetisch dargestellt von H. Tollin, Lic. theol., Prediger zu Magdeburg. Gütersloh. I. Bd. 1876, II. u. III. Bde. 1878.

Spanish thinker is at length completed. There is always likely to be some little want of entire conformity between the successive parts, when such a work as this is issued at varying intervals. The reader will perhaps think that the exigencies of space have rendered some sections in the last volume disproportionately concise. Freshest from the perusal of this particular volume, we retain perhaps on that account a keener memory for some of its slight *incuriæ*. Thus (p. 134), *Israelitarum* is rendered *Israelitinnen* (as though Serveto had written *Israelitidum*). Our Lord uses the word ἐκκλησία, not "ein einziges Mal" (p. 195), but on two occasions (Matt. xvi. 18, xviii. 17), on the latter occasion twice. The reading which is treated as so extraordinary (p. 285), "quamquam omnia divisa in se ipsam (sic!) mox coeat (sic!)," is no doubt that of the printed text of the *Restitutio* (p. 223), but the word there misprinted is *omnia*. It should be *anima*. An acquaintance with the Curio MS. shews that Serveto frequently abridged both words, writing the one oīa, and the other aīa. Hence the confusion. The Curio MS. once reads *omnia*, where Serveto had written aīa, for *animam*. Tollin's book, however, merits such notice as we do not pretend to give to it here. We do but announce its completion. The great and lasting service which Tollin has rendered to the study of Serveto's *mind*, is the clearness with which he has discriminated, and the fulness with which he has illustrated the successive stages of his author's Christology. He distinguishes five distinct *Lehrphasen*, of which the first three are all to be traced within the limits of that little work *On Trinity Errors*, which appeared in Serveto's twenty-first year. Even if they neglect to enrich their knowledge with the detailed exposition of these phases of Serveto's faith, as presented in Tollin's three thin octavos, our readers may gain a comprehensive view of the chief positive results of Tollin's studies, within the compass of a short but pregnant essay, which has since appeared.* Here will be found also the pith of the older schools of Servetic interpretation. To the investigation of Serveto's *life*, Tollin has devoted himself, for some score of years, with a diligence as marvellously successful as it has been surprisingly painstaking. As yet the results of that investigation, so far as they have been made known, have been scattered over a couple of dozen essays in as many stray magazines and reviews. It is not easy, therefore, at present, for the historical student to be sure that he knows all that

* Theolog. Stud. u. Krit., 1879. Heft I. "Ein Beitrag zur Theologie Servets."

he ought to know respecting the biography of Serveto. In the latest of these essays,* replete with new and valuable matter, Tollin, who keeps his eye open to every passing criticism, discusses afresh the name of his author. Referring to our recent article, in which the form Serveto is uniformly adopted, he describes us as having fallen back upon the "hypothesis" of Mosheim; the fact being that we have fallen back upon the practice of Serveto himself. The case is in a nutshell. Two forms, and only two, of his patronymic were ever traced by the pen of the Spanish theologian. Of these, the earlier is Serveto; this we find in his first and his second publication, and in his letter to Œcolampadius. The later is Servetus; this we find first of all in the *Restitutio* (p. 199), and afterwards in his French correspondence. The former we take to be the real name, the latter its Latinized equivalent. Never once, in any circumstances, does he write himself Servet; so far from using this form, he avoids it. Whence, then, does Tollin get it? From contemporaries, beginning with Œcolampadius, whose "hypothesis" we may call it if we like. The strongest part of Tollin's case is an argument which goes to prove that his author *wilfully* chose the form Serveto, though the form Servet was probably the right, that is to say, the family one. The weakest part is his reliance on the Records of the Geneva Trial. Tollin points to the entry (15 Aug.), "Interroge, dont il est, respond .... quil sappelle Michel Servet." But on 23 Aug. we have: "Interroge sus le premier, respond .... de son nom il sapelle Michel et son surnom Servet alias Revers." Tollin declines, of course, to accept "Revers" as authentic; so do we, and in like manner we decline to accept "Servet" as accurately conveying the response of the prisoner. In fact, the names in the Geneva record are written down with little care. We have "Agnouw" for Hagenau, "Cesserius" for Secerius, &c. A man's own handwriting is better evidence than the orthography of a clerk of the court; a man's own usage outweighs that of any number of contemporaries.

The anonymous author of a new History of Pantheism,† disarms criticism at the outset, by avowing his work to be "chiefly a compilation, taken more frequently from translations and abridgments

* Hilgenfeld's Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie. 21 Jahrg. IV. Heft. "Zur Servet-Kritik."

† General Sketch of the History of Pantheism. In Two Volumes. Vol. I. From the Earliest Times to the Age of Spinoza. S. Deacon and Co. 1878.

of originals, than from the originals themselves." It is not a production of the slightest value, except perhaps to the author himself, as a praiseworthy commonplace-book of his miscellaneous reading. For philosophical thought he seems to have no mental aptitude. His section on Serveto, which drew us to his book, is nothing but a poor hash of the miserably mangled account by Dr. Willis, which we recently reviewed. He swallows Willis' "the Devil was in the Deity" (p. 340). He even improves upon Willis, by misprinting some of Willis' blunders, already bad enough (p. 325). His capacity for forming a theological judgment may be estimated by the remark (p. 319), that Serveto "agreed with Arius in concluding that in the very nature of things the Father must have *a longer origin in time* than the Son." To give a useless book its due, we may say that its last section, on Vanini, is much better than any part of the rest. But it is not good. Vanini's baptismal name was not Lucilio, but Giulio-Cesare; hence there was no reason for speaking of his having "renounced the name of Lucilio for that of Julius Cæsar" (p. 378). To state that "he *describes* himself as *Doctor in utroque jure*," is to speak as if there might be some doubt of his right to the double degree, which, however, Vanini took on 6th June, 1606. To say that of his martrydom "the most probable date is 1618 or 1619," is to write in ignorance of the well-known fact that it occurred on 19th Feb. 1619. To represent his works as "most rare and difficult of accession," is going too far. At any rate, the French translation of them by Xav. Rousselot (1842) is not a very scarce book. There are several lives of Vanini, which seem unknown even by name to our anonymous compiler. In particular, an able fellow-countryman, Raffaele Palumbo, has this year (1878) devoted an interesting work to the story of the martyred Theist.

People have been slow to recognize the enormous addition to our knowledge respecting Jesus Christ which is directly due to our accepting his life as truly natural. There has been great wailing over what has been rejected as unhistorical, and very little rejoicing over the vast wealth of new knowledge that has been won by the diligence of great scholars. Yet as a mere question of amount, the gain far exceeds the loss. Give an astronomer three points in the orbit of a new planet, and he will calculate the whole of that planet's path to a hair's breadth. Something similar can be done with a real human life. If the main outline of the career is known, especially the decisive determinations of the human will, then a great deal more may be safely filled in by those who can fairly realize the

external situation in which that life is placed. Such a work as this of Hausrath's,* may be of inestimable service in helping people to understand what were the conditions under which Jesus had to work, helping them to realize, as never before, what was the aim of his life, what were the difficulties he encountered, how inevitable was the failure, how surely, though slowly, were being prepared the elements of future success. The book has long been prized by scholars, and ought now to be appreciated by the general English public, for it is no mere student's manual, but a brilliant history, written in a style which is almost without parallel in German theology. We wish we could speak favourably of the translation, but in plain truth we cannot; and as this is only the first volume of a series, it is important to be explicit. Great pains seem to have been taken in verifying references, and substituting the equivalents most convenient for the English reader; but this will not make up for carelessness and incompetence in the main body of the work. The rules of English syntax are not unfrequently violated, German idioms are translated with bald literalism, confusion of metaphor are introduced when they do exist in the original, and all in cases where a little more trouble would have given us reading as attractive as a page of Lecky or Seeley. What is still more to be regretted is the number of actual errors which a comparison with the original at once disclosed. Thus in the first fourteen lines on p. 137, "sich zu vertragen mit," which means "to live on good terms with," is translated "they had betrayed." "Sippe" has nothing to do with supping, and should not be translated "boon companions," but "young relations" or cadets of Herod's family; it means all the persons who stand in a given relationship to a head of a family; and "aufnehmen" is the technical term for to "adopt." "Mandate" are not quite "commands," but rather the "instructions" sent by a central authority to high officials in the provinces; "und" is "and," not "but"—this change suggests a totally incorrect meaning to the whole sentence. "Sich auschieden" is not "to seclude oneself," but "to form a (political) party;" and lastly, "befördern" means to "promote," not to "demand." Other instances of blunders as bad as these could be given, though it might be difficult to find again so many condensed within so small a compass. "Ueberhaupt" means

* A History of the New Testament Times. By Dr. A. Hausrath, Professor of Theology in the University of Heidelberg. The Time of Jesus. Vol. I. Translated by Charles T. Poynting, B.A., and Philip Quenzer. London: Williams and Norgate. 1878.

"altogether" or "generally," not "especially;" "folter" is the "rack," not the "halter," and the sentence states that actual torture, not merely "the risk" of it, failed to produce the result; "nicht unbedenklich" does not mean "dangerous," but rather "of doubtful propriety," something about which one would have scruples; and "da" is not "therefore," but "since," giving the ground for the above statement (all on p. 157). On p. 186 we have noticed a serious error: "während" is "whilst," not "inasmuch as," and introduces an opposition between "domänen," the technical term for "public state lands," and private landed property. So at the foot of p. 187, "härteste" should be "harshest," not "strictest." But we will not pursue this unpleasant task of fault-finding; probably we have said enough to shew that the present volume needs a thorough revision, and the future ones much more careful editing.

"The Bible Readers' Commentary"* gives the contents of the four Gospels in "a consolidated form," together with notes gathered from very many sources. The editor ignores any discrepancies there may be between them as to facts, dates, &c., and his theology is of the low evangelical type. There is the usual fling at "skeptics," amongst whom we find, in the following order, Mr. Noah, a New York editor, and Dr. Raphael, both Jews, Dr. Channing, John S. Mill, Strauss, Richter, F. C. Baur, C. P. Wing, Renan and Theodore Parker! The editor does not object, however, to "spoil the Egyptians," since on page 221 he has inserted an engraving which is also to be found in Renan's Illustrated Life of Jesus, p. 181! There is a great mass of material in the volume, and its plan is not without merit. We wish that the quality equalled the quantity, and that the working out were worthier of the plan.

The Creation recorded in Genesis i.—ii. 3, was, according to Dr. Stewart,† a reconstruction "on a material globe already in existence, and for the purpose of fitting it up as a habitation for man;" so that the "beginning" means the commencement of the human period of the earth's existence as ushered in by the creation (p. 15). The Doctor is astonished, therefore, that the Westminster Assembly of Divines has "committed to writing, in their Confession of Faith, that it was made of nothing" (p. 40). The account of creation in

* The Bible Readers' Commentary. The New Testament. In Two Volumes. Vol. I. The Fourfold Gospel. Prepared by J. Glentworth Butler, D.D. New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1878.

† The Creation: or, Moses and Science in Harmony. By the Rev. Alexander Stewart, M.D., LL.D. (America). London: Elliot Stock. 1878.

Gen. ii. 4 ff. is "the first part of human history in the Bible," on which account the name for God is changed to the "self-existent One;" and it is because He thus lives as the self-existent One that man can live and have a history (p. 241). The English word "God" is, we are told, a contraction of the Saxon word good (p. 16). These extracts will give an idea of "principles" which, in Dr. Stewart's opinion, will "render futile all the assaults of infidelity" (Preface). Nevertheless, the Doctor cannot altogether escape the rationalizing tendencies of the age, since he substitutes "a strong wind" for "the Spirit of God," and speaks of Jesus Christ as Creator, or at least as "the agent of the Godhead in the creation" (p. 22).

Dr. Atwell* objects to the modern theory of Inspiration as having been derived from Roman Catholic teachers, and as being limited to "divine assistance and direction." It is not quite easy to make out what is the theory he wishes to substitute for it, but he professes to set forth St. Paul's views on the subject, and to adopt them as his own. Since upon page 31 he calls 1 Cor. ii. "the luminous statement of the apostle," which he "clearly expounds," and "a profoundly difficult passage," we are not surprised to find that he has not added to the luminosity or lessened the difficulty. Revelation he holds to be the suggestion to the mind of truths which it could not of itself have seen or suspected; whilst inspiration is a new spiritual condition of the writer, "a spiritual transfiguration," a "means to a divinely instituted end" (p. 90), viz. the understanding of revelation. There have been, it seems, cases in which revelations were not understood by the men to whom they were made, because they were "not accompanied by an inspiration of suitable intensity" (p. 153), a fact which would seem to take off considerably from the value of the revelation, and to throw doubt in other cases upon the suitable intensity of the inspiration. Dr. Atwell's style is often peculiar. Such a sentence, e.g., as "Jesus of Nazareth as very man .... *while he tabernacled in the flesh* .... WAS FAVOURED WITH express revelations," is not happy either in theology or in expression (p. 17). The Doctor takes back with his left hand that which he gives with the right; for after having rejected the "direction theory" as too mechanical, he claims verbal inspiration for Scripture after all (p. 156). Of any verifying faculty he will not hear on any account (p. 187). Had he or his reviser had a "verifying faculty,"

‡ The Pauline Theory of the Inspiration of Holy Scripture. By William Erskine Atwell, D.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1878.

such blots as possunt (Preface, p. x), prologomena (p. 97), susing (p. 101), in light the (p. 105), Doctine (p. 165), would have been avoided. Perhaps their inspiration was not of suitable intensity.

The "Ancient British Church"* is a scholarly and, on the whole, a well-written sketch of the rise and progress of Christianity amongst the Britons, together with an attempt to prove the apostolic succession of the Episcopal Church in Wales therefrom. The author in a very candid spirit traces the various stages in the "absorption of the Welsh Church into the English" (p. 253), and of the attempts to suppress the national sentiment "through the medium of an Episcopate, Hanoverian in politics and Latitudinarian in theology" (p. 263), which he believes brought about the present hostility of the Welsh to "the mystical body of Christ," and their mistaken belief "that the essence of religion consists solely in the relation of the individual soul to God" (p. 264). Things are, however, improving. "While among the Welsh Dissenting bodies piety is degenerating into a series of short-lived emotions which .... die away amidst the duties and trials of life, there is .... in the Church a deepening of the spiritual life" (p. 272). Hence Mr. Pryce confidently looks forward to the triumph of the Church. "Is this Church," he asks, "to be disestablished, and to be despoiled of possessions bestowed upon her by her own sons, and secured to her by the reverence of ages?" But here his facts run counter to his theories. He has shewn very candidly that the English Church absorbed (disendowed?) the Welsh Church, the only bond of union being their common episcopal government, and that the reverence of ages was withheld throughout Wales from this English, i.e. foreign, Church. We cannot see any way of reconciling these discrepancies, and with the bulk of the Welsh people we fall back upon what, after all, is a truth, if not the whole truth, viz. that the "essence of religion" consists mainly in "the relation of the individual soul to God."

We can well believe Mr. Brown† when he says in his Preface that his present subject has been more "simply" treated than his former one, and that the sermons he has founded upon its contents have involved less labour both upon himself and upon the "young women's Sabbath-morning Bible-class" to which they were ad-

* The Ancient British Church. By John Pryce, M.A., Vicar of Bangor. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1878.

† The Joyful Sound: being Notes on the Fifty-fifth Chapter of Isaiah. By William Brown, Author of "The Tabernacle and its Services." London: Hamilton, Adams and Co. Edinburgh: William Oliphant and Co. 1879.

dressed. He *improves* Phil. ii. into, "that Jesus Christ is God to the glory," &c. (p. 234), and tells us that Christ is sometimes called David (p. 121). He refers, to prove this, to Ezekiel xxxiv. 23, 24, "my servant David." We wonder he did not *improve* these verses also (as our Authorized Version improves Acts iii. 13, 26), and change "servant" into "Son." He even "rationalizes" "nations that he knew not" into nations "with which he was not on terms of friendship or intimacy" (p. 147). We are sorry to find that there is any call for books of this description.

Far different, both in conception and execution, is the little volume of sermons* by the Rev. Charles Shakspeare, B.A., of St. Stephen's Church, Westbourne Park, London. Canon Farrar has done the book great honour by writing a special preface for it, and the book reflects great honour upon him. We have rarely read sermons which have at once so interested and instructed us, and we close the volume with an increased respect for a Church in which such preaching is possible. Mr. Shakspeare examines the chief problems of the day after a scientific method and in a Christian spirit. He has once more proved that a man may hold and strongly defend his own views, and yet be able to pay due and even anxious respect to those whose tenets he controverts. Where all is so excellent it is difficult to select, but we think that for a fine candour and a convincing argument, couched in language worthy of the thoughts, the sermon upon the Stoics bears away the palm. We hope to hear more of Mr. Shakspeare, and soon.

Whatever the changes of fashion in poetry, Wordsworth will have "fit" audience, even if at times it be also "few." His works furnish the aliment of a class of minds akin to his own, through whom their influence reaches many others for which it might otherwise be too abstract and refined. Such a disciple is Professor Knight, of St. Andrews, who in the little volume before us† has undertaken the task of identifying and elucidating the topographical allusions in Wordsworth's poetry, and especially of connecting it with that English Lake country which he loved so well, and which was to him a perennial source of inspiration. The task was not always an easy one; for Wordsworth,

* St. Paul at Athens: Spiritual Christianity in Relation to some Aspects of Modern Thought. By Charles Shakspeare, B A. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1878.

† The English Lake District as interpreted in the Poems of Wordsworth. By William Knight, Professor of Moral Philosophy, St. Andrews. Edinburgh: Douglas. 1878.

like many other great artists, united a singular exactness in reproducing natural facts with every now and then a free play of the imagination in combining and modifying them. Some of his descriptions are thus, after the growth and decay of three quarters of a century, quite easy to localize, while in the attempt to identify others it is not possible to attain to more than a conjectural certainty. We can heartily commend Mr. Knight's little book, which contains much patient and loving work, to all intelligent tourists in Cumberland and Westmoreland who wish to become acquainted with and understand its brightest poetical illustration. It will serve both as a companion to the guide-book and as an introduction to Wordsworth's poetry. Perhaps Mr. Knight's enthusiasm has led him to quote a little too profusely, and the space thus taken up has prevented him from dealing with all Wordsworth's local allusions as fully as with those which centre round Grasmere and Rydal. The River Dudden Sonnets are passed by in a single paragraph; and there are well-known allusions in Wordsworth to St. Bees, to Black Coombe, to Brougham Castle, and other places on the outer verge of the Lake country, of which he has nothing to say. These omissions do not impair the value and interest of what he has done, but they prevent us from regarding his book as a complete topographical commentary on Wordsworth.

Mr. Richard Lowndes, whose "Introduction to the Philosophy of Primary Beliefs" was reviewed at length in this Journal some years ago, has just published a very interesting little volume on Descartes.* It consists of an Introduction, a Life of Descartes, a Translation of his "Meditations," and a Commentary. Mr. Lowndes frankly confesses his obligations to Kuno Fischer in that review of philosophy before Descartes which forms the first portion of his work, and indeed seems to us to wish to play, not without success, the part of a Kuno Fischer to English readers, a writer, that is, who is able to present the main movements of philosophical speculation in a clear, succinct form. This Introduction and the Commentary which concludes the volume are intended, to use his own words, "to fix the place of the 'Meditations' in the history of philosophy, by exhibiting on the one side the state of the science at the time the 'Meditations' were written, and on the other the manner in which the problems and solutions of Descartes were taken up into the system

† René Descartes: his Life and Meditations. A new Translation of the "Meditations," with Introduction, Memoir and Commentary. By Richard Lowndes. London: F. Norgate. 1878.

of Kant." It is of course impossible for us, within the limits of such a notice as this, to enter upon the discussion of any of the important and difficult questions which Mr. Lowndes necessarily raises, for they are those which lie at the basis of all ancient and modern speculation. But apart from the literary merit of the translation, which is very great, we have not for a long time seen a little book so fit as this to serve as an introduction to the study of philosophy for intelligent readers. Mr. Lowndes' statements and criticisms are always clearly and forcibly put, and there is a certain familiar vividness about his style well calculated to lure on those who may have imagined that there was something "harsh and crabbed" in the voice of "divine philosophy." To another class of readers the Memoir of Descartes which this volume contains will be its most attractive portion. The figure of Descartes is a singularly interesting one, that of a thoroughly original man, who sought truth by methods of his own, yet whose career was not without a certain flavour of romance also. Mr. Lowndes has told the story well, and whoever masters it will not be without a distinct picture of one of the greatest of Frenchmen and the most effectual pioneers of modern thought.

The anonymous "Book of Prayer," the full title of which we give below,* is due, if some tell-tale initials may be trusted, to Mr. R. Crompton Jones, the compiler of two well-known and much-valued collections of religious poetry. The idea upon which are based the thirty "Orders of Worship" of which it chiefly consists, is that of leaving much more room than liturgies commonly do for the minister's free prayer. They are indeed rather introductions to public worship than themselves supplying its form and matter. "The first twenty-two," says the Preface, "have been compiled almost entirely from the older devotional literature; the seven which follow are from more recent sources, or have been contributed specially to this collection." The thirtieth follows the lines of the Book of Common Prayer. The last hundred pages of the book are taken up with "Prayers and Thanksgivings," long and short, general and for special occasions, to be used publicly and privately. We should not venture to prophesy as to whether this little book will come into congregational use or not. It aims to supply an old want in a new way, and the new way may not all at once recommend itself to general acceptance.

* A Book of Prayer, in Thirty Orders of Worship; with additional Prayers and Thanksgivings for Public or Private Devotion. London: Williams and Norgate. 1878.

The very variety which it offers may, from the congregational point of view, present itself to some minds as a drawback. On the other hand, looking at it as a manual of devotion, its richness and fulness and many-sidedness are great recommendations. The tone is throughout pure, fervent, simple: there is nothing to offend the most fastidious taste: the blending of old and new elements of piety is happily made. It is a book which should be universally in the hands of ministers, and might with advantage find a corner in the pulpits even of those who deliberately prefer self-reliance in this important matter. Altogether we look forward to its exercising a refining and elevating effect upon the public worship of the churches over which its influence may make itself felt.

E.

THE

# THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

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## I.—HEBREW LITERATURE.

*Publications of the Society of Hebrew Literature.* London: Trübner. Containing up to the present time:

*Miscellany of Hebrew Literature.* Vol. I., 1872. Vol. II., edited by Rev. A. Löwy, 1877.

*Ibn Ezra Literature:* Vols. I.—III. *The Commentary of Ibn Ezra on Isaiah,* edited from MSS., and translated, with Notes Introductions and Indexes, by M. Friedländer, Ph.D., 1873-7. Vol. IV. *Essay on the Writings of Abraham Ibn Ezra,* by M. Friedländer, 1877.

Among the many societies formed in the present age for preserving and extending the knowledge of past times, their speculations, literature and characteristics, the Society of Hebrew Literature is certainly not the least deserving of support. The Jews have had, ever since ancient history shaded off into medieval and modern, to say nothing of older times, a history of their own. Since their dispersion they have been found everywhere—at first spreading abroad into every province of the universal empire of Rome, and enjoying the equal protection of its laws; yet not limited even by its vast boundaries, but adventuring beyond them, to Tartary, Parthia, India, and other regions of the far East. So wide a dispersion was facilitated at the outset by the unity of the Roman Empire, which made one province as eligible as another to a people left without any political coherence of its own, and forced to choose a dwelling solely on the cosmopolitan principle, *ubi bene ibi patria.*

The great break-up of the Empire found Jews in the various provinces which became independent kingdoms. They naturally remained at first where they had settled, and generally clung to the same land, despite all manner of discouragements and persecutions, which only gradually and very partially produced their inevitable consequences in driving them to seek happier homes. Thus, if we could have a general history of the Jews, it would include a resumé of the histories of most of the existing nations. Still, they were everywhere in, but not of, the nation with whom they "sojourned;" their laws and institutions were distinct, in part through the systematic unfriendliness which they encountered, and which forbade their holding land, and thus becoming free citizens like others; in part through their own peculiar and cherished religious and social usages, which set a bar to any complete amalgamation. Thus a history of the Jews would form a distinct chapter in that of Spain, Poland, or any country where they have dwelt in sufficient numbers to demand the historian's attention. Yet this chapter has unfortunately been too rarely written; and an important factor determining and illustrating the characters of nations, and advancing or retarding the march of civilization, has been very generally neglected. In England, indeed, there is not much to say of the history of the Jews. It seems curious that the land which is now pre-eminently the refuge of the oppressed and homeless stranger, should till recent times have been the most forbidding of all, at least to the Jew. And not the least curious feature of this historical fact is, that it was the Norman invaders, not the native English, who favoured the settlement of Jews, who even then were useful through their commercial thriftiness; and that as Normans became blended with English, the character of the latter prevailed and the Jews were excluded. This exclusion lasted till the Commonwealth. Oliver Cromwell, who was remarkable for nothing more than for the enlightened freedom from prejudice with which he desired to accord equal rights of action and speech to all, whether in sympathy with himself or not, exhibited this characteristic nowhere more strikingly than in the favour

with which he listened to Menasseh ben Israel, pleading for liberty to the Jews to settle in England. This plea was, however, rejected by the Privy Council, and no large immigration of the Jews driven from Portugal and other countries took place immediately. Still, in reliance on the influence of the Protector, some few ventured over, and the number gradually increased; so that the Anglo-Jewish community may be regarded as exactly two centuries old. I need not, however, speak more of it here, as it has recently formed the subject of a very interesting and instructive article in this Journal.*

If we may believe, as an increasing number of scholars now do, that some of the laws of the Pentateuch are of post-exilic origin, and that consequently the complete collection and arrangement of the Levitical legislation in the form in which we now have it is of somewhat later date still, then this date—400 B.C. at the earliest—indicates the commencement of the systematic or codified legislation of the Jews, which at the same time resulted from their desire of separation from the heathen, and sealed their fate to be so separated for all future time—from the best, most enlightened and most progressive, no less than from the corrupt influences of the outer world. Under this Law, known from the first as that of Moses, and originally called by his name, we may well believe, rather from a conviction, surely not wholly imaginary, that the great Leader in the Desert had himself been the author of its earliest elements, than with any intention of attributing to his age and his direct agency the whole mass of the five-fold book, the Jews, restored to their native land and sanctuary, attempted to live. The Law itself became their religion and their God. It prescribed the means of approaching and propitiating their God by the agency of temple, priest and Levite, by passover and atonement; and by directing exclusive attention to these, killed out the free and unlicensed forms of religious fervour which had in earlier times found a vent in the utterances of psalmists and prophets. It was thus the Law that killed the

* "The Jews in England," *Theol. Rev.* XIII. p. 413, by Rev. Ph. Magnus.

Prophets. It was the Law that obliterated the God of the Hebrews, by placing itself, avowedly as a means of approach to him, but practically as a bar to direct contact with him and thought of him. Henceforth his name, once so great both among them and among the heathen, was never heard again, and its place was supplied by abstractions such as the Shechinah, "the Presence," or the Shem, "the Name." The sense of the actual presence of the living God being thus at least greatly weakened, the Law itself as his work took his place more and more, and became itself the object of religious sentiment. It is easy to see how momentous must this change of attitude be. The Law as the all-holy could not contain anything impure, could not contradict itself or speak with a doubtful voice, could not sanction injustice or cruelty, could not give precepts lower than the highest known to the religious man. Hence arose the necessity of careful study of all its parts, with a view to explaining whatever appeared to savour of impurity, self-contradiction, cruelty or the rest; while its divine authority gave to such study a dignity above that of any other possible human employment. Thus the Midrash or "study" began very early—if not immediately after the completion of the Thorah, at least as soon as ever it had attained the general veneration I have described. Other causes contributed, especially somewhat later, to encourage this study and to turn it in other directions. The Law prescribed a mode of life for Jews living in their own land and within easy reach of their Temple. But only a small number of them returned from Babylon. Many remained behind; others had avoided the captivity by escaping to Egypt; and in later times many settled in Asia Minor, at Rome and elsewhere. What was the law for these? It was necessary to study the Thorah to discover, if only by analogy, what should be their rule of life. And practical difficulties arose everywhere, as the state of society differed more and more from that in and for which the Law was intended, on questions such as marriage, divorce, food, testaments. Schools of the learned in the Law were established, discussions were held and duly reported, and cases

and anecdotes were told, and thus out of the older and simpler Mishnah arose the far wider and more intricate literature of the Talmud. On the development of the Talmud I refer generally to Deutsch's essay, and quote therefrom the following:

"The Talmud, which is composed of these two elements, the legal and the legendary, is divided into *Mishnah* and *Gemara:* two terms again of uncertain, shifting meaning. Originally indicating, like the technical words mentioned already, 'study,' they both became terms for special studies, and indicated special works. The Mishnah, from *shanah* (*tana*), to learn, to repeat, has been of old translated δευτέρωσις, second law. But this derivation, correct as it seems literally, is incorrect in the first instance. It simply means 'Learning,' like Gemara, which, besides, indicates 'complement' to the Mishnah—itself a complement to the Mosaic code, but in such a manner that, in developing and enlarging, it supersedes it. The Mishnah, on its own part again, forms a kind of text, to which the Gemara is not so much a scholion as a critical expansion. The Pentateuch remains in all cases the background and latent source of the Mishnah. But it is the business of the Gemara to examine into the legitimacy and correctness of this Mishnic development in single instances. The Pentateuch remained under all circumstances the immutable, divinely given constitution, the *written* law: in contradistinction to it, the Mishnah, together with the Gemara, was called the oral or 'Unwritten' law, not unlike the unwritten Greek Ῥήτραι, the Roman 'Lex Non Scripta,' the Sunnah, or our own Common Law. . . . . This whole process of the development of the 'Law' was in the hands of the 'Scribes,' who, according to the New Testament, 'sit in the seat of Moses.' . . . . The task of the first class of these masters—the 'Scribes' by way of eminence, whose time ranges from the return from Babylon down to the Greco-Syrian persecutions (220 B.C.)—was above all to preserve the Sacred Text, as it had survived after many mishaps. They 'enumerated' not merely the precepts, but the words, the letters, the signs of the Scripture, thereby guarding it from all future interpolations and corruptions. They had further to explain these precepts, in accordance with the collateral tradition of which they were the guardians. They had to instruct the people, to preach in the synagogues, to teach in the schools. They further, on their own authority, erected certain 'Fences,' i.e. such new injunctions as they deemed necessary merely for the better keeping of the old precepts. The whole work of these

men ('Men of the Great Synagogue') is well summed up in their adage: 'Have a care in legal decisions, send forth many disciples, and make a fence around the law.'"

Mr. Deutsch then proceeds to describe the organization of education whereby the supply of these learned expositors was kept up with a zeal that no persecution could extinguish:

"The masters were martyred time after time, the academies were razed to the ground, the practical and the theoretical occupation with the law was proscribed on pain of death—yet in no instance is the chain of the living tradition broken. With their last breath the dying masters appointed and ordained their successors; for one academy that was reduced to a heap of ashes in Palestine, three sprang up in Babylonia, and the Law flowed on, and was perpetuated in the face of a thousand deaths. . . . . The 'High Colleges' or 'Kallahs' only met during some months in the year. Three weeks before the term the Dean prepared the students for the lectures to be delivered by the Rector, and so arduous became the task, as the number of the disciples increased, that in time no less than seven Deans had to be appointed. Yet the mode of teaching was not that of our modern universities. . . . . Here all was life, movement, debate; question was met by counter-question, answers were given wrapped up in allegories or parables, the inquirer was led to deduce the questionable point for himself by analogy—the nearest approach to the Socratic method. The New Testament furnishes many specimens of this contemporary method of instruction. . . . . There is something almost German in the profound reverence uniformly shown to these representatives of science and learning, however poor and insignificant in person and rank. Many of the most eminent 'Doctors' were but humble tradesmen."

I have transcribed these sentences in the rather desperate endeavour to obtain a standing-ground from which we can fairly estimate the Hebrew literature which grew from these beginnings. That literature can afford less perhaps than any other to be judged by an abstract or absolute standard. It is based wholly on foundations such as we find it very difficult to realize, foundations laid by the ancient Doctors of the Law, who themselves were but expositors and enlargers of an older code deemed divine. That formed its beginning, but it has no

end. As long as there are Jews willing to live under their Law, so long will changing circumstances, the different tastes and ethics of various times and countries, demand renewed revision, and commentaries upon commentaries in an unending series. The veneration felt in the earliest ages for the study of the Law was naturally extended to the students of it, however poor and insignificant, as Mr. Deutsch says, in person and rank. And the fearful vicissitudes which the Jews have experienced during two thousand years, and which have extinguished their old nationality and transformed them into Spaniards, Germans and Poles, have left this sentiment as strong as ever. A Polish Jew in one of the many almost exclusively Jewish villages of Poland, who can devote his time to reading the Talmud and the commentaries on the code of Caro, however sordid his lot and repulsively dirty his habits and surroundings, receives the respect which a merchant prince with all his jewels and perhaps magnificent charities will not obtain; and his wife will have such pride in her husband's unproductive labour that she will cheerfully undertake any amount of domestic drudgery to maintain him in his learned idleness. But it is evident that as the Mishnic system of interpretation inaugurated a mode of regarding all human relations which might be further developed but could never be cast off, any really independent philosophy or science was by it rendered impossible. The Jewish literature became a mass of texts and commentaries; tradition wound itself with snake-like coils around the mind; escape from its benumbing fetters was impossible; the mind could nowhere walk freely and think original thought. Philosophy, physical science, poetry, in their higher form, could not be; nor was the want probably keenly felt, for, had it been, the remedy was at hand; the fetters were self-imposed, and could be cast off when found to be burdensome. A parallel naturally suggests itself to us. The Christian Church accepted, no less than the Jews, the divine origin of the Scriptures, of the Old as well as of the New Testament, and had until the Reformation a living authority to enforce and interpret them. The mind of the individual

Christian was not left free to think for itself where it could possibly come into collision with the ideas of Scripture as understood at Rome. The Christian fetters were, however, different from the Jewish. They as a rule only prescribed the form of *religious* ideas, as religion was understood by the Christian. But to the Christian the Mosaic law was a thing of the past, and he was left free in the bodily and social matters with which it deals so minutely. Science and philosophy could take their free and unimpeded course, and attach themselves to Plato or Aristotle, or other pagan masters, even in the dark ages when the power of the Church was highest. Only when they were so unfortunate as accidentally to run against some distinct statement of Scripture, such as the story of Joshua and the sun, did they lead to inconvenience. A freer development of the intellect was therefore possible in Christendom; and the scholastic philosophy, the science of Roger Bacon, the poetry of the Troubadours, Petrarch and Dante, arose under the very wing of the Church. The Jew, on the other hand, regarded religion in a different way. With him, as with Eastern nations generally, it permeated the whole of life; food, raiment, marriage and divorce, belonged to it no less than prayer and ideas of God. It resided in the whole of the Mosaic Law, that part alone being temporarily in abeyance which was incapable of fulfilment—the rites belonging to the non-existent Temple; and this was to come into use again whenever "the people" should be restored to the land of their fathers. Yet outside of this severe limitation the Jew had some counterbalancing liberties which placed him in a freer intellectual sphere than the Christian. His religious fetters had relation, as I have said, very largely to external things, and left his mind comparatively free to speculate. The differences between rival schemes of Church government, the disputes about symbolism in religious services, or about the persons in the Godhead, which continue to tear the Christian Church, never existed in such ominous magnitude among the Jews. Philosophical and theological ideas were perfectly free, with the sole reservation that the thinker must not directly

oppose anything which had been laid down; but very great latitude of interpretation was generally allowed. And it must further be insisted on, contrary to the popular notion, that the Jews, especially in the twelfth and following centuries, when some of their greatest scholars lived, had a freedom from national or religious prejudice, which gave them an immense advantage in the acquisition of knowledge over the Christians of that age. The latter were generally debarred by hate and prejudice from appropriating any of the rich stores of science then held by the Arabs and Moors, or even from learning from the Jews; while national individualism kept scholars of different countries sundered to some extent, though less than in modern times since Latin has abrogated its useful function of a universal language of learning. But the Jew was cosmopolitan; and the eminence of Jewish scholars of that age was very largely due to their studies of Moorish science, and to their acquaintance with a large number of modern, as well as the chief ancient, languages. It is to the time when this work was to be done that we naturally look for, and find, the most eminent Jewish scholars, whose minds were most philosophical, and whose works have most interest for the world at large.

The preceding observations have, I hope, shewn the *raison d'être* of a "Society of Hebrew Literature." I have endeavoured to shew that there is, despite many drawbacks, a certain amount of Hebrew literature worthy to be resuscitated in a convenient form and made generally accessible by means of translations, and that the history of the Jews in Europe since the commencement of the Christian era is an important complement to the histories of European nations. The Society was organized in the year 1870, "with the object of rendering the literary treasures of the Jews accessible to those who sympathize with the intellectual activity for which Jewish scholars, in all ages and amid the severest trials, have been eminently distinguished." The first volume was published in 1872; six have appeared up to the present date, and others are promised. Of the six, four are devoted to Ibn Ezra (Aben Ezra), "one of

the most influential Hebrew authors of the middle ages;" and certainly no worthier object could be chosen by the young Society, nor any which would better give it a character for solid learning and discriminating judgment. It has done well, moreover, in leaving all these volumes of "Ibn Ezra Literature" to be prepared by one able scholar, Dr. Friedländer, Principal of the Jews' College, London, who has made a very full and interesting study of his hero's life and writings. Although one of Ibn Ezra's Biblical Commentaries, that on Isaiah, is here published in full both in the original Hebrew and in an English translation, yet the volume which contains Dr. Friedländer's Essays on his writings has a more general interest for us, as in it he has brought to a focus Ibn Ezra's entire system of philosophy and theology by laborious search through his works, besides giving a careful account of all his Commentaries. We thus learn much more of the whole character of the man than we could by ever so minute a study of any one of his works—presuming that Dr. Friedländer's account is as faithful as it is lucid in exposition, which there seems no reason to doubt.

Abraham Ibn Ezra was born at Toledo, in the very heart of Spain, and less than fifty miles south of Madrid. It is a very ancient city, having been a Roman colony, and was in the middle ages one of the largest and most distinguished both for profitable industry and for learning in Spain. As early as A.D. 712, it was taken by the Arab general Tárik during the very first Moslem invasion of the peninsula, when Gibraltar, where the host landed, received its modern appellation of "Tárik's Mountain" (Jebel Tárik). Toledo was inhabited, at least from this epoch, by a mixed population of Arabs, Berbers and Jews, besides the native Christians. But the Jewish population was much older, and sided with the invaders against the Gothic rulers, who had in earlier times treated them with the harshness which seems to have been universal wherever Christian rulers had Jews among their subjects. The friendship thus inaugurated between the Arabs and the Jews in Spain was maintained during the whole period of Moorish dominion

in the peninsula, greatly to the moral as well as the physical advantage of the former, who not only had free scope for pursuing their favourite learned studies, but were admitted to posts of dignity and confidence as ministers of state to the Moslem sovereigns. The Arabs, after overrunning the whole of the peninsula and a large part of France—from which last they were finally expelled by the great victory obtained over them by Charles Martel near Tours in 732—ultimately established a kingdom independent of the Eastern Khalifate, with Cordova for its capital and Toledo for its second city. This dynasty (the Beni Umeyyah or Ommayides), after a brilliant career, came to an end in 1031, and the country was divided among a number of small Arabic kingdoms, which enabled the Christians to recover some parts of the country. Alfonso VI. of Castile and Leon was able to regain his own dominions, including the important city of Toledo, which he took in 1085. Ibn Ezra is believed to have been born about 1092. He appears to have always been very poor; this may be perhaps accounted for by the unsettled state of the country and the frequent sieges, for the Arabs made several attempts to recover Toledo. But his poverty may only have been the result of his mode of life. He must have been a hard student from an early age, to gain the profound learning which distinguished him; and if this reputation enabled him in his later life to obtain some profit for manuscript copies of his works, this resource was not available while he was still young and unknown. All that Dr. Friedländer can discover about his early life is, that he wrote poems, both liturgical and secular; and that he interested himself in solving scientific problems, such as difficulties in the computation of the calendar. It is evident that he had not the practical talent which secures success in the walk of life. His complaints against his ill-luck were uttered in verse at various periods of his life; they leave the impression of a mind "cast down, but not destroyed," or, in more modern language, "floored, Sir, but jolly." Dr. Friedländer quotes one of these epigrams written in elegant Hebrew, which he renders very literally thus:

"I cannot become rich, the fates are against me;
Were I a dealer in shrouds, no man would ever die.
Ill-starred was my birth, unpropitious the planets;
Were I a seller of candles, the sun would never set."

Toledo having been the scene of only failure and disappointment, he left it and set out to travel. He may have been about forty years old at this time, and had produced none of his great books. The mode and the means of extensive travelling in the middle ages, especially for the numerous poor men who contrived to roam about the world almost as freely as we can do now, form a subject of great obscurity and interest, which we would gladly see elucidated by some contemporary personal narratives. Unfortunately, Ibn Ezra does not satisfy our curiosity on this point, and Dr. Friedländer can only tell us what countries he visited, some of which are distinctly marked out by the composition of books. He visited the south of France, Italy, Greece, the Archipelago, Damascus, Palestine, Egypt, Arabia, and even Persia and India. He also came to England, where he wrote two tracts, one of which was dedicated to one Salomon of London. This is interesting for two circumstances: first, that it proves that there was at that time a Jewish community established here; and secondly, because it throws a little light on the obscure question I have just alluded to, inasmuch as it seems to shew that the Jewish traveller was received and aided by his co-religionists in the countries that he visited. In some places he lived for a considerable time: at Tiberias, where he examined old manuscripts of the Bible; at Rome, Mantua and Lucca, at all of which he wrote books, and the last of which he called his residence. He observed accurately the manners and customs of the places he visited, and scatters notices of them through his works. One anecdote, though manifestly apocryphal, and not told by Ibn Ezra himself, is worth repeating:

"It is said that once when he was on board a vessel with some of his pupils, a raging storm compelled the captain to throw every ninth man of the passengers over-board; by means of an algebraical

formula, which his mathematical knowledge had discovered, he placed himself and his party in such a position that the fatal number never reached one of them; but neither the plan of the captain nor the counterplot of Ibn Ezra is sufficiently known."

Abraham Ibn Ezra died at the age of seventy-five years, at Calahorra (Navarre), or at Rome, according to various authorities, saying of himself, in the words of the Bible, "And Abram was seventy-five years old when he departed from Haran"—i.e. from the troubles of life.

In the attempt which I must now make to give an idea of Ibn Ezra's system of philosophy and theology and principles of Biblical interpretation, I am entirely dependent on Dr. Friedländer. It is a work which can be undertaken only by one who has made an exhaustive study of his writings for the purpose, since these "abound in philosophical matter, in definitions, arguments and deductions," which, "carefully collected, analyzed and arranged, offer sufficient material for the reconstruction of his whole theory."

To begin with his views on the Cosmogony. Ibn Ezra assigned to the verb ברא *bara* in Gen. i. 1, the meaning, which we are now again beginning to understand (from its use by the prophets and elsewhere) as specially its own, of *forming*, rather than of *creating out of nothing*, and consequently considered that verb to predicate only the formation of *the* (now existing) heaven and earth out of chaos (תהו ובהו); the previous creation of chaos or matter was not denied by him, but put back into a previous age beyond human ken and prior to the epoch described by the Biblical cosmogonist. It is interesting to note that Ibn Ezra anticipated Ewald in regarding v. 1 as a dependent clause, translating it, "When in the beginning God formed the heaven and the earth, the earth was void and formless."* The chaos of Gen. i. 2 is what philosophers call

* Friedländer, p. 5. In a later work, however, Ibn Ezra declares that v. 2 cannot be the apodosis of v. 1 on account of the ו at the beginning (והארץ), an objection which is perfectly just if it refers to a ו prefixed to a substantive which is subject of a following verb in the participle, and which applies equally to the two following clauses in v. 2 (ורוח, וחשך). But it is strange that this objection

Matter, and consists of four kinds—the four elements of fire, air, earth and water, which are indestructible (in so far as there is no power in nature by which they can be destroyed), yet not eternal; without life, volition or understanding. From this latter character it results that they are incapable of apprehending or obeying a Divine command (like "He commanded and they were created," Ps. cxlviii. 5); and therefore Ibn Ezra assumes, as Jews and Orientals are always ready to do, angelic ministers surrounding the throne of God, endowed with power to execute his commands, intermediate between the Divine Majesty and the creatures. These highest of created beings, themselves invisible, transmit the Divine commands to lower and visible agencies—sun, moon and stars, which form and cause whatever happens on earth, each star having its own special property impressed upon it from the beginning. The luminaries are simple—not composed of the four elements—and therefore unchangeable and endless; but not on that account without a beginning; for Ibn Ezra argues from series of numbers, which may go on for ever increasing, yet start from one definite point, that what has no end need not be eternal in the past also. His numerical system thus took cognisance only of positive numbers.

Ibn Ezra divides the universe into three worlds. The upper world he calls the Heaven of heavens; it is the abode of the Ideals or genera, according to the pattern of which the concrete individuals are fashioned; they are spiritual, and therefore invisible, and everlasting, and constitute the hosts of the Most High, and his messengers to fulfil his behests, yet not by flying to earth, since they are immovable, but like a lamp, which sheds its light abroad without itself moving; they are called the דָּבָר, "the word" of the Lord, and אֱלֹהִים, "the Mighty

did not lead him to look further down for the apodosis, which he would have found at the beginning of v. 3, introduced in the customary way by וְ prefixed to the verb, in וַיֹּאמֶר, so as to yield the sense, "In the beginning of God's forming the heavens and the earth, while the earth was shapeless and waste, and darkness over the face of the Abyss, and the breath of God was brooding over the face of the water,—then God said, 'Let Light be!' and Light was." See my discussion of this passage in Theol. Rev. Vol. V. pp. 4, 7—12.

ones." We have here a Jewish adaptation of the Platonic philosophy, made very ingeniously to fit in with many Biblical expressions which by it acquire a deeper meaning than is generally seen, and perhaps than it is likely their writers ever had. The Ideals are termed צורות, forms, models, exactly the Platonic ἰδέαι, and חקים, the statutes by which the world is governed. The souls of men which have acquired knowledge and adequately fulfilled their earthly mission, are received among them. The second or middle world is that of the heavenly bodies, the sun, moon and stars, as described above. The third or lower world is that of the earth and its atmosphere, in which are found all the visible, corporeal and individual beings corresponding to the ideals of the upper world.

God is said to be "self-existing," which quality is indicated by his name יהוה or יה [Jahveh]="He is," as he is the only being that can be said absolutely to be—without the consent of some other being.* He is called the Creator of all, and is said to be in everything and to be everything; to be without shape or form, and above our comprehension or imagination. We can therefore know him only through the acts which he exhibits to mankind. God is omniscient, because his knowledge of individuals, being derived through the ideals or genera, which comprehend all the possibilities of variation in individuals, is perfect; "while the reverse method of proceeding from the other extreme, from the individual—the only method

* Ibn Ezra treats the Name sometimes as equivalent to עומד עצמו, "self-existing," and sometimes as meaning מעמיד הכל, "causing everything to exist." It would appear that he was as certain that it is derived from the verb חוה or היה, and as doubtful whether it is from the root or from the causative (Hiphil) form, as we are now-a-days (see Theol. Rev. Vol. XV. p. 607, Oct. last). His interpretation of יי צבאות as the "creator of the hosts of angels, i.e. ideals, that surround his throne," is so ingenious that it might almost convert one to his philosophy of ideals, did not such a philosophy appear flagrantly inconsistent with the spirit of an age so simple and so early in culture as that which spoke of "Jahveh of hosts." Then he treats אלהים as denoting the same high agencies, the angels, and consequently makes אלהים=יי צבאות, יי in both phrases being in st. const.; from which, he says, by a curious suppression of the *nomen regens* (of which it would be difficult to find another instance), the word אלהים by itself came to be used of the *Lord* of the Elohim himself.

available to man—leads to a knowledge of an imperfect and uncertain nature, because it is impossible to ascertain by experience the properties of the entire system of innumerable creatures which constitute the universe." Finally, though God works through ministers, he is nevertheless cognisant of the details of the universe, and occasionally sets aside the action of his heavenly agents by anomalous feats which we call miracles, but which are declared not to contradict the original design of creation; but these interferences are only resorted to on behalf of the good of man.

In speaking of the nature of Man, Ibn Ezra considers that he holds a supremacy over all earthly creatures in virtue of his Soul, although he admits our impotence either to understand its nature, whether mortal or immortal, whether substance or attribute, or to see the advantage it receives by entering the body. Yet he is able to discriminate in the soul the three functions of nutrition, sensibility and intellect,*—the first common to all animals and plants, the second possessed by animals only, the third peculiar to man. Intellect, however, can only act when moved by volition, which often refuses to act, being governed by the lower faculties of nutrition and sensibility, as well as by the inherited will of preceding generations; still the will remains essentially free, and if man trusts implicitly to the guidance of divine revelation (as Abraham did), he gains "the supreme reward, the summum bonum, the expected Eden." The highest faculty of the soul, the mind or intellect (נשמה), has an existence independent of the body, in which it is only imprisoned, and lives both before and after the earthly life. Its highest aim is to acquire a knowledge of God, which can be attained only by study of his works on earth, and especially of man, the microcosm; hence man must strive to know himself, especially the nature and purpose of his soul, to lead him to the right path of life. By gaining knowledge of divine laws and grouping them together, we ultimately reach the one First Cause; a few attained this

* (1) נפש, (2) רוח, (3) נשמה.

knowledge even on earth, as Enoch, Moses and Elijah. The soul of the wicked will perish—apparently because, from not having striven towards the true knowledge of God, it has ceased to be a living and animating force that can exist without the body. The soul is imagined by Ibn Ezra to descend from heaven as a blank *tabula rasa*, on which is inscribed the knowledge gained on earth during its sojourn in the body; the soul of the righteous, therefore, or rather the writing inscribed on it, will live for ever; this, however, he declares to be esoteric doctrine intelligible only to the few who are initiated in psychology. The soul has the capacity for forming general ideas, and in its advance towards perfection is alternately active or knowing, passive or known, and the knowledge itself which leads to action. In the soul of supreme perfection these three coincide: "the soul is then like God, who, in perceiving anything, is the subject which perceives, the object perceived, and the perception itself." Men who reached the highest possible knowledge of the Almighty, like Moses and Elijah, were thereby enabled to work miracles.

I think this very slight sketch of the religious philosophy of one of the most philosophical of the old Jewish writers will be interesting, and, it is to be hoped, may lead some to study the more detailed exposition given by Dr. Friedländer. It exhibits a very curious attempt at a system in which ideas begotten of the philosophy both of Plato and of Aristotle are brought into a not unnatural contact and harmony with phrases of the Hebrew Scriptures. Many ideas, too, especially on the Divine nature and activity, and on the destiny of the soul, remind us of the philosophical systems of India. It can scarcely be believed that Ibn Ezra's interpretations of Biblical expressions, when given in support of his transcendental views, are tenable as expositions of what the writers really meant, because we cannot suppose that those early and simple-minded writers had any transcendental philosophy at all; but they cannot but strike us as indicating a powerful and subtle intellect, and as anything but perverse, if they cannot be literally true. When we pass to his Theology, as exhibited in his mode

of dealing with the interpretation of Scripture, we seem to descend from the sublime level of a perfectly independent speculator on the highest problems of man's existence, to the far lower level of the ordinary commentator whose task is laid out before him, and who must to a great extent sink his own individuality in his acknowledged duty to do no more than explain the obscure and harmonize the seemingly contradictory, in writings the correctness of which could scarcely be called in question. He becomes again the Jew, though no doubt still "the Wise," as he is called. I can only mention a few of his leading ideas.

Revelation from God to man is expressed in Scripture in figurative language; thus Jahveh is said to speak, when a purely spiritual communication without any audible voice is intended. The prophets have knowledge of God and direct communion with him; but they are not always at an equal elevation of spirit; they cannot always and *ad libitum* predict the future, and they are liable to error and sin. In the prophetic books only the sense is inspired; the words are human and unimportant, being the prophet's own; yet they must not be altered, lest an alteration should change the sense too. All the books of the Bible are "holy," but not all inspired. Four of the Megillot (Song of Songs, Ruth, Ecclesiastes, and Esther) and Job were received into the canon for various reasons, but not on account of any inspiration. The Pentateuch is the most holy book, and the Psalms follow next. Other books, of history and prophecy, he says, had a temporary importance for the generation to which they were addressed, but do not increase our knowledge. On the Pentateuch he adheres to the traditional view, that it was all written by Moses, except the last few verses on Moses' death which were added by Joshua, and upholds the correctness of the Massoretic text throughout, not agreeing with the Midrash where it reports textual alterations or interpolations. The correctness of all statements made in the Bible, as a book of Divine authority, is maintained by Ibn Ezra, and he says that every assertion which is contradicted in the Bible must be rejected; moreover, as the Bible

cannot contradict itself, all seeming inconsistencies occurring in it must be explained away. The book of Samuel, down to the mention of the death of Samuel, was written by Samuel; the minor prophets by those whose names they bear; the first thirty-nine chapters of Isaiah by Isaiah; the remainder of the book by a prophet who lived after the restoration from Babylon. For this last belief, in which Ibn Ezra surprisingly anticipates one of the most generally accepted results of modern criticism, his reasons are only partially the same as those of the moderns: the writer uses the name and acts of Cyrus as an illustration derived from a period already past, and moreover speaks throughout of a "delivery from our present exile" as the subject of these chapters, for which the restoration out of the Babylonian exile is only used by way of parallel; yet he does not insist on his conclusion, which indeed rests on very insufficient arguments, since according to his avowed principles a prophet can occupy in his speech an imaginary point of time, past or future, round which events will group themselves as relatively past or future, and thus Isaiah himself might have transplanted himself in imagination to the later period after the restoration, and spoken of Cyrus's acts as already past.

The remainder of the principles avowed by Ibn Ezra shew him in a different light—not as one who simply accepts the common opinions about verbal inspiration, Mosaic authorship and the rest, nor as a philosopher, alternately mystical and sceptical—but as a man of common sense, a lover of the *via media*, who will stand no nonsense. The reported allegorical acts of prophets* are mere imaginations and were not really performed; and similarly angels are not seen, but only perceived in the mind. Creation out of nothing is not to be assumed; all the reported wonders can be explained from the forces of nature acting with the Divine will. Miracles are never to be assumed when not distinctly asserted in the Bible, and consequently those recounted only in the Talmud must be rejected; more-

* E.g. Is. xx. 2, 3; Hosea i., iii.

over, the miracles must appear natural and possible—a curious and unphilosophical condition, which seems to shew that Ibn Ezra could at times regard the outward semblance of things even in direct defiance of their inner nature. He maintains, however, that "there is nothing new under the sun"—therefore no real miracle; what appears new is so only in form; yet, as said above, man, having attained to a sufficient elevation of soul, may work miracles, counteracting by his intellect the influence of the stars upon his life. Although direct communion between man and God is only possible in exceptional cases, yet every man can offer acceptable prayer. It must be uttered in words, and must never be injurious to others; it must be addressed to God only; no angels or stars can afford us any help against evil. The language of prayer should be very simple, so as to be intelligible to all worshipers; the Biblical Hebrew is specially recommended to those who understand Hebrew. All men, all places and times, are alike to God; "yet they possess different properties, through which they are more or less adapted to the worship of God;"—thus Palestine was distinguished above other countries, Jerusalem over other hills, Israel over other nations, and so forth. This is surely a conspicuous instance of the philosopher who has not the courage of his own opinions. Ibn Ezra in this point only anticipated the most common phenomenon in the history of opinion at the present day. His philosophy can see no reason *a priori* why God, the Creator of all, should feel partiality for one man or one place above another; and the condition of the Jews in his time made no such partiality as a fact credible. But the teaching of the books which he accepted as inspired clearly asserted such partiality, and gave countless instances of it from history. Ibn Ezra, being, as I have said, a lover of the *via media*, is content to maintain both the philosophical and the biblical doctrine, without attempting to harmonize them. On rules of life also his opinions are moderate; he recommends within reasonable limits abstinence from all luxury and indulgence, and condemns self-denial, abstinence and seclusion, when carried to excess; voluntary abstinence is

only commendable when it does not interfere with the mental faculties. Celibacy is wrong, because the propagation of the race is a duty.

As to the interpretation of the Pentateuch, it must be remembered that this is a far more weighty matter to a Jew because he is "under the Law," and this fact binds him to come to definite conclusions which will leave nothing doubtful in what regards every-day practice. And in fact it would be exceedingly inconvenient to come to any other conclusion than the upholding of the Talmudical interpretations which are generally received by his fellows. Thus Ibn Ezra contends that wherever the language of the Thorah is vague, it cannot have been intended to have more than one interpretation, and that the correct one has been handed down by continuous tradition from Moses to the Talmudic writers; to their decision, therefore, he defers, even in cases where he would himself have explained the text otherwise. In the books of history and poetry, on the other hand, he feels himself under no such obligation to adhere to Talmudic tradition, and interprets them independently. As to the future, he expected the restitution of the "daughter of Zion" to her country, and believed that the dead would be restored to life in order to share in beholding the permanent establishment of the Divine institutions. On the Messiah, who is a necessary person to this belief, he held a peculiar form of opinion. He expected two Messiahs; the first called "son of Ephraim or of Joseph," as if representing the northern kingdom or the lost tribes, and destined to lead the nation through the last fearful wars and to be slain by the enemies of Israel, and the second the real Messiah, "son of David," to whom the first is only forerunner, and whose advent is to be announced by the prophet Elijah—a personage, however, who is not identical with the Elijah of history. The Messiah will possess all human virtues in perfection, and will rule with kindness and equity, all nations recognizing his decrees. The condition of mankind will then be greatly elevated, especially in the Holy Land; the atmosphere will be pure, the soil fertile, and human life long and

happy; the dead will live again to enjoy the happiness they could not reach during their previous earthly life. But the Messianic period is not for ever; "for the body will return again to dust, and the soul will then rejoin the immortal heavenly chorus of angels." The ultimate resurrection in which Ibn Ezra believes, is exclusively spiritual: in the future world "there will be no eating, no drinking, nor any of the material enjoyments: the intellectual beholding of the Divine Glory will be the only reward then enjoyed by the souls of the righteous."

I cannot speak in detail of Ibn Ezra's Commentary on Isaiah, which is presented in two volumes, one containing the original Hebrew text, and the other an excellent English translation by Dr. Friedländer. Its interest is mainly historical; its publication may possibly shew its author to be the real originator of some explanations which would otherwise be assigned to recent writers. Its careful grammatical analysis cannot but raise our opinion of the philological acumen and training of the early days before there was any "revival of learning." Indeed it tempts us to ask whether this revival was not, in relation to Hebrew, rather an extension to the Christian world of knowledge which had never died among the Jews themselves. This Commentary deserves to be in the hands of every one who reads Isaiah in the original, along with those of the best modern writers. After what I have already said of Ibn Ezra's treatment of Scripture, it is scarcely necessary to add that we must not expect to find in it synthetic views and generalizations, which endeavour from the statements and omissions of the prophet to reconstruct his historical and religious position; this higher criticism is reserved for our own more far-seeing age, and for men of untrammelled principles and sympathetic insight like Ewald and Kuenen.

I have spoken hitherto on the most solid labours of the Society of Hebrew Literature. Two volumes remain, entitled "Miscellanies," which contain short papers on very various subjects. Some are articles on special points of biography, geography and history; others, specimens of Hebrew literature,

translated into English. Some of the former class are extracted from German and other works, where they are not likely to be easily discovered by English readers. As a rule, these essays will be found interesting to a larger and more miscellaneous class of readers than those who care to master the philosophical speculations or biblical expositions of Ibn Ezra. The whole story of the labours of Menasseh ben Israel to obtain for the Jews liberty to settle in England, and his negotiations to that effect with Cromwell, are here told in full; accompanied by his remarkable "Declaration to the Commonwealth of England," the pleading of which is urged under three heads: How profitable the nation of the Jews are; How faithfull the nation of the Jews are; and On the nobility of the Jews. The chapter on the Sufferings of the Jews during the Middle Ages, extracted from Zunz's "Synagogale Poesie des Mittelalters," is another valuable contribution to Jewish history from one of the first masters of the subject; it need hardly be said that it is full of horrors which are the eternal shame of Christian rulers and peoples; but the pathetic poetry that persecution and martyrdom elicited from the victims would probably hardly be imagined till revealed by this essay. One of the most curious papers in this, or perhaps in any book, commences with a biography of the little-known Jewish physician of the tenth century, Chisdai, son of Isaac, of Cordova, who through his knowledge of medicine and of the Greek and Latin languages, and through general tact and ability, became Vizier to two Khalifs of Cordova, and conducted many embarrassing affairs with great ability, and at the same time remained the faithful protector of the Jews against the Moslems, and the promoter of Jewish learning. But what specially interests us in him is, that he heard "from time to time from Oriental travellers that there was a Jewish kingdom in Asia, ruled by a Jewish king." He inquired on every opportunity concerning the name and locality of this mysterious country. Having at last learned that the land was called Cusar, and had this account confirmed and supplemented by ambassadors from the Emperor of Constantinople to the Khalif of Cordova, who said

it was fifteen days' journey by water beyond Constantinople, and the king's name was Joseph, he determined to put himself in communication with him. But it was not easy to find a messenger, even though his efforts were backed by the Khalif Abderrahman. The first went no further than Constantinople; but at last, by a roundabout course, his letter reached king Joseph, whose kingdom seems to have been on the Caspian, near Astrachan and Derbend, and (what is more) received an answer, and both are preserved and given to us here in English. The Spanish Jew inquires of the Oriental of the state of the Israelites there, and how they came there; whether they form an independent state not subject to any foreign ruler, whether they conform to the law of Judaism, and so forth. These questions elicit a reply tracing the history of the people of Cusar, who are derived from Togarma son of Japhet, and therefore not Israelites, but embraced Judaism after a disputation on the comparative merits of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The letters are replete with the most curious geographical details. It is no wonder that they have been deemed forgeries, but they are believed to be genuine by so weighty an authority as Zedner, and apparently Cassel also.

There are other papers of which I have not space to speak, which are not inferior in importance or interest to those here described. I hope that the Society will be able to continue its publication, not only of the large works of great writers (Maimonides is next to be taken in hand), but even more of these miscellaneous volumes, in which so much light may be thrown on dark spaces of history or biography by essays not long enough to form independent volumes. These "Miscellanies," moreover, deserve to secure for the Society extensive support among the lovers of literature outside the Jewish communion.

RUSSELL MARTINEAU.

## II.—THE CASUISTRY OF AMUSEMENTS.

AMUSEMENTS are not noticed in the Ten Commandments, nor do they occupy a conspicuous place in any scheme of morals. Yet they make up an appreciable part of life, and must be more or less considered in any comprehensive or minute regulation of conduct. The consideration accorded to them in the abstract will always vary according to circumstances of period, place, society and religion. Possibly the right line of conduct may vary also. The frontier has often been a "hap-hazard" one. Still oftener it has been exceedingly rude and primitive—a sort of great wall of China, a foolish and futile, though formidable and massive barrier. It is for casuistry to make the border-line "scientific."

This seems the more necessary as a provision for the conscience. There is some fear that in our own country, with which we have most to do, conscience is becoming a comparatively "silent member." Except on certain broad distinctions of morals, its voice is an inarticulate murmur rather than an intelligent rule of behaviour. It has ceased to be a guide; it amounts at most to a certain sensation of mild inward disquiet and discomfort. This arises partly from the neglect of casuistry, partly from a dissatisfying consciousness of deficient self-control. The two defaults are intimately connected. People control themselves insufficiently because they are insufficiently certain what to do and what to avoid. They are insufficiently certain because they have not applied to the increasingly complicated questions of daily conduct which civilization and events have produced, that enlightened casuistry by which, as social existence becomes more complex, the simple canon of the Decalogue requires to be expanded and refined.

It is to be feared that there are things of more consequence than amusements in which the ethics of our day need to be nicer and more exact. Commercial morality, for example, is one of the most uncertain of codes. Some things may be done by everybody—must be done by everybody—who wishes to

live by business. Other things must not be done by anybody who desires to preserve a fair name. But between these two classes of actions there lies a great range of business conduct in which the Ten Commandments are useless for reference, in which men who are moralists and nothing more can be of little use as practical monitors, and in which what is wanted is that combination of perfect detailed knowledge and sensitive morality which only the sound casuist possesses. To demand the prosecution of a Glasgow Bank Director is easy. To prove that if he has been from the beginning of the Bank's deficiencies one of its active managers, with full freedom of discretion and choice, he ought to be punished, is superfluous. But it is not unnecessary, nor is it by any means easy, to say off-hand what a man should do who comes on to a board of direction and finds the institution he is to help to manage already committed to unprofitable investments in "going concerns," which may or may not yield under patient treatment the returns requisite to bring the balance on to the right side. There is really, however, little uncertainty in any such case. The place where each Director ought individually to have drawn the line can be ascertained, if the moral investigator can be made acquainted in the retrospect with exactly the facts and exactly the subjective convictions of which the impugned Bank Director was conscious from time to time. But for want of casuistry, in its good sense, the man himself has never really taken stock of his moral position, which consequently has always resembled the pecuniary state of one who lives constantly in debt and is perpetually miserable about it, but never ascertains how much or how little he owes.

Uncertainty on questions of conduct is the bane of peace and the blight of morals. In modern English and American society, many men who have to make their living by trade give up the idea of feeling absolutely comfortable about how they are to do it; and when they have made this plunge or slip, though it would be untrue or extreme to say they are on the road to ruin, they unquestionably lose the consolations of rectitude, and the security both moral and practical which

ascertained principles of action afford. The true aim of sound casuistry, in great matters and in small, is to arrive at and formulate that certainty without which there can be neither hearty comfort in the moral sense, nor reasonable safety amidst the unavoidable moral dangers of a complex society.

Nothing therefore can be farther from the truth than the popular notion that casuistry is a Jesuitical system of facilities for decently doing wrong. The first essential of sound casuistry is that it should not depart a hair's-breadth, if possible, from the binding laws of morality. But the second essential is to recognize the fact that morality may be too blunt, as that coarser immorality with which casuistry has nothing to do is too gross; and that for morals to be applicable and applied, they must be tempered and sharpened with delicate reference to the texture and structure of the conduct they have to dissect.

To the neglect of casuistry Protestantism owes many of the inconsistencies and still more of the gloom of those who belong to the various non-Catholic communions. There is much, of course, in the Roman Church that may well drive those who shun it to spiritual and moral extremes. Especially is there something very lamentable in the practical system of a priesthood which retains for esoteric and professional study the infinite charities, the myriad theological allowances and the exquisite moral distinctions of its Church, and offers to the laity little more than harsh rules of thought, mechanical penances and superstitious solaces. At the same time the existence within Catholic literature of a vast body of acute and delicate moral speculations and refinements, gives ethical as well as dialectic distinction to the Roman Church; and those who best understand human nature will most regret that, in quitting the low, poor atmosphere of Rome for that of Protestant spirituality, our fathers did not bring with them some of the moral aptitude and systematized charity which are among the true glories of the many-sided Church they forsook, and which, in co-operation with Protestant culture of the conscience and the heart, would have established a code and practice of morals such as would have preserved them from almost all the

crabbed errors into which they and their descendants have fallen.

An enumeration of the hard and fast lines by which Protestant communities—mostly in unwritten or at least unenacted laws—have substituted extravagant pietistic requirements for rational rules of life, would detain us too long. We have only to look around to see traces of the bad influence of that bald and severe restriction of amusements which, at any rate throughout the Anglo-Saxon race, has come to be identified with operative religion.

No doubt this restriction is softening and wearing away. It has largely disappeared from among persons of superior education. The British dinner-table, which is a fair average tide mark, no longer indicates even in serious circles that diseased scrupulosity on the subject of amusements which formerly it illustrated. It is matter of common observation that the young men and women of Nonconformist families marry much oftener than formerly out of their own set, and this probably arises from their going more into the world and meeting other young people under circumstances which the stricter Dissenters of even five-and-twenty years ago used to avoid. To what extent cards are admitted into religious households we shall not attempt to say, but they are often seen where not long ago they would have created great surprise; and they are never called the Devil's Prayer-books. Dancing, which two or three decades ago was avoided by all who were specifically denominated "religious," is now very generally indulged in, though probably there are many thousands in all English Protestant denominations who still strictly avoid and in their families prohibit it. Theatre-going also is much more general, and conversation about actors and actresses is well-nigh universal. Billiards no longer excite horror, except, very justly, in reference to the dissipated places and atmospheres in which they are apt to be played. Racing is objected to only so far as it cannot be severed from betting; and, curiously enough, betting is not much frowned upon except in connection with races. Altogether there is more freedom in the matter of recreation,—a

freedom which may be most exactly expressed in this form: that amusements which formerly were regarded as marks of depravity or at least of irreligion, can now be moderately indulged in without incurring—at any rate without incurring so generally and certainly—this reproach.

In making this comparison, we are no doubt adopting a rather rigid and narrow standard of what used to be strict morals in this matter. We are adopting the popular standard, however. There have always been many people—many people who believed themselves on good grounds to be religious—who did not share the general ideas about forbidden recreations; as there have always been many who lived chiefly to be amused, and never thought of the right or wrong of enjoyment. Some have always been above and some have always been below such punctilios; and, indeed, it may always be said that one half the world does not feel the scruples by which the other half is agitated. Still it is true that difficulties about amusements used to be so general that every one in England knew and assumed them to exist. As at the present moment, if you caught a hundred chance men in a net and asked them whether such and such a thing ought to be done by a clergyman, at least ninety-nine of them would say, "It would not be consistent with his character," so if you had asked a similar hundred, similarly caught, thirty years ago, whether the same thing was permissible in a religious man, ninety-nine would have said, "It would be inconsistent with his profession." Thus we see that if the rule has worn away in popular estimation, it is only because it has worn away in religious practice. To satisfy high-toned casuistry, it should have been modified equally in the acknowledged standards of life and conversation by which the consciences of English religionists are formally regulated.

Has it been so? We think not. A significant fact to the contrary is, that the clerical class has not given any general public adhesion to the new tone of practice. A sermon by Dr. Bellows or a speech by Bishop Fraser in favour of the stage is still published with a sort of flutter; and there are Prelates of the Church of England who would find it an inconvenient

invasion of their privacy if it were to be openly stated that they occasionally enjoy very pleasant evenings in the society of a leading actor of the day. We do not, indeed, hear "the ball-room" or "the novel" spoken of in the pulpit with the old ominous use of the definite article; but neither are ball-rooms freely spoken of among the places where a Christian demeanour should be maintained, nor are novels referred to in the pulpit as books assumed to be within everybody's knowledge. To a certain extent this may arise from mere adherence to the manners and customs of preaching, but it also denotes unreadiness to give clerical sanction to lay freedom; and where lay freedom has not pulpit sanction, it is likely to consist rather of loosely assumed license than of reasoned liberty.

On the other hand, it may be admitted that in many salutary ways the lesson has been successfully taught to educated people during the last forty years, that the right aim of religion is rather to gather as great a proportion of the community as may be under its visible influence, than to separate a small elect number from a reprobate world. It were too long a story to enlarge upon this, but the historians of nineteenth-century religion will perceive, unless they are Dryasdusts, that the Anglican movement, by bringing into the religious focus a larger number of ordinary Englishmen than could have been got into a Methodistical frame; the Arnold and Kingsley influence in blending the ideas of Church and Nation; and the general rationalizing effect of criticism in allying advanced intellect with a modified acceptance of religious truth, have greatly liberalized and rendered much more generous the common conceptions of religious obligation in the lighter departments of daily life.

An ingenious and healthy "week-day sermon" was published on this subject some years ago by Mr. Dale, of Birmingham. Puritan traditions have affected Mr. Dale's views of amusements somewhat, but not much. He has an honest sense of humour, and a familiar acquaintance with the scruples of the Evangelical Dissenters. Well comprehended incidents in history have made these scruples the practical standard of

religious life in England for the majority of the people. The Commonwealth and its theoretic rigour gave Nonconformity a place of social authority such as neither it nor anything corresponding to it had ever enjoyed; and the establishment of a State on even more rigid principles of Puritanism by English refugees in America, confirmed the popular notion that religion, which in Catholic countries means observance of forms or indulgence in those luxuries of special devotion which Dr. Newman has never brought himself to like, consists mainly of a rejection or avoidance of "worldly" pleasures. Afterwards—when the fervour of Puritanism had decayed and the nation at large seemed to have sunk into spiritual apathy—various influences of a stimulating and awakening kind began to be the vehicles of religious activity in England; and from Law downwards, all who promoted this revival of religious sensibility, re-exacted conformity to the old Puritan standard of abstinence from worldly pleasures which in the meantime had scarcely been preserved in operation except among the Dissenters. Wesley and Whitefield made the new earnestness popular, but in doing so they veered towards and eventually landed in Dissent. Wilberforce and his school, indeed, managed to conciliate their Methodism with fidelity to the Church of England; but the "Practical View" and the writings of Hannah More follow that extremest doctrine of isolation in conduct which is the characteristic of Puritan ethics. There are many not very old people who can remember a time when in thousands of English families it was a moot point whether even the stories of Charlotte Elizabeth might be exempted from the general embargo that was placed on fiction; and Charlotte Elizabeth herself—see her story, "Conformity"—uncompromisingly taught that "a Christian" was so absolutely bound to be different from other people, that he was not entitled even to go out to tea unless he was persuaded that all the guests would be converted persons. If this seems incredibly childish, so much the more remarkable is the progress towards liberal views of recreation that has been made since the favourite novelist of pious Evangelical homes thirty or

forty years ago fell into oblivion. We in the present day may despise ideas so impracticably narrow and so devoid of all right feeling of common human fraternity, but if they overspread the greatest part of the area of the "religious world" in England at so recent a date, and fixed the ideas of that world entertained by the general community, they cannot be unworthy of the moralist's attention, especially as they have left survivals.

Some of these survivals are treated by Mr. Dale with a sort of twinkling humour which would have surprised and shocked his predecessor at Carr's Lane Chapel, but which is obviously justified by the extremely fantastic character of the distinctions between right and wrong which linger in the circles of which and for which Mr. Dale writes. Curiously enough, he has not quite emancipated himself from such rules, but he cannot help being amused by them. Why, he says, should bagatelle be played in very strict families and billiards be sternly condemned? Why chess and not whist? Why should draughts be allowed and backgammon abjured? Why should even clergymen be permitted to fish, and shooting be considered a sign of unregeneracy? Why should people take their children to a circus who would be horrified at their seeing a pantomime? Why indeed?

Mr. Dale finds reasons for these distinctions. Whist is not so innocent as chess because it is not feasible to play the latter for money. Bagatelle alarms good people less than billiards because a billiard-table is a large and costly piece of furniture which requires to be kept at a uniform temperature, so that few families can have one, and young people who acquire a taste for the game are likely to go to public tables in hotels, where gambling is sure to go on; whereas sufficiently accurate bagatelle-boards are cheap and accessible, and "the girls and boys play bagatelle with their father." As to rod and line, is it Izaak Walton that has given them the *pas* among good people? Mr. Dale thinks not. He traces the phenomenon to the solitude and quietude in which the angler plies his art; whereas shooters go in parties, are apt to be

noisy, and usually finish the day with roystering. "All this," says Mr. Dale, "is rapidly changing; in many parts of the country it has quite disappeared; but I am inclined to think —speaking of those whom I know best—that though a Nonconformist minister, with a cast of flies on his hat and a rod on his shoulder, would feel no shyness at meeting accidentally the very gravest of his deacons, he would rather be on the other side of the hedge if he happened to have on his gaiters and to be carrying his gun."

The prejudice against novel-reading Mr. Dale attributes to the exceedingly bad character of the novels which first gave rise to it. We doubt this explanation. The novels of Mrs. Behn were never generally read among ordinary decent people, and those of Fielding and Smollett, though chargeable with immoral laxity, cannot be called "poisonous" except in the sense in which our religious forefathers considered everything worldly to be so. Still we will admit that strictly religious people might hold their sanction to fiction in suspense while Peregrine Pickle and Tom Jones represented that class of authorship. It is a point of true casuistry to allow studious or even reflecting men the use of all literature that has obtained classical rank, but in justice to our predecessors we must admit that the claims of Fielding and Smollett to enter religious families when their books were mere candidates for fame and favour, were not likely to be entertained. This, however, was no reason for rejecting and excluding Scott; and Scott was excluded, as Mr. Dale admits, because religious people did not make distinctions. He says we should honour their caution. We say it was wrongly conceived, bigotedly applied, and essentially ill-founded. The rough and narrow-minded canons in which it was embodied were unworthy of rational beings.

You might as well attempt to dissect an eye with a piece of iron hoop as to justly regulate conduct without that casuistry which, as Mr. Dale confesses, no Protestant since Jeremy Taylor and Richard Baxter has attempted to study or expound. The root error of Puritanism is, that it will not discuss whether an action is right or wrong, but allows or forbids it according

to an arbitrary test of its worldliness or unworldliness. Mr. Dale sufficiently despises this error in some of its aspects, and keenly admonishes religious people that business, which they never suspect, is much more likely to make them worldly than pleasure. Indeed, he has good casuistical qualities if he would give them play. But he feels bound to respect unduly unintelligent scruples. He "believes in reverence for the deliberate judgments of good men. What they have generally shrunk from and condemned must have had some evil in it." True, he adds that if our saintly predecessors objected to things because of their accessories and not because of any evil in the amusements themselves, "we are actually imperilling their reputation for moral discernment and good sense by appealing to their authority in condemnation of what is plainly harmless when the evil accessories have disappeared." True, Mr. Dale very wholesomely protests against too much consideration for the weak, weakness being "a bad thing; and if a constant homage to it tends to make me and others weak too, I may think it right, for the sake of my own moral vigour and for the sake of the moral vigour of those who are in danger of becoming morbidly scrupulous, to live the bolder and freer life which my conscience approves." All this is good, but it is not enough. Beyond this we want casuistry; and casuistry —though he admits it might be useful here, if anywhere— Mr. Dale condemns.

"Simplicity, robustness and manliness of character are seriously imperilled when the conscience is perplexed by the refinements and intricacies in which casuistry delights." But not, it appears, when you accept, or at least pay deference to, the arbitrary restrictions on conduct which are delighted in by those whose religion largely consists in mere separatism. "It is safer to leave men to the guidance of those great and obvious moral laws whose authority every pure and honest heart acknowledges."* Our reply to this must be, that these moral laws, however "great" they may be, are certainly not "obvious," but

* Week-day Sermons, by R. W. Dale, M.A., p. 183.

leave conduct absolutely unguided on points upon which the will must decide. A man must do something with his evenings: may he sometimes go to a theatre? If so, to what form, or to all forms, of dramatic or lyric entertainment? May he see the "Grand Duchess," "Pink Dominoes," a ballet? Is the "Traviata" permitted or prohibited by the great and obvious moral laws whose authority "every pure and honest heart acknowledges"? Should one countenance the religious service which is enacted on the stage in "Il Talismano"? If not, wherein lies the distinction between it and the grand coronation scene in the "Prophet," or the whole opera of "Moïse in Egitto," or the village prayer in "La Sonnambula"? Should a Christmas carol, the words of which are most sacred, be allowed in "Olivia"? Should the negroes in "Uncle Tom's Cabin" be allowed to sing their quaint religious hymns in a stage play? And supposing some of these things are wrong, are they best protested against by eschewing the theatre altogether, or by participating in the pleasures and contributing to the public opinion of theatrical audiences?

May a "pure and honest heart" preserve game or take a gun and shoot partridges if invited to do so at a hospitable country house? Are honesty and purity of heart in their right place at a horse-race? Should one play cards for money? A hundred such questions need settling on their merits. We do not propose to settle them, or even to suggest settlements; but we insist that every person who is properly concerned to behave rightly ought not to be deterred from settling such points by fear of "effeminate moral delicacy," or by the fact, if fact it be, that "people who are very scrupulous in small matters are often miserably weak in the presence of great temptations." Fortunately for many of us, we escape for the most part very great temptations, but none of us avoid the temptation of acting in moral doubt and discomfort; and to act so when we might have certainty, is not only to sin, but to weaken all our future forces of resistance to evil.

Perceiving this, and recognizing other reasons for strictness and drabness of life, our Puritan fathers adopted a general rule

of abstinence which differs as widely as possible from Mr. Dale's easy disregard of morbid scruples, but produced those curious petty prohibitions to which he is too indiscriminately respectful.

They pre-arranged to give rigour the benefit of every doubt. Their principle is most generously expressed in the words of Jeremy Taylor, to the effect that men are apt to stand on terms with God, and to study how much is lawful, how far they may go, and which is their utmost stretch of lawful, being afraid to do more for God and their souls than is simply and indispensably necessary. "The good man," says the Bishop, "has a way of determining cases of conscience which will never fail him. For if the question be put to him, whether it be fit for him to give a shilling to the poor, he answers that it is not only fit but necessary to do so much at least, and to make it sure he will give two; and in matter of duty he takes to himself the greatest share; in privileges and divisions of right, he is content with the least." Even on the side of positive duty, this rule of life would probably tend to upset the just balance of many sincere and earnest lives, because excess of generosity and effort cannot go on all round, and when a man exceeds in one direction he must fall short in other. On the side of negative or abstinent duty, Jeremy Taylor's rule is absolutely misleading. It tends directly to asceticism and to the establishment of needless distinctions between religious people and the rest of the world. The result of going to the utmost extreme in surrendering enjoyments or avoiding pursuits which a punctilious conscience may be tempted to call in question, is to present all moral seriousness in an unlovely light, to divorce from religion departments of literature and art which ought to co-operate with it in softening and improving humanity, and to make the non-religious part of the community distinctly irreligious. A scrupulous person, therefore, who follows Jeremy Taylor's rule of freely giving up his privileges on the first demand of conscience, whether it be well or ill informed, not merely denies himself pleasures which it might be for the glory of God that he should enjoy, but indirectly confirms the un-

scrupulous and indifferent in a habit of enjoying pleasure without reference either to the Divine will or to a nice moral judgment of things fit and becoming.

Equally indefensible on principle is the easy acquiescence which is excused by the general feeling that it is morbid to be too particular. There is a point, no doubt, at which it is foolish to scruple, but that point itself requires to be ascertained with great care; and you only remove the venue a little when, instead of deciding that a certain small action is right or wrong, you decide that the moral quality of actions of undefined smallness is of no consequence.

For instance, "where's the harm" of fox-hunting? Our religious forefathers replied easily that a hunting-field was not the place in which to cultivate heavenly-mindedness; that it was impossible to hunt without mixing with a great many people whom it would be better to avoid; and that your love must be very cold if you preferred to run the spiritual risks incident to such a scene rather than to forego a recreation which is a mere pleasure of sense and of the world. These arguments are put out of court by the better spirit of modern religion, which imposes on Christians the duty of going into the world rather than keeping out of it. But fox-hunting is open to other objections. A man of sensitive morality will surely not engage in it unless he is convinced that farmers are sufficiently reconciled to it for indulgence in it to be consistent with the golden rule. This is one point upon which a clear conviction is essential to the following of the hounds with a clear conscience.

Supposing it to be settled in favour of hunting, the question of cruelty still remains. Here we would not dogmatize, but we are not satisfied with Mr. Dale's easy suggestion, that "as for the fox, he lives such a roguish life that he may be sacrificed with an easy conscience for the general good." Granted that the fox's life is mean and insignificant, and that a large field of squires and dames and professional men and dogs and horses derives a great fund of pleasure and some degree of improved health from hunting him, it is not clear how any individual fox-hunter can take pleasure in what he knows

makes the poor creature fearfully and intensely miserable. Nor is it apparent why they should forcibly or carelessly push the fact of the fox's agony on one side, when they can certainly, if they please, obtain the same amount and kind of pleasure from cross-country riding otherwise concerted. Suppose there were no foxes. There has been supposed to be a presumption of English law that foxes might be hunted, whatever the inconvenience to the farmers, because they are injurious vermin; but it is quite certain foxes would soon be extinct without hunting, if English country gentlemen did not prohibit their destruction. Well, suppose them destroyed. Does all the health and happiness attributed to fox-hunting disappear? This is incredible. Manly exercise and womanly emulation in it, love of fresh air and of adventurous riding, ingenuity in finding methods of enjoying these delights in company, would survive, and some substitute quite as exhilarating would soon be provided. It is too much to pretend that horse exercise in the country, or even the special pleasure of it as now enjoyed, is as mortal as an easily extirpated species of rural vermin.

Weighing these considerations, it appears to us that fox-hunting should be avoided for reasons of humanity. The cruelty involved may bear a small proportion to the total enjoyment derived, but it cannot be supposed to be indispensable even for the production of that enjoyment. Even if it were, the actual suffering inflicted is more than any individual of the hunt would cause for his own gratification. And the *morale* of the case is not altered because a large number of persons co-operate in the torture which none of them would individually apply. It is not pretended that the hunters are in a state of mind in the least degree cruel. This is not the question; but whether, seeing the suffering they cause to a certain animal is undeniable and not indispensable, they ought not, as humane and amiable beings, to consider that suffering, and to deliberately and successfully justify it before consenting to engage in the sport.

The noxiousness of the hunted animal does not enter into the issue, for it is clearly the duty of agricultural civilization

to have done with foxes, and they would quickly be extinct but for the illogical necessity of keeping up the sport which pretends to extirpate them. The smallness of the animal no doubt lightens the matter to many minds, as also in the case of shooting. When the fox is hunted, few are in at the death, and not many therefore see the only disgusting part of the day's proceedings. When birds and hares are shot, the death-pangs are very short, and—except in the butchery of the battue—there is something in the pursuit, the air, the cheerful company, and in the small, inoffensive character of the game and its pretty appearance after death, which unquestionably expels from the mind every feeling that can be considered savage or ungentle. Are we at liberty, however, to ignore the fact that the sensations of this kind of sport are the germ, and under favouring circumstances the fast-growing germ, of that passion for "killing something" which in its grosser forms is unquestionably repulsive?

The pleasant, one might almost say pretty, sport of rabbit-shooting often degenerates into something painfully coarse and horrible on the introduction of the ferret, and the transition does not seem to be felt to be a violent one. From battue-shooting in "warm corners" to pigeon-shooting at Hurlingham is an easy descent. Boar-hunting, tiger-hunting and elephant-hunting, must have traits of ferocity, and, on a large scale, incidents of carnage which would horrify many a refined and amiable man who can shoot birds in the stubble-fields or on the moors without compunction; but it is doubtful whether a reasoning being is entitled to hide from himself that the scale of the killing is not of the essence of the matter. Once admit the element of pleasure in the destruction of life, and a concession has been made to the baser sort of humanity, the ultimate issues of which cannot be limited.

We hold it certain that in a perfectly civilized condition of society the act of killing for necessary purposes will be classified as an act of duty, just as the killing of sheep and oxen is now, although the hereditary Nimrodism of the human race may for some time impel men of leisure to seek beyond the

bounds of civilization for opportunities of sport. When Mr. Matthew Arnold wants a name for the class which chiefly maintains killing among amusements, he is obliged to call them barbarians. Sport of that kind in the midst of civilization is a relic of barbarism; to pursue it beyond the boundaries of civilization is approximately to return to barbarism. Nor should it be forgotten that in cultivated countries sport can only be artificially maintained. Every one who enjoys shooting in England does so by favour of a demoralizing law, distinctly adverse to the greatest good of the greatest number. The delights of a deer-forest in Scotland represent the depopulation or the non-population of wilfully wasted land in a country proverbial for honourable thrift and indefatigable industry. Land laws less partial would soon put an end to the wilder sort of shooting both in Scotland and Wales. The abolition of the game laws—which are generally condemned by advanced political thinkers—would soon make the shooting of partridges, pheasants and hares a thing of the past, and the preservation of these animals for the kitchen, if accomplished at all, a matter of industry and commerce.

Again we say, therefore, as in the case of fox-hunting, that, admitting the healthy results of shooting, and allowing that out-door exercise is neither attractive nor to the fullest extent hygienic unless it has in it the pleasure and excitement which to most men nothing yields so certainly as sport, it is nevertheless an unworthy position for beings capable of self-control to be dependent either for health or enjoyment on practices the continuance of which is an anachronism unlikely to be perpetuated, while, consciously or unconsciously to the individual sportsman, they connect pleasure with the act of killing, which the highest morals require to be ranked among the necessities and not the amenities of life.

We do not shut our eyes to the obvious and inextinguishable fact that the chase must always be attended with pleasure. All well-done work yields delight to the workman, and those who have watched a good gamekeeper filling his bag, in order to stock the larder at the hall, has witnessed a spectacle of

heartily enjoyed and skilfully performed duty, which in all ages has been found with pre-eminent frequency among those whose bread-study has been the killing of wild animals for food. The question is whether men of culture can, if they reflect deliberately, share this sort of pleasure as a mere relaxation, and whether it is worthy of them to avoid reflection in order to enjoy a boon so essentially vulgar and barbarous.

The point at issue in any average individual case of a gentleman who shoots moderately for health may not be a grave one. Such a sportsman may not be bound to waste much time on the question if his mind is pretty clearly made up in favour of his general practice. While all the game that is killed is appreciated and eaten, it is really not of very great consequence who kills it, or whether it is killed as a business or as a pleasure. And assuredly the compromise of accompanying the shooters without a gun—what with the fresh air, the desultory pleasure of rambling without fear of trespass, the various opportunities of novel observation, and the *agrémens* of an *al fresco* luncheon—is so seductively innocent and delicious, that the most rigid denouncer of sport who has once been led into it can only avoid repeating the frailty by declining all invitations into the country after the 12th of August. Still the principle of moral conduct involved is not altogether without importance, and, as a point of casuistry, we may add that an admission that the practice is not strictly defensible may be of value even where it is not abandoned.

A perception of its tendency to lead to grosser forms of sport will at least stimulate well-regulated minds to draw the line as distinctly as they can between sport which it is not worth while to avoid and sport which it is not creditable to participate in. A recognition of the purely accidental character of such amusements, depending as they do on temporary limitations and incompletenesses of civilization, will save sportsmen from that harshness in enforcing and maintaining game-laws and land-laws which is often a painful inconsistency in otherwise liberal men. And a clear sense of the value of the open-air element of sport and familiarity with nature as real

essential good things, for which killing birds and beasts is only an excuse and an appetiser, will lead to the encouragement of studies and habits that will give to many a love of country life which will stand them in good stead whether they shoot or not, and which would afford them abundant excitement and enjoyment in the fields if shooting were no more. Perhaps we may even conceive a time when a rich man may buy for himself and friends, even if a poor man may be still debarred from it, the right to trespass in search of a botanical specimen or a fact of natural history, as now he buys the right to go where he pleases, and to take as many as he pleases with him, to bring down something with powder and shot.

The favour accorded by moralists to angling has always been a much greater puzzle to us than the apologies for field sports. Many of the fish on which the angler wastes his time are practically useless. The torture inflicted by the hook is much more distinctly present to the sportman's observation than the sharp and sudden death-strokes dealt by gun-shot; and the "tender handling of the worm," about which so much heartless nonsense has been talked, is one of the most intolerably disgusting processes conceivable. There must be a charm in the rod and line which blunts the susceptibilities of some of the best and kindest of men; but casuistry can find no tenable or even feasible justification for their indifference to the misery they inflict. Happily this amiable sport is pursued in a solitude as strict as if it were the most morose of occupations, and is proportionately less seductive.

The case of horse-racing is generally supposed to be very difficult, but it will be found on a little reflection sufficiently simple. In its favour may be urged the absence of cruelty, the innocence of the aim, the utility of generous emulation in a pursuit naturally befitting men of station and wealth, and the substantial advantage derived by the country from the results of that pursuit in improving the breed of horses. Against horse-racing it must be alleged that it has fallen into the lowest deep of moral degradation owing to a toleration of all sorts of rascality, which has completely saturated the sport

with the worst sort of chance—that arising from inscrutable chicane—and that it is never unattended by surroundings of the grossest and lowest character.

In spite of the innocence of horse-racing in theory, and its pleasantness as a spectacle—that is, the prettiness as a sight of the actual running—it is probably not too extreme to say that all persons of scrupulous conduct who do not keep race-horses will do well to keep away from race-courses so long as racing is in the main what it cannot be denied to be at present. To the majority of such persons the matter only presents itself now and then in the form of a question whether they shall or shall not attend a race-meeting, and if they go once they are usually prevented from going again by the extreme repulsiveness of the attendant sights and sounds. To others, however, racing offers a problem of greater nicety. According to the usages of rank and county position, often according to the hereditary customs of families, a stud may be expected to be kept up, and some interest may be expected to be taken continuously in the sport. It is most undesirable that a country gentleman of scrupulous life from whom this is looked for, should either behave carelessly in the matter, or should have no other guide for his seriousness and feeling of duty than a mere Puritanical tabooing of worldly pleasures, which in this as in other things is the only check upon conduct much recognized in English life. Intelligent casuistry will probably convince any wealthy man so placed that he has a choice of two eligible lines of conduct. He may not join carelessly and acquiescently in racing as other men follow it, nor need he eschew racing on grounds of Puritan anti-worldliness. If he has no taste for the pursuit he had better shun it, assigning as his reason that without bestowing pains and ability upon it he would be led into countenancing evil which he could not check. If racing falls in with his tastes, it may be his duty to participate in it with a strict avoidance of everything that is not consistent with the whitest honour, and also of all betting and book-making on the mere chances of the sport. Those who choose to inquire among persons familiar with racing

will discover that there are noblemen and gentlemen who not only adopt this creditable and useful line of conduct, but are just as well known to do so as the Greenwich Observatory is known to keep correct time. They will also meet with reasons for believing that every keeper of race-horses who behaves thus sensibly improves, or perhaps we should say mitigates, the characteristics of racing as a whole, and that every additional instance of the kind would make the purification of the Turf a more hopeful enterprize.

Almost all betting and absolutely all gambling lies, in our judgment, on the wrong side of the line which divides moral from immoral conduct, but some employment of casuistry may be necessary to carry this home to many minds. There is no eleventh commandment which says, "Thou shalt not bet;" and it is not obvious to everybody that betting is prohibited when the tenth commandment says, "Thou shalt not covet." It is admitted that to bet under some circumstances of certainty is a breach of the injunction, "Thou shalt not steal;" and there the moral prohibition is considered by many to end, except so far as betting, like other things, is not to be indulged in immoderately or beyond one's means. Now, as a sort of clincher to a victory on a point of fact or in a prophecy, a bet is quite harmless, though the habit of thus as it were adding a relish to one's feats of memory or forecast is apt to develop into a vulgarity and a nuisance. In such transactions there is little greed, and the bet is by no means the first consideration. All betting for betting's sake, however, involves a distinct lowering of the moral tone, and this in casuistry seems to be the conclusive argument against all the gambling appurtenances of amusement.

There are many accidental reasons which in individual cases should prohibit all spicing of amusements with contingencies of gain and loss. If the secrets of all hearts were confessed, many persons, who do not scruple to say that they cannot enjoy a game "unless they have something *on*," would admit that when they have something on, however trifling, they cannot play without losing their temper. Others would ac-

knowledge that they find it impossible or nearly so to avoid petty cheating—a much commoner accompaniment of playing for money than of playing for love, and commoner in all sorts of games than is generally believed. A still larger number would allow that playing for money, even when the stakes are small, renders it quite out of the question for them to avoid playing a great deal too much, and wasting an undue proportion of time on what ought to be a comparatively brief and light recreation. And a larger number yet would agree that when playing for money they cannot summon moral courage to stop at the point where it is inconsistent with their means to go on. In all these cases, and probably in others that might be thought of, it is as much a duty to abstain from playing for money, as it is for a man to become a teetotaller who cannot avoid a glass too much, even on the supposition that the practice is not intrinsically wrong.

We hold, however, that a just casuistry rules playing for money out of permissible amusements. The Bishop of Manchester, in a late speech to working men at Sheffield, said that he had never been able to satisfy his mind as to what was the precise sin of gambling or why it is a wrong thing to bet. And that the case of conscience is not without difficulty is proved by the somewhat transcendental and unduly vague rule laid down by Dr. Newman, that the sin of gambling is that you have an inordinate affection for an earthly thing. This may be sound, but it is not easily verifiable; nor is it sufficiently distinguished from many cases in which the sin or the innocence is a question of degree. We hold the immorality of playing for money, or betting for the sake of winning, to be no question of degree at all, but to be intrinsically involved in the very act.

That this is not the general opinion is proved by a quotation from a devotional manual given in a letter to the *Guardian*. Rightly enough, the matter is brought under the tenth commandment; but the self-examining interrogatory, "Is the stake you play for what you can afford for such a purpose?" is clearly likely to suggest to the young communicant who is

supposed to use this directory of conscience, as the writer to the *Guardian* pointed out, that it may be permissible to spend a certain sum in card-playing.

The practice appears to us to be sufficiently condemned by the fact, which must be left to be established or repudiated by individual consciousness, but of which we have no doubt, that, as we have already said, the moral tone suffers an unmistakeable deterioration as soon as the money element is introduced. There are some people who can play a whole evening at whist without having a coin depending on it. There are others who could not play a rubber without the excitement of gain or money risk. The former are undoubtedly of a superior moral make to the latter. Suppose four friends to play for two hours for the mere pleasure and emulation of the game, and then for the rest of the evening for money. In three out of the four, if not in all, the moral tone will distinctly deteriorate from the moment at which so much a point is introduced. Not only will tempers become more tetchy, the interest in the game disproportionately feverish and unhealthy, and in too large a proportion of cases the play less perfectly fair and chivalrous,—but, even supposing serene temper, moderate excitement and punctilious honour to endure, a spirit will be found to have crept in which has lowered the whole mood and tone of the recreation.

Why should we persist in a practice which thus renders amusements inimical to elevation and amiability of feeling? The object of all amusement should be innocently to relieve the strain, both mental and moral, which is incident to diligent, intelligent and conscientious life. Amusement runs counter to its purpose when it weakens moral force, encourages bad mental and moral habitudes, stores up contingencies of temptation, and establishes predispositions to infirmity, instead of refreshing, purifying and invigorating the intellectual system.

What makes playing for money thus deteriorative is the subtle and sinister influence of greed. Greed is an acknowledged vice, which need not for our present purpose be defined. Enough that it seems to be unfailingly present as soon as playing for money or betting for betting's sake is introduced.

it cannot be innocent, because it is a passion that cannot be associated with any elevated feeling. Even when the gains of gambling are generously lavished, they have first been greedily acquired. A certain amount of greedy emotion may be inevitable in the mixed experiences of inevitable actual life; but wherever it cannot be avoided, it is greatly qualified by being in company with useful labours, with generous emulation, with high ultimate objects, and with many mitigating circumstances. In amusements it is absolutely inexcusable, because it deteriorates their moral quality and is easily dispensed with. If not, then all the more reason is there to get rid of it at any cost of difficulty, for the confession that amusement is unenjoyable without money risk is a challenge to one's moral strength which no man who intelligently desires to respect himself can honourably decline.

Of all lamentable scenes, one of the most lamentable is frequently looked on with pleasure. A family party playing a round game for small stakes is commonly regarded as a delightful domestic spectacle; and so far as the excellent and generous intentions of the elders, to whom the winnings are indifferent, are concerned, no doubt the motive and spirit of the sport are unexceptionable. The evil is unsuspected. But it exists. It was with a sure and true instinct that Charles Kingsley, who played at cards every night with his children, invariably declined to allow playing for money. Who has ever seen children so occupied without greed being developed? Who could witness it and still consider the amusement innocent without forcibly avoiding reflection? Who ever knew a company of children among whom greed did not need to be in every way repressed rather than in any way encouraged? Of the two sights, it is less painful, because more natural, to see a young man of twenty sowing his wild oats at billiards, than to behold the keen eye, the febrile excitement, the tenacious clutch of the gambling money-lover precociously present among children, whose parents foolishly think that because it takes place under their own roof-tree, and is for stakes which are to them insignificant, "playing for money" is exorcised of its moral evil.

Having contended that all stakes at play are of objectionable moral tendency, there is only one qualification necessary to be made. Those who object to playing for money are bound to recognize that they are in a minority, and that those who differ from them are quite unconscious of any moral error in their own practice. In reference to so simple a matter as a rubber of whist at low points, it is well to abstain if there are others to play, and if the money is considered, by the habit of the house or the circle, an essential part of the amusement; but there are many occasions on which it may do more good and be more advisable to fall in with play for a small amount, after declaring plainly your general principle, than to spoil a pleasant evening by a too punctilious insistance on a rule which under the immediate circumstances is of no moral consequence.

Going to the theatre is a matter upon which the tone of religious people is much more intelligent than formerly, but it cannot be pretended that the old prejudices are extinct, or that the freer practice of our day has been logically justified to all religious minds, or that there are not still existing on the stage things which tend to alienate such minds from dramatic performances.

"There are thousands of young people," says the *Saturday Review*, "who, though they dance, do so in the firm belief that they are waltzing to perdition, and who, when they venture to visit the theatre, shudder at the allegorical words, 'The way to the Pit.'" A few weeks ago, a most respectable member of the dramatic profession gave some performances in a northern county town where the drama seldom presents itself. He found that zealous persons were inundating the place with a tract, which represented the theatre as perilous to the soul, and every person who paid for admission as a partaker in the sin of keeping up a vast machinery of corruption. "Has the theatre," says this tract, "a tendency to lead to heaven or to hell? What do the Bible, thy own conscience, and a death-bed reply?" There can be no doubt that the good Kendal folk who procured this remarkable and libellous leaflet from

"Drummond's Tract Depôt, Stirling," thought they were doing God service, and fulfilling a duty obligatory on them as Christians. If you could have induced them to see a representation of an average stage-play, they must have recognized the fact, that although they might justify the avoidance of theatres on grounds of separatism, they could not condemn average performances on any intelligible principle of moral restraint which would not equally forbid the reading of a newspaper.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that plays are sometimes produced on the stage and have long runs which would seem to justify the most inveterate prejudices against the theatre. In reference to some of these, and probably to one of them in particular, no less a person than Mr. Henry Irving, the tragedian, lately acknowledged, in a speech at Birmingham, that the offences of his profession were often gross. He declined to cover "even with a counterpane of courtesy" its exhibitions of deliberate immorality, whether consisting in intentional disregard for the decencies of costume, or in plays the whole structure of which was impregnated with moral unhealthiness. "It is to be feared," he said, "that in endeavouring to obtain from the great storehouse of French invention attractive adaptations to suit certain tastes in the present day," we have imported pieces "the essential character of which is to make a mock of domestic purity, and to efface from the minds of the spectators the line which, according to good old English ideas, distinguishes a foul from a fair life. They inoculate the feminine mind with rakishness. They establish usages of confidence and familiarity as to certain deplorable incidents of civilization and society which between good men and chaste women are best avoided. And they cover so absolutely with gay ridicule the common places of profligacy that they become part and parcel of the freemasonry of decent society, in which they should never even be heard." After such a confession from the head of the histrionic profession, it would be idle to assert that liberty to attend the theatre is a right of religious people which no casuistry is necessary to defend.

Not a moment need be wasted in considering those sub-

stitutes for theatrical amusements to which many religious objectors condescend. They are beneath contempt, and require for their enjoyment not merely a scrupulous conscience, but a softened brain. The casuistry of amusements is more concerned to vindicate the right to patronize the drama—which is a most important intellectual privilege; to declare the limits within which this privilege may be enjoyed; and to lay down the rule of conduct which is binding generally upon conscientious persons in reference to this amusement.

The second of these is a function which must be performed by individual and public criticism as occasion arises. No general rule of discrimination can be laid down. Many dramas are moral which are popularly considered otherwise. A pietistic censorship would have excluded some of the finest plays. The best leading principle is apparent intention, and by no means a bad subsidiary test is intellectual excellence. What is immoral or indecent in the bias of its aim and interest is not likely to be moral or innocent in its effect; but what is really fine intellectually is rarely otherwise than virtuous in its main intention, though there may be nothing obscurantist in its method and details. To exercise a purist oversight over the stage, or to be too precise in your requirements before going to the play, would be as absurd as to affect a similar scrupulosity in the library. As, however, there are many books too bad to possess, and many others that you do not offer for the perusal of young or unwise persons, so the right way to treat the theatre is for those who have control or influence over others to form their own judgment on plays and performances, and with a reasonable mixture of strictness and latitude to regulate the participation in theatrical pleasures of those over whom they exercise authority. Also, they and all other persons will do well to help as much as they can to form a sound public opinion on the subject. The theatre has greatly improved since the notion that it was wicked to attend it was left to nonsensical fanatics. It will improve still more when high-minded and religious men not only logically assume and act upon the full dimensions of their liberty in this matter, but

settle upon a public-spirited basis their responsibility as members of society for the purity, the good taste, and, as far as is consistent with popular conditions, the high intellectual merits of an institution which must always exist and always be governed by so much public opinion as is applied to it. To ignore and abstain from the theatre would be to hand it over to a reprobate mind, with the melancholy certainty that it would deprave vast multitudes who are by no means of reprobate predilections.

We have thus illustrated in a few pages a subject upon which a volume might be written, but upon which it would be absurd either to write or to read any lengthened disquisition. The object is not to define and decide the cases of conscience to which amusements may give rise, but to insist on their being defined and decided in individual life, instead of being either ignored as unimportant or decided by a hard Procrustean test of so-called Christian consistency.

The theory of our casuistry of amusements as suggested in these fragmentary inquiries is, that the old separatist usage of abstinence, whether founded on Evangelical theories of "otherworldliness" or on a general assumption of moral superiority and segregation, should be abandoned; that each amusement should be judged on its own merits, with due reference to all its attendant circumstances and all necessary distinctions between its various forms; that as to acts of participation, liberal allowance should be made for the minuteness of the questions involved and for the easy opinions or practices generally prevalent; but that every scrupulously behaving person should take the trouble to make the rule of his own conduct in each case as clear as possible, and to commend it by discreet argument and politic action to others, whether more or less liberal, or more or less careful, than himself. Individual questions, on which we have summarily pronounced, are no doubt open to much of that refined moral argumentation which is the business of casuistry, and such cases ought to be argued. Of the two snares, easy-going indifference and excessive scrupulosity, intelligent Christians should avoid both.

EDWARD R. RUSSELL.

## III.—GOD, DUTY AND IMMORTALITY.

### A REPLY.

In the article by Mr. F. W. Newman, entitled, "God, Duty and Immortality," which appeared in the January No. of this Review, the writer specially singles out for criticism Mr. Peter Dean, author of a biography of Theodore Parker, as representative of the Theistic creed, and takes Mr. Holyoake as representative of the Atheistic or Agnostic.

Of neither of these gentlemen or their works does the present writer propose to say anything. Her concern is with the views put forth by Mr. Newman himself on the supreme triad of ideas expressed in his title. Mr. Newman lays down the following propositions: 1st, That the idea of Duty is prior to the idea of God, and that the basis of Duty is the perception of the utility of certain rules of conduct under certain social relations, conscience or the moral sense delivering judgment on what is right, as well as commanding that right be done. 2ndly, That religion, defined by Mr. Newman as "speculation concerning superior spirits, or an after-life of the individual man," "neither contributes nor *can* contribute a single article to morals; it can only corrupt morals in the attempt;" that religion and morality have no necessary connection, religion being independent of morals, as morals of religion; that each grows up separately and perhaps has a long existence separately. 3rdly, That belief in a future life, so far from being a sound or necessary basis of morality, imports into it an element of selfishness; that such belief has "no *emotional* force at all;" that it has no essential bearing on our belief in God, and indeed no value except as an exercise of the speculative and imaginative powers, lifting them above the narrow sphere of the known, to beat their wings,—vainly it would seem,—in the limitless fog of the unknown. These are the propositions which it is proposed to discuss in this article, without any reference to particular persons or schools.

To begin with the genesis and succession of the ideas of God, that is, of a Supreme Power above and beyond man, and of

Duty, that is, of a supreme obligation. The mental history of mankind, which we can trace from its earliest stages, still existing for us in the life of the lowest savages, and on which the development of each human being from infancy to manhood throws the most vivid light,—this history shews almost to demonstration that as the first consciousness of the individual self begins with the sense of resistance, so the first idea of relation to anything external to self is the idea of power, as force that cannot be resisted. The infant and the savage, who is the infant of the race, recognize, with the first dawn of consciousness, powers, forces outside of them, to which they must submit, and over which they can exercise no control. The savage recognizes these powers in natural phenomena,—the sun by day, the darkness by night, the wind, the rain, the storm; and he bows down before them in worship and unresisting awe, deepened into abject terror when the power is hurtful to him. There is as yet no moral element in his feeling,—the sense of good or evil as distinguished from beneficent or hurtful, with its inseparable accompaniment, the sense of a right and wrong in human conduct and of duty as moral obligation independent of any external pressure, being the fruit of a later and higher development. Again, the savage and also the child, —if the latter belong to the savages of civilization,—feels himself strong or weak in relation to his fellows, takes what he can get, keeps what he can, with no more sense of justice or injustice in the exercise of his power than a beast of prey. Emphatically "might is right" in the beginnings of human society, and its first, and for long its only bond of union is self-defence. The tribe is stronger than the individual, therefore the individual must submit to it; and his rights, which mean the exercise of his individual power, will be admitted by the tribe only in proportion as that power contributes to the general welfare. The weak in such a state of society have no rights. The woman, the child, the infirm, the aged, are the chattels of the strong men, who decide on their life and death, their weal and woe, as it pleases them. And mark that the weak no more rebel against the injustice of this absolute power

than their masters against the injustice of the earthquake or the whirlwind.

This sense of Power, external and irresistible, is the true germ of religion, as, indeed, Mr. Newman admits, though in somewhat startling contradiction to his definition of religion as speculation on spiritual existences. Speculation of any kind belongs to a much later period of intellectual development, and never becomes religion, or the instinctive, inevitable personification by the human mind of the powers it feels outside and above itself, offering them the homage and propitiation which would be most acceptable to a human superior. When, later on, the moral affections awaken, bringing the sense of right and wrong, good and evil, distinct from the useful or hurtful, and the voice of conscience is first heard commanding that right be done, this voice within is referred by the same instinctive process to the Power without;—for to the Power man recognizes as supreme, he ascribes, by the necessity of his nature, the attributes he supremely honours,—and Duty becomes a part of religious service.

If these views of the origin and succession of the conceptions of God and Duty be correct,—and the whole history of human development may be appealed to in their support,—Mr. Newman's derivation of morality and duty from the experience of the utility of certain actions to society has no more foundation in nature than the "Contral Social" of J. J. Rousseau; and so far from religion and morality having grown up independently of each other, they have been organically connected, the ideal of the first becoming the standard of the second, and both incessantly acting and re-acting upon each other.

The fundamental error in Mr. Newman's argument, and the source of all the rest, is his confusion of the moral sense, i.e. the sense that there *is* a right and a wrong, with the true judgment of *what* is right and wrong, thus attributing to conscience the judging as well as the governing power. This fatal error lies at the root and has been the strength of all the antagonism to the doctrine of an innate moral sense in man; for it was easy to shew that the moral standards of different ages and

countries have differed as widely as the times and places themselves, and that the Syrian mother who sacrificed her children to Moloch, obeyed her sense of duty as truly as the Christian one who gave hers to be martyrs in the cause of Christ. But the true and only innate moral sense in man of which conscience is the voice, is the sense that there *is* a right and a wrong in human conduct wholly distinct from the expedient or inexpedient, and that the right *must be done*, cost what it may. This is the categorical imperative, the *I ought*, which makes itself heard with the first awakening of the moral nature, and which, just because its essence is to be independent of considerations of utility, can never be logically derived from an utilitarian basis. With that awakening, power assumes a moral character, and appears good or evil as distinguished from beneficent or harmful. But it is not conscience, but reason, working on the materials supplied to it from within and without, which decides what is good and what is evil; and hence we see that the standard varies with the growth of the intellect, of the affections, of knowledge, with the thousand influences which affect human judgment, just as the power to understand a received standard varies in individuals and with the age of the individual. The child cannot grasp the moral principle which guides the man; the ignorant, the uncultivated, the childish in moral and mental development among the generations of men, cannot grasp the moral ideal of the leaders of the race. But we also see, through all these variations, a constant tendency in the moral judgment to correct, to purify itself, to rise to an ideal standard; and the consensus arrived at wherever the same point of development has been reached, a consensus admitted by the moralists of every school, is sufficient to prove that the development is normal, and the result as truly contained in the constitution of human nature as the production of flower and fruit in that of the plant. To deny that the just discernment of good and evil, the sense of imperative obligation to do the good and refrain from the evil when once discerned, are innate in this sense, because their development, like that of all other human faculties, is slow and gradual, requiring

time and cultivation to bring them to perfection, seems as reasonable as it would be to deny that the powers of articulate speech, of erect walking and of abstract thought, are innate, because the infant is incapable of them.

It follows from what has been said that the order of ideas contested by Mr. Newman,—God first, as the Power without, Duty afterwards, as the imperative of conscience, the power within,—is the true one, and, let us add, that this imperative, "Thou shalt," or "Thou shalt not," points as unerringly to a rightful authority without us, independent of the fluctuating judgments of the human mind, as the needle to the existence of a magnetic pole. When Mr. Holyoake says that he must obey his conscience, he is unconsciously testifying to this fact in language more conclusive than the reasoning of any Theist. Matthew Arnold has said somewhere, "We none of us know how anthropomorphic we are." It might be said with equal truth of some of us that we know not how religious we are.

Mr. Newman, while admitting that the idea of power is the germ of religion, not only denies to it any moral value in its crude state, but taxes it with an actually demoralizing influence, as long as power is the only attribute ascribed to the Deity, "the worship of mere power being virtually to worship a devil." Perfectly true, when the power is consciously recognized as evil. The times of lowest moral degradation and corruption have been those when, as under the Roman empire, men bowed down in homage before the vilest of tyrants, feeling all their vileness, but abjectly worshipping their power. But in the early stages of human life, while the moral feelings are still in abeyance, and the sense of moral right and wrong yet unawakened, the idea of a Supreme Power above and beyond man gives him the first element of moral as of social life—the sense of being under a law; afterwards, by the inevitable process already pointed out, the attributes recognized as good will be ascribed to the Power worshipped as supreme. To say that a thousand errors have been committed as to what is good, that even yet the moral standard of the most civilized portion of the race is far from being perfect, is only to say that human

nature is human and not angelic. We shall have something more to note on this subject presently; the essential point to establish here in answer to Mr. Newman is, that religion and morals go hand in hand; that they rest on the same basis, i.e. the recognition of a supreme law, and that their ideal standards rise and fall together.

How those standards are formed, by what process the sense of moral beauty is awakened in man, and justice, mercy and truth become lovely and loveable in his eyes, not for their utility, but for their own sakes, and as more precious in themselves than any use they serve; how is evolved the idea of an *absolute* right and wrong,—for it is the absoluteness of conscience which is its distinguishing characteristic,—are questions quite beyond the aim and limits of this essay. Only let this be said: that when it is attempted to derive these ideas and feelings from the slowly accumulating and inherited experience of the utility of certain virtues to human communities, the effect is substituted for the cause, and the discovery thus arrived at of a true *criterion* of social morality is put for the motive power of moral action.

Moreover, this criterion applies only to social morality, for no utilitarian standard of morals can give more than a man's duty to his neighbours. His duty to himself, the supreme obligation of being pure, true, honest, just, in inward thought no less than in outward deed, of striving towards the highest and best he can conceive,—this branch of morals has no place in the morality which is founded on social utility, which has no ideal higher than happiness, and demands only outward acts, without inquiring into their hidden motives. On the other hand, it is this branch of morals which has its deepest root in religion, i.e. the belief in responsibility to a Power above all human power, good beyond all human goodness, represented by the conscience within, and judging,—reversely to human judgments,—not by the outward acts, but by the inward motives, laid bare before an All-seeing Eye. This is the "article of morals" which religion supplies, and which can never be derived from a moral theory, rejecting religion and

resting on the experience of social utility. It is not meant that this branch of morality is never practised by individual Atheists, for they may be, and often are, men of the highest and purest personal morality, putting to shame the lower tone of professed Theists and Christians, but it is because they are better, as the latter are worse, than their creed. The true moral tendencies of the creeds themselves can be fairly judged only by following out their general consequences on a scale large enough to eliminate individual exceptions. Let us compare in this manner the moral tendency on the mass of mankind of the belief that right and wrong are absolutely and eternally good and evil in themselves, the expression of the eternal law of righteousness of a living and righteous God, with that of the contrary belief that they are merely rules derived from the observation of their utility to society,—intellectual judgments, in short, on which, therefore, the private judgment of each individual has a right to exercise itself, to weigh one utility against another, the remote interest of all against the nearest and dearest interests of one, and that one, be it noted, having by the hypothesis no future beyond this present life,—this brief space granted him out of the eternity of nothingness, to enjoy if he can, to suffer if he must,—and then let the impartial mind, knowing human nature and human life, decide which will best resist the strain of passion and the insidious temptations of selfishness; which, in the long run, will obtain from men the largest and steadiest sacrifice of personal to general interests, of desire to duty.

Mr. Newman, as many others have done, seems to think that the sanction of morality, derived from a belief in God, is solely that of reward and punishment in a future life, overlooking the fact that the characteristic of the imperative of conscience is, that it commands without any reference to the consequences of actions. It does not say, "Do this, or refrain from that, because you will gain or suffer by it," but simply, "This *must* be done or left undone." And if the command be consciously or deliberately disregarded, the punishment is not future, but immediate; the disobedient mind kicks against

the pricks. Habit of course will deaden the pain; and if the habit has been formed of looking upon it as only the reflection of the disapprobation our neighbours would feel at the violation of rules instituted for their general advantage, it will prove a veritable Lethe, or, at best, the pain will resolve itself into the mere dread of being found out; but even this artificial soporific has its limits, and remorse remains, and will remain, while human nature exists, the one supreme and intolerable punishment, the true hell, which the imagination of man has projected into a material hell beyond the grave.

We believe that nothing has been more exaggerated than the deterrent influence of a belief in eternal punishment, and that except in acts of death-bed repentance it has scarcely had any active influence on human conduct at all. As one instance among many in support of this assertion, may be pointed out the maintenance through centuries of the code of honour as the gentleman's rule of duty, even to the extent of taking life, in direct opposition to the code of Christian morals, enforced by all the tremendous after-death penalties threatened by the Church. Duelling was murder by every Christian standard, yet how many Christian gentlemen, though devout believers in a future retribution, ever even hesitated, much less refused, to obey the law of honour compelling them to fight? It is but one of many proofs that human nature is too noble to be governed, like the bestial, by slavish fear. Lord Bacon has shewn, in his essay on Death, that there is not a passion in the human breast that is not stronger than the fear of death, and the fear of death includes the fear of punishment after death. This may seem to contradict the superior influence just attributed to the religious view of conscience; but the contradiction vanishes when we bear in mind that the true office of conscience is to command that duty be done, not to decide what that duty is. By what subtle transformations of feeling, and under what peculiar social conditions, the ideal of honour assumed the place of the Christian ideal, and caused shame to be substituted for remorse, it would take us too long to trace out here; it can only be pointed out that the result,

however obtained, confirms the fundamental fact of the recognition of a supreme moral authority within us, to be obeyed for its own sake, independently of any external inducements, and having its own sanctions of internal joy and suffering distinct from any external loss or gain.

Mr. Newman falls into the same confusion with regard to the belief in immortality as with regard to the moral sense. As he refuses to admit an instinctive moral sense in man, because it did not from the first produce a uniform and exalted code of morals, so he refuses to admit an instinctive belief in a life beyond this life, because it does not shew itself in a uniform and exalted theory of the immortality of the soul; and he rejects all the primitive and rudimentary forms of it as of no value. All the indications of the ineradicable tendency,—it might almost be called the necessity,—of the human mind to continue and complete this life in another, of which some of the strongest proofs might be found in the nations and individuals apparently most alien to it, go for nothing with him, because their views of the future life are as various as the mental and moral conditions of those who hold them. But this variety only makes more striking the unity of the feeling beneath it, the irresistible impulse to break through the limits enclosing life here, and reach forward to something larger, more perfect, beyond. Here again want of space forbids any attempt to meet Mr. Newman's argument against the universality of this feeling, drawn from the absence of it in the Chinese, the Buddhists and the ancient Jews, and to shew, as I believe could be shewn, that these apparent exceptions may be resolved into proofs of the rule. One word only as regards the Jews. It seems most singularly to have escaped all those who have commented on the omission in the Old Testament of any reference to a future state, any mention of other than temporal rewards and punishments, that the whole legislation of Moses, the whole of the later prophetic exhortations and denunciations, were addressed to the Jews as *a nation*, to Israel, the chosen people of God. The judgments denounced against the disobedient were national judgments, the rewards were

national grandeur and prosperity, and both, therefore, are necessarily temporal. The individual existed for them only as a member of the corporate body. In one of the most pregnant passages of Sir Henry Maine's work on Ancient Law, he shews that this was the characteristic of all ancient codes, which recognized no rights of the individual man as such, but only those belonging to the position he held in the family, the tribe or the state; and it is the equally marked characteristic of Christianity to have for the first time considered man as an individual, and addressed itself to each individual soul, laying down a law separate from the law of the state, resting upon a life outside the life of the nation. Note also that as in the development of morals we find the conception of moral good, and of God as its source and highest embodiment, rise together, so does the conception of a future life rise from the ideal hunting-grounds of the savage, the pale Elysium of the Greek, to the Christian heaven, where those who have hungered and thirsted after righteousness shall be filled, where the pure in heart shall see God. And it is an evidence that the aspiration after immortality is the aspiration after perfection, not the selfish desire for happiness, that through all the debasement, the ignoble perversions of Christianity, which have made the history of Christian churches one of the darkest and bloodiest in the annals of mankind, still has the Christian ideal of eternal bliss been kept pure and undefiled by any touch of sensual pleasure, and its highest reward remained, as proclaimed by its Founder, a closer union with the Divine.

To return from this digression to the points really at issue in Mr. Newman's article, the inseparable connection of a belief in immortality with Theism, and its influence on conduct. It seems inexplicable that a Theist should raise any doubt on these points; for what but belief in the future life makes possible the belief in an absolute Goodness and Justice which men can love and worship, and, loving, strive to attain to their likeness? What else can give meaning and completeness to this life, which without it is but

"A tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing"?

or, worse still, the work of some pitiless, sneering fiend, whose essence is cruelty, the pure delight in the infliction of pain, creating myriads of sentient beings to be "butchered to make a *devil's* holiday"?

The belief in immortality is the inseparable condition of belief in a God worthy of human worship, and its moral influence lies in thus securing for man a supreme ideal towards which he can tend as his goal, to be perfect as his Father in heaven is perfect. Mr. Newman repeats an argument he might have left to a certain school of orthodox theologians, that it is not for man to judge the justice of God; and he, a Theist, may be shamed by the words of one whose nobler nature made him sublimely inconsistent with the utilitarian creed he professed. "If," says John Stuart Mill, "instead of the glad tidings that there exists a Being in which all the excellences which the highest human mind can conceive exist in a degree inconceivable to us, I am informed that the world is ruled by a Being whose attributes are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, nor what are the principles of his government, except that the highest human morality does not sanction them,—convince me of it, and I will bear my fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this, and at the same time call this Being by the names which express and affirm the highest human morality, I say in plain terms that I will not! Whatever power such a Being may have over me, there is one thing he shall not do: he shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no Being good who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures; and if such a Being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go!" The Atheist may find it as easy to reconcile the unquenchable human thirst for a justice, a perfection, never found on earth, with their non-existence anywhere, as to evolve the order and harmony of the universe from the fortuitous con-

course of atoms; but to the Theist this is impossible. He can, feeling his incapacity to grasp the ultimate relations and issues of things, to fathom the infinite possibilities of eternity, believe

> "That not a worm is cloven in vain,
> That not a moth with vain desire
> Is shrivelled in a fruitless fire,
> Or but subserves another's gain;"

and bowing down in adoration before the Power he cannot understand, may still exclaim, "Though He slay me, yet will I trust in Him." But if those possibilities are excluded,—if what we see and know of this confused, disjointed, meaningless present, is indeed the be-all and end-all of human life, groaning and travailing in pain to bring forth nothing,—if there be indeed but one thing to happen alike to Jesus of Nazareth and Cæsar Borgia, and all that was Alexander find no nobler use than "to stop a bung-hole,"—if each generation of mankind is to be sacrificed for the greater good of the next, till the last shall inherit all, like the survivor of a huge tontine, then disappear in the wreck of the planet itself, and all the love, the beauty, the struggles, the agony and the triumph of unnumbered myriads of human beings leave nothing behind

> "But a burnt-out sun, and a cinder star,"—

then indeed the faith of the Theist becomes impossible, and dies for want of any food on which it can live.

Far different is it when that hope for the vanquished and trodden-down, the hopelessly lost in this world, is left to us. Then even from the contemplation of this life we can

> "Assert Eternal Providence,
> And justify the ways of God to man."

It may seem a startling paradox, yet it is a truth capable of demonstration, that human nature and human life would have lost in grandeur, in nobility, would have forfeited their highest beauty as their highest virtue, if the moral sense, evolved, as Mr. Newman supposes, from the sense of the utility to society, and to the individual through society, of certain courses of action, had been strong enough from the first to rule mankind,

and bring it to "dwell in *prudencies* for ever." Torrents of blood, torrents of tears, would doubtless have been spared, but the greatness born of suffering would have been spared also. The faithfulness unto death, the martyr's constancy, the patriot's heroism, the righteous will defying prosperous iniquity, all the elements of the wondrous drama of human life, high as heaven, deep as hell, kindled into life by the clash of conflicting forces, would have remained unborn and unknown in such a world. It may be asked, why then struggle, as all reformers are doing, to establish a society where justice and the greatest good of the greatest number shall prevail, if it is to result in such a dead level of commonplace prosperity? The answer is, because the good won by a struggle, the hard-earned reward of effort, is a wholly different thing from the good passively received or inherited; and if ever we see a human society fulfilling the ideal of the Christian and the Altruist alike, we know that it will have been reached, not by taking life

> "As idle ore,
> But iron dug from central gloom,
> And heated hot with burning fears,
> And dipt in baths of hissing tears,
> And battered with the shocks of Doom
> To shape and use,"—

a diviner shape, a nobler use, than the "idle ore" could ever have attained.

Mr. Newman assures us that the belief in immortality "has no *emotional* influence whatever; that it is purely intellectual and speculative, acting only on the imagination, and "stirring neither desire, nor hope, nor fear, nor curiosity;" and he adduces as proof his personal experience when he believed himself to be at the point of death. It is a broad conclusion to draw from the very slender premiss that *he* felt no emotion in the contemplation of a future life at the moment when the ebbing powers of this might be supposed too weak for any vivid grasp at all. And against his one experience might be set the multiplied and equally authentic records of the rap-

turous joy with which parting souls have sprung forward, as it were, to meet the dawn of the eternal day. But the emotional power of a belief is not to be measured by its effect on the dying, but on the living; not on the spirit from which the worn-out "vesture of decay," the failing instruments of its activity, are dropping off, but on the spirit in its full and vigorous exercise of them. Is there, then, for such a spirit in the prospect of eternity, no stirring of a boundless hope where else would be hopelessness? no fear of the dread possibilities of a new life unconceived, inconceivable? no curiosity to pierce the infinite unknown? no desire for the vision of perfect goodness in which the long thirst of life shall, at last, be satisfied?

Alas! for those who can answer these questions in the negative!

MARIA G. GREY.

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## IV.—THE CONDITIONS OF COMMON WORSHIP IN FREE CHURCHES.

IT would not be easy to conceive a contrast more complete than between rationalistic worship within, and rationalistic worship beyond the pale of the Established Church. We take it for granted that the former is possible, and that instances may be found in which the minister puts an interpretation on the formularies of the Church which he believes to be consistent with modern thought and knowledge, while the congregation by no means hold themselves bound by any orthodox expositions of the Creeds. The peculiarity is, that when this is so, a devout Churchman of any ordinary type may join in the service without sense of shock or jar. Possibly the Athanasian Creed is not read on the days appointed in the Rubric, but in every other respect all is done decently and in order. The service may even have in it a large element of the ornate, as if it were one thing to hear certain expressions of belief

tunefully and tastefully sung, and another to make them in cold blood and with a loud voice. Perhaps the degree of intellectual agreement between the congregation and what the minister is reading varies widely between a maximum and a minimum,—reaching the former in the Lord's Prayer and that "for all sorts and conditions of men," declining to the latter at "born of the Virgin Mary," "descended into hell," "resurrection of the body." But the outward signs of this variation are discernible only to the watchful and the instructed eye. Otherwise the service flows on in a swift, uninterrupted stream of thanksgiving and petition. The Apostles' Creed is recited without any recollection of the controversies which through six centuries have left their marks upon clause after clause, and given them a meaning which present usage does little to suggest. So, too, with the Symbol of Nicæa: it is as if no controversy had touched the nature of God, no speculation had moulded man's thought of the divine, since the days of Constantine. No doubt it is a great thing to pray in words consecrated by long usage and many tender associations; yet the present too has its rights, and cannot express all its wants and hopes in voices of the past. But the whole service belongs to the past; its newest word is three centuries old; and if our supposed congregation had wholly yielded themselves to its influence, which is usually far from being the case, they would greet the sermon, with its metaphysics of last week and its science of yesterday, with a start and a shiver.

Enter the meeting-house of an "advanced" Nonconformity, and everything is changed. Congregation and minister now are loose from all moorings of usage, and both are deeply conscious of their freedom. There is no certainty at any moment as to what will happen: the service follows no stated round of thought and feeling: last Sunday's practice is no guarantee for to-day's. If the minister reads Scripture, he chooses his own lesson, but he is as likely as not to put in its place a Vedic hymn or a passage from Emerson. His prayer is his own: perhaps taken from a cycle of written devotions not unknown to his congregation, perhaps the inspiration of the moment;

but in any case the outcome of his own mind, and to be followed by the worshipers only with considerable effort and a partial apprehension. Very likely he has a conscientious scruple against praying through or in the name of Christ: possibly he thinks he can improve upon the Lord's Prayer by bringing it nearer to a modern philosophical standard. But whatever his scruples, the people must accept and learn to fall in with them: he is absolute master of the situation: antiquity has no authority for him, and he has almost a pleasure in flouting usage. It is obvious that the religious value of such a service wholly depends upon the spiritual nature of the man, an element which in the first case went for almost nothing. He may be merely a sharp, shallow rhetorician, glib of speech in regard to God as to everything else; and then all that the congregation can do will be to fill up his poverty-stricken phrases out of the riches of their own hearts. Or he may be one who sees God face to face, and is overflowed by an abiding sense of the dignity and the mystery of human life, in which case his humble chapel becomes a very Mount of Vision, a tabernacle where the Eternal sometimes deigns to dwell.

These are extreme cases, we frankly admit; but every one will allow that they are possible, and extreme cases are best for purposes of illustration. And the apparent distinction between them lies in this: that in the first, the minister is bound by the letter of the Prayer-book, and the people have a perfect guarantee against either defects of taste or doctrinal aberrations; while in the second, the minister is absolutely free, and the people are at the mercy of his heresies, his scruples, his possible irreverence, his inevitably recurring dryness of heart. But this is not quite all the truth. Against all bad taste, except indeed such as is implied in unintelligent reading or nasal intoning, the Church congregation are protected; but the doctrinal guarantee is more verbal than real. What surety is there that the minister understands the doctrinal statements and implications of the Prayer-book in the same sense as the congregation, or that the concinnity of words between reading-desk and pew involves any genuine harmony of thought? Perhaps, if one

could pierce beneath the vocal unanimity of such a service to the various degrees of divergence of belief which it hides, the spectacle of words used in so many non-natural senses, and phrases calling up different and conflicting associations, might not be altogether edifying, especially if it be recollected that the worship is addressed to a God who "desireth truth in the inward parts." Whereas the other service, with all its admitted imperfections, is at all events an attempt at perfectly honest worship, in which no word shall be uttered to an omniscient God which does not come from the heart and is not approved by the head. No doubt common worship is in no case possible without more or less of compromise between minister and people. It can never be certain that words are spoken and understood in the same sense. Neither a form of prayer nor one man's orison can meet the precise wants, at a particular time, of hundreds of living hearts: the first errs in being too general, the second must be too personal. But compromise may be greater or less; and while the first kind of worship we have tried to characterize is quite contented with the maximum, the second is an honest and eager attempt to find the minimum.

These two methods of worship, narrowly scrutinized, are found to have their deepest root in different conceptions of the nature of theological truth. It may be regarded as "the faith once delivered to the saints," a thing perfected and rounded off at a bygone epoch of human history, and thenceforth incapable of development and modification. If with the Evangelical Protestant we look for it within the covers of the Bible, or with the Anglican in the belief of the first four centuries and the Canons of the Councils of the individual Church, it may well make itself vocal in a fixed liturgy, and we need not fear lest that liturgy should ever come to be out of harmony with modern modes of thought. On this view, theology is the one constant of human knowledge among many variables; and no possible intellectual inconvenience can result from a fixed view and method of treating it. There is not only no reason why Bishops to-day should not worship in precisely the same

words as Augustine and Chrysostom, but a thousand reasons of sentiment and association why they should; and a creed which satisfied the six first centuries may well be satisfactory always. But the case is at once altered when Theology is regarded as a progressive science, and methods of looking at divine things are seen not only to be susceptible of modification, but to be actually modified by new knowledge of the physical, and fresh criticism of the ancient world. The consensus of history is against "born of the Virgin Mary." Chemistry will have nothing to do with "the resurrection of the body." We can trace the actual steps by which the legend of the descent into hell grew up. No one can be imbued with the spirit of modern science without feeling the need of a profound change in the tone and structure of prayer. The old liturgies are still solemn, and stately, and pathetic; but whoever lives the new life and wants to be religious, hears in them the jarring note of perpetual anachronism. A free church and a progressive theology are in truth correlative ideas: the new wine will have new bottles—or if it be persistently poured into the old, we know the result. For a while words may be used in new and strange senses, fresh interpretations may be put upon old formulas, the present may be forced to express itself in terms of the past; but if the process be continued too long, the result is a paralysis of the intellectual conscience, and men's religious talk, degraded to the level of Talleyrand's diplomatic language, becomes no more than an instrument for concealing their thoughts.

But, in the next place, such a service as that of the Church of England is felt to answer to a precise dogmatic theology. We do not speak merely of the creeds, although the creeds are the argumentative nucleus of the whole, and impart to the whole a certain character. This religious utterance is the subjective side of a theology which is a science in the same way as astronomy or chemistry is a science, the main principles of which are quite well known, and all the chief details accurately mapped out. Words are used in precise technical senses. Phrases have a recognized doctrinal reference. The dogmas involved are not only definite of outline in themselves,

but are co-ordinated and subordinated into a symmetrical system. It is quite true that the nature of the subject-matter is such as to render the complete elimination of ambiguity impossible, so that different meanings are put by different men upon the same form of words; but the disputants are far enough from recognizing any corresponding obscurity in the things which the words denote, and one dogmatic interpretation is confidently maintained against another. And to a mind which comes to the Prayer-book touched by the characteristic moods of modern thought and feeling, it seems strangely to err by over-precision. It may or may not be all true, but who can know? The very word God, with its awful suggestions of meaning, with its burthen of significance that seems to grow less or more with the varying insight of the worshiper, which is now the expression of the most solemn and stable reality, and again seems only to hint at that which the mind can never adequately grasp,—ought not to be narrowed down to denote One of whose character we are confident, whose ways we know, whose nature we can divine, whose plans we are accustomed to analyze, whose judgments we venture to anticipate, whose thunderbolts we sometimes presume to throw. A devout soul may feel itself profoundly touched by divine realities, may be full of a childlike trust, or overwhelmed by a solemn awe, and yet turn away from a thousand things in this form of prayer as affirmations that are too bold, as implications which it does not know to be true. Of course, to a certain school of Churchmen, these affirmations and implications are delightful mental and spiritual aliment. For them, no other science approaches Theology in precision. They have no doubts as to any, even the minutest detail in the dogmatic system of the Church. They know all about prevenient grace, in the same way as the chemist knows all about carbon or phosphorus. They expatiate within their system, as a man wanders through the well-known fields and by the accustomed paths around his home. They are as ready to stand by every corollary from every article of the Catholic faith, as to defend the primary truths of religion. But men of a more modern

spirit are beginning to see that the creed of the future will consist of very few clauses, and every one of them expressed in terms of great latitude. Human life is hung in mystery; and religion, which seeks the bases of life, is of necessity mysterious. The great facts of faith may be clearly discerned, but will not be clearly defined. Something we know, but we guess, and believe, and hope more. So it is more than possible that as in the future men's awe, and faith, and trust expand, their dogmatic system will shrink to very small dimensions.

Sometime, no doubt, the day will come at which it will be possible for a free church, which feels itself no longer bound by either the Creed of Nicæa, or the Confession of Augsburg, or the Thirty-nine Articles, to gather up the results of progress, and to express them in a liturgical form which shall be true to the living consciousness of the time. The process of emancipation from mediæval theology cannot last for ever: even if the pendulum of thought be destined to swing into many alternate extremes, there is an equilibrium of belief in which it will rest at last. Such a liturgy, if ever it take shape, will be much less historical than that of the Church of England, but then it will make up for breaking with the past by answering much more perfectly to the wants of the present. It will be profoundly unsatisfactory to those who revel in minuteness of doctrinal detail, but it will give full and various voice to the simple and basal emotions of human religion. Every form of prayer aims, it may be presumed, to exclude the transitional, to include the permanent elements of faith; but it may safely be predicted that this will draw the line of distinction at quite an unexpected place. Some of the materials of such a form of prayer already exist: there are well-known petitions and collects in the Prayer-book which in their simple and severe beauty, and their almost unbounded width of application, have already made themselves part of all devotion that expresses itself in the English language; while, as the unhappy dissensions of our time clear away, and men breathe more constantly the air of pure spiritual feeling, these will become more, and more various. At the same time, each

age as it comes will bring with it its special way of looking at divine realities which are too great and too many-sided to be fully apprehended by any, and the colour of religious language may change, even while its burthen of meaning remains substantially the same. And if the public services of a church are to reflect with absolute exactness the emotions and aspirations of the worshipers, provision will always need to be made for what is changeful in them as well as for what is permanent.

But how far is a free church possible and desirable? And in which of many current senses is this somewhat abused phrase to be used?

Perhaps the definition of which we are in search may be best approached from the negative side. That is not a free church, in any adequate sense of the word, which is so called because the building in which it worships contains no appropriated sittings, and its revenues are raised by voluntary offerings at every service. This is a mere detail of ecclesiastical arrangement, of much less consequence, it seems to us, than its ardent advocates make it out to be. Nor can we give the title of a free church to a congregation or collection of congregations simply because it stands in no ecclesiastical relation to the State. Common experience shews that in such churches the expression of opinion is often much more restricted than in Established Churches. The severe hierarchical self-government of Wesleyan Methodism enables it to deal with heretics much more effectually than the Church of England can; while in like manner the Free Kirk and the United Presbyterians maintain a stricter standard of orthodoxy than the Kirk of Scotland. Liberty of self-regulation, in small matters as in great, in discipline as in doctrine, is no doubt an element in church freedom, but many more elements must be included before we at all fill up the measure of the conception. A free church is one in which minister and people are so related to one another, to other churches, to the past and to the future, as to give the utmost play to the present expression of religious thought and emotion, and to transmit the same liberty unimpaired to succeeding generations. If this ideal is to be aimed at, no reli-

gious tests must be imposed upon either the minister or his congregation. No creeds must be recited in public worship. No doctrinal name must play the part of a creed in one article. The application of theological standards must not accompany the administration of any rite. Church property must be held on trusts which will leave each successive generation of worshipers at liberty to mould its own worship. And to complete the fabric, it seems necessary that such a church should be of the congregational order; that it should not be subject to the control of a Bishop or a Synod; and that in any arrangements for mutual help and encouragement which it may make with other churches, it should jealously guard a complete independence.

Now it cannot be too clearly seen, that if Theology is not a progressive science, and if its statements and definitions are always fully adequate, there is no special justification for the freedom of a church as thus understood. If we are to take the Nicene Creed, for instance, as a statement of truth about the Divine Nature absolutely beyond dispute, and if every phrase used in it has one definite, well-understood sense, and no more, there can be no reason why it should not be used as a basis of faith, and allowed to regulate the outflow of religious emotion. The great argument against creeds, when employed as tests of orthodoxy or conditions of union, is, that even in the simplest form they are inadequate and delusive. They are inadequate because their subject-matter is such as to transcend definition; they are delusive because no two thoughtful men ever apprehend them in exactly the same sense. The object of a church's freedom is, that each individual worshiper, each succeeding generation of worshipers, should stand in its own fresh attitude of awe and reverence before the Eternal Mystery, drawing indeed what inspiration it can from the long homage of the past and the consentaneous hymn of the present,—but still uttering its own heart in its own words, pleading its own penitence, enumerating its own wants. It needs no arguments to prove, even if it were not proved by experience, that this is not inconsistent with the due cultiva-

tion of the religious life, both on its spiritual and its practical side: this stands altogether outside of the alternative between theological freedom and theological bondage. In all manifestations of religion that can be even approximately measured by external tests, the freest churches are no whit behind those who most rejoice in the restrictions of creeds. But they alone have a confident outlook to the future. They alone are plastic to needful change. They alone are as fitted to express, with perfect honesty, the faith of the twenty-second as the faith of the nineteenth century. Perhaps they alone have so firmly grounded a belief in the unchangeableness of the central truths of religion, as to be able to disregard change in human methods of apprehending and expressing them.

This is all very well, we may be told, in theory; but it is a theory too airy and fine-spun ever to be reduced to practice. For even when all restrictions of creeds and doctrinal articles in trust-deeds have been swept away, they are always liable to be replaced, and for practical purposes must be replaced, by tacit, sometimes by verbal understandings, which are just as binding, though in a less explicit and open way. Then, again, the perfect freedom of the minister and the perfect freedom of the people are things essentially incompatible. Pulpit and pew must agree upon a *modus vivendi* which is inconsistent with the absolute liberty of either. Can a minister be truly said to be free who knows that he must go if he transgresses certain well-known, though undefined, doctrinal limits? Or what is the freedom of a congregation worth who are compelled to listen Sunday after Sunday to teaching which cuts athwart their most matured convictions? These questions have often been debated of late, and usually in the most trenchant way, as if the common conditions on which men live together could be abrogated in this particular case, and no liberty were worth having that could not prove its entire independence of law. Somewhat more practical than this, we trust, will be a discussion of the extent to which this theory has been and may be worked out—a discussion which will take into account its real limitations as well as its ideal scope.

Whether a church administered on such a theory would be entitled to call itself absolutely free, we shall not attempt to determine; but at all events its liberty would stand in refreshing and hopeful contrast to the bondage in which most religious communities are now uneasily content to live.

It may be admitted at once, that although such a church in choosing a minister may ask him no direct doctrinal questions, much less require him to make a formal confession of faith, or to sign a prescribed creed, it does exact some more or less valid guarantee of his general theological agreement with it. He may have been educated in a particular institution; he may have been the minister of a church known to stand on similar ground; or the very fact of his willingness to accept the office may be primâ facie evidence that so far as the colour of his convictions goes, he is not unfit to hold it. Nor, again, can it be denied that a certain amount of intellectual agreement between a minister and the majority of his people is necessary, if the connection is to be peaceful on one side or profitable on the other. This agreement may be much less precise than is generally supposed. It is often curious to notice the wide divergence of theological and philosophical opinion between men who are nevertheless quite content to join in the same devotions and to listen to the same sermons. Still a congregation which believed that the Father was the only proper object of divine worship, would find itself very ill at ease under a minister who habitually prayed to the Son. The whole tone of moral instruction on the part of a preacher who put his trust in a vicarious atonement, would be repugnant to hearers who rejected any theory of atonement at all. No man in his senses, either in the name of liberty or on any other pretext, would deny to a congregation the right of choosing a teacher who was able to teach; and such a general agreement between minister and people as we have alluded to, is one of a religious teacher's first requisites. He cannot do his work if he begins by enforcing doctrines which his hearers have long ago deliberately rejected, and assuming principles of the fallacy of which they are convinced. But it has been

far too much forgotten in the discussion of this question, that a minister's theological opinions are only one element in his fitness for his work, and that by no means the most important. Has he a true prophetic soul? Can he see divine realities for himself, and through his eyes make others see them? Can he pray, and help his people to pray? Does he burn with the enthusiasm of humanity? Are his zeal, his self-devotion, his charity, so ardent, as to have the true contagious quality? Is he able to see intellectual difficulties on more sides than one, and to feel the force of other views than his own? If he be all this, the precise amount of his theological agreement with his congregation shrinks into a matter of comparatively little consequence: if he be none of this, his ability to pronounce their shibboleths with the utmost accuracy will avail very little to bring them nearer God.

But when the teacher is found, and, without questions asked or a line of action marked out beforehand, is set to begin his work, under what conditions does he perform it? On the legal side, ministers of free churches usually bind themselves to give and to take six months' notice before removal. In many cases the minister's independence is still further protected by a regulation that the notice must be given by a substantial majority, two-thirds or three-fifths of the congregation, the implication being that a high-minded man would wish to retire of his own accord long before his ministrations had excited so large a mass of dissatisfaction. These rules seem to us to be only such as must be allowed to regulate any contract between man and man to which it is desired to give a formal and binding character, and may be dismissed without further allusion. But on the intellectual side, we understand the minister to be, for the time, perfectly free. The very terms of his tacit contract with his congregation are, that he is to read, to think, to inquire, to live,—and from week to week to communicate to them such results of the process as may be possible and profitable. Nor is he to think within bounds, or to inquire only into a class of subjects, or to read none but approved books. He suffers his mind and heart to take their

natural course of development. The one thing about which he is justly anxious is that they should develop, that he should grow and live, and manifest the fruits of growth and life. To stand still, to repeat contentedly the crude platitudes of his youth and the stereotyped conclusions of his college tutors; to be no wiser for the growing knowledge and changeful wisdom of his time; to feel no answering influence on his own mind from the minds of those to whom he speaks, nor to be plastic under those experiences of life in which he must bear a sympathetic part,—this is what he ought chiefly to dread. And to this privilege of free thought, feeling, life, answers the duty of free speech. We do not mean that a minister is bound to give his congregation the result of his unfinished trains of speculation, or to take them into his confidence at every stage of a long inquiry. Many young ministers are apt to do this far too much: the novelty of negation has a powerful charm for them, and they find themselves committed to positions from which maturer reflection bids them draw back—when it is too late. But apart from this possible error of over-haste, it makes the whole worth and dignity of a free preacher's office that he is bound to speak out; that careful and honest utterance of what is in him is the basis of his intellectual relation to his people; and that whatever fruit his mind and heart produce is his, in order that it may be theirs.

It is, however, quite plain that a minister may strive to fill up this ideal with more or less success, and yet with very various result on the mind of his congregation. In the legitimate and deliberate exercise of his own freedom, he may come to occupy a position at variance with theirs, from which it is no longer easy to do his work with efficiency and serenity of spirit. The present is, in particular, a time of rapid intellectual change, in which religious truths once supposed to be beyond dispute are vehemently called in question: to all winds of intellectual influence the minister is, by the necessities of his position, much more exposed than his congregation: he moves faster than they do, and with all goodwill on either side he may not be able to carry them with him. Or, again, it is

quite possible that his mental development may take an opposite direction to theirs. A conservative tone of mind, or a shrinking and devout nature, may very naturally hesitate about committing itself to so wild a sea of doubt and change as rages now about the free churches; and a man, still true to the principle of freedom, still anxious to resign none of the prerogatives of his position, may feel that his preaching has taken a tone and colour with which his people can sympathize only in part. What is to be done in either of these cases? We cannot help thinking that the more thoroughly the principle of freedom is understood on both sides, the easier they will be to deal with, and the less soreness will be left behind. No high-minded man would wish to continue his ministrations to an unwilling congregation. If his people come to him, and say honestly, kindly, perhaps even sorrowfully, that from any cause —theological, practical, moral, even a failure of health or an unpleasantness of manner—his teaching fails to promote their religious life, all he has to do, all any reasonable man would wish to do, is to part with them on friendly terms, and to find some other corner of the vineyard in which he can hope to work with more success. But we fail to see why one particular kind of incompatibility should be selected from all the rest, and looked at with special reference to the principle of freedom. By parity of reasoning, it might be said that it was an infringement of the freedom of a weak-voiced man that he was compelled to give up the ministry in a large chapel where no one could hear him. A minister is a man chosen to do a certain work: he is left free to do it as he thinks best, subject always to the condition *that he does it:* but we cannot think that he has any just ground of complaint if the connection naturally ceases when, from any cause, he is unable to do it any longer. And this is the case which we are considering. So long as he can do his work, and men and women are the better for it, let him do it in God's name and with God's help; but when his ministrations have the result, not of acquiescence, but of revolt —not of peace, but of irritation—not of growth, but of stagnancy—not of increase in love, but of offence against charity,—

it is time for him to recognize the fact that the conditions under which his freedom of teaching was put into his hands no longer exist, and to try a happier experiment elsewhere.

We have purposely put an extreme case, one that very rarely arises among churches that really set freedom before them as a possible ideal. And it must be remembered that the recognition of liberty on both sides tends in many ways both to prevent such an issue, or, if it must come, to reduce its discomfort to a minimum. A minister has a much better chance of carrying his congregation with him in any voyage of intellectual change which he may feel compelled to take, if there is no fixed *terminus a quo* or *terminus ad quem* to give direction to their wanderings, or to remind them how far they have wandered. So long as they are in a fair state of agreement, both are within their right in moving, which would not be the case if there were a forgotten trust-deed in the muniment-chest, or a creed recited in worship, upon which each day's movement put a less natural sense. Then it makes a great difference if minister and people frankly acknowledge at the outset that they do not always expect to agree. It is too true that many hearers measure the worth of a sermon by the degree in which it gives orderly and forcible expression to their own more confused opinions; but these are rarely the hearers who best reward the preacher's toil. Others, of a finer temper, eagerly welcome a line of speculation not their own, a view of a subject which had not occurred to themselves; while it is the common experience of all reflecting readers that the most suggestive gleams often come from remotest quarters of the sky. A truly great preacher, a truly thoughtful congregation, who felt for each other a strong mutual respect, would, we are persuaded, resent the substitution of a dead uniformity of agreement for the shock and play of minds, and the collisions which break into real illumination. And the depth and sincerity of this toleration, on either side, is enhanced by the all-important fact, which we have already tried to make prominent, that a minister's relation to his people is only in part, and that not the most essential part, intellectual. To differ as to the

logical apprehension of divine facts is, unhappily, only too easy; but the awe of worship, the glow of gratitude, the ecstacy of praise, the serenity of trust, the tearfulness of penitence, the self-accusing shame of remorse, are common ground to all who stand within the pale of religion. But to feel these things himself, and to be able to make others feel them, is the gift of the true minister of God. Just in proportion as a man possesses it, will he be able to give a good account of his ministry. A really religious man will condone much intellectual divergence before he deliberately separates himself from one whom he feels to be an efficient link between his own soul and God. Or if the separation must come, it will be made reluctantly, courteously, tenderly, and leave all the ties of private friendship still unbroken.

The less of minute organization which any corporate body possesses, the more will its tone and temper depend upon the individuals of which it is composed. And so a body of churches, to whose internal management the principles of freedom has been applied with more or less consistency for a century and a half, will no doubt work it out in practice with a much greater realization of its advantages, and a far finer manipulation of its difficulties, than others who may be making their first experiments with an unknown polity. It is commonly supposed that no religious body can exist without a creed. Yet a religious body, partly perhaps by the accident of its history, does so exist, and finds itself neither molluscous nor acephalous. It is impossible, we are told, to reconcile the freedom of the minister and the freedom of the congregation; yet ministers and congregations exist in increasing numbers who enjoy a common freedom which satisfies their utmost desires. Now and then, no doubt, a case arises in which doctrinal self-assertion on the one side, or doctrinal prejudice and panic on the other, get the upper hand, and Liberty is wounded in the house of her friends. But such a case is only the exception that proves the rule. We firmly believe that nowhere can a more genuine kindliness, a larger spirit of concession, a deeper mutual respect, a finer considera-

tion for the rights of the individual judgment, be found, than among the ministers and congregations of the Free Churches, which are absolutely exempt from doctrinal tests, and whose unprescribed discipline rests only on the justice and courtesy of Christian men and women. The profession of the ministry among Nonconformists has its difficulties and drawbacks, not greater than similar difficulties and drawbacks in the Church of England, though perhaps different in kind. But ministers remain long, sometimes their lives' long, with the same congregations; the most faithful private friendships are interwoven with their public work; their strength is appraised at its best, their weaknesses at the least; and the absence of any outward and visible tie only makes the bond between pastor and people the closer and the more durable. Freedom, no less than Wisdom, "is justified of her children."

Such a free polity as we have attempted to describe, if indeed it be not better defined as the absence of all polity, is the necessity of the near future, if men of education are to be attracted to and kept in connection with Christian churches. Except the Anglo-Catholics, who have as a body broken with modern thought and learning, and in the exuberance of their new zeal for sacerdotalism are eagerly taking upon their shoulders burthens which some of the best men in the older Church would gladly throw off, the reflecting laity of our time shew a unanimous disposition to avoid ecclesiastical obligations. One reason why so many of them remain in loose connection with the Church of England is the well-known fact that that communion, reserving all its tests and most of its theological difficulties for its priests, practically asks no questions of its lay adherents. It is true that a stricter intellectual morality than now prevails might hold that a layman gave at least a tacit consent to the doctrinal principles of a service which he habitually attended; but the idea commonly entertained and acted upon is, that he may believe as much or as little as he likes of the expressions of faith which he hears from the reading-desk. In the Church of Scotland, repeated attempts have been made to effect a relaxation of subscription for elders, on the ground

of the difficulty of procuring laymen of fit education and social standing to fill that office; while among English orthodox Dissenters, either the practice of free communion is silently extending, or the congregation grows at the expense of the church. But however this may be, the free organization of Christian churches may be defended on another and a more general ground. No one who can at all read the signs of the times can doubt that changes of religious belief are about to take place on a much larger scale than has hitherto been the case. Mediæval theology and modern science cannot always live together on the delusive terms of amity which now serve to postpone the inevitable crisis. The time must come, and that soon, at which educated men will be compelled to choose between a complete abandonment of religion, or a modification of religious belief and speech in accordance with certain knowledge. Such a process of modification will be long and painful and difficult; accompanied by great searchings of heart and many shipwrecks of faith; at every moment liable to be arrested by fear and prejudice. And the only church organization which will have any chance of weathering the storm as an ark of refuge for the faithful of the next generation, must be one in which all forces of religious thought and emotion will have the freest and most natural play, and which will finally assume a shape determined only by the needs of men's spiritual nature. In that hour of trial, churches will be found frail in proportion to their fixity. The only way to find a haven of rest will be to hoist all sail, and, with help of whatever wind may blow, to dare the open sea.

The history of the Broad-church party in the Church of England during the last quarter of a century may afford a final illustration of the necessity of a freer organization of religion than can be built up on any dogmatic basis. In truth, it is hardly a party. When its story comes to be told, it will be more accurately described as a number of able men, more keenly alive than their fellows to the characteristic culture of the time, and influenced by it in various ways, but on that very account not moving together on any party lines, or con-

sciously working towards a common end. There is no apostolical succession among them: they do not even form a school. Their influence with the laity is great; their books are widely read; their sermons are eagerly listened to; they have done much to reconcile religion with the modern spirit. They sow seed which constantly grows, and bears fruit of a kind which they do not expect, and perhaps little like. Personally and individually, they are successful, and that in the best way: it is when their work is looked at ecclesiastically that it is seen to be a failure. The paucity of their numbers, the incoherence of their ranks, are due to the fact that they are not naturally and steadily recruited from the centres of national education: clever young men who have imbibed their ideas look askance at the obligations of the clerical life, and turn aside to scholarship, science, law, medicine. The fact is that they live under a system, and the system is too strong for them. They would not for an instant entertain the idea of becoming Nonconformists and testifying to the truth in the wilderness: their business is to remain in Zion, and to reform her. But Zion will not be reformed: after much striving, they cannot even get rid of the Athanasian Creed: and, with trifling exceptions, all things remain as they were in 1660. They, too, at last come to believe, in a strange, superstitious fashion, in the formulas which they habitually utter, and are almost as zealous in declaring that the Prayer-book must remain as it is, as the Ritualist who sees in it the sheet-anchor of his position. The reason is, that while men come and go, with their varying insight into divine things, and their different report of what they see, the Church is always there, repeating the same creeds, reciting the same prayers, presenting religion to her docile children in the same light. And the system overpowers the men, who cannot put a new life into it, and at the same time will not break away from it. The sharpest arrows of logic fall blunted before it, and it baffles changes of opinion by surviving them. Conservative feeling, ancestral prejudice, much tender and graceful sentiment, always fight for it, and fight for it even in the hearts of those whom strictly-reasoned conviction

would drive to assail it. Liberal theology is, in sad truth, an exotic in the garden of the Church, always struggling for life against an unfriendly climate, and hardly holding its ground against growths more congenial to the soil. There have been latitudinarian movements before this, both in England and Scotland, which have left their record in noble books and some sweet and saintly memories; but what trace remains of their impact upon the dogmatic system of either Church? Their destroying, modifying, refining, reconciling work needs now to be done as much as ever; but it can only be effectively and lastingly done by men who have the courage to stand outside the system which they seek to change in the interests of the future. A free theology must be the work of free theologians.

CHARLES BEARD.

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## V.—MAX MÜLLER'S HIBBERT LECTURES.

*Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion, as illustrated by the Religions of India, &c.* By F. Max Müller, M.A. London: Longmans. 1878.

THE Hibbert Trustees are to be congratulated by all friends and disciples of the simpler religious views now in course of development, as many of us hope, harmoniously with the intellectual results of history and science in this country, upon the latest application of the funds at their discretion. In answer to a memorial signed by some eighteen names, not all of them divines, nor all belonging to one and the same religious organization, but all known and respected generally among us, the Trustees were moved to institute a Lectureship, which we presume will be maintained at least until "the various historical religions of the world" have been passed in review by competent scholars before large audiences and the larger circle of interested readers. The first fruits of the new experiment lie before us in Professor Max Müller's delightful volume.

How successful the venture has been so far is sufficiently attested by the facts that it was only by the lecturer's delivering each lecture twice that the numerous applicants for tickets could be all gratified, and that the book, although published at the close of last year, has already been some weeks in a second edition. These facts are symptoms of considerable interest in the undogmatic treatment of questions connected with religion. That interest is not confined to students. And no one knows better than Professor Max Müller how to speak and write in a manner that shall interest a wider public of men and women, while at the same time he increases the knowledge or challenges the criticism of specialist, philosopher and scholar. The Hibbert Trustees could not have made a happier choice for their first lecturer than the renowned editor of the Veda. Further advantages accrued from the nature of the special subject to which Professor Max Müller naturally turned as his treasury, from which to produce for us things new and old. English men and women can least of any folk in the world be excused if they are indifferent to the religions of the world which they colonize, and of India, in especial, which they govern. Not as Aryan only, not as the eldest records of the common stock and primitive religion, do the sacred books of the Hindus appeal to us. And again, the matter had this advantage, that it could be treated with the least suspicion of offence to prevalent susceptibilities. Though so near us in one way, it is far off in another: the religions of India, as such, have never claimed our allegiance or influenced our faith: we are all agreed that they may be treated as natural and historical products. And again, viewed as such, they have a very special advantage of their own, which makes the study or exposition of them pre-eminently suited for an inaugural course and introduction to the science of religions; for the ancient literature of India, says Professor Max Müller, "gives us opportunities for a study of the origin and growth of religion such as we find nowhere else;" or, as Geiger puts it in a sentence left by Professor Max Müller in the original German, and which certainly in its less cautious utterance may not be so

easily admissible: "The Indians developed their religion to a pitch of ideal and classical form which makes it for all time the key to the natural faith of the whole human race."* But is it religion or religions? On the title-page, Professor Max Müller speaks of "the Religions of India," although in the body of the book I do not find much stress laid upon their plurality, or very much said about any religion save what is to be found in the Vedas. In especial, Buddhism does not come in for any but incidental treatment, perhaps because, as Professor Max Müller says, "Buddhism is the frontier between ancient and modern literature in India," and he proposed to treat only of the literature of India which supplies materials for a study of the origin and growth of religion. There is no rule, apparently, in the matter among the specialists; for Wurm,† in his instructive and readable compendium, in which he treats of "The Religion of the Veda," "The elder Brahmanism," "Buddhism," and "The later Brahmanism," sums the whole up under the title of Indian Religion. *Nugae!* Religions or Religion as we please, the meaning in both cases is plain enough. Whether or not in those parts of the book treating more immediately of Indian Religion, or Religions, the author has produced anything which he has not already given the world in another form, or whether there was anything within the limits to be produced brand-new, are questions on which I am not competent to enter. In any case we must follow with wonder and pleasure the master as he moves, with the ease and assurance of life-long habituation, through a world whose beauties and treasures are hid to most of us, except when he points them out, bringing us here a flower and there a pearl. Did this whole book treat exclusively of ancient Aryan matters, the ordinary reader would have nothing to do but to accept with gratitude the goodly

* M. M. p. 51. I might have done better, perhaps, to leave this untranslateable extract in its original dress, as the Professor has done—"Fools rush in," &c. *Urweltliche Classicität* is one of those delightful expressions in German which may be expounded, but never translated, into English. *Götterglauben* is not an easy term to render—in fact, there is hardly an easy word in the whole little sentence.

† Geschichte der indischen Religion: Basel, 1874.

fare spread before him. Criticism or dispute from such a quarter would be impossible, or, if attempted, ridiculous. But deeply interesting, illuminative, and suggestive, as are those chapters and parts of chapters concerned with the exposition of early Aryan philosophy and feeling about the world and its rulers, it may be questioned whether the thoughts and emotions of most readers will not be even more throughly stirred by the portions of the book which deal with more general topics, and with questions and debates more accessible to the average man and woman. For the book consists of two elements which can to some extent be held distinct from each other, and which are clearly distinguished in the title: "The Origin and Growth of Religion, as illustrated by the Religions of India." Although the illustrations make up, as might be expected, the greater bulk of the work, the main thread and initial interest are determined by problems that lie near to every one of us. The illustrations are matters of an old history and of a dead literature, which we must accept on the authority of experts, among whom Professor Max Müller is chief. The text is a matter drawn from wells of life and thought quite sealed to none of us. Any one who has reasoned seriously upon the commonplaces of psychology and metaphysics, and enjoyed a moderate discipline in those subjects, may without presumption express an opinion, which will probably not be peculiar to himself, for what it may be worth, upon certain fundamental positions and upon certain questions of method which are insisted upon by Professor Max Müller. Moreover, it is inevitable that in a work of this kind, which is not merely a scientific exposition for the benefit of students, but is addressed to a wide circle of sympathetic minds, readers should eagerly catch, as the hearers in the Westminster Chapter-house must have caught, at any indications of more direct ethical or religious instruction—any stray hint of how they are to keep near the higher life in these days of doubt and division—any gracious glimpse granted, in passage or in conclusion, into the secret places of a strong mature life—hints and glimpses which might have been ungladly missed in the spoken words, and are

not absent in the printed pages; to which must be reckoned the exquisite and touching Dedication prefixed to the book, which might well serve to warn away irreverent eyes, and to encourage any child of man to approach who feels, with the dying Schleiermacher, that the highest speculative thoughts are for him identical with the deepest religious feelings.

One doubt may suggest itself to any one even superficially acquainted with the subject, at the very start, arising out of the title and subject of the book. How far can the religions of India be expected to illustrate the problems of the origin and growth of religion? The growth, that may pass; for we may assume, or allow ourselves easily to be persuaded, that there has been growth in religion, and in Indian religions, as everywhere. But the origin of religion? Surely that is something very ancient; yea, much more ancient than the earliest Aryan records! Literature, even the literature which is only the redaction of an oral tradition, is from one point of view comparatively modern. How many advances had not man achieved, how many errors and experiences and inventions and manifold efforts passed through and forgotten, before he busied himself with the laborious design of remembering the deeds of men or the manifestations of the deities, or hit upon the glorious expedients of rhythm and verse to make remembrance possible! And all that illiterate, unmusical time, was he without God in the world, without religion? What says Professor Max Müller on this question of the relative antiquity of the Vedic literature and religion as such? He by no means assigns them a coeval origin. "In the Veda Dyaus is already a fading star" (p. 276). Again: "The historical documents of a religion never carry us very far. They fail us often just where they would be most instructive, near the first springs of the old stream. . . . . For many generations a national religion has no tangible form as a body of doctrine or ceremonies: it has hardly a name" (pp. 128, 129). "The spontaneous growth of Vedic poetry," "the gradual development of the Vedic religion," are to be dated prior to 1000 B.C. But how much prior? "Some scholars extend it to two or three thousand

years before our era" (p. 152). But what are even two or three thousand years B.C. as an era for the origin of religion? Even "the most ancient relics of human poetry in the Aryan world" do not seem to carry us nearly right back to the very origin of religion. How many hymns were said or sung before the most ancient ones, still extant, were committed to memory? How many rude prayers or practices were essayed before the first hymn was chanted?

But Professor Max Müller, not the Sanskrit scholar only, but the comparative philologist, can carry us further back towards the origin of religion than merely to "a literature at least a thousand years older than Alexander's expedition to India" (p. 182). The undivided Aryan language may to some extent be recovered "by comparing the language of the Aryans of India with that of the Aryans of Greece, Italy, and the rest of Europe." That primitive Aryan language, so recovered, betrays, as all speech does, the thoughts of the men who used it. Thence it appears that, "five thousand years ago, or it may be earlier, the Aryans, speaking yet neither Sanskrit, Greek, nor Latin, called him [the All-father] *Dyu patas*, Heaven-father" (p. 216). Again, in that early time, "before the Aryan languages separated"—thousands of years, it may be, before the first hymn of the Veda was composed—"the adjective *deva* had been formed, meaning originally 'bright.'" This word came in course of time (how long?) "to mean 'god,' because it originally meant bright; and we cannot doubt that something beyond the meaning of brightness had attached itself to the word *deva* [Lat. Deus, Fr. Dieu] before the ancestors of the Indians and Italians broke up from their common home" (pp. 4, 5). But even this stage in the development or growth of the Aryan religion is not an absolute beginning. We can peer back further still through the lenses of the philologist. It took time, we may be sure, to form the adjective *deva* from the root DIV, meaning to shine. And even the root DIV itself had a history assuredly, if we could only recover it! Even the root DIV, which is abstract and applicable to more than one object or action, was a birth of time and human thought.

What was the religion, or germ of religion, in the Aryans before the adjective *deva* had been formed,—before the root DIV had been formed? Here is a point surely where language itself seems to forsake us higher up, as literature has forsaken us further down, the course of development or growth. The problem of the origin of religion does not unseal itself by this method, apparently, nor do we get behind the truth on this way. Neither the earliest Aryan literature, nor the far earlier Aryan language, undivided, and simply radical—if, indeed, any still traceable roots can be regarded as primeval—carries us up along the course of time to the origin of thought and religion.

But is there not another method whereby to come at the secret of the origin of religion? We speak of religion as of something the same always and everywhere, in the modern German or Anglo-Saxon, as well as in ancient Greek, or still more ancient Aryan, before the division of the languages. Let us fix our attention upon what is essential in religion in all times and places, that element or quality without which we should not say that religion was present, whether in our own case or in the case of our remotest ancestors. Fixing our eyes upon that essential element or factor, let us consider whether it may not supply the key to the secret of the origin of religion, which seems to elude a purely historical research.

There are, in fact, two broadly distinguished methods, either of which may apparently be adopted in such inquiries. Religion is in one aspect an historical phenomenon, or series of phenomena: in another aspect, it involves a purely psychological and metaphysical problem. Neither the essence nor the origin of religion is a manifest point or quantity. Both are secrets to us until we investigate them. But at which end shall we start? Shall we take the historical facts, so far as we can recover them, and from them seek to determine the essence and origin of religion; or start with some general conception of religion, or some metaphysical or quasi-metaphysical analysis of religion as we find it among ourselves, in ourselves, at present, and use this key, supplied by the analysis of the

essential element in religion in all times and places, to unlock the secret of its historical origin?

Now as to this question of method, I must notice that Professor Max Müller's utterances may seem at times inconsistent with each other, and at times his theory inconsistent with his practice. Thus on p. 219 he writes: "We have simply to collect all the evidence that can be found in the history of religion all over the world, to sift and classify it, and thus to try to discover the necessary antecedents of all faith." Again, on p. 256, he shews that "an impartial collection of all the evidence that could be brought to bear on the origin and growth of human speech," alias "the historical study of language," is the proper model for the science of religion. And again, in a different context, he says (p. 227): "In exploring new strata of thought, it is always best to expect nothing, but simply to collect facts, to accept what we find, and to try and digest it." On the other hand, in regard to this very question of the origin of religion among the Aryans, he seems to adopt the contrary method. He imagines what, under certain circumstances, with a certain definition of religion and a certain origin admitted, we might expect from the primitive Aryans, and then seeks to verify his anticipations by comparing notes with the poets of the Veda (p. 224). This method is not justified by an appeal to the intuitions of genius, which are so happily characterized elsewhere—(p. 234: "To a man who has faith in himself and in the world around him, one glance is as good as a thousand observations")—but by the exigencies of logic. And so at starting we are not at once introduced to the historical facts, or to the early monuments in literature and language of Aryan religion, but treated to a psychological analysis of religion as a subjective faculty. It is not the historical genesis or growth of religion, so much as the *a priori* conditions of religion, which are analyzed: and long before we learn the early forms of religious phantasy or practice among the Aryans, which, according to a strictly historical method, should predetermine our conception or definition of religion, we are put in possession of our guide's own solution

of the mystery, or at least of his principal "note" or sign for its solution. The subject of the Lectures is not, accurately described, the religions of India, but rather the origin of religion, psychological and metaphysical; the refutation of a rival psychological and physical derivation; and the verification, or rather the illustration, of the given psychological derivation of religion by reference to the religions of India—with some further illustrations of subsequent religious growth.

But this criticism of method would be very imperfect if left here. I am far from intending to take any serious exception to the method which Professor Max Müller pursues: it is sufficient for my present purpose to have shewn that his utterances on the subject are not always quite consistent with each other. The fact is, surely, that neither of the two methods above described is of much use by itself, or capable of isolated application. The process of our best thought is tentative and double, now more metaphysical, now more historical; the shuttle moves to and fro as the stuff is being woven. The anticipation is based, directly or indirectly, upon history or experience, and will be verified or corrected, as the case may be, by fuller knowledge or experience: the history itself is a chaos until anticipation and the common analogies of human nature suggest motives and causes for events and opinions. This is a true account of all undogmatic thought and speculation—seeking a definition, yet starting from a definition of the very thing it is in search of; beginning with something, more or less, gathering and throwing away as it goes along; reaching a goal at last which is the same, yet not the same, as it originally left.

In truth, the historical origin of religion among the Aryans, or any other folk, can only be explained by reference to the permanent element in history, which unites the present and the past, human consciousness and its common conditions and analogies. Therefore no serious exception can be taken to the position of Professor Max Müller's prefatory chapter, however qualified may be the assent which we bring to its contents.

After shewing the necessity of having some conception or

definition of religion to start with, before we can determine its origin, Professor Max Müller discusses various recent definitions of religion, only to reject them as inadequate, one and all. His method here is Aristotelian, and consists in playing off one definition against another, and shewing that they mutually destroy each other, rather than in any direct analysis of each given definition, or any proof that it is inconsistent with facts or with feelings. Thus Kant's view that religion is morality raised to the power of a divine command, is cancelled by juxtaposition with Fichte's view that religion is a form of knowledge not directly related to practice. Similarly Schleiermacher's famous definition of religion as the feeling of absolute dependence, is put into contrast and opposition with Hegel's conception of religion as perfect freedom (presumably, independence), and the two are left to destroy each other. Yet one cannot but think that Professor Max Müller is a little hard upon the philosophers, for a good deal might be said for each of their definitions, as well from an historical as from a psychological point of view; nor are they perhaps so mutually destructive and irreconcilable as might appear at first sight. Moreover, Professor Max Müller does not make it plain that the philosophers have been doing virtually what he himself next proceeds to do, in despair of finding or inventing any adequate and exhaustive definition (though perhaps they claimed to have done more), namely, giving some specific characteristic of religion which shall serve to distinguish its manifestations from other mental and social phenomena. Religion, Professor Max Müller goes on to say, is, psychologically viewed, the apprehension of the Infinite; its psychological origin, its logical justification, is to be found in the existence in us of a faculty, or mental state, for the apprehension of the Infinite: historically speaking, religion began whenever and wherever man first had a perception, presentiment or apprehension of the Infinite—whenever and wherever, that is, the common human faculty for the apprehension of the Infinite was first called into play.

Against two misconceptions Professor Max Müller is careful

to guard himself throughout the work. The one belongs to the psychological sphere, the other to the sphere of history. The apprehension of the Infinite is not to be ascribed to any innate miraculous organ of knowledge, *sui generis*, and qualitatively distinguishable from the ordinary human faculties, a sort of internal revelation. For though Professor Max Müller seems to posit such a faculty himself, he is careful so to qualify his assertion as to bring the religious faculty on to the same level with the ordinary faculties of sense and reason. Again, he is no less explicit in his rejection of the idea of a primitive revelation as the source and explanation of man's perception of the Infinite, or belief in the existence of what transcends the reason and the senses alike. No. Neither internal revelation, in virtue of an extraordinary or special source of illumination, nor external revelation, superseding or anticipating the slow work of the senses and human reason, but those very senses and reason themselves, rightly understood, have dowered man with a perception or presentiment of the Infinite from which indeed he cannot escape.

Against these two misconceptions Professor Max Müller guards himself expressly; but I cannot think that he altogether avoids ambiguity in regard to the former of the two. There are two inlets in especial by which this ambiguity enters, as it appears to me. The one arises from the attitude of the author towards the sensationalist psychology; the other, from an apparent inconsistency, a want of full articulation, in his ultimate conception of the Infinite, so far as he here expresses it.

As to the former point: Apparently as a concession to philosophers who insist on all knowledge being derived from and through the senses, the author professes himself willing to accept those terms, and to discard faith as a separate faculty, and goes on to shew that even the senses themselves supply us with a perception or presentiment of the Infinite, to wit, the infinity of matter and of the material universe. Now though Professor Max Müller in the first instance seems to reserve for himself the right of appeal, at least among friends, to some other source, or analysis of the sources, of knowledge, practi-

cally it comes out that he considers the reduction of all knowledge to sensuous perception a satisfactory analysis, since sensuous perception contains the infinite as well as the finite, if only you analyze it rightly. How then can he without ambiguity speak of faith being "independent of, nay, in spite of, sense and reason"? (p. 23, cf. p. 27). And if it is to be answered that in this particular place he is using sense and reason in a restricted signification (which is not accurately defined), it must be asked further, how can faith be independent of sense and reason, and do them despite, if faith, like reason, is "a development of sensuous perception"? (p. 26). If reason is a development of sense, and faith also is a development of sense, the question arises whether faith is developed from sense through reason, or independently and immediately. Professor Max Müller answers in effect (p. 32), Independently. Sense is the common perception of the finite and the infinite; developed in one line, it results in reason; developed in another, it results in faith. If that be so, how can faith be independent of, or in spite of, sense? Further on (p. 36), Professor Max Müller himself seems to derive the idea of the Infinite "from a necessity of our human reason;" at least he calls the philosophers who do so, "our friends," and the others, who do not, "our opponents." Yet that he also accepts the sensible world as the source of all our knowledge, appears sufficiently plain from such passages as, e.g., p. 224; and in regard to religion, the doctrine is expressly formulated a little further on (p. 233) in the words, *nihil in fide nisi quod ante fuerit in sensu.*

There is thus, at least as I read the Lectures, an ambiguity in the account, or various accounts, given of the psychological process of the apprehension of the Infinite. Corresponding to the ambiguity in the account of the psychological act, process, or faculty, I seem to find an ambiguity, or want of sufficient clearness, in the idea of the Infinite itself—that Infinite which is the object of apprehension. The one ambiguity may help to explain the other.

Thus Professor Max Müller gives "indefinite," "invisible," "supersensuous," "supernatural," "divine," as one and all

equivalents, with "infinite," for the object of religion (p. 28). But between the first three of these so-called equivalent terms (infinite, indefinite, invisible) and the last three (supersensuous, supernatural, divine) there is a great difference, amounting to one in kind. The first three apply clearly to the sensible, material world; the last three as clearly do not. But even within the reason of sensible phenomena, actual or possible, it is not a matter of indifference whether we employ the term infinite or the term indefinite in speaking of objects and of our perceptions. An "indefinite object" can only mean an object of which *we* have no definite conception or perception; the indefiniteness is in *us*, not in the *object*. But the infinity of the object of religion (faith) would have no value for Professor Max Müller's argument if it were not the quality or essence of the object itself. Professor Max Müller says that in the earliest or most elementary perception we have a sentiment, presentiment, or even a perception, of the Infinite: if we substitute for this statement the fact that elementary sensation and perception are indefinite, the result surely is very different. An indefinite sensation is one thing; a sensation, or perception, of the Infinite, is quite another. Otherwise, the lower forms of perception would have most of the infinite in them, and the blur of sensation in a brainless ascidian might be counted nearest the divine.

It is no wonder, then, that Professor Max Müller (as I read him), seeming to confuse together an indefinite perception or sensation with a perception of the Infinite, should also seem not clearly to mark the difference between the idea or concept of infinitude, as applicable, for example, to space, and the perception or sensation of the Infinite as such. Fully admitting that the ordinary abstract distinction between sensation or perception on the one side, and thought or reason on the other, is wholly fallacious, and that it would be just as true to say that our sensuous knowledge is based entirely upon our conceptual knowledge, as to say (as Professor Max Müller does, for the sake of the argument) that "our conceptual knowledge is based entirely on our sensuous knowledge" (p. 28), I should still

urge that it is only on reflection, and by a process of reasoning, that we can come by any idea of the Infinite; and that we never have a perception or sensation of the Infinite, least of all through any of the five senses, singly or in combination. We never perceive the Infinite, *as such;* even time and space, as *perceived*, are always finite; it is only as *conceived* that their infinitude is revealed. Granting that space, infinite space, is the necessary form of all sensuous perception, what is present *ex hypothesi* in every sensation and perception cannot be the object of any one perception. We have in sensation and in perception the materials for constructing a subjective concept of infinite space—since we can never *think* of space as limited; but, strictly speaking, we never perceive space at all, but only objects in space, or under the condition of space. Similarly, I should urge that we never arrive by the perception or sensation of the visible at the idea of the invisible, as such, but merely at the conception of objects which are by accident invisible, but might become at any moment visible by the aid of a glass. There is all the difference in the world between what is invisible because it is beyond the material range of our eyes, and what is invisible because it belongs to a different order of being from the material universe existing in space. If invisible in the latter sense may be substituted for invisible in the former sense, then, no doubt, we have a bridge from space into infinitude, from time into eternity; but we cannot surely make so vital a substitution of one idea for another without a word of explanation. Infinite invisible space is quite a different idea from the invisible universe (p. 45); the universe of space is all potentially visible. The implicit assertion of the existence of two *universes*, a visible and an invisible, is one, indeed, that cannot pass unchallenged. Is the visible universe different in kind from the invisible, or not? If both are material and sensible, how come there to be two? If the one is sensuous, the other intelligible, we must ask whether a sensuous universe that is unintelligible is, in any proper sense, a universe at all?

The source of the ambiguity which seems thus involved in

Professor Max Müller's description of the Infinite, I ascribe to his omission of a clear caution, to the effect that the object of faith and religion, or an essential element in it, or in them, if more than one object is to be spoken of, is spiritual. And this remark supplies, I believe, a proper criticism of his definition or description of religion as "the perception or apprehension of the Infinite," and also (as it seems to me) suggests an emendation in his criticism of the Fetish theory of the origin of religion. Religion is not, and never was, the perception or apprehension of any material object, or of the Infinite as a material quantity or designation, or of the element of infinitude in the material universe (space), in conjunction with, or in abstraction from, material objects, whether semi-tangible or intangible, whether trees, mountains, rivers, stars or sky. It is the presence of spirits, or of a spiritual element (quite different from material infinity) in matter, in the universe, or at any rate man's belief in such a presence, which is the source of religion, whether in us, or in the savage of to-day, or in our primitive Troglodyte ancestor. Man suspects, or assumes, the presence of such a spiritual element, of such spirits, because he is himself spiritual. The spiritual is by no means of necessity to be spoken of, or conceived of, as infinite; if it were so, it could not be spoken and thought of as a plurality of beings or objects (cf. Max Müller, pp, 26, 28, 33), and Monotheism would be the natural and primitive form of religion.

It is not, then, the element of indefiniteness in elementary sensation, nor the perception of the infinity of space in the material universe, nor the discovery that beyond the furthest object of vision there are objects not yet visible, though in their nature sensible, that first suggests to man, and finally persuades him of, the reality of the supersensuous, supernatural and divine. It appears from the analysis of his language that he can only speak, and therefore think, of external objects, whether tangible, semi-tangible or intangible, in the first instance, as active; that he ascribes to them, one and all, in the first instance—so far as he speaks or thinks of them at all —a spiritual activity such as he claims virtually for himself

and his fellows. The earlier stages in man's education seem to consist, not in any growing definition of the Infinite, or in any clearer conception of the Infinite, as such, so much as in the gradual diminution of the number of objects, classes of objects, or beings, of which he speaks and thinks as active spiritual agents, in terms such as he uses of himself and his fellows. The primitive man spake and thought of objects material, not as objects merely, but as *subjects*. Let this statement not be misunderstood. The conscious distinction of subject and object is a late development of thought. The most difficult preliminary to thinking or speaking of primitive man and his ways, is the necessity of denuding ourselves, so far as we can, of our inheritance in the whole history and development of thought. His own finite spiritual being, his own *subjectivity*, is not present to the primitive man's consciousness, or only dimly present. He does not know himself. But so far as he knows himself or interprets the world, he interprets it, more or less unconsciously, by the analogy of his own nature; he speaks of natural or even artificial objects as though they were active and in so far living. It marks an epoch in his thought and language that he should after a while divest material objects of their spiritual quality, and regard them as lifeless instruments of living beings. The origin of religion is surely to be sought for in this primitive necessity of human thought and language; the growth of religion is surely parallel to, and concomitant with, the gradual despiritualization (so to speak) of material objects, the gradual diminution of the number of classes and beings whose action or uses are explained *ex analogia hominis*, the gradual liberation of the spiritual element, not-himself, before the eyes and mind of man, and its gradual concomitant concentration in narrower classes of beings or objects, until a multiplicity of gods, or devas, narrows and concentrates into a plurality (whether arranged in a hierarchy or left in apparent equality, matters not), and the plurality issues in a Monotheism on one side, or in the total denial of any subjective spiritual beings or being, outside man, on the other.

That the narrowing denotation of the names, whatever they may be, for the divine beings or being, should be accompanied by a growing and deepening sense of the connotation of the term divine, is only what is to be expected from the natural conditions of the process. As man's own nature and mind deepen and expand, so does his conception of the divine beings or nature, which is not himself, but still like himself, expand and deepen. Yea, the very denial of the existence of any such being may arise, as Professor Max Müller shews in relation to Indian Atheism, from a sort of reverence and religiousness.

It is not then (as I conceive) in the perception of the Infinite, as such, nor in the element of infinity in matter, nor in the indefiniteness of elementary sensation, that the origin of religion is best looked for; but rather in the primitive predication and presentiment of spiritual agency, first of all in things material, and finally in complete detachment from matter. Professor Max Müller has not, I think, sufficiently distinguished between infinity as a quality of matter, which is—or is not—present in all sensation, and the spiritual presence or presences, agent or agencies, which form the objects, not by any means always regarded as infinite, of religious creeds and cults, whether among the lowest Fetish-worshippers or among the most advanced Asiatic and European nations.

This clear distinction between the Infinite and the Spiritual suggests a criticism on one or two further points. The Infinite, as such, is not an object to move adoration. "The clear-eyed philosophers of Greece," to whom Professor Max Müller alludes, regarded the Infinite as the source of evil; that was their interpretation of the indefiniteness of sensuous perception. The Good, the Beautiful, the True, were all, in their opinion, definite. The whole effort of the Creator, the whole life of the wise man, were directed to imposing limits upon the Infinite. This is what comes of not distinguishing clearly between infinite matter and infinite spirit!

A second remark to be made concerns the assertion that the Infinite is not a negative conception, because if it were it would comprise nothing (pp. 28, 29). And why should it comprise

anything? A negative abstract idea may have its uses. The illustrations given do not seem applicable. Not-blue does not mean green, yellow, red, or any colour, except to a man who has seen those colours. If we imagine a man to have no vision except for blue, to see everything as blue, then *not-blue* cannot possibly convey or suggest a positive idea to his mind. It is just the same with straight and not-straight. If we can imagine a man incapable of seeing anything except as straight (he would need to be very short-sighted!), then *not-straight* would be to him a mere abstract negation. If "there is nothing known to us outside the concept of the finite," the concept of the infinite simply comprises nothing, i.e. if the word is taken literally. Any definite idea connected with it can only be of vast multiplicity or of vast extent.

The statement that infinite is not contained in finite, and cannot therefore be abstracted from it (p. 28), we may cancel by juxtaposition with the other statements, that "we apprehend the infinite not only as beyond but also as within the finite" (p. 38), and that the infinite is present from the very beginning in all finite perceptions (p. 43). If the infinite is present in two or more finite perceptions, the idea of it can be abstracted from them; if it is present in all finite perceptions, it cannot itself be the concept of an object, or of a plurality of objects; it comprises nothing. Much the same criticism must be passed upon Professor Max Müller's "step beyond Kant" (p. 47). What is to be said of a supersensuous infinite thing which nevertheless is *an* "aistheton," i.e. object of sensation, distinguishable from other objects, of course, and therefore finite? How is knowledge increased, or thought clarified, by speaking of a supersensuous Sensible or a finite Infinite?

The truth is, that mere sensation, as such, with its forms to boot (space and time), cannot be the origin of man's idea of the divine. Sensation and its conditions man shares with the lower animals: the source of religion and faith must be looked for in his specific humanity. Religion is anthropopathic and anthropomorphic. There is nothing in these words to frighten us; they do not denote of necessity a low state of feeling and

thought; they are applicable to every stage in the history of man.* "Man never knows" (or often forgets) "how anthropomorphic he is." Man cannot rise above his own best self at the time; but time is a condition which is present not merely in outward sensation, but in inmost thought, feeling, and volition. It has struck me as strange that in his derivation of the idea of the divine, or supersensuous, from the conditions of the finite and of sensation, Professor Max Müller lays so much stress on space and so little on time. Man's thoughts and feelings about God have surely always contained more reference to superiority over time than to superiority over space; and the Eternal not-himself, yet like himself, has been best imagined by man as existing from one generation to another, as being from everlasting to everlasting.

Professor Max Müller thought perhaps that in detecting the elements of man's consciousness of the Divine in the simplest sensation, he had the advantage of avoiding the objections of anthropomorphism and anthropopathism; I cannot but think that he has been in danger of "throwing away the child with the bath." He seems, to me at least, in theory to have cut man off from the most obvious sources of religious feeling; or at least not to have marked sufficiently the presence, from the first, of the specifically human element (subjective spirit) in man's sensations, feelings, and thoughts; or the point at which his own theory glides from the perception of a material infinity to the inference of superhuman spiritual beings, or of one such being. And I cannot but think that his second Lecture likewise suffers for want of these clear distinctions.

Professor Max Müller discards not merely the theories of internal illumination or instinct, and of external primitive revelation, as explanations of the origin of religion, but also the so-called Fetish theory. It would, perhaps, have been enough for his immediate purpose to have shewn that Fetishism was not the primitive form of religion among the Aryans; we need not complain, however, if he has gone further, shewn us his whole mind on the subject, and concluded that Fetish-

* "We cannot be .... too anthropomorphous in our thoughts."—M. M. p. 370.

ism is not, and has not been, anywhere the primitive form of religion, that it has been everywhere a parasitical growth, and always a degeneration from a purer form of religion. It is difficult to establish a universal negative; and if the perception of the Infinite had been everywhere and always the root and essence of religion, the wonder would be how fetishes ever came to be worshipped at all, or to be objects of religion anywhere. For a fetish, according to Professor Max Müller's strict view, is a visible, tangible, inanimate object, such as a stone, shell, bone, or what not: he will not allow semi-tangible objects, such as trees, rivers, mountains, &c., much less animals below, or the intangible objects above, clouds, sun, moon and stars, to be reckoned fetishes. Now, are there any theorists still left who maintain that religion originates in the worship of, or faith in, visible, tangible, inanimate objects, and these alone? If there are, they must feel themselves hard hit by Professor Max Müller's arguments, for he certainly makes it most probable, not merely that the ancient Aryan religion began in a reverence for semi-tangible and intangible objects (so far, I add, as it was confined to material objects), but that even the religion of the Negroes—which has been taken all along as the classical example of fetishism—so far from being a uniform fetishism, is many-sided in the extreme (p. 114). He utterly disproves the assertion "that the religion of the Negro consists in fetishism, and in fetishism only." But who now makes this assertion? Is it worth refuting? In Fritz Schultze's monograph on the subject,* I find it repeatedly stated (pp. 86, 248, 255, 288) that there are two elements in natural religion, or religions, always found together, to wit, fetishism and the worship of spirits; that is to say, fetishism is never found by itself as the sole and whole representative of even the least cultured religion. This second factor in nature-religions is generally called Animism, which itself is not so much a religion as "a sort of primitive philosophy, which not only controls religion, but rules the whole life of the natural man."† Now of this second factor in primitive religion, Professor Max Müller takes

* Der Fetischismus: Leipzig, 1871. † Tiele, Outlines, p. 9.

very little account, though he twice alludes to it as roughly synonymous with "figurism, anthropomorphism, anthropopathism." His derivation of religion from the supposed apprehension of the Infinite seems to have led him to pass it lightly over. Yet in this anthropopathism we have surely just the middle term which serves to connect and explain the lower and the higher phases of religion, whatever be their historical relations. He himself remarks that "the whole world which surrounded the primitive man was assimilated or digested by him, he discovering everywhere acts similar to his own acts" (p. 189); that there was a time "when everything that was known and named had to be conceived as active, and if active then as personal; when a stone was a cutter, a tooth a grinder or eater, a gimlet a borer" (p. 188); when, "if *calx*, the heel, meant the kicker, so did *calx*, the stone. There was no other way of naming it. If the heel had kicked the stone, the stone kicked the heel; they were both *calx*" (p. 189). And he says elsewhere: "If we once admit that it was perfectly natural for the primitive savage to look upon a stone as something human, ... then all the rest no doubt is easy" (p. 126); i.e. it is easy to make out a case for the Fetish theory of the origin of religion. Now no one wants to make out that the stone or bone was human to the savage with all the connotation of that word to-day, psychological, moral, social, personal, nor even human with the humanity of a savage to-day: but only so far human as to be not merely inert and passive, but active; not merely felt, but feeling; not merely an object, but a subject; however unmeaning such words and distinctions would be to the savage —as unmeaning as the term Infinite itself.

In his polemic against the Fetish theory, Professor Max Müller appears to me to establish two points, that fetishism, pure and simple, nowhere exists to-day, and that it cannot have been the primitive form of religion; but he does not appear to me to establish his theory that it is in all cases a parasitical growth, or, in any proper sense, everywhere and always a degeneration from a purer type of religion (cf. p. 105). In two points in especial his method of disproof seems to me to be questionable.

In appealing to the Veda (p. 182), he takes up the evidence at far too late a date; for the fact that the most ancient relics in the Aryan world contain no worship of stocks and stones does not prove anything about the religious rudiments of the "tertiary Troglodytes"—there having been plenty of time for religion to have been lost and found again between those two epochs! He admits himself that the primitive savage was probably not very much disturbed by intangible objects (p. 180). And he appears to me to be hardly fair towards the supposed advocates of the Fetish theory, in charging them with "having taken for granted that every human being was miraculously endowed with the concept [God] of what forms the predicate of every fetish" (p. 127), or in urging that this predicate is itself the problem (p. 119); for he himself allows that there was a time, even in the history of our Aryan forefathers, "when the idea of Deity, as such, had not been formed" (p. 196)—a time in which "gods, in our sense of the word, did not exist" (p. 197); and he tells us elsewhere that "when man has once arrived at a stage of thought where he can call anything, be it one or many, God, he has achieved more than half his journey" (p. 258). Surely even the most ardent disciple of the most one-sided Fetish theory, if we can rout him out, will be enabled to screen himself to his satisfaction behind these admissions!

The second point alluded to above is more serious. Professor Max Müller demands (p. 104) that natural religions, or nature-religions, should be explained by the analogy of revealed, or rational, or positive religions, and that because fetishism in the latter cases is always explained as a departure from the true intention of the founders, therefore also in the former case fetishism should similarly be explained as a parasitical growth. This demand appears to me to set the matter topsy-turvy, and to ignore one of the strongest arguments in favour of the natural prevalence of fetishism. The great characteristic of a revealed, rational, or positive religion (using the term in distinction from a nature-religion), is just this, that its first appearance marks also its ideal epoch, and that it is never manifested in greater purity or perfection than in its founder.

For the clear distinction between "personal religions" and "national religions," I have Professor Max Müller himself to thank (pp. 128, 129); it gains in intensity when applied to nature-religions. You cannot say exactly where, when, or wherewithal they began: you can only point to the elements of which they were composed, partly on the evidence of existing types, among savages, no doubt largely modified from the original form, partly by the aid of psychological inference. If you do not want to fly in the face of the general analogies of evolution, it is more probable that the lower form of religious belief preceded the higher, at least among the "tertiary Troglodytes." No doubt there were differences of genius among the Troglodytes too; and who shall say if the glimmerings of fetishism, animism, magic, and what not, were not an advance, a spiritual gain, in their first forms, due to the thoughts and wishes of the more intelligent of the Troglodytes? It is at least as probable that in its day fetishism was a sort of advance on a lower relation to the spiritual in nature, as that it was everywhere and always a declension from a higher. Its re-appearance in the history of positive, or personal religions, marks, no doubt, a decadence from the purpose of the founders; but that re-appearance is one of the arguments for its earlier prevalence, according to the generally admitted laws of revival and survival in culture, to which Professor Max Müller does not allude. *Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret!* If even in the most advanced stages of culture you cannot keep fetishism out, what may you not reasonably believe of its prevalence in the earliest?

If when Professor Max Müller writes that man from indefinite sensation "gains a presentiment of something beyond the finite" (p. 48), which he then sees in mountains, trees, rivers, sky, sun, moon, &c., we read for "something beyond the finite," "a spirit, a consciousness not his own—spirits, beings—in things around him," we surely have as good and probable an origin for religion as the presumed apprehension of the Infinite. What is an apprehension of the Infinite so long as it apprehends the presumed Infinite only as finite?

How long is it before man has any conscious suspicion, so far as his language and thought betray him, of any Infinite being, as such? What does the infinity of the material universe end in with the Aryans? The denial of the Devas (Aditi presumably included!) in India; the apotheosis of the finite in Greece. And what is the common term which best serves to link all forms of religion together, the lowest and the highest, the natural and the personal? Surely some such term as anthropomorphism, anthropopathism, which carry a creative and causal connotation with them, rather than "the apprehension of the Infinite," which even Professor Max Müller has not persuaded me is a positive perception.

The previous criticism has not exhausted every exception that might be taken to particular statements in the Lectures; but it will have fulfilled its object if it should help to concentrate the attention of other readers upon two or three fundamental issues in the philosophy and method of the science of religions, so far as they are raised in the work reviewed. It would be superfluous to enumerate the many interesting and exceptional characteristics of Indian religions which Professor Max Müller describes in their places, for every reader will observe them there: nor shall I redeem a hint half given above to trace the indications of Professor Max Müller's more direct ethical or religious teaching, which glimmer and shine here and there through the closer reserve of scientific exposition. It would be a presumption on my part to recommend the work; but I may, without offence, express the wish that others may read it with the same delight, and find in it the same stimulus, as I have done; adding a hope that the respected author may hereafter have occasion and will to delight and instruct wide circles of hearers and readers again with, it may be, an exposition of the philosophy of the Upanishads (p. 317), or of some such high theme as he half promises us at the close (pp. 375—377), in that pellucid and idiomatic style which must be the wonder of every English reader.

REGINALD W. MACAN.

## VI.—SUMMARY OF ECCLESIASTICAL EVENTS.

The religious interest of any particular period, such as the months which we now briefly survey, largely depends at present upon the conflict of opposing parties and warring schools of thought in the Church of England. The general features of the struggle, especially since the present dead-lock began, change very little from year to year. The Evangelicals are probably the largest, while the Ritualists are undoubtedly the most active party in the Church. The former stand stiffly upon what they take to be the old paths; resist with all their energy Rationalistic innovations on this side, and Ritualistic innovations on that; and call in to their aid the courts of law, civil and ecclesiastical. But they are under this disadvantage, that while both the other parties are full of life and movement, they are still, with something of the stillness of decay and death. They are strong in the direction of a great mass of half-educated public opinion, but they have apparently forgotten the art of carrying away the people on the tide of their own enthusiasm, and have never learned that of appealing to the learned and the thoughtful. They steadily pursue the policy of prosecution: the Church Association continually finds new clerical culprits, and hunts them through the courts. But apart from serious legal difficulties, of which we shall speak just now, the plan does not answer. The incriminated clergy oppose a unanimous policy of passive resistance, which is at once very provoking and very effectual. It is beginning to be seen that it is impossible to put down a great party by indicting its members one by one. Bishops are evidently getting tired of working the Public Worship Regulation Act, and are trying what fatherly advice will do. A good many prosecutions have thus been avoided, but the general result is, that a high tone of doctrine and ritual, which would have excited surprise and indignation a few years ago, is beginning to be quietly recognized as tolerable. We should give great offence in certain quarters if we ventured to say that the Church of England was slowly drawing Romewards. But it is certainly approaching a region of thought and practice, for which not long ago there was no other word than Romish.

The peculiar feature of the last few months—not certainly one that gives us much hope for the future—is furnished by the conflicts on matters of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which have been carried on by the highest legal authorities in the land. We mentioned in a

previous article Sir Fitzroy Kelly's revelation as to the dissidence of Judges in the Court of Appeal, to the vicar of Llanfairfechan, and the rebuke given to him by the Lord Chancellor, followed up by the publication of an Order in Council enjoining silence as to the opinions of individual members of the Court. This Order, which, it must be confessed, rather savoured of the Court of High Commission, and recalled some of the worst days of our judicial history, was attacked by the aged Chief Baron in a pamphlet which shewed that his mind had lost little of its vigour, and his pen nothing of its sharpness. The next legal tournament, which is not yet concluded, was of a more serious kind. It took its beginning in the too famous case of Martin *v.* Mackonochie. In 1874, Mr. Mackonochie was condemned by Sir Robert Phillimore, then Dean of Arches, to six weeks' suspension for certain ritual offences. A monition was also issued against him, warning him not to repeat them. He did repeat them, and Sir R. Phillimore's successor, Lord Penzance, suspended him for three years and renewed the monition. The case was then taken to the Court of Queen's Bench, when the Lord Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Mellor—Mr. Justice Lush dissenting—decided that the proceedings in the Court of Arches had been all wrong; that the monition had been invalid; while if it had been valid, imprisonment, not suspension, was the proper punishment for its violation. Beyond the simple statement already made, we cannot in this place go into the legal aspects of the question; but it is obvious that the judgment involved a claim on the part of a civil to override the decisions and to regulate the jurisdiction of an ecclesiastical court. To the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Penzance replied at length in giving his decision in the case of Combe *v.* Edwards, which again called forth a rejoinder from Sir Alexander Cockburn, in a pamphlet which was something more than vigorous. The whole case has now been argued at great length before a strong Court of Appeal, consisting of Lord Coleridge and Lords Justices James, Brett, Cotton and Thesiger, but no judgment has yet been given. The result, whatever it may be, must reveal a strange confusion of jurisdiction between civil and ecclesiastical courts, which will need legislative interference; and in the mean time all suits such as those against Mr. Mackonochie, Mr. Edwards and Mr. Dale, are in a state of suspended animation.

Another legal difficulty has been brought to light by a suit in which the Bishop of Oxford was the defendant. The Rev. T. T. Carter, Rector of Clewer, near Windsor, is a well-known and greatly

respected member of the High-church party, in accordance with whose principles everything at Clewer is conducted. With the practically unanimous consent of his parish, he uses in the celebration of Holy Communion the eastward position, wafer bread, the mixed chalice and elevation of the consecrated elements. Of these things, however, a dissatisfied parishioner, Dr. Julius, complained to the Bishop of Oxford, but without effect. The Bishop in his reply declared his objection to litigation in all cases, as tending to bring the Church into contempt, and pleaded the general consent of the parish of Clewer, as well as Mr. Carter's advanced age, and the respect and affection with which he was commonly regarded. After some further correspondence, Dr. Julius applied to the Court of Queen's Bench for a *mandamus* to compel the Bishop to proceed against Mr. Carter under the Church Discipline Act. The case was heard, the Bishop appearing in person, and Mr. Carter being represented by counsel. Three questions were raised. First, was the Clergy Discipline Act superseded by the Public Worship Regulation Act of 1874? Second, if not, did it leave any discretion to the Bishop? Third, could the Court of Queen's Bench exercise its discretion and refuse the writ? All three questions the Judges—the Lord Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Manesty and Mr. Justice Field—answered in a sense hostile to the Bishop, who must therefore either disobey the Court or prosecute Mr. Carter. The importance of the decision is obvious. It practically abolishes Episcopal discretion in these matters. One dissentient parishioner can set the Diocesan in motion, whether he likes it or not. In the mean time the Bishop of Oxford has appealed to a higher Court.

In July of last year took place a repetition of the Pan-Anglican Synod of 1867, under the less ambitious title of a Lambeth Conference. It was in its way a pompous and impressive ecclesiastical function. Exactly 100 Bishops, gathered from all English-speaking quarters of the earth, attended. The proceedings at Lambeth took the form of religious services and long debates, from which reporters were jealously excluded; and for some little time before and after, lawn sleeves were as plentiful at all Church occasions as surplices are usually. But very little came of it. What result there may have been of mutual comfort and encouragement, it is of course impossible for us to say. Certain resolutions on ritual and confession were indeed promulgated to the public, but they were resolutions that resolved nothing, and decisions that had no decisiveness in them. Bishops are great proficients in the art of sailing safely between

Scylla and Charybdis, and their deliverances are admirable specimens of that kind of verbal navigation. Then there was a wonderful debate on Infidelity, in which the Bishops surpassed themselves in demolishing that worst of all foes,—only, unfortunately, their rules prevented its publication. What shall we say to episcopal advocates of Christianity, who not only can if they would, but have actually demolished unbelief, and yet are hindered by a mere matter of form from letting the unbelieving world have the benefit? We confess that we are a little incredulous as to the completeness of the victory. If it were as thorough as the Bishops say it is, they would never withstand the temptation of taking the light off their bushel.

The only thing which we can find out that they actually did has got them into some trouble. Father Hyacinthe, or M. Loyson, who has set up a church in Paris which is to be neither Catholic nor Protestant, but a kind of happy medium between the two, desires episcopal supervision. This task the English Bishops delegated, as they are wont to do all cases of doubtful ecclesiastical legality, to their brethren of the Scottish Episcopal Church, and especially to the Primus. What he is to do is not very clear. Father Hyacinthe can surely preach in Paris without the help of episcopal supervision; while if episcopal discipline were exercised over him, no one in the world is likelier to rebel. However, the measure, vague and ineffectual as it is, has excited the wrath of many High-churchmen, who think it an unwarrantable intrusion on the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Paris, and the Bishop of Ely has gone the length of formal protest. In itself the affair is of no consequence; but it is curious to contrast this tenderness to Catholic Bishops abroad, with much calm ignoring of the very existence of Protestant Dissenters at home.

Besides the Bishoprics' Bill, which has as yet borne no solid fruit, the legislative achievements of last session were confined to an Act for encouraging "intermediate education" in Ireland. Seven Commissioners are every year to examine students between the ages of sixteen and nineteen, in Latin, Greek, English, Modern Languages, Science and Mathematics; scholarships are to be given as prizes; managers of schools will get something for each student that passes; the principle of the conscience clause is to be generally applied; and a million out of the Irish Church surplus is to be appropriated to the object. Several objections on points of detail were taken to the Bill, but it passed with the substantial concurrence of both political parties.—At the beginning of the present session of Parliament, Irish

expectation was raised to a high pitch by a persistent rumour that Government were about to deal with the vexed question of Catholic University Education. Nothing, however, has come of it. Probably when the subject was narrowly looked at, it was found that the task of reconciling the demands of the Catholic Bishops with the convictions or prejudices of his own Protestant supporters, was too much for even the ingenuity of the Premier.

The Burials' question, in spite of two fresh attempts to settle it, remains where it was. On the 19th of February, Mr. Balfour moved the second reading of a Bill, offering, as he thought, an acceptable compromise. Nonconformists were to be buried in churchyards with their own services. Any churchyard or part of a churchyard acquired by gift within fifty years to be exempt from the operation of the measure. Wherever there was a cemetery within three miles, Nonconformists to have no right of burial in the churchyard, and their right to cease in any churchyard as soon as such a cemetery was provided. On the Conservative side of the House, this Bill was regarded as giving up the whole matter in dispute, and it was accordingly "talked out." A week after, Mr. Monk, from the other side of the House, introduced a second Bill. He avowed himself a supporter of Mr. O. Morgan's measure, and brought forward his own only as a temporary instalment of relief till that was passed. Its effect would be simply to add to existing churchyards portions of unconsecrated ground for the use of Dissenters. The plan was so unanimously condemned on the Liberal side of the House, that Mr. Monk asked leave to withdraw it. But the Conservatives would not permit this, and Mr. Cross threw his ægis over the Bill. It was, however, rejected by 160 votes to 129,—a good augury for the future success of a genuine and thorough measure of reform. In the mean time a "burial scandal" at Akenham, in Suffolk, in which both sides to the dispute did all they could to put themselves in the wrong, and which has been followed by an action for libel, has envenomed a conflict already sufficiently bitter.

Two ecclesiastical promotions made this spring have called out expressions of satisfaction more than commonly enthusiastic: that of Canon Lightfoot to the Bishopric of Durham, vacant by the resignation of Dr. Baring, and of Dr. John Henry Newman to the Cardinalate. Some surprise was manifested that Dr. Lightfoot, who, if report speaks truly, has more than once before refused a Bishopric, should now have consented to leave the University of which he is so distinguished an ornament, and the theological studies in which

he achieves so much, for the somewhat unthankful task of episcopal administration. At such a time as this, however, Lord Beaconsfield cannot be blamed for trying to secure the highest character and the finest abilities for the Bench, and we can only hope that the Church may gain what it is to be feared theological scholarship will lose. The other promotion is a long-deferred compliment paid to the greatest of English Catholics by a Pope who, by it, gives evident proof that to secure his favour it is not necessary to be violently Ultramontane. At his advanced age it would probably have been more agreeable to Dr. Newman to have been left in the ranks of the priesthood; nor can any dignity, however exalted, add to the position which he holds in the mind of those who honour in him, not only a profound and subtle theologian, but an unrivalled writer of English prose, and a poet whose songs, though few, are often very precious. The promotion, we cannot help thinking, is one in which all educated Englishmen, of whatever form of faith, will take a pride.

The year of grace allowed to all Colleges and Halls of Oxford and Cambridge by the Universities' Act has now expired, and we may presume that most, if not all, have availed themselves of it to lay before the Commissions schemes of self-reform. But the nature of these schemes has not yet been made publicly known. So far as we can judge from private information, there will be a great diminution in the number of clerical restrictions upon fellowships in any form, and a general limitation of the time for which "idle" or "prize" fellowships may be held. The Commissions themselves have spoken no word. It is a characteristic proceeding of the Bishop of Lincoln to have rushed into the fray, and as Visitor of two Oxford Colleges, Brasenose and Lincoln, to have recorded his formal and emphatic protest against changes which the altered spirit of the age emphatically demands. The funds necessary for the establishment of the new Selwyn College at Cambridge do not seem to come in very rapidly, though we may take it for granted that the plan will eventually be carried to completion, as a Master, the Hon. and Rev. A. Lyttleton, and a Council to govern the College, are already selected. On the other hand, two theological Halls, on the narrowest Evangelical basis, have been projected, one for each University. Wycliffe Hall at Oxford has already been at work for more than a year, under the presidency of the Rev. R. B. Girdlestone, M.A. Ridley Hall at Cambridge has not got beyond the purchase of a site, not yet built upon. The object of these institutions is to "assist to educate resident members of the University who are candidates for holy orders

in the principles of our Reformed Protestant Church, and to train them to become good ministers." And to keep them quite sound, all the Trustees and every one of the Council are required to subscribe a declaration of "principles."

Not every one, at all events at Cambridge, is quite as much in love with subscription as the promoters of these new Halls. A few weeks ago, Canon Swainson laid before Convocation a very remarkable *gravamen*, to the effect that the following address had been presented to the Professors of Divinity at Cambridge:

"We, the undersigned resident junior members of the University of Cambridge and lay communicants of the Church of England, beg to call your attention to the great difficulties which are felt among us with regard to certain clauses of the 'Athanasian Creed,' commonly known as the 'damnatory clauses.' We venture respectfully to submit:—1. That the Creed as a whole, and more particularly these clauses, are of comparatively late origin, and do not possess the sanction of any General Council. 2. That these clauses are exceedingly painful to many persons, and cause great difficulty to many who are or might otherwise become candidates for Holy Orders. 3. That they are a cause of estrangement between the clergy and laity of the Church of England. 4. That they tend to alienate many from the Church of England. 5. That in their plain ordinary acceptation we believe these clauses to be untrue. 6. That practically it is inevitable that they should be generally so taken. 7. That it is therefore undesirable that these clauses should hold their present position in one of the Church's creeds, more particularly as forming a part of the Liturgy. We believe that no plea of inopportuneness can fairly be urged for postponing the consideration of this question, and we therefore pray that, whether by bringing this petition before Convocation or otherwise, you will take such steps as in your judgment may best conduce to the removal of these difficulties."

Canon Swainson goes on to say that this address was signed by three fellows and twelve scholars of Trinity, three fellows and eight scholars of King's, five fellows and nineteen scholars of other Colleges, and 101 bachelors of arts and undergraduates, and that many more signatures might have been obtained. The signataries included many of the most distinguished and, from a Church point of view, most promising young men of the University. The Professors felt that they had no other course open to them but to lay the petition before Convocation. It was referred to the Upper House, where, we are afraid, it is likely to meet with but scant attention.

A case of great importance from a domestic point of view has just been before the Courts. Mr. Agar Ellis, a Protestant, married a

daughter of Lord Camoys, a zealous Catholic. The religious difficulty arose in its strongest form before marriage, and the lady stood out until Mr. Agar Ellis had distinctly promised that all the children that might be born should be educated in the Catholic faith. Three daughters, the eldest now about fourteen, are the issue of the marriage. Mr. Agar Ellis now turns round, and, though not denying his promise, insists that the girls shall be Protestant. The result is a law-suit. Vice-Chancellor Malins first decides in the husband's favour, on the ground that by no ante-nuptial or other promise can a father divest himself of his sole authority over his children's education; and this decision, on appeal, is sustained by Lords Justices James, Baggalay and Thesiger. In this place we have no intention of passing any ethical judgment on the dispute: all our business is to record the facts. Some of our readers will deeply sympathize with the feelings of the defeated mother; others may not regret to see a strong rebuke administered to the too grasping domestic policy of the Roman Catholic Church. The most obvious inference from the whole affair is, that mixed marriages, in cases where the religious opinions of both parties are of a decided type, had best be avoided, as leading to certain unhappiness and discord.

Affairs in the Congregational Union have for the present settled into peace, but it is a peace which cannot be, one would think, of long duration. Mr. Picton has been successfully excluded from the Union—how, it is not easy to say. His name was not returned in the the Secretary for insertion in the Year-book by the London gational Union, which is, if we may borrow a phrase from legislation, the local authority. The allegation is, that furnished to that body the necessary attestations of his position, which from his long service at St. Thomas's Sney, is matter of universal knowledge. The counter al which we have never yet seen denied, is, that other religious likewise disdained to give proof of what everybody kn have not been excluded,—and that Mr. Picton *was* a debate in the Committee of the London Congrega which turned on both theological and personal issues. time Mr. Picton, we regret to say, has resigned his pu intention of devoting himself to literary work. We d that he should have withdrawn from so ignoble a strug we may regret that by his withdrawal the principle which the Congregationalists vaunt so highly, is prac without defence. Mr. Baldwin Brown, the eloquent Ch

the Union, continues to speak bravely out, though we certainly think that he might have protested more forcibly in Mr. Picton's case than he did. His address at the autumnal session of the Union in Liverpool was a reiteration of the principles and arguments of his speech in the spring,—a reiteration which many members of the Union evidently thought might well have been spared; and he has since preached and published two admirable sermons on the true idea of Congregationalism. But whatever effect they may have produced is not allowed to become vocal. The idea plainly is, that as Mr. Baldwin Brown is unfortunately Chairman of the Union, he must be allowed to say what he pleases, and that the less notice is taken of his utterances, the sooner will their echo die away. It is, however, not the less true that an outrage upon religious liberty has been perpetrated in the person of Mr. Picton, and that the members of the Congregational Union either do not know when Liberty has been outraged, or consider it quite right that she should be outraged in the interests of orthodoxy.

E.

## VII.—NOTICES OF BOOKS.

### 1. Professor Pfleiderer's Philosophy of Religion.

*Religionsphilosophie auf geschichtlicher Grundlage.* Von Dr. Otto Pfleiderer, Professor an der Universität zu Berlin. Berlin: G. Reimer. 1878.

About ten years ago, Dr. Pfleiderer published his well-known work on "Religion, its Essence and History," dedicating it to the *Tübinger Stift*, on the occasion of Schleiermacher's centenary. That work, though in some respects defective, was favourably received, as the first important effort of a thoughtful and conscientious writer in a trying field of religious investigation. The author's subsequent studies have, however, transformed him, so far as that book is concerned, into his own severest critic. Not only is he dissatisfied with its method and subject-matter, but with its whole conception of the philosophy of religion. And this adverse verdict is so candidly stated in the introduction to his new work on this subject, that one must admire his disregard of the possible charge of self-contradiction, and his fidelity to truth, rather than to the opinions of his earlier

years. In the light of a clearer view of the proper scope and function of the philosophy of religion, he confesses that this philosophy is precisely what his earlier book fails to give, in the one or the other of its two divisions. The first of these (Das Wesen der Religion) contains religious philosophy, but not the philosophy of religion, that is, it falls short in the philosophical cognition of religious phenomena as presented in human history. The second part (Die Geschichte der Religion) provides historical facts, but their philosophical treatment is inadequate. Consequently, though the conception and the actuality of religion are both dealt with, the work fails to present that conception of the actuality which constitutes the real philosophy of religion. For this and other reasons, the author has wisely preferred a process of entire reconstruction to one of correction, and this task has been done so thoroughly that the volume now issued is to all intents and purposes an entirely new production. Without doubt many of those who have profited by the earlier work may regret the necessity of its being banished, Ishmael-like, into the wilderness. But apart from this natural feeling, there can be no question as to the claims of its younger brother to be installed as the child of the promise. In maturity and richness of thought, in philosophic tact and insight, and in clearness and gracefulness of style, the new book is vastly superior to the old. Apart from Dr. Pfleiderer's achievements in various other departments of theology and philosophy, the present work alone would suffice to place its author in the honoured list of eminent scholars and workers in the same field, such as Lipsius, Biedermann and Schweizer. And in the present transitional period, when the current of religious belief so frequently shifts and fluctuates, and when the teaching of scientific theology is practically in abeyance at our national universities, such a "Philosophy of Religion" is fitted to supply a pressing want in this country. Were it well translated into English and widely circulated, it would help to clear away many of the religious misconceptions and differences which are at present the life-long affliction of enlightened and charitable men. It would shew that in theology, as in science, the standard of an objective criticism may be calmly and conscientiously applied, and the measure of right or certainty attained by opponents fairly acknowledged. English theologians would find to their surprise that it is possible to traverse the whole field of religion without pushing one's own opinions into undue prominence, or casting those of other schools into deepest shadow. And Dr. Pfleiderer's work has

the additional merit of being no abstruse philosophical treatise, adapted only for initiated circles. On the contrary, it extends the limits of the philosophy of religion beyond those indicated by the familiar definition of Lipsius—"the psychological *Verständniss* of the laws of the religious life, and of its historical development"—and hence deals largely with the concrete as well as the abstract. Gathering its materials from all past history, and turning to account the ancient philosophies as well as modern speculative thought, it employs the results in the solution of the great problems now before the religious world, and in the illustration of the present condition and probable future of the Christian churches. It is thus adapted to a far larger class than most works on this subject, and indeed may be read with pleasure by all who have mastered the ordinary philosophical concepts. For such sections of society its teaching is as urgently needed as in theological circles. Unfortunately, the mistake seems to prevail widely that religion and philosophy have no natural connection with one another, and that of late they have parted company on anything but amicable terms. The excellent maxim, "that although science may progress without a sound philosophy, yet religion cannot," thus requires at the present time to be remembered and acted upon. And those who set themselves to examine the foundations of their faith, or the course of religious development, will find in Professor Pfleiderer an impartial, enlightened and conscientious interpreter and guide.

The work, like its predecessor, is divided into two parts, the first containing a "History of the Newer Philosophy of Religion;" the second, a "Genetic-Speculative Philosophy of Religion." The former naturally begins with a reference to the *Aufklärung*, and then proceeds to shew how Lessing and Kant, the representatives of the critical philosophy, made short work of the rigid dogmatism and feeble rationalism which marked its close. To Lessing is rightly assigned the double honour of being at once the founder of the classical literature of Germany, and also of her philosophy of religion. English readers may probably be disposed to think that the claims of Leibnitz to some share of the latter distinction have been overlooked. But seeing that his visits to this field were few and far between, that his own religious sensibilities were by no means acute, and that, as the pupil of Des Cartes, his philosophy was more French than German, the award pronounced by Dr. Pfleiderer can scarcely be called in question. On the contrary, as was happily remarked by a speaker at the late *fête* on the 150th anni-

versary of Lessing's birth, "this gifted thinker had always the ambition to be a theologian, and turned the very stage into a pulpit." Although it was only towards the close of his life that he was entangled in theological controversy, he speedily displayed such polemical skill and vast and varied information as startled and paralyzed the professional expounders of the written law and the traditions. It is not too much to say that in one short year he shattered the dogmatism into which Luther's doctrine had crystallized, gave to the Bible a new position and significance, and established the right of free inquiry and belief. Of late there has been a superfluity of articles on Lessing in English magazines, but in no case have his services to the cause of religious enlightenment received such a clear and masterly exposition as in the work before us.

The section on Kant contains a careful analysis of his negative criticism, and gives an interesting glimpse of the way in which he and Lessing went hand in hand in the work of destruction. The causes of Kant's failure to build up a new and unassailable system in place of the dogmatism and rationalism which he had demolished are admirably stated. Due prominence is given to the seemingly unavoidable contradiction arising from his first denying the possibility of all knowledge beyond experience, and then dealing with his "ideas of reason" almost as if they possessed an objective validity. It may be said in this connection that Professor Caird and other critics of Kant will find it worth while to study Dr. Pfleiderer's acute suggestion for strengthening this weak part of the master's armour without the introduction of any foreign material. In addition to the mischief caused by this hiatus in Kant's system, the unsatisfactory results of his one-sided conception of religion, his misapprehension of its primitive elements, and his inability to realize its deeper experience, are candidly acknowledged.

Thus the critical philosophy had pulled down, but could not create or restore. And for a time the flood-waters of Scepticism and Rationalism spread more and more over Germany, and the only visible ark of safety was that which contained the pietistic disciples of Spener and Francke. But this condition of affairs was too melancholy to last, and the most strenuous efforts were made to reach the firm ground of truth. Unfortunately, however, these efforts were followed by the building of more than one tower of Babel, with accompanying confusion of tongues. There were, as our author correctly indicates, two ways of escape from the consequences of the negative criticism: first, the psychological, attained by withdrawal

into the feeling, believing, intuitive *Seelenleben*; and, secondly, the speculative, reached by a resolute advance from the point where the Kantian system had broken down, towards the consistency and unity of a true spiritual philosophy. The three chief explorers of the first of these paths were Hamann, Herder and Jacobi, and the next section of the work, which has no counterpart in the earlier book, describes their efforts in this direction.

Hamann is introduced as the chief representative of the so-called *Genialitätsrichtung*, which serves as a middle term between the critical and speculative schools. While his mystical profundity is duly recognized, his system is shewn to be marred by indefiniteness and inconsistency, the natural consequences of an unrestrained and insubordinate intellect. This exposure of the rents and patches in the mantle of the "Magus of the North," has naturally excited the rancour of the present reactionary Lutheran party, who are wont to take refuge under its folds, and to boast of the veneration felt for Hamann by Goethe in his younger days. The hue and cry raised on this account against Professor Pfleiderer has, however, only served to shew more clearly that his estimate of Hamann is but the re-affirmation of the deliberate verdict of history. The chapter on Herder will be of special interest to English readers. Hitherto he has been regarded in this country more as a historian and theologian than as a philosopher. And this view is correct in so far as he left no system which can be regarded as complete, and that his philosophy was to a large extent moulded by impressions received from his predecessors and contemporaries. But the more closely Herder is studied, the more highly will his work be estimated. His researches in the field of Hebrew literature, his attempts to reconcile Christian faith with the teachings of nature, his felicitous blending of the views of several great minds into a new aspect of the universe, and his original and clear conception of religion, all shew him to be endowed not only with the philosophic but the prophetic gift. And his life-work was of the highest value to religion, inasmuch as he traced the gradual revelation of God in the history of mankind, unveiled the poetry and symbolism of ancient inspiration, shewed that divine and human elements mingled in all religions, and that a necessity existed for manifold forms of faith.

In Jacobi, the mystical-intuitive philosophy attains its fullest development. Recognizing that the three ideas of reason laid down by Kant afforded no theoretical certainty, he sought to establish the principle of intuitive cognition, or the validity of direct faith as

opposed to speculative thought. Prof. Pfleiderer fully appreciates the spirituality of Jacobi's nature and the depth and beauty of his thought, but points out that his faith-philosophy by no means lifts us clear of the difficulties which understanding and sensation are unable to remove. And the consciousness of this failure was often present to Jacobi's own mind, and led to the confession "that he was a heathen with the understanding, but a Christian with the spirit."

Having now summarized a sufficient portion of the work to give an idea of its method and aim, it will only be possible (on account of the limited space available for this notice) to glance at the remainder of its contents. The third section deals with the speculative school of Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher and Hegel. In addition to the clear analysis of Fichte's philosophy in this section, a pamphlet by Dr. Pfleiderer (Johann Gottlieb Fichte—Stuttgart: Levy and Müller, 1877) will be found to delineate the personality and teaching of this philosopher in a most masterly way. Schelling's standpoint is well defined, and his system ably set forth. Here one sees the inevitable conflict of the two tendencies which proceeded from Kant, the one leading towards faith, the other towards scepticism, a conflict which left Schlegel no refuge save in the bosom of the Romish Church. Schleiermacher's endeavour to find a middle path by the identification of religious belief with religious feeling, is next dealt with. One point in the analysis of his philosophy may be of interest. It has been customary in England to regard him as sharing the belief of Kant in the non-validity of man's conception of God, but this agreement is affirmed to be more apparent than real. And the mistake has arisen from Schleiermacher's desire to bring out into bold relief his leading principle, that as religion is identical with feeling, so God, the object of religion, is to be realized by feeling and not by thought. Our author's analysis of the Hegelian system has evidently been a labour of love. While by no means following in Hegel's steps, so far as his *à priori* dialectic is concerned, he, like Biedermann, acknowledges his acceptance of his central principle of absolute Being, and his obligations in other respects to this great master of the speculative-idealistic philosophy. Hegel's Philosophy of Religion is affirmed to be the last complete system that has been elaborated. And in this fact lies the justification of the modern empirical realistic reaction. This is able to shew the defects of the Hegelian method, and therefore to break the sway of this philosophy, but unable to set a new system in its place. We

are therefore at present under a kind of philosophical interregnum, an especially favourable condition for the growth of eclecticism, which, going back to old standpoints, seeks to combine the best elements in all.

The remaining section of the first part describes the various modern tendencies, and criticises those writings which have given rise to religious and philosophical controversies. And in one of his happy modes of expression our author depicts these claimants appearing one after another before the public gaze, each thinking itself the last and permanent, while the feet of them that are to bury it are at the door. Feuerbach, Lange, Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Weisse, Rothe, Strauss and Biedermann, are amongst those introduced, while a brief but highly appreciative critique of Schwarz's charming little work on the "Nature of Religion" closes the history of the newer Philosophy of Religion.

The contents of the second part, which contains a "Genetic-speculative Philosophy of Religion," can only be enumerated. Proceeding in the main on the historically-inductive method, it first proceeds to treat of the religious *Subject*, viewed more especially in its relation to morality and cognition. The second section describes the *Object* of the religious consciousness, or matters of belief, in the following order—God, Angel and Devil, Creation, Theodicy, Revelation and Miracle, Redemption and Mediator, Eternity. In general, each of these subjects is dealt with according to its historical development, then a summary is added of the various theories held concerning it by modern philosophers, and a critical resumé closes the whole. It may be safely affirmed that readers of every school of theology will feel themselves instructed by the masterly review of the whole realm of spiritual philosophy which is found in these two sections. The closing portion of the work treats of the religious community, sketching the rise of objective religion, the historical development of rites and ceremonies, the position of the priesthood, and the relation of the Church to civil society. In every respect this work, by one of Germany's most distinguished thinkers, may be warmly commended to the educated classes of this country.

ANDREW CHALMERS.

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2. *William Harvey. A History of the Discovery of the Circulation of the Blood.* By R. Willis, M.D. Kegan Paul and Co. 1878.

Dr. Willis' handsome volume about Harvey and his forerunners is in fact a posthumous publication. The preface is dated October,

1878, but the venerable author died on the 21st of the preceding month. Though little inclined, in any case, to echo the cynical utterance of the imperial fratricide, *Sit divus dum non sit vivus*, we own to a strong wish to say the best we can of a book thus ushered into the world of letters. And indeed we are honestly able to say, in a comparative sense, much that is good. Compared with his *Servetus and Calvin*, which no amount of revision could render even tolerable,—compared, too, with his *Benedict D'Espinoza*, in which he vainly undertook to "soar through tracts unknown,"—the volume before us merits the praise of care and intelligence. Nevertheless, we are constrained to say that the care is not sufficient, nor the intelligence complete. Dr. Willis has evidently taken great pains, and we are sorry that he has not been more accurate. Even on a cursory survey of his pages we noted too frequently the signs of the sort of scholarship that has allowed him to print (p. 31), "*Hœ duœ* vasorum genera," where his authority (the Latin version of Galen) reads plainly enough, "*hæc duo.*" And the closer our examination, the more evident became the traces of this failing. We shall deal, however, not with the whole book, but only with that section of it which is likely to possess most interest for our own readers, the portion, namely, devoted to the history and services of Serveto. And here we gladly acknowledge that Dr. Willis has made an effort to set in a true and striking light the contribution made by the Spanish thinker to physiological discovery. He says (p. 84), "Servetus's physiology of the pulmonary transit left nothing to be added by successors." He maintains (p. 85) "the indefeasible title of Servetus to rank as the physiological genius of his age." He describes him as "the most legitimate predecessor of Harvey." He holds (p. 76) that "Harvey had, in reality, no proper precursor in the field he made so wholly his own, but Michael Servetus." He shews (p. 231) that not only did Serveto precede Harvey in the tracing of the pulmonary circulation, but still remained in advance, even after the publication of Harvey's discoveries, in his doctrine of the aeration of the blood. For Harvey assigned the bright tint of the arterial blood "to the straining it underwent in the capillary vessels of the" lung. Yet Serveto had rightly described it as "due to its exposure to the air in the lung." This difference, we may observe, constitutes a strong point against the theory that Harvey had made himself actually acquainted at Padua with Serveto's discovery. It was not till 1669 that Richard Lower (p. 266) "proved irrefragably by experiment" that the florid hue, as Serveto had

declared, was "due to the air of the atmosphere inspired." Furthermore, Dr. Willis makes a new, and, we believe, a good point, when, discussing the relation of Serveto to his teacher, Johann Günther of Andernach, he suggests that Günther learned from Serveto quite as much as Serveto from Günther. Of the latter he says (p. 60), that inasmuch as he "shows by his language that he was in the hands of his two able assistants, we shall probably do him no injustice when we conclude, that as he owed his better knowledge of the anatomy of the heart and lungs to the dissections of Vesalius, so in his physiology he had all wherein he advances on his predecessors, from the reflective and more independent Servetus." With all this, Dr. Willis keeps more clearly and constantly apart than many admirers of Serveto have done, the actual services which Serveto performed in relation to the pulmonary transit, and the further and distinct question of the general circulation, which Serveto nowhere propounds in 1553, but which stands foremost with Harvey in 1628.

Having said thus much, we feel equally bound to point out the blots in Dr. Willis' fresh account of Serveto. We cannot complain that his birth is placed in the year 1509; for while we believe 1511 to be decidedly the true date, something may certainly be said in behalf of the earlier reckoning. It will not do, however, to speak (p. 70) of "his father following law as a kind of hereditary profession *in the town of Villanova.*" Vilanova was, and is, a village of some sixty houses; and the only clue to the place where the father of Serveto exercised his calling as a notary is afforded by the son's statement at Vienne that he himself was born in Tudela. The suggestion that Serveto "seems soon to have abandoned the idea of becoming either monk or priest" deals with a purely imaginary intention. Nothing points to the Church as ever having been the destiny of Serveto. Law was his designated calling; science his chosen pursuit; medicine his adopted profession. The territorial name derived by Serveto from the place of his extraction, and used throughout his professional career, was not "Villeneuve or Villanovanus" (p. 72), but de Villeneufve or Villanovanus. The statement (p. 71) that in the outset of his career, "with a single exception, perhaps, he was very coldly received" by the Reformers of Basle and Strasburg, is not consonant with fact. At the hands of Œcolampadius and Bucer, to speak of no others, his reception was most warm, as the extant letters of both are fortunately with us to testify. Dr. Willis takes Serveto to Paris "in the course of the year 1533." For this first visit there is not a shadow of evidence. It rests solely

on the blunder of Beza, who places the meeting between Calvin and Serveto in 1534, instead of in 1536. Only once was Serveto in Paris, viz. from 1536 to 1538. It is probably only by a misprint that Serveto is represented (p. 73) as "graduating M.A. and M.B.," instead of M.D. and M.A. From Paris Serveto went, not "first to Charlieu . . . and then . . . to Vienne" (p. 75), but first to Avignon, thence to Charlieu, thence to Lyons, thence to Vienne. In dealing with the writings of Serveto, it is to be observed that Dr. Willis in no single instance quotes accurately their titles. In regard to the earliest of them, his substitution (p. 71) of "Auctore Michael Serveto" for the careful "Per Michaelem Serueto" of the original, effaces a characteristic evidence for Serveto's own spelling of his name. The *Christianismi Restitutio* he calls (p. 75) his "second theological work." He had already enumerated two previous ones; and reckoning the important edition of the Pagnini Bible as the third, the *Restitutio* counts fourth. These, it is true, are little slips; but it is in little matters that we discern the essential difference between desultory pains and real care. Similar instances of carelessness are to be found (p. 73) in the reference to essays by Tollin; and the instructive parallel (p. 94) between Serveto and Matteo Realdo Colombo is sadly marred by misprints. The broken quotation from James Douglas (not Douglass), "Servetum conjectandi locus est Columbum hæc ab eo hausisset," should read: "Cùm eadem opinio fusè & dilucidè exposita extet apud Mich. Servetum conjectandi locus est Columbum hæc ob eo hausisse."

An error of more moment occurs on p. 76. Here we are told that "as the work on Trinitarian error had been the first open rebellion against Catholic Dogma by a man of learning, so might the little volume on Syrups be characterized as the earliest lapse from the universally prevalent faith in the pathological and therapeutical dogmas of Galen." The first half of this sentence may pass muster, though it would be improved by reading, "against scholastic dogma by a youth of genius." In penning the second half, Dr. Willis forgot what he had already said in his *Servetus and Calvin*, p. 112. So far from being a protest against Galen, the little volume, of which Dr. Willis gives the title, "Syruporum universa ratio ad Galeni censuram *concinnata*" (it should be *diligenter expolita*), is expressly put forth as "Galenici dogmatis iusta defensio." It lays down the maxim, "Sacra est authoritas Galeni, passim docentis;" and not only as against the rival school of Arab physicians, but as against the Galenists themselves (Champier, for example), its aim is to recur

to the truer teaching of the great master. "Illo dimisso, Galenum appello. Ad cuius ego censuram, tanquam πρὸς τὸ ἐξεθειασμένον hanc de syrupis tractationem redigere totam contendi." Is it possible that the word *censura*, with its reference to Galen as arbiter of the discussion, may have misled Dr. Willis?

Again, it is quite erroneous to say (p. 77) that Serveto held "that there were two kinds of blood in the body, one appropriate to the veins—the *natural* blood, destined to the nourishment of the parts; another confined to the arteries—the *spirituous* blood, the vehicle of heat and vital endowment; the liver being the source of the one, the heart the fountain of the other." Serveto knows nothing of "spirituous blood," which is one of Colombo's foolish phrases. He expressly identifies the fluids (*spiritus*) contained in the veins and arteries. They had previously been distinguished as "natural" and "vital." But Serveto says: "The fluid which is communicated through anastomoses from the arteries to the veins, and in them is called *natural*, is in fact *vital*." Dr. Willis entirely omits from his transcript of the "circulation" passage the important sentence in which Serveto maintains that the blood "is communicated from the heart to the liver;" the heart being thus with Serveto the distributor of the blood.

Two features of Serveto's scientific intelligence are especially noteworthy,—his passion for unity, and his eye for design. The first is seen not only in his identification of the venous and the arterial fluids, but also, throughout the *Syruporum Universa Ratio*, in his refusal to admit, with the Arab physicians, that there are two or more sorts of digestion; one, for example, in the healthy, the other in the morbid body. There is, he clearly shews, but one kind of digestion in hale or sick. In both these cases, however, he had forerunners. The other characteristic of his mind, his eye for design, is very conspicuously manifest in the way in which he develops the doctrine of the pulmonary circulation; and here he had no forerunner. He not only sees—what Galen *almost* saw, when he owned that there was no discernible perforation—he not only sees that the blood cannot get through the midwall of the heart, but he also sees that it goes round by the lungs *for a purpose*, viz. that of the aeration of the blood. Hence we can understand the force of the interjected clause (licet aliquid resudare possit) which has puzzled Mr. Huxley, who takes it as admitting that after all the blood *may* get through the partition. Serveto sees the main stream of the blood pursuing its way right on to the lung *with an object*. There is a definite

design before it, which it is going to accomplish, and which cannot be fulfilled anywhere else. The perception of this purpose makes him sure of his discovery, even if it were to be granted as a barren possibility that, while the volume of fluid is thus doing its duty, something may ooze off (not "transude," with Mr. Huxley, or "sweat through," with Dr. Willis).

ALX. GORDON.

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### 3. OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY.

*Studies on the Times of Abraham.* By the Rev. Henry George Tomkins. Bagster and Sons.

Mr. Tomkins is an enthusiastic archæologist, and has spared no pains to produce a graphic description of the "times" to which he refers the patriarch Abraham. Himself an excellent draughtsman, he has added much to the value of the book by heliotype plates, representing various ethnic types, and interesting Babylonian seal-cylinders. Artistically there are few works on subjects so remote from æsthetic interests which can vie with this charming volume. Nor is the importance of the book seriously diminished by the extremely narrow theology of the author. A few hard epithets are all that historical critics have to bear, and these are obviously due to mis-apprehension: between "true" and "false," in the newspaper sense of the words, the author sees no mean. The archæology is throughout sound, though much more inquisitiveness is ascribed to Abraham than seems consistent with a natural interpretation of the narratives in Genesis. Mr. Tompkins' critical faculty seems to have been torpid during his composition of this work: he thinks that the occurrence of Abu-ramn as an Assyrian name creates a presumption in favour of the historical character of Abraham, forgetting that the Abu-ramn of the inscription himself may have borne a name of mythic origin. I wish I could feel so sure as Mr. Tomkins about the confirmation of the Biblical narratives from Assyriology and Egyptology. Is it so certain even that Gen. xiv. has been proved historical? As to the monotheistic character of Egyptian religion, I must also express some hesitation. But by simply regarding Abraham as a symbol of the Hebrew tribes, I have succeeded in reading this book with a warm feeling of content, and think the readers of the *Theological Review* may be glad to do so likewise. The style often rises to eloquence.

*Zechariah and his Prophecies, considered in relation to Modern Criticism: with a Critical and Grammatical Commentary and New Translation.* By Charles Henry Hamilton Wright, B.D., Ph.D., Incumbent of St. Mary's, Belfast. (The Bampton Lectures for 1878.) Hodder and Stoughton.

A learned but most dreary book, the very merits of which detract sorely from its readableness. Mr. Wright has a generosity of feeling almost unique among "orthodox" Biblical critics; there is not one harsh word throughout the book; the questions at issue are discussed on purely literary grounds. The piquancy which Dr. Pusey's works derive from his numerous personalities is therefore totally wanting in this most conscientious but most unappetizing work. No opinion of any consequence is left unnoticed; how the book is to be read in this busy English world, it is difficult to conceive. The author even condescends to notice the vagaries of Dr. Adam Clarke and inferior triflers of our own day. The most valuable part of the work is the grammatical commentary at the end, though here again the work suffers by an unreasonable attempt at exhaustiveness. Mr. Wright's Hebrew scholarship needs no certificate, and he has had the additional advantage of private communications from Professor Delitzsch and our own great Arabic scholar, Professor Wright.

The author thinks he has proved the post-exilian character of the whole of Zechariah. Dean Perowne, it will be remembered, when he wrote in Smith's Bible Dictionary, thought the integrity of the book at any rate uncertain. I cannot at all understand Mr. Wright's expression of confidence in the traditional view, though I approach perhaps nearer to his position than to that of Ewald. Perhaps I may be excused for briefly putting forward my own conclusion, as it represents a possibility which I do not think has occurred to the respected author.

I think, then, that both Zech. ix.—xi. and xii.—xiv., in their present form, proceed from a post-exilian writer, and probably, as the phenomena of xiii. 7—9 suggest, from the same writer. He was not, however, the same who wrote Zech. i.—viii., but lived nearer to the apocalyptic age. In the former part, he availed himself very largely of a pre-exilian prophecy or prophecies: hence that remarkable predominance of pre-exilian phenomena which has been so often referred to. In the latter, he depended more upon himself: hence a superabundance of post-exilian indications. It is to this latter

part that we must go for the special characteristics of the writer (supposing that both parts come from the same pen). He has a much greater interest in the details of the future than the principal writer of chaps. ix.—xi., but though more imaginative, he is (from a literary point of view) less fervid, less impulsive, less natural. See how realistically he interprets the works of later writers, more or less similar in tone to himself. Compare, for instance, Zech. xii. 4 with Joel iii. 12, Zech xiv. 12 with Isa. lxvi. 24, and Zech. xiv. 17 with Isa. lx. 12* (same verb in different sense). He is, in a word, an apocalyptic prophet, which does not of course exclude his possession of deep convictions and noble principles. He is a near kinsman of the author of Isa. xxiv.—xxvii.; like him, an anonymous writer, an imitator, and an "*Ueberarbeiter*" (over-worker), inconsistent, inquisitive and apocalyptic. It is also worthy of remark that the last verse of the latter prophecy contains a striking parallel to chap. x. 10a, so difficult a verse on any of the ordinary hypotheses.

I am happy to think that critics of various schools are tending in the same direction as myself. Abraham Geiger regarded Zech. ix.—xiv. as a late appendix to Zech. i.—viii.; and Prof. Delitzsch frankly admits that the author of Zech. ix.—xiv. may perhaps reproduce older prophecies, though he believes that in their present form both parts of the book proceed from one writer.

T. K. Cheyne.

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### 4. Miscellaneous.

The eighteenth century has of late years been a frequent subject of study. Books such as Mr. Hunt's, Mr. Leslie Stephen's and Mr. Lecky's, will at once rise to the reader's recollection. In addition to these general surveys of the ground, particular periods and special aspects of religious or philosophical thought have received much attention; on the one hand, Butler, Hume, Paley, have been acutely and exhaustively criticised; on the other, every detail of the Methodist revival has been collected and set in order. Here, however, we have another bulky book,† which aims to look at the eighteenth century from a different point of view, that of the English Church. In some ways there was room and even need for it. A

* The Book of Joel, and parts of the non-Isaianic part of the Book of Isaiah, I am obliged to bring down very late indeed: more of this elsewhere.

† The English Church in the Eighteenth Century. By C. J. Abbey and J. H. Overton. 2 vols. 8vo. London: Longmans. 1878.

good deal is to be found here which is absent from the deservedly well-known books which we have enumerated. At the same time, our authors are to some extent under the disadvantage of cultivating a field, a very large part of which has already been diligently ploughed and harrowed. They always tell their tale well; but the student as he reads cannot help remembering sometimes that it is a tale already more than twice told.

The plan of the book is a little peculiar. The authors, both Oxford men and both beneficed clergymen, have hit upon the plan of dividing their whole task into separate "subjects," each of which is treated in a chapter by itself. Nor have they gone upon the principle of conjoint authorship, except in so far as either appears to have revised the work of the other: each chapter is a distinct essay, which has the initials of the writer appended to it. The result is, that the book is not a history or a connected narrative at all, but a collection of essays, each of which is occupied by a distinct topic, which is continued from its beginning to its end, and if necessary throughout the whole of the century. The effect of this is perhaps less fragmentary than would readily be supposed. Our authors take much the same view of things, and, still more curiously, write much the same style. After a careful reading of their book, we have not succeeded in disentangling their individuality, or in forming a clear impression of either as distinguished from the other. Still the book remains a collection of "articles," and has the merits and defects of its form. The chief merit is, that many subjects are carefully and interestingly treated which a dignified history might possibly have passed by in neglect. The most noticeable defect is, not so much that the same ground is traversed again and again—though this is to some extent the case—as that the treatment is too often allusive, and presupposes knowledge which the reader may or may not possess. For instance, in the chapters which are chiefly occupied with the early years of the century, Dr. Sacheverell is naturally often mentioned. But the story of his sudden and undeserved popularity, and of the commotion which he raised throughout the nation, is nowhere told; indeed, our authors assert that it is too well known to need telling. In a word, these volumes are not the history of the English Church in the eighteenth century, but a very able, interesting and impartial commentary upon that history.

The first volume contains, besides an introductory essay, chapters on "The Church and the Jacobites;" "Robert Nelson, his Friends and Church Principles;" "The Deists;" two on "Latitudinarian

Churchmanship;" "The Essayists;" "The Trinitarian Controversy;" "Enthusiasm." The second takes almost a wider range. "Church Abuses;" "The Evangelical Revival;" "Sacred Poetry;" "Popular Church Cries;" "Church Fabrics and Church Services," are its topics. This is a plentiful and various bill of fare; and the student of the period will expect from it, and rightly, much curious information and many valuable reflections. But there is no reason why it should not have been more plentiful and various still, but for the fear of increasing the bulk of volumes already perhaps too bulky. In the first volume we might perhaps have expected an essay especially devoted to the Nonjurors, whose story certainly is a part of that of the English Church, and another dedicated to the rise and early history of the great Church Societies, the S. P. G. and the S. P. C. K. In the second we miss some reference to Sunday-schools, to Education in its general relation to the Church, and to the life of the two Universities, which were in the eighteenth century an integral part of the Establishment. But when we have received so much that is interesting and valuable, it is almost ungrateful to complain that we have not received more. Still, as we read on, the thought will intrude itself, whether by a little judicious compression of treatment and of style, and a more complete concert between the authors, it might not have been possible to have given more by giving less. The chief literary fault of an admirable book is a certain diffuseness, which encourages the reader to whom the history of the period is already familiar, rather to seek to gather the sense of a page at a glance than to read it word by word.

Of the spirit of historical impartiality and true Christian moderation displayed by our authors, it is impossible to speak too highly. We do not think that they have written a single phrase which on maturer reflection they would wish to blot. Whatever their own position in regard to the excited Church politics of our time, they are able to look at the High-churchmanship of Ken and Nelson, the Latitudinarianism of Tillotson, and the Evangelical zeal of Wesley, of Newton and of Venn, with eyes of just appreciation. What is even a rarer virtue, they are fair to such manifestations of Nonconformity as come within their scope. As a rule they do not touch the general religious life of the nation, and in consequence their picture suffers in completeness for the omission. But when, as in the chapter on the "Trinitarian Controversy," they come in contact with Dissenters, who are also heretics of the deepest dye, the perfect moderation of their tone is beyond praise. We would especially

refer to a passage (I. 510), too long to quote, on the meaning of the word "Socinian," which in its calm historical fairness involves a pungent rebuke to the many orthodox and heterodox writers who at the present day use it as a vague but convenient term of reproach. We cordially recommend these volumes to our readers. Those who are most familiar with the period to which they refer will find in them much to interest and instruct; while no one can read them without conceiving a genuine esteem for the authors, and, we should think, a kindlier feeling for the great historic Church to which they rejoice to belong.

The late Walter Bagehot was not generally esteemed a writer for all markets; but there are few markets in which his "Literary Studies,"* if really known, would not find favour. The lighter and brighter qualities of the author's mind, insisted upon with vehement affection in Mr. Hutton's memoir, really come out in many of the fugitive compositions which are here reclaimed, chiefly from the wastes of periodical literature. These compositions suffer, indeed, from an unnecessary and capricious inequality of style; and in many instances as much readiness of apprehension is assumed in the general reader as a whimsical but favourite talker counts upon in the circle of his daily associates. The essayist, however, never quite lets his reader go, and even when for the moment it is uncertain what he would be at, there can be no doubt of the subjective brightness and vivacity of his mind. In Mr. Hutton's memoir of his friend we are made acquainted with the manner and type of Mr. Bagehot's education, and it is also made clear that for an education of that type he was an exactly fit subject. His thoughts were always in a condition of boiling activity. His observation was keen and well-nigh universal. A good general education under men of a high order of intellect was rapidly, we may say greedily, completed by fruitful excursions into numerous by-topics, and especially into religion and theology, without some wise familiarity with which scarcely any mind appears to be brought to a first-rate edge and polish of subtlety and sympathy. Thus prepared, Mr. Bagehot was launched into literature, with good opportunities for the most careful and ambitious kind of anonymous writing. He had in a high degree the peculiarity, which he attributes to Bishop Butler, of

* Literary Studies. By the late Walter Bagehot, M.A., and Fellow of University College, London. With a prefatory Memoir. Edited by Richard Holt Hutton. In Two Volumes. Vol. I. London: Longmans.

addressing himself mainly to thoughts and topics of contemporary interest; and the essays here collected are in the main the expression of the judgments and speculations, on subjects most rife at the time of their utterance, of a critic who was enlightened and perceptive, if not great. Mr. Bagehot never merely recounts or paraphrases. He always has an object, or several objects, in view, and in most cases one feels that his aim has been suggested fairly and naturally by the contact of the subject before him with his own accumulated store of reading and opinion. A very good example of Mr. Bagehot's liveliest style is to be found in his account of Lord Eldon in the article on the *Edinburgh* Reviewers. The old law-lord's figure in history has dwindled almost to a shadow of antiquated prejudice; but Mr. Bagehot reminds us of the supremacy he held in successive Ministries, and of the adroitness with which he adapted himself successively to sovereigns so unlike each other as George III. and George IV., quoting very aptly the speech in which Brougham referred to the nominal head of the Cabinet, Lord Liverpool, as virtually a member, like himself, of the Opposition. In the same article the character of Horner is admirably sketched, and his success rationally, though rather subtly, accounted for; and there is a capital hit at Whiggery —the article was written in 1855—in the remark that "when an ancient Liberal, Lord John Russell, or any of the essential sect, has done anything very queer and is attacked for it, he always answers boldly, 'Lord Lansdowne said I might.'" This trick of supplying a sort of half-anecdotic formula for a general proposition has a good deal to do both with the strength and with the weakness of Mr. Bagehot's writing. For instance, when he classifies Sydney Smith as an after-dinner writer, one sees, with the help of a sentence or two of expansion, that the description is an apt one; but when Tacitus is said to write like a pair of stays, one feels that this is mere fancifulness run mad. Most of the fancifulness, indeed, has some basis. Mr. Bagehot's natural watchfulness not only made him master of many facts, but almost ensured his knowing all the facts that could be accumulated by eyesight on any subject he had observed. As he says of Shakspeare, and as has often been said of Mr. Sala, when he has been through a street he knows what was in it. Thus, for instance, how true it is that "a real reviewer spends his first and best pages on the easy and comfortable parts which he knows. The formidable difficulties which he acknowledges you foresee by a strange fatality, he will only reach two pages before the end; to his great grief there is no opportunity of discussing them. You may occasionally read a

whole review, in every article of which the principal difficulty of each successive question is about to be reached at the conclusion." In a wider field of observation, there is much shrewdness in the remark, that "good books are so few because so few people who can write know anything"—which is not a mere flippancy, but a true generalization of the prevailing character of men who possess the gift of expression by the pen. Mr. Bagehot fully appreciated in others the observant, remembering and reproducing habit which so strongly characterized himself, and his remarkable paper on Shakspeare is mainly excellent in the completeness of its demonstration of the great dramatist's possession and constant exercise of this faculty. "A man who knows little of nature may write one excellent delineation, as a poor man may have one bright guinea. Real opulence consists in having many. What truly indicates excellent knowledge is the habit of constant, sudden and almost unconscious allusion, which implies familiarity—for it can arise from that alone—and this very species of incidental, casual and perpetual reference to 'the mighty world of eye and ear' is the particular characteristic of Shakspeare." We need not remind any one that a characteristic may be one thing in Shakspeare and another thing in a lesser man; or that a habit of profuse allusion does not contribute to perfection of style, or that it does not exclude liability to waywardness of estimate. With all qualifications, however, Bagehot was a very engaging and stimulating writer, and in these volumes he will be found to have turned the newest lights of modern judgment on many such subjects as Shelley, Cowper, Milton, Bishop Butler, Lady Mary Wortley Montague, Sterne, Gibbon, and the metaphysical basis of toleration, while he has discoursed with appropriate freshness on such present-day topics as the French Coup d'Etat, Cæsarism, Thackeray, Dickens, Macaulay, Béranger, Clough, Crabb Robinson, and the Public Worship Regulation Act.

The third volume of Mr. Smith's admirable translation of Ewald's "Hebrew Prophets"* is mainly devoted to the book of Jeremiah, and ought to appeal to a rather wider circle of readers than its predecessors could well expect to reach. For when Ewald is translating a prophet whose style is rugged, abrupt, enigmatical, or so condensed as to be barely intelligible, it is neither his theory nor

* Commentary on the Prophets of the Old Testament. By the late Dr. Georg Heinrich August von Ewald, &c. Translated by J. Frederick Smith. Vol. III. Nahûm, Ssephanya, Habaqqûq, "Zakharya" xii.–xiv., Yéremyá.

his practice to reduce fierce and rapid Hebrew to tame and orderly German. His translation is almost as rushing, as fiery and as unintelligible, as the original. The reader can hardly fail to become conscious instantly that he is in the presence of a mighty spiritual power; but if he seeks anything beyond an impression, if he seeks any genuine comprehension of the oracles, he must devote much patient study to the form of their utterance before he can have any distinct conception of what it is they really say. In a word, the reader who takes up either of the first two volumes of Mr. Smith's translation of Ewald (in which all the characteristics of the German re-appear) will probably find them at first simply unintelligible. With the volume now under review, the case is different. Jeremiah is generally perfectly intelligible. Of course we do not understand exactly what he *means* until we have studied the circumstances of his life, and penetrated to the central purposes and principles of his prophetic career; but at any rate we can see at once what he *says;* and the reader who takes up this third volume, even if he is puzzled by allusions which he does not understand, will not be repelled by sentences which are in themselves absolutely unintelligible to him. Again, amongst all the prophets of the Old Testament, there is no other of whom we have so complete a picture as we have of Jeremiah. Every aspect of his outer life and inner experience is adequately represented in his book, and his is a nature calculated alike by its strength and its weakness to wake our deepest sympathy and our profoundest interest. In depth, in purity, in intensity of religious life, he stands without a peer amongst his brethren, unless we are to except the Prophet of the Return; and Ewald, both in this volume and in his History of Israel, expounds with singular power and beauty his great renovating conception of the "New Covenant." It seems all the more strange, when we consider the keen insight and warm sympathy with which Ewald brings out the force of this spiritualized conception, that he should not have been able to accept Jeremiah xvii. 19—27 (a passage on the observance of the Sabbath conceived in the spirit of Ezra and Nehemiah) as authentic. His remarks upon this passage, however, are very characteristic; so, in a more favourable sense, is his beautiful commentary on another passage, which sterner critics reject as unauthentic, Jeremiah x. 1—16. It is a passage about the idols of the heathens, in the style of the second Isaiah, and sober criticism must decisively reject it from the works of Jeremiah; but Ewald's comments upon it as a part of the context in which it now stands, are full of spiritual

discernment, and point out such a noble truth, that we are tempted to think Ewald when wrong, a finer interpreter than almost any other critic when right.

The little volume which celebrates the Centenary of West Orchard Chapel, Coventry,* has an interest for our readers beyond that which such records generally possess. In itself it is the story of an Independent congregation which had its origin in a secession from an older church of the same order in 1776,—a story which presents the usual features, highly honourable in themselves, of fine spiritual, social and political objects steadily pursued and largely attained through a period of one hundred years. But Mr. Delf, who has been the minister of West Orchard Chapel for some thirty-five years, is a man of a large heart as well as of a sound mind, and he has thought fit to associate with himself, on this great congregational occasion, his friend the Rev. John Gordon, now of Kenilworth, but formerly of the Great Meeting, Coventry. Mr. Gordon was one of the few surviving ministers who was present at Mr. Delf's ordination, and now contributes his share to this volume in a vigorous and interesting lecture on "The History of Independency." We cordially recommend the volume to our readers, not only or chiefly because of Mr. Gordon's contribution to it, but because in the utterances of Mr. Delf, Mr. G. B. Johnson and Mr. Baldwin Brown, they will find the views and principles of Independents set forth from the best and most spiritual side.

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* Centenary Celebration of West Orchard Chapel, Coventry. London: Yates and Alexander. 1879.

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## I.—THE SOZZINI AND THEIR SCHOOL.

1. *Roma Racoviana et Racovia Romana.* Authore Gulielmo Jameson. Edinburgi: Andr. Anderson. 1702.
2. *Die Protestantischen Antitrinitarier vor Faustus Socin. Nach Quellen und Urkunden geschichtlich dargestellt. Zweites Buch: Lelio Sozini und die Antitrinitarier seiner Zeit.* Von F. Trechsel. Heidelberg: Winter. 1844.
3. *Gli Eretici d'Italia, Discorsi Storici.* Di Cesare Cantù. Torino: Unione Tipografico-Editrice. 3 vol. 1865-7.

BENEATH the chancel floor in the Church of the Friars Minor at Cologne, with nothing now to mark the spot but a black slab of marble in rear of the altar to the right, lies one whose life has been thus summarized: *Scotia me genuit, Anglia me suscepit, Gallia me docuit, Colonia me tenet.* There rests the real founder of modern Unitarianism. The Northumbrian from the border dales, who made Mary immaculate, rendered possible the Socinian view of her Son. If from Priestley we go back to Bidle, and from Bidle to Sozzini, alike historic truth and theologic insight constrain us to climb further up the hill in search of the rock whence we are hewn and the hole of the pit whence we are digged. Ochino points the way. From that skilled analyst of ideas, who threw off his capuchin's garb but never doffed the Scotist vesture of his thought, we straight ascend to the *Doctor Subtilis*, the short-lived, keen-witted Johannes Duns.

The method of Scotus was the direct agent in the production of the astute scepticism of our supercilious English Ockham,

*Doctor Invincibilis.* Indirectly, perhaps, it gave scope for the lay theology of the warmer-hearted Dutchman, Wessel, *Magister Contradictionum*, whom Luther loved; and who paved the way for orthodox Protestantism. Both directly and indirectly, both by the spirit which it nourished and the tenets which it upheld, Scotism is the forerunner and the parent of Socinianism. The cold intellectual hardihood, the dexterous adroitness, the unceasing effort of verbal precision, which combined to raise conscientious hair-splitting to the dignity of a serious organon for the unravelling of theological complications—the vigorous common sense at work below all this ingenious apparatus, and really guiding the decision of spiritual problems, shone forth in all their splendour from the chairs of Theology at Oxford and Paris in 1301 and 1304, and have been illustrated since in many a Socinian pamphlet. When we further investigate the teaching of Duns, the incautious conundrum which Charles le Chauve threw across the table to Erigena acquires a new application, and we ask in all sobriety, "Quid distat inter sottum (*sozzo*) et Scottum?" For, the constructor of quodlibets defends Scripture on the ground of its accordance with reason; ranks the love of God and of one's neighbour as the fundamental principles of divine verity; teaches only a contingent predestination, and allows a certain meritoriousness to the works of the natural man; denies that reason can establish the immortality of the soul; and describes the manifestation of the Son of God and the glorification of the human nature in Christ as accomplished for its own sake, thus making it the exhibition of a perfection, and not simply the expedient of a repair. Above all, he treats the Atonement on an entirely new ground; maintains that Christ had merit, not by reason of his being God, but inasmuch as he was man; that his merit, insufficient and finite in itself, availed for the purposes of redemption because it was accepted as such by the Divine volition; and thus that a good angel, or a man begotten without sin, might have served as our Redeemer had God so pleased.*

* *Opp.* (Leyden, 1639) v. 48, 1306; vi. 786; x. 28; viii. 202, 429, &c.

There is another side to the comparison. At the head of this article we have placed the work of a forgotten controversialist, with no aim of reviewing it in detail, but because it brings out in strong relief the features of a not uninstructive parallel. William Jameson (also spelled Jamison) was a stiff and stark Presbyterian, well furnished with authorities and possessing a vigorous command of language. He threw himself with energy into the disputations of his time; attacking the Quakers, who replied to him; confuting the Prelatists on Patristic grounds; and, on the death of Principal Rule, taking up the cudgels in continuation of Rule's quarrel with John Sage, the first of the Scottish post-Revolution Bishops. Sage appears to have let Jameson alone; both biography and history have closely followed Sage's example. Yet Jameson was no unworthy sample of Scottish perseverance. The Quakers call him a "mad priest," after their controversial manner. It appears, however, that in 1692 the Senatus of Glasgow University, "taking into consideration the condition of Mr. William Jameson, who had been born blind yet having been educate at this University hath atteaned to great learning and particularly is well skilled in history both civill and ecclesiastick," appointed him to "have a public prelection of civill history once a week" in Latin, in the Common Hall. A salary of £33. 6*s.* 8*d.* was afterwards granted to him out of the Archiepiscopal revenues of Glasgow, and this he held till his death, apparently in 1721.* As a fruit of his prelections, he published a volume on Egyptian antiquities. In the thick of his labours against the hierarchy, he found time for the composition of the curious work in which Rome and Racow are impaled on the same stake. This ingenious quarto, printed at the author's expense, has never, we think, been noticed by any Unitarian writer. The Episcopalians, who were but slightly alluded to in the course of the argument, left it to be dealt with by antagonists beyond sea. "If you would know," says Jameson, "who these *learned Forreigners* are, they are even two Clubs of *Papists*,

* We owe these particulars to the kindness of the Clerk and Assistant Clerk of Senate, Glasgow. Watt gives a full list of Jameson's books.

the one at *Paris*, the other at *Trevoux*. These gave some three or four mean and unmanly Snarles at my Book, which did militate equally against *Papists* and *Socinians*, and none of either Factions has hitherto adventured to attack Me, but only to give two or three Sentences filled with Untruths, and impertinent Language."*

Jameson is well up in the *Fratres Poloni*, and in the tracts of Bidle and his coadjutors. His points are pursued with some insight and with indefatigable minuteness. He is aware of the genesis of Quakerism from Anabaptism: "*Anabaptistis*, vel (ut nunc audiunt) *Tremulis*" (p. 43). He distinguishes clearly between Arians and Socinians, and makes game of their mutual animosities (p. 63). He detects the fundamentally anti-dogmatic tendency of Unitarianism: "Expectares a Socinianis ut saltem hunc unum articulum negativum prorsus necessarium & fundamentalem assererent, viz. non esse plures in Deo Personas. At audi ipsum *Socinum*," &c. (p. 68). These are indications of a writer who knew what he was about. His strongest point is the identification in principle of the central authority of the two systems, the official infallibility, attributed to Christ by Socinians, and by Catholics to the Pope.

In tracing the history of Socinianism to its source, it has been very customary to credit Lelio Sozini with the origination of its constituent ideas, Fausto Sozzini with the organic presentation of them. Of the uncle it is assumed that we know scarcely anything, except that he was the secret author of the opinions which the nephew adopted, systematized and spread. Lelio is out of sight, or recognized only as the inspiring influence which ultimately bore fruit in the life and work of Fausto. Nay, it has even been deemed probable that in the very form of Fausto's expositions there is little originality; for the uncle's manuscripts fell into the nephew's hands, and he may have absorbed their substance into his own voluminous treatises. How such a view can be seriously maintained in the face of the researches of Trechsel, it is difficult to understand. We

* *Sum of the Episc. Contr.* p. 263.

are driven to the conclusion that Robert Wallace, who refers to the work of Trechsel, yet gravely asserts that "on all the leading points of Christian doctrine the opinions of the nephew were those of the uncle,"* had not adequately mastered what is still the leading authority on the subject. The truth is, that in relation to the inner man, the living, thinking, fraternizing, self-communicating soul, we know the uncle even better than the nephew. And, as regards the complexion of their minds and the tendencies of their speculation, no two men, in some respects allied, could well present more diametrical differences. But this will be perceived to greater advantage in the course of the sketch we propose to give of the career of each.

LELIO SOZINI† came of a lineage of patrician jurists, long seated at proud Siena, where he was born in 1525. Sozzo (son of one Martinello) the banker of Percena, near Buonconvento, was living in 1294. His second son, Ser Mino Sozzi, the notary, removed to Siena in 1304, and died April 1340. His shield of arms shews the well-known Sozzini coat, the black lion ramping in a white field, with a tiny red globe close to the uplifted paw.‡ Of his seven sons, five at any rate achieved distinction; one of them, Il venerabile Pietro Sozzi, a Dominican, who died of the plague in 1348, being the first Inquisitor of Siena. Mino Sozzi's eldest son, Sozzino, a merchant, was the

* *Antitrin. Biog.* ii. p. 86. We should be sorry if the remark in the text were construed as any want of respect for the labours of an author who is indefatigable in his way, and has rendered essential service to the study of a great subject.

† So he always spells his name, Latinizing it *Sozinus*. Bullinger and Melanchthon write *Soccinus* or *Socinus;* the *Contra Libellum Calvini* has *Zosin*$^{9}$*;* Calvin's editors (1575) have *Zozinus*. Fausto always spells his name *Sozzini*, Latinizing it *Socinus*. It may be convenient to recognize the distinction of spelling, Sozini for the uncle, and Sozzini for the nephew. It is evidently deliberate, and has a modern parallel in the amicable dispute between John Home of Kilduff and his kinsman David Hume. Cantù observes little uniformity, spelling the family name Sozzini, but giving Soccini as its literary form. The derivation from *sozzo* (ill-favoured) is alluded to by F. Sozzini in his pseudonymns of Felix *Turpio* and Prosper *Dysidaeus*. Stress must not be laid upon this as proving the etymology, since Urbe*vet*anus and *Ger*apolensis, under which Sozzini veils *Sen*ensis, are mere *jeux de mots*. Similarly Martin Bucerus (Kuhhorn) disguises himself as Aretius *Felinus*, from *Buse* (provincial Germ.) = pussy.

‡ We suspect that this red globe was originally a bezant, the banker's sign.

first of that name, but not the founder of the family so designated. This descends from Giovanni Sozzi, Mino's fourth son (d. Aug. 1374). Giovanni's third son, Sozzino (d. May 1403), stands at the head not only of the main line of the Sozzini, but of the two secondary branches. Only about the beginning of the present century did the chief stem, descended from Count Celso, an elder brother of Lelio, become extinct in the person of an heiress, Porzia Maria Martina Sozzini, born 4th Oct. 1707, and married 16th Aug. 1728, to Count Gaetano Marciani of Orvieto. On her death,* the family residences, mortgaged for an annuity, passed into the possession of a neighbour, the Cavaliere Malavolti. The Palazzo Sozzini, at the corner of the Via Ricasoli and the Via di Follonica, still stands, though now incorporated into the adjacent Palazzo Malavolti. The country mansion of Scopeto, or The Bush, six miles from the Porta Ovile, purchased in 1543 by the younger Mariano from the heirs of his cousin, Scipione Sozzini, remains very much in its original state.

Mariano Sozzini the elder (1397—1467) was confessedly one of the ablest canonists of the age. His diminutive stature, which prompted the pleasantry of Enea Silvio, "He ought to have been one of us, the Piccolomini," did but increase the marvel of his intellectual greatness.† From the Chair of Canon Law at Padua up to the time of his marriage, and subsequently from the home of his studious leisure, the Casa della Sapienza, in Siena, his reputation spread far and wide. He was celebrated as *un' arca di scienza*, and his judgments were revered as though *proceduti dalla bocca di Dio*. His son Bartolomeo (1436—1506), founder of a separate branch of the family, is reputed to have surpassed him in forensic shrewdness; yet, though the *Socini solutiones* of Bartolomeo passed into a proverb, neither for breadth of attainment, nor for moral

* She probably died at Orvieto in very reduced circumstances, but we have not been able to learn the exact date.

† Cantù erroneously refers this and another saying to the younger Mariano, not born till eighteen years after Enea (Pio II.) died. Cantù misprints the birth of the later Mariano 1452; the date in the text is from his epitaph at Bologna.

virtues, is he to be compared with his illustrious father.* Mariano the younger (b. 25 Mar. 1482; d. 19 Aug. 1556), grandson of his namesake through the undistinguished Alessandro (1443—1503), was educated under his uncle. From the age of twenty-one, when he graduated in civil and canon law, he well sustained the dignity of the family name, and may be said to have even enhanced the fame it bore in relation to the hereditary calling. The courtesy of the age bestowed upon him the title of *Princeps Jurisconsultorum.* Latterly, he severed his connection with Siena and with Tuscany. After lecturing on law with increasing repute at Pisa and Padua, in 1540 he settled down at Bologna in the Chair of Alciati. Here he remained till his death, steadily refusing several brilliant offers of other employment. Of his thirteen children, Lelio was the sixth son.†

Born to wealth, inheritor of a famous name, allied in blood with some of the noblest families of Tuscany, gifted by nature with a disposition of surpassing charm, and with an intellect of singular fineness and dexterity, Lelio Sozini can hardly be said to have fulfilled the promise of his gifts and his opportunities. The necessity for carving out his career was never laid upon him, and he was content with the easy position of a "gentleman in search of a religion," a traveller to intellectual centres, an eager and enthusiastic inquirer, an ever welcomed and even beloved associate of great men.‡ His early training was polite rather than laborious. He spoke and wrote Latin as a matter of course; but his subsequent acquaintance with Greek, Hebrew, and even a little Arabic, had no real scholarly depth. It was partly the result of his determination to get

* Bayle, however, is misled, following Guido Panzirolo, when he says, "il le falut enterrer aux frais du public." The truth is that he had a public funeral.

† Eleven sons and two daughters. Wallace, after Panzirolo, says, "ten sons and three daughters," and contradicts himself (pp. 64, 307) as to our knowledge of their names. Cantù (ii. 508) gives the whole list.

‡ The context does not leave it quite clear whether Mr. Lecky's fancy portrait of "the timid Italian" (Hist. Rise and Infl. Spir. Ratm. in Eur., 2nd ed. 1865, i. 408) is meant for the nephew or the uncle. It may be accepted, however, as a caricature of the latter.

beyond the text of the Vulgate, partly the genteel occupation of his travelled study. Doubtless what he learnt he learnt well, but erudition was not his delight. Nor was he willing to play a seriously responsible part in the business of life. He heard law lectures under his father's guidance at Bologna, and received a magisterial appointment in that city,* which, however, he speedily relinquished; and, on coming of age in 1546, betook himself to Venice, as the first stage in a journey of intellectual curiosity. Yet Lelio Sozini was at heart no trifler. That he journeyed towards Venice, the head-quarters of the Evangelical tendencies in the newer thought of Italy, is proof of this. A warm religious spirit pervaded him through life. Not only was his mind exercised, but his soul was engaged in spiritual concerns. His piety was true and fervent; his love of Christ, his communion with God, are constantly manifest in his writings. He had the same naturalness and spontaneity of religious sentiment which constantly refresh the aspirations and the speculations of Serveto. Had he been thrown from the first upon his own resources, he might well have developed a stronger character, and risen to be a greater name in the history of religious emancipation; he could hardly have become a more loveable and attractive being than he appears, even as he is.

Lelio's stay of about a year in Venice has been made the occasion of what we venture to call the myth of the Vicenza Society. According to the received account, the leading heretics of Italy met from time to time in secret conclave at Vicenza; and there, under the leadership of Sozini, deliberately concocted the programme of a further religious reformation, in the very year of Luther's death. Trechsel has torn the whole story to shreds, shewing that it abounds with anachronisms, and in particular that the type of doctrine alleged

* So R. S. (*Mon. Rep.* 1827, p. 422), apparently following Tiraboschi. Panzirolo assigns the appointment to "Laelio ejus [Mariani] genero," i. e. Lelio Pecci (m. Porzia Sozzini, 1539). There is a biographical sketch of Lelio Pecci, among the MSS. of his descendant, Giov. Antonio Pecci, in the Biblioteca Laurenziana at Florence. No mention is here made of his having held such an appointment.

to have become completed at Vicenza was unknown to the most advanced thinkers at that epoch.* The tale assumed its shape by degrees. No contemporary writer lets fall a syllable about it.† In the earliest Unitarian account of the Sozzini, the life of Fausto by Samuel Przypcowski, published in 1636, we seek in vain for any trace of it. It first appears in the *Narratio Compendiosa* of the younger Andreas Wiszowaty (1608-78), printed by Sand in the year of the writer's death.‡ Wiszowaty was the grandson of F. Sozzini; and this fact has caused unusual stress to be laid upon his testimony, inasmuch as he may have been delivering a family tradition. He speaks of "colloquia atque collegia" begun about 1546 at Vicenza, in which "the received opinion concerning the Triune God" was called in question. He says the gatherings were broken up in consequence of the arrest and execution by strangling (*suffocati*) of Giulio Trevisano and Francesco de Ruego. The other members fled from Italy, some to Thessaly and Damascus, some to Switzerland. Of these, Lelio Sozini was the leading spirit (*præcipuus*). No other names are mentioned, though the number of associates is reckoned as close upon (*fere*) forty.

If this was a family tradition, it was very inaccurately remembered. No one was put to death for religion in the Venetian territory before 1560. Giulio Guirlando de Treviso suffered on 19th Oct. 1562; Francesco Saga de Rovigo, not till 25th Feb. 1566. They were not strangled, but drowned. Now Lelio left Italy in 1547. Granting the family tradition, its basis may be that, while in the Venetian territory, Lelio formed or joined a group of young men, an *Accademia* of a sort not uncommon in that day, and similar to the one which we shall

* *Historisch-kritische Beleuchtung der sogenannten Collegia Vicentina*, Trechsel, ii. 391—408 (391 is mispaged 191). It is evident that Wallace cannot have read this searching essay.

† This is remarked by Cantù (iii. 156), who nevertheless relies upon Lubieniecki, and quotes a tradition according to which the Accademia met in the Casa Pigafetta, well known for its curious facade. Tradition even points out the path by which the fugitives escaped over the hills "to Germany."

‡ *Appendix ad Nucleum Hist. Eccles.* 1678, pp. 86—90.

find his brother Celso setting on foot at Siena.* That such a club of young spirits would talk on matters of religion as well as on matters of taste, is most probable; but Wiszowaty's testimony must be accepted with the utmost caution, for he goes on to tell us that Lelio's heresies began in the endeavour to trace in the Sacred Writings the foundations of jurisprudence (a science in which Lelio, as we have seen, had no serious interest); and that in the course of this search he noticed the discrepancy between the Scriptures and the dogmata of the Church, especially in reference to the Trinity, and revived the opinion that the Son of God had no existence before his human birth. This latter was the opinion of Fausto, not of Lelio.

If we ask why Vicenza was selected as the scene of the romance, the answer is, that in 1553 we do find in that town a little band of Italian Protestants, to whom (*ad Vincentinos fratres*) Matteo Gribaldo forwarded from Geneva letters concerning the trial of Serveto.† To this body Guirlando and Saga may well have belonged, and its dispersion may have been synchronous with their arrest. Giving then the utmost credit to Wiszowaty that we can, he has at any rate mixed up matters which refer to two distinct periods,—the family tradition of an *Accademia* in 1546-7, the persecution which dispersed a body of heretics about 1562.

It is scarcely worth while to pursue the amplifications of the younger Sand and the younger Stanislaus Lubieniecki, both of whom date the whole matter "about 1546." Sand fixes the number of associates as above forty. In addition to the two names furnished by Wiszowaty, Sand heads a list of twelve with Leonardo Busali, a Calabrian Abbot of Spanish blood, of whom it has been ascertained that he reached Damascus and supported himself there as a tailor. This name may fairly be placed with those of Guirlando and Saga. Beyond this, Sand's list is evidently mere guess-work. He

* Cantù observes (iii. 392) that it has been asserted that Lelio introduced Freemasonry into Italy at Vicenza; he produces, however, in disproof, a circular addressed to the Italian Lodges as early as 1535.

† *Contra Libellum Calvini*, edition of 1612, p. A 6.

enumerates Ochino (who, however, left Italy in 1542, never to return), Serveto (who was at Vienne, 1542-53), Giovanni Valentino Gentile, Giorgio Biandrata, Niccolo Paruta, Gianpaolo Alciati, Matteo Gribaldo, Jacopo Paleologo, Mattia Glirio, Andreas Duditz, and Giorgio Complacio. Sand is uncertain about Ochino in his *Appendix* (1678), but expresses no doubt in his *Bibliotheca* (1684). He is also uncertain about Serveto, and in 1684 omits his name. A few of the others, he says (1678), may perhaps be doubted. Accordingly in 1684 he omits Gribaldo, Glirio, Duditz and Complacio, but adds Jacopo de Chiari, Francesco Negri (who, however, was at Chiavenna, 1543-9, and thence journeyed to Moravia), and a Dario Sozzini. Sand's list in fact brings together all the heretics with whom Sozini, at different periods of his life, may be supposed to have come into some sort of contact.

Lubieniecki* (who gives as his authority a manuscript of Stanislaus Budzynski) is much more bold. According to him, the "collegia et colloquia pia" were not confined to Vicenza, but took place at other towns in the Venetian territory. He raises the number of associates very considerably. Busali, he tells us, in company with forty others, escaped in the direction of Thessalonica; all getting safely there except three, Guirlando, Saga and Chiari. The remainder of the associates left Italy for Switzerland, Moravia and Poland, but kept their opinions to themselves in the mean time. Then he tells us what these opinions were. His account is drawn almost verbally from the Racovian Catechism, with the tell-tale addition of the chiliasm of Ferencz Dávid, which came still later into vogue with the followers of his opponent. In point of historical audacity, this creed of Vicenza is on a par with the lengthy speech thrust into the mouth of Serveto immediately before his execution, in which Lubieniecki makes Serveto teach and defend Socinianism as regards the Godship of Christ. Briefly, the Vicenza myth is a misleading attempt to antedate by a century the later phase of Socinian orthodoxy. In a small way it is as much out of place as is the association of the *Symbolum*

* *Hist. Ref. Polon.* 1685, pp. 38—40.

*Quicunque* with the name of Athanasius. It has done serious harm, by putting inquirers into the genesis of Socinianism on a totally wrong scent. Not at Vicenza, but at Chiavenna, did Lelio Sozini receive his initiation into heresy, nor with the Trinity did his difficulties arise. To find the incipient traces of concerted action for the development of heresy, we must pass beyond Italy altogether. We meet them first in the Italian Church of Geneva, where, under Calvin's own shadow, that arch schemer, Giorgio Biandrata, looked around him in 1557 for associates among his fellow-refugees.

Leaving Venice, not by a forced flight, Sozini went northward in furtherance of a religious quest, which Venice stimulated but could not satisfy. In Venice, which Ochino had so recently quitted in the prime of his powers, the evangelic tendencies were already cramped by the authorities, and were soon to be suppressed by the Inquisition. In the communities of his expatriated countrymen, now scattered over Europe for their faith's sake, Lelio expected to find a freer and a clearer light; and as Paul went from synagogue to synagogue of Jewish colonists as an apostle, so Lelio travelled from knot to knot of Italian emigrants as an inquirer. He bent his steps through the Grisons to Chiavenna, where he arrived in 1547. The date is significant. Had he been a little earlier, he might have encountered a gentle, penetrating spirit, one Tiziano, an exile of conscience, who led a homeless life on either side of the Alps, and at length fell into merciless hands, in 1554, at Chur, and was flogged into a recantation. From him the traveller might have learned, among other heresies, to question the Incarnation, the Trinity, and the immaculateness of Scripture itself.* Had Lelio's arrival been deferred for a year or two, he might have fallen at a critical moment under the influence of a man of very different stamp, with whom indeed he had some relations later on, the selfish and domineering Pierpaolo Vergerio. This able and restless being, who had abandoned law for the career of an ecclesiastic and diplomatist,—who never forgot, when, discarded by the Church, he took to Protestantism, that he had

* Wallace does not make any mention of Tiziano, but few men of his day have so good a right to a place in the catalogue of Antitrinitarians.

worn the episcopal pallium of his native city, Capo d'Istria,—who improvised for himself the title of "Visitator" of the Grisons Churches,—was like Sozini in the readiness with which he sucked in heresy, but utterly unlike Sozini in that his nature had no room for religious earnestness. Escaping the contact of the radical and the indifferent, Lelio at Chiavenna came across a remarkable man, his brief and passing acquaintance with whom left its durable impress upon his seeking soul.*

Cold is the heart that does not warm to the story of Camillo. A Sicilian by birth, and a man of no little culture,† we meet him first in 1542 as a tutor in the house of Rafaele de' Pallavicini at Caspàno in the Val Tellina, and he has taken the name of Renato, in sign that he has been born into the kingdom of Light. He belongs to that company of believers in the Spirit, of which George Fox is the greatest English exemplar. But he holds the truth of the Inner Witness in a form provided by the Evangelical movement, which he had joined on leaving Catholicism. In short, he is a species of Calvinistic Quaker. He is not conscious to himself of any heresy. His theology is centred in predestination, but the elect are they who have the Inner Guest (*Christianus ille Spiritus*). The soul unquickened by the Holy Spirit dies for ever; the children of the Spirit do but sleep in death, to receive at length a renewed and purely spiritual existence. The child of the Spirit needs no outward law; the law is for those who have not the Inward Light. Sacraments are but symbols of verities already received by the heirs of the kingdom. Such was the pith of Camillo's conception of the new life of the Gospel; but it opened a path of its own for further heresies. On the Trinity, Camillo had no speculations.‡ He laid great stress, however, on the reality of Christ's human nature, which in itself was peccable; he

* The influence of Camillo on Sozini is well brought out in a letter by Giulio Milanese, 4 Nov. 1555. Fuesslin. *Epp. Reformatorum*, 1742, pp. 355-9.

† "Literis haud trivialiter ornatum," is the testimony of his pupil. Trechsel, ii. 117.

‡ His pupil Gianandrea de' Pallavicini was a Sabellian. Having been chosen as their pastor by the Church at Caspàno in 1551, he was rejected by the Synod.

denied that Christ was a sacrifice for sin, or that merit attached to him; he insisted that Adam must have died even had he never transgressed.

On his appearance in the Italian community at Chiavenna in 1545, Camillo Renato was received by the pastor, Agostino Mainardo, with open arms. Only his pure spirit, his piety, and his sacrifices were known; and his darling idea, the revival of a Love Feast (*Epulum*) among Christians, to take precedence of the Lord's Supper, after apostolic example, was looked upon as a harmless project. But the question soon led to a bitter strife on the nature of the sacraments themselves; and this drew out the unexpected revelation of Camillo's fundamental divergence from orthodox ways of thinking. The division went deep, and the strife was hard. Camillo was greatly beloved; Mainardo even thought of quitting his post in despair and accepting an invitation from Ochino to join him in England. At length Camillo retired to form a little band of faithful ones into a Church of his own. On 6th July, 1550, he was excommunicated by the decree of the neighbouring Churches. On the 19th of the following January, pressure was put upon him to sign a confession in accord with the doctrines he had impugned. He subscribed the document, and Vergerio was the attestor. Let us draw the veil over his weakness, and thank God that we do not live in such times. Not every servant of truth has the iron nerve of Bastwick, who when told he should lie in prison till he made his recantation, thrilled the Star Chamber with the brave soul's ultimatum: "That will be till doomsday in the afternoon!" Once again in the history of that time do we hear the voice of Camillo. It is when, from his retirement at Traona, he pens the vivid lines of that tremendous apostrophe, *In Jo. Calvinum de injusto Michaëlis Serveti incendio*, lines which, despite the trammels of Latin metre, vibrate still with the horror, the indignation, the distress of wounded piety and outraged charity.* Such, then, was he in whose person Sozini beheld at Chiavenna the visible truth that the spring

* This poem, printed by Trechsel, i. 321-8, possesses high authority as a nearly contemporary account of the arrest and execution of Serveto. It is dated September 1554. It will be found also in the *Corp. Reff.* edn. of Calvin's works.

of heresy might be the lively struggle of the Spirit of God in the heart.

Yet Lelio gave no sign of an immediate susceptibility to the ideas of Camillo; nor, probably, was their intercourse sufficiently close to allow for a thorough opening of the poor tutor's mind to the young patrician. Some years must pass before the full effect of the visit to Chiavenna is seen. With Mainardo in the mean time Sozini keeps up a correspondence, which will inform him how matters are going on. He pursues his journey through Switzerland and France to England, where he would doubtless meet Ivan Laski (generally called à Lasco), and probably also Ochino and Vermigli, who arrived in London together, on the 20th December, 1547. From England he passes into Holland, and from Holland makes his way to the stronghold of the Reformation, reaching Geneva at the end of 1548 or beginning of 1549.

No one was more ready than Calvin to welcome a stranger in search of Evangelical truth. Lelio brought with him not only the recommendation of a famous name, but the introduction of an ingenuous presence which must have been singularly fascinating. With all his severity of mind and speech, Calvin habitually exhibited a wonderful patience in dealing with all inquirers who shewed a real desire to be taught. Perhaps no feature in that massive character impresses us with more admiration than the freedom with which his time, his thoughts, his pen, were always at the disposal of learners. Even with Biandrata, though he saw through his flatteries, and admonished him in the roughest style of scolding, Calvin was willing to continue to take infinite pains, so long as the wily Italian was ready to put up with these rebuffs, and approach the intellectual giant as a master. Calvin's great insight into men never deceived him for a moment about Lelio; he detected at once his sceptical turn, but he recognized just as clearly his religious purpose and his thorough purity and honesty. More than once he wrote letters of such stern rebuke as would have closed their intercourse for ever, had there not been real magnanimity on the one side, and real sincerity on the other. Again and

again we find Lelio's sweet nature laying open his subtle doubts and questionings to be handled by the penetrating logic of Calvin. There must have been much that pleased the great thinker in his young friend. To the last there was no breach between them.

Sozini, however, was but passing through Geneva. He went on to Zürich in 1549, there lodging in the house of old Conrad Pellicanus (1478—1556) the ex-Franciscan, author of the first printed Hebrew grammar. Thence he made a short visit to Basle, staying with Sebastian Münster (1489—1552), also an ex-Franciscan, "the Esdras and Strabo of Germany." Four letters written by Sozini from Basle, in July and August 1549, to Heinrich Bullinger, are sufficient to prove the range of his acquaintance, the warmth of his friendships, and his keen interest in all the controversies of the time. At Basle he met Castellio. It is curious too that we find among his associates a Transylvanian, Sigismund Gelo, and a priggish young Pole of good family, Florian Susling of Warsaw. The end of the year sees him in his old quarters at Zürich, where the friendship and the truly fatherly kindness of Bullinger proved a greater attraction for Sozini than the circle of *literati* at Basle.

The conjecture is hazarded by Trechsel that about this time Sozini had thoughts of marriage, and to an Italian lady. This is suggested by certain pointed queries which he twice addressed to Calvin,* touching the propriety of a conjugal union with one who, not disinclined to Evangelical truth, is outwardly a Catholic; and on the lawfulness of Papal baptism in case there should be a family. Calvin replies in his most genial mood, taking a view of the situation very different from that which he applied with brutal ferocity to the condemnation of Serveto's Vienne conformity. "I dare not," he observes, "condemn absolutely

* Lelio's letters (14 May and 25 July, 1549) were known to Trechsel only through the medium of Calvin's reply. These earliest remaining productions of Lelio's pen have since been recovered at Geneva, and are printed in the *Corp. Reff.* edn. of Calvin (xiii. 271, 337). The editor remarks upon their "scriptio intricatissima, latinitas tirone digna." So difficult, indeed, is Lelio's usual hand, that a word which Trechsel reads *crede* is read by Baum *venerande*.

(*simpliciter damnare*) those who do not withdraw from the outward profession of Popery (*idololatriae*), even if, through fear of the consequences (*periculorum metu*), they dissemble their faith." In company with this practical we find a speculative difficulty, the first fruits of the influence of Camillo. The problem of spiritual religion was working in Sozini; he questioned the resurrection of the flesh.* Calvin's reply thus concludes: "This, I hope, will satisfy you, unless it find your mind too much prejudiced (*nimis occupatam*), which is very unlike both your piety and your modesty. Still, however, I thought it my duty lightly to admonish you, as a friend (*pro nostra amicitia*), because, when you talked with me on the subject not long ago, I had an uneasy apprehension (*subverebar*) that this opinion had struck roots in you too deep for you to get rid of it easily. Otherwise I have such confidence in your intellectual dexterity, as to feel it enough to have barely indicated a line of argument which with a man of less acuteness or expertness I should have pursued at greater length. Farewell, excellent man, and my very dear brother in Christ the Lord."

Next year, Lelio proceeds by way of Nürnberg and Leipzig to Wittenberg. Here he arrives 18th July, 1550, with good introductions to Melanchthon, who shews him every hospitality, and places him in the house of Johann Forster, the Hebraist, a master in the special line of study Lelio is minded to pursue. On the 26th September, he matriculates in the University, which is evidently proud of so well connected a scholar.† Melanchthon is delighted with the new-comer. He is only sorry that the disturbed state of Germany renders Wittenberg a precarious place of resort. "I could wish him (*optarim*)," he writes, 25th July, "to be in Switzerland, ἄλλος γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλην πόλιν τεταγμένος. And perchance at no distant date fresh dislodgements (*nova exilia*) will be necessary both for him

* A powerful fragment on this subject forms part of the *F. et L. Socini item E. Soneri Tractatus aliquot Theologici nunquam antehac in lucem editi.* Eleutherop. 1654.

† After his signature in the University books is added by another hand, *Mariani Sozini Jconsulti præstantissimi filius.*

and for us."* In another letter he describes Sozini as "serious, learned, and a lover of the true doctrine concerning God." John Malfinski, a young Pole, who had studied law at Padua under Sozini's father (as indeed had several of the Wittenberg students), sets no bounds to his admiration of his preceptor's son. His sweetness, his integrity, his openness in expressing his views, his virtuous life, have endeared him to everybody. "With such constancy," writes Malfinski, 24th August, "is he true to the bonds of friendship, that he seems to me to have been gifted by Providence rather than by hazard (*non temere sed fato*) with the name of Laelius."†

Whether Sozini for his part was greatly attracted to Melanchthon may be doubted. He gives no evidence of his cherishing toward Master Philip either the warm attachment which he felt for Bullinger, or the intellectual admiration which constantly drew him to Calvin. He even, in the confidence of his correspondence with his spiritual "father" at Zürich, gives reins to the light raillery of his wit regarding Melanchthon's well-known penchant for astrology. "On Melanchthon all depend; and whether he depends most on the stars or their Maker, I really don't know." Sozini, like many another man of an earnest and yet a doubting nature, found warmth and strength more helpful to him than mildness and moderation. And, as we have seen, he was not deeply enough tinctured with classic erudition or the classic spirit to appreciate for its own sake the peculiar genius of the Wittenberg humanist.

He left Wittenberg after eleven months' residence,‡ starting 25th June, 1551, for Prag and Vienna, intending to return to Saxony. But from Vienna he pressed on to Cracow, meeting

* Wallace, who renders, "I wish him back in Switzerland," and there stops, views the remark as a sign of "some degree of distrust." On the contrary, it is proof of confidence. The Greek is an iambic line, slightly transposed.

† C. F. Illgen: *Symboll. ad vitam et doctrinam L. Socini illustrandam*, 1826, ii. 20. Lelio, too, who was fond of playfully subscribing himself *Laeli* in letters to intimate friends, on one occasion signs thus: "*Laelius sive de amicitia* vera et christiana quae in aeternum durat." Hottinger: *Hist. Ecc. N. T.* ix. 474.

‡ Melanchthon, in furnishing Sozini with three letters of introduction on 1 Dec. 1557, speaks of his having been more than three years at Wittenberg, a lapse of memory which has misled later writers.

here Francesco Lismanin, whom he induced to throw off, with his Franciscan's habit, the last tie which bound him to Rome. From Cracow he came back to Zürich before the year was out. Switzerland, on his return, was astir with the discussion of Calvin's proceedings against Jerome Bolsec for heresies about predestination, of which accounts had already reached Sozini at Wittenberg. With characteristic candour, Lelio at once and without hesitation submitted his difficulties on this momentous topic, the very kernel of Calvinism, to the Oracle himself at Geneva. Bolsec had been banished on the 23rd December. Sozini's letter must have arrived almost directly after. Calvin was in no temper to be trifled with. Having just resorted to the argument of exile, he was little likely to be prepared for a serene examination of less potent syllogisms. To this we ascribe the peremptory tone of his reply to Sozini on New-year's-day, 1552. As quoted in part by Przypcowski, and often re-quoted, this famous letter wears an air of unrelieved harshness, and has been taken as a final utterance of Calvin to Sozini,* and as a fair sample of his relations with him. It is in truth a dignified response, indicating respect for his correspondent's powers, and curiously enough exhibiting more confidence in the straightforwardness of "my dear Laelius" than in that of Melanchthon. But the moment was one when the great dialectician had already done his best and his worst, and would neither be argued with nor argue. "I have spoken my mind before, and I gravely warn you again: unless you maturely correct this *quaerendi pruritum*, it is to be feared you may bring upon yourself severe anguish (*gravia tormenta*).†... The time will come, I hope, when you will rejoice to have been awakened even by this rude shock. Farewell, brother highly beloved (*dilectissime*) by me; and if this chiding (*objurgatio*) is harsher than is right (*aequo durior*), put it to the account of

* W. Cunningham: *Historical Theology*, ii. 159.

† After translating this "heavy calamities," Wallace remarks (following Przypcowski, who says, "pro responsione objurgationem *ac minas* reponit"): "Here it is intimated, in no very obscure terms, that, if Lælius pushed his inquiries any further, he must expect no mercy at the hands of Calvin." *Antitrin. Biog.* ii. 80.

your love towards me."* At any rate, Lelio besieged the Lion no more with speculations on the problem of predestination, as seen from the point of view to which Camillo Renato had introduced him.

His spirit of inquiry could not, however, remain idle above six weeks. His next line of investigation brought him face to face with the dilemma: 'How was it that Jesus Christ, while on earth, forbade his disciples to proclaim him as the Messiah? How was it they had no clear view of his approaching sufferings and death? Were they not sent to preach the kingdom of God? Can the kingdom of God be preached in the absence of a proclamation of the Messiah, and in ignorance of the method of redemption?' These queries he laid before Bullinger. The reply he got is one of the noblest epistles that ever faithful friend wrote to friend. To the points of inquiry Bullinger rendered a simple and sensible answer; then, with exceeding gentleness and affection, he added as follows:

"Lastly, since I love you, my brother, and long to give you the best advice as to my best and sincerest friend, I will add, to what I have here said, a very few words more for your admonition; nor do I doubt that you will take in good part this faithful and sincere freedom of mine. I see that you are very studious of the sacred writings, and of the business of our true salvation; but at the same time exceeding curious, for ever twisting and turning a multitude of knotty questions; raising entanglements and demanding to have them untied. Now I approve that ardent zeal of yours on a subject the most sacred. I recognize in you the excellent gift and kind bestowal of God most good. Others, indeed, surrender themselves to pleasures, resorting to the courts of princes, to rot at length in great anguish (*magnis cum tormentis*) and go down quick into hell. You, having the most ample opportunities of attending such resorts and thus perishing, raised above this by the right hand of God, choose rather by travel, by discussion, and by putting questions in season and out of season, to be learning that you may believe aright; and meantime are willing, through zeal for religion,

* See *Corp. Reff.* edn. of Calvin. The letter was published by Bonnet (*Lettres de Jean Calvin*, 1854), from a copy. Przypcowski, who alone gives the signature, "Calend. Jan. 1552, Joh. Calv. tuus," probably had access to the original. Henry gives a copy, with some inaccuracies, *Leben Johann Calvins*, Vol. i. 1835.

to be absent from your gentle and most tender parents, nay, to defraud your own genius. But I ask for moderation even in this matter, though it be the best. I praise the studious mind which directs all things to the assured end of true and eternal salvation, which knows how to have enough, which sometimes takes an interval of peace, yea rests secure in what it long hath learned. Our religion is not endless, but has been brought within easy compass. This religion, rightly understood, supplies also the plain meaning of Scripture, admits nothing incongruous, refers all things to piety, is no way solicitous about diversified and complicated questions. The Apostle approveth not those who are ever learning, and never arriving at the knowledge of verities, so that they may rest therein. Therefore with all my heart I appeal to your piety, dear and worshipful Lelio mine; put on the curb, observe measure and reason in your concerns. The end of the law is Christ, to the justification of every one that believeth; but Christ you have learned, and Christ you hold, and know that in him you have all things of life, and are thus completed in him. Herein then stand fast and abide, I beseech you. True theology is speculative no doubt, but even more is it practical. Believe, hope, love, persevere and pray, that you may be able for these things, that you may be guarded from all evil. Questions, with the discussions thence arising, leave to be sifted by those whose delight it rather is brilliantly to learn, than to rest with simple mind in the words of the Lord, and holily to live. Do not despise my counsel; I am not the first to set this before you."*

Needless to say, this sterling advice bore little fruit. The Sozzini were neither of them amenable to a plea from the outside, however beseeching. They took counsel with their own thoughts, and that was sufficient for them. On Lelio, Bullinger's fine exhortation had about as much effect as good Simon Ronenberg's touching, even if rather foolish, appeal about baptism, with "mi Domine Socine" in every other line of it, had at a later date upon Fausto. The young disputant (he was still not seven-and-twenty) felt himself master of a very keen weapon, and shewed small scruple about sometimes using it simply to keep its edge in order. Such must surely have been the motive for his wickedly puzzling Rudolph Gualther about the subtle-

* The letter (dated 21 Feb. 1552) is printed in full, Trechsel, ii. 447-52.

ties of Divine and human interaction involved in the phenomena of repentance. That was within three months of Bullinger's letter.

That same year Lelio revisited Italy.* After a stay of three weeks, in June 1552, under the roof of Vergerio at Vico-soprano, he started for Siena, a letter from his father arriving too late to alter his purpose. In September he reached Siena, "quam non ab Hispanis solum, verum etiam ab alia quacunque servitutis specie liberam salutavi," he writes to Bullinger. It was a crisis of hope, at which the heart of Sozini might well cry, with a later writer,

> "Beautiful and dear Italia,
> Surely Freedom's day appears!
> Though its dawn be crimson-tinted,
> And we watch it through our tears."

But, alas! as Trechsel well observes, it proved but the evening glow of a waning day. After a visit to his father at Bologna, he returned to his native place in the spring of 1553, enjoying there for a short while the unwonted privilege "libenter loqui de Christo inviso." But his stay was already attended with danger. At the end of September we find him in Padua, the guest for two months of Matteo Gribaldo. Gribaldo was fresh from Geneva, "graviter commotus"† by the proceedings against Serveto; and in Padua the two friends would receive with unmixed horror the details of the consummation of the great stain upon the Reforming movement.‡ In January 1554, Sozini reached Basle. Here the sad news overtook him of his mother's death, sad in its consequences in more ways than one. We find him at Geneva in April, and the following month once more at home in Zürich.

The year 1555, which we now approach, is the period when Sozini's speculations become most distinctly radical. Italy

* We may observe that it would not be possible to transfer to this date the Vicenza story, for we can trace the progress of Sozini's journey almost from week to week.

† *Contra Lib. Calv.* A6.

‡ Wallace is misled by Illgen in supposing Sozini to have been in Geneva "at the time when Servetus was cast into prison."

had given renewed impulse to his mind; the controversies and wants of the time furnished ample food for his thoughts; the death of Serveto compelled him to speculate upon the Trinity; the rise of the Locarno community seemed the providential occasion of religious freedom. At Basle he had "devoured" Bullinger's treatise on Divine Grace. He thought upon it long; for Sozini's difficulties were never the chance suggestions of the moment. He could not harmonize its teaching with the doctrine of the purchase of salvation through the merits of Christ. He could not account, on the hypothesis of an exclusive election, for the possession, even by the reprobate at times, of a sense of Divine Love; which, on the other hand, the righteous sometimes lose. To whom did he turn with his doubts? Again he resorted to Calvin; and this time the great man went carefully into his difficulties. It is worth noting that, on the first point, Calvin adopted a Scotist solution: "Christus nonnisi ex Dei beneplacito aliquid mereri potuit." To a local divine, Johann Wolff of the Frau-Münster, he addressed his thoughts on the Sacraments, the only subject, by the way, on which he is known to have reduced his ideas to anything like system.* His position may be best explained by saying that he applies to the Lord's Supper itself, and to Baptism as well, Camillo's doctrine of the Epulum. The Sacrament does not communicate any spiritual gift, as the Lutherans taught; nor is it a sign or seal of such communication, as with the Calvinists; still less is it, as the Zwinglians make it, a mere species of preaching, a visible invitation to others to draw near to Christ; or a simple commemoration according to the Racovian Catechism, "alioqui omnium immemor quo magis esset quis, eo rectius et frequentius sacramentis uti deberet, ut in memoriam sibi revocaret, quod excidit." It is the act of the assembled Church, not for reception or recollection, but for thankfully imparting to each other the joy of the Christian life.

To Wolff also he came with his speculations upon the Tri-

* See the somewhat crabbed *Laelii Socini de Sacramentis Dissertatio*, first printed 1654, and given in full by Trechsel, pp. 438-44.

nity; for Wolff had entered with some sympathy into his Sacramental views, and had impressed him as a man to be both esteemed and loved.* We have seen that in the previous year Sozini had made a flying visit to Geneva. While on the spot where the ashes of Serveto had so recently cooled, it was inevitable that his mind should be strongly exercised upon the mysterious dogma, for impugning which Serveto suffered martyrdom. The pastor of the Italian church in Geneva, Count Celso Massimiliano Martinengo, reports that Sozini had dropped in conversation doubts on the subject of the Trinity, and had written him a letter in which he recurred to the subject in more than a doubting spirit—"imo gloriari Turrem hanc a fundamentis eversam."† From Sozini's own letter to Wolff we learn what shape these doubts ultimately assumed. Sozini did not touch at all the question of the Incarnation; his point of departure was the Person of the Spirit. 'God is a Spirit,' said Sozini, 'that is to say, a Spiritual Being. Can there be any other meaning of the term, so as to justify us in speaking of a Third Person, distinct from the Father and the Son? Then, as to the Sonship; God is a Father; can we say, God is a Son? Is Christ the Son of a Trinity, or is he simply the Father's Son? Can even his human nature be called the work of a Trinity, though its creation must certainly be the act of the whole Godhead?'‡ These questions are far from

* "Quem ego pluris facio et magis diligo atque colo, quam re ipsa declaraverim."

† Trechsel, ii. 180. Long afterwards he was suspected by Beza (*Vit. Calv.*) of having had an important hand in the production of the famous "farrago," *De Haereticis, an sint Persequendi*, 1553, with a dedication by "Martinus Bellius." Trechsel has identified "Basilius Montfortius," one of the contributors to the volume, with Sebastian Castellio (*βασιλεὺς = σεβαστὸς, mons fortis = castellum*). It is just possible that from *sozzo* may have sprung Bellius, *bellum quia minime bellum* (Priscian), and from Bellius again, Martinus. Yet we hesitate to assign to Lelio either the masculine strength or the local allusions of Bellius. If he wrote any part of the book, it was probably the short concluding piece (pp. 170-3), *De Filiis Carnis, et Filiis Spiritus.* As for the *Contra Libellum Calvini*, 1554, which Cantù (ii. 485) unreservedly ascribes to Sozini, further examination has convinced us that the author of this second and less original pamphlet is still to seek.

‡ This most important letter has not yet, we believe, been printed in full. The following are the extracts on which we found the above reading of its purport. "An Spiritus ille reperiatur in Dei essentia ab eo distinctus qui est Deus Pater

suggesting the Socinian, or, to avoid confusion, we will say the Racovian view. They start from Camillo's doctrine of the Spirit, as strictly synonymous with the Godhead; while they point to a view of the generation of the Son which is Servetan, and, in principle, Athanasian. But Sozini knew theology, not as a historical science, simply as a living interest of his own time and his own thoughts.

How was it that Sozini chose Wolff rather than Bullinger as the recipient of these inquiries? Because Bullinger had been set to watch and report upon him. First Vergerio from Tübingen, next Philip Salutz from Chur, then Martinengo, lastly Calvin himself, had written strongly to Bullinger about those incautious words at Geneva. The good Bullinger had written back: "I restrain the man's curiosity as far as I can; I will look more carefully into the matter." He sought an interview with Sozini, read the letters he had received, without naming the writers, and entreated him to be open, and to say what his belief really was. The reply of Lelio was frank, and sufficiently orthodox to allay Bullinger's apprehensions. He asked if Lelio would authenticate with his signature what he had then and there expressed; not that he himself felt any mistrust, but that he might be able to satisfy others. Lelio at once expressed his readiness to do so. He was better than his word. Of his own accord he drew up a confession of his faith, which he handed to Bullinger, with his signature attached, and the date 15th July, 1555. Even Trechsel speaks highly of this document. It is manly, straightforward, and evidently sincere; bringing out the affirmative side of his Christian credence without overstepping the bounds of his actual belief, and "in no way endeavouring to cloak his doubts." Lelio was not the man to recant, with Camillo. It is true the temptations to do

atque Filius? . . . Praeterea vide an Filius de ipso Deo, sicut Pater, omnino praedicetur. Nam Jesus Christus illius Dei Filius, qui trinus et unus creditur esse, non tamen Filius Trinitatis dicitur, quamvis creatura sit, et opera Trinitatis ad extra censeantur indivisa." The letter is not dated. Wolff's answer was not written till 10 Aug. 1555. He does not attempt to enter into his friend's line of argument, but relies upon Patristic authorities.

so were not in his case so cruelly urgent. The scion of a wealthy house had a ready path of freedom open before him which was closed to the indigent pedagogue. Yet had he been in straits, his Tuscan nobleness would have forbidden him to stoop. Moreover, it is plain that his doubts arose, not from his having any alternative scheme to propose in substitution for the received doctrine, but from his earnest desire to get at the kernel of Evangelical religion in its purity. The Apostles' Creed, he said, whatever its authorship, he had learned as a boy and he believed as a man; those of Nicæa and Constantinople, new to him since his intercourse with Protestants, he honoured as much as he could and ought. Dogmatic terms, such as Trinity, Person and the like, were of old standing and of technical value; "though I will speak freely," said he, "what I think; I should be in every way satisfied if the Christian, apostolic and evangelic faith were still explained to us in the actual words of Christ, the Apostles, and the Evangelists." "Meantime," he adds, "I will never allow myself to be deprived of this sacred liberty, of inquiring from my seniors, and of discussing with modesty and reverence, to the increase of my knowledge of divine things." "Pray earnestly with me," he concludes, "to the God of all grace, that He may finish the good work which He hath begun in your Laelius; that he may no more be a boy, fluctuating and borne about with every wind, but, holding the truth in love, may profit in all things."* Bullinger thought this confession might have been improved; however, he did his best, and with tolerable success, to restore the confidence of the Reformers in Sozini.

The conclusion of Lelio's story is soon told. In reviewing the life of Ochino, we have already referred to the important part which Sozini took in the negociation which introduced Ochino to the pastorate of the Italian Church in Locarno.† His earnest letter (13th Jan. 1555) to the little community, soon to be refugees from "that beautiful but earthly paradise," is at once the most impressively religious of his extant writ-

* Trechsel, ii. 186.

† No. LV. Oct. 1876, pp. 551, 552.

ings,* and the one which, by the gospel simplicity of its reference to sacred themes, bears the clearest impress of Lelio's attachment to a type of Christianity unvitiated by the accretions of ecclesiastical dogma. He speaks of Christ as *nostro dolce crocifisso*, and *nostro precursore*, and renders "praise, honour and glory to our Father and God through the Lord Christ Jesus."

Late in the year following, his father died (20th Aug. 1556) at Bologna; and the death was succeeded by troubles respecting the family inheritance. During his father's lifetime, Lelio had no pecuniary anxieties; his wants were freely supplied from home by a generous hand. But things were different when Mariano, a good Catholic, was gone, and Siena again under a government which made it unsafe for his children to reside upon their patrimony. With a view to recover possession of the family resources, Sozini made a journey in 1558 to the Courts of Vienna and Cracow, hoping to secure the interest of those powers in support of his application to the reigning Duke of Florence.† His journey was not hastily undertaken. He fortified himself with influential introductions, visiting for this purpose Worms and Tübingen at the end of 1557. Before starting on his mission, he secured the good offices of Calvin, who writes to Bullinger (22nd May, 1558): "Your bare testimony that Laelius now rests in the same faith which we profess, would have been enough to make me receive him with kindness, forgetting all faults; your commendation made me ready in addition to render him without stint all the services he could ask."

Keeping his eyes constantly open to the religious affairs of the time, Lelio travelled by Tübingen, Augsburg and Vienna, to Cracow. Here he stayed six months, in close intercourse with the heads of the Evangelical party, particularly the aged Ivan Laski; and frequently "admissus in colloquium solita-

* The remains of Sozini consist of some four-and-twenty scattered letters, a short treatise, a confession, and a fragment. The present writer hopes, at some future time, to have the privilege of editing and translating these.

† Cosimo de' Medici, not "Grand Duke of Tuscany" (Wallace) till 1569.

rium" with the King, Sigismund Augustus II. Returning to Vienna, he was equally well received by Maximilian II., King of Bohemia and Archduke of Austria. He now felt sure of the success of his mission. The last letter from his pen which has come down to us addresses Bullinger in high spirits.

"Vivo, valeo, venio, and good tidings I bring of great joy to you all, and to Dominus Heinrich in especial. Pray God that he deliver me quickly out of Italy; and believe me that very few people know the true state of Polish affairs. Perhaps Utenhoven,* if he pass that way, will be able to do many things which no one else can. Maximilian left the city to-day, so as not to be present at the idolatrous procession (*circumgestatio*). He told me so himself, and other things besides, which you will gladly hear, and you will give thanks to God with me. May He protect me in this most perilous sequel of my journey. Nothing further can I now say. The rest I leave to our Burcher,† who has been bold enough to engage with Indians and Jesuits, and who is at one and the same time an admirable disputant and a great lover of the Zürich folk, but in this latter respect he may cheerfully yield to Laelius. God grant that they in their turn cease not to compass me with kindness, and it is enough.

"Vienna, 10 May, 1559. Yr. bro. LAELI SOZ."

Soon was this happy prospect overcast. Lelio's efforts, however strongly backed up, proved entirely fruitless. In August 1559 he returned to Zürich, a disappointed man. His brother Camillo had been compelled to fly from Italy. Cornelio, another brother, who lived at Rome, was detained in prison. A third brother, Celso, and the nephew Fausto, were rendered uneasy in their position at Siena. Their patrimony fell to the Inquisition. No charge of antitrinitarianism was, however, brought against them. Their heresies, as recorded in Camajani's letter of information, are purely Evangelical. They

* Johann Utenhoven, of Ghent, the friend of Laski.

† John Burcher, an English inventor of economical fuel (Fueslin. *Epp. Reff.* p. 418), "vir valde bonus," and the bearer of the letter. This man figures in the *Zürich Letters* (Parker Soc.) as an extreme Puritan, unhappily married. We find him in Switzerland as an exporter of wood for bows (1542), a cloth merchant (1548), and a brewer (1558). At last he takes Anglican orders, and gets a cure near London (1563).

regard churches as simply places for hearing the gospel; shrug their shoulders and otherwise make game during Mass; jest at purgatory, and "one of them, one morning, being present at a sermon by a Theatine, who discoursed on purgatory, abruptly went out, laughing and saying that he would not stay any longer to listen to such fables; another had spoken *poco conveniente* of the authority of the Holy See."*

A shadow falls upon the few remaining days of Sozini. He survived his return barely three years. How he supported himself, we do not know. The loss of comparative affluence must have severely affected a man of his patrician breeding. In Ochino, his fellow-townsman, despite the great disparity of their years, he found an intimate friend. We may imagine him a frequent visitor by the bedside of the ex-Capuchin during his long illness in 1560; and may be sure that he was consulted about the publication of the *Laberinti* in 1561, and saw in their Italian form the ever-memorable *Dialogi*, forwarded to Basle in 1562 to receive a Latin dress. We have traces, too, of a brother and a nephew as visitants at Zürich, not however under the same roof with Lelio. None of his kindred were with him when he died. He expired at his lodging in the house of Hans Wyss, silk-weaver, on the 14th May, 1562.† Fausto, who heard of the event through Anton Maria Bezozzi, came over from Lyons to gather up his beloved uncle's few books and papers.

That we devote so large a space to the study of a life which scarcely attained the age of seven-and-thirty, is due to prevalent misapprehensions of its true significance. From what we have said, it must be evident that Lelio Sozini has no claim to the title, bestowed upon him by Bayle, of "le premier Auteur de la Secte Socinienne." Lelio was always a querist,

* Cantù, ii. 448. The list of names appended to the letter is headed with Carlo (Celso) and Camillo, sons of Maria (Mariano) Sozini; Fausto, brother of Alessandro Sozini; and Savola, daughter (?) of Levio (Lelio) Pecci. Pecci himself, the husband of Porzia (Lelio's sister), was suspected. Seven others are named.

† Not, as Wallace says, following Illgen, "in the house of his friend Pellican." Conrad Pellicanus (Kürschner) died 14 Sept. 1556.

never a system-maker. Nor even is it true, as Jules Bonnet affirms, that his "doubts were afterwards to be set up as dogmas by his disciples."* We cannot help thinking that, had he lived to see his nephew's *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, he would have searched it with his keen intellectual probe, as relentlessly as though it had been Calvin's. Moreover, the point of view from which Lelio directed his subtle interrogations, was one which Fausto never reached. Lelio's mind was a deep well of religious thought, from which heresy was constantly gushing up with amazing force; but at the bottom of the well was a central pool of warm spiritual apprehension. Fausto had nothing of this. Little as the statement may seem borne out by a superficial glance at both men, his is the more fundamental scepticism. At the substratum he is a pure Agnostic. His fixed, unmalleable certainty, as regards the tenets in which he rested, is the result of his tenacious grasp of an alien and a dogmatic authority. The constructive principle which shapes his doctrines is essentially diplomatic. His positions face both ways. Adapting a Catholic language and providing for a Catholic worship, he withdraws the allegiance of the intellect from the radical ideas of the Catholic creed. In some respects Fausto Sozzini is the Hobbes of his age. But we anticipate.

ALX. GORDON.

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## II.—THE TEMPTATION OF CHRIST.

THE scene, vision or parable of the Temptation has been overladen by paraphrase and commentary. Its simplicity has been impaired by additions to the narrative, and its meaning obscured by the introduction of foreign or unnecessary ideas. Its universality has been sacrificed to a special and limited application, and that special application has been so elaborated

* *Letters of J. Calvin* (Eng. ed.), 1857, ii. 315.

and encumbered as altogether to divest the story of its original meaning.

What is the original meaning of the story of the three temptations, we propose to shew by adopting the simple plan of endeavouring to discover the clue to the temptations in the words of the several replies to them. "It is written"—these words are the key which, we believe, will open the whole of the parable.

Without any danger of impugning or touching the question of the general truth of the Gospels as historical narratives of the words and acts of our Lord and his followers, it is very easy—nay, quite imperative—to distinguish the story of the temptations as given in full in the Gospels according to St. Matthew and St. Luke, and briefly referred to in the Gospel of St. Mark, from the accounts of actual or possible events which the same narratives contain. We may allow that the best critics and commentators have at least effected this deliverance for us; that we are no longer troubled with the difficulty of discovering the exceeding high mountain whence all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them could be seen in a moment of time, or with the scarcely less difficult task of imagining the actual personal colloquy and contest between Jesus and the Devil, either in the wilderness, on the mountain, or on a pinnacle of the temple. Nor is it important to determine between the rival theories of "vision" or "parable." Spiritual things are spiritually discerned, and may be imparted either in the similitude of a dream or in the avowed form of a fiction. There are correspondences between the objects of the external world and the mind of man which give to vision and to insight a base as certain as the pillared firmament; and so long as man is a creature of high imaginings, retaining the image or likeness of God in his own nature, and placed in the midst of things both divine and material having the same source and origin, he will find the highest truths are brought to him in the wilderness of his spiritual wanderings, from the deeps of hell, or on the summits of beatific vision. It is, then, in no rationalizing spirit that we propose to deal with the subject of

the Temptations of Christ, nor with a design to explain them away. They are real, as all true spiritual experience is real; and firmer reality we do not expect or desire.

Milton's "Paradise Regained" has effected for the Temptation what Milton's "Paradise Lost" has done for the story of the Fall. Both these poems are contributions to what may without offence be called the English Protestant mythology; that is, they have expanded certain portions of the Bible by enlarging and adding to them, and by connecting them with sundry religious ideas and doctrines, so as to give to the portions in question an altogether different position, both actual and relative, from that which they would otherwise have held. They have enlarged the scenery and multiplied the persons of the original story, so that under their influence we have on one hand the rebellion of the angels and the fall of man in their minutest details, and on the other the scene of the personal conflict between Christ and Satan, filled up to the measure of a stately drama only less awful and grand than its great precursor. We cannot rid ourselves of the imposition of this great mythology. It is part not only of our literature, but of our religious thought. But we may keep ourselves free from its tyranny, and draw a straight line between its religious sources and its literary additions.

We have now nothing to do with the question of the "orthodoxy" of either of the two poems. We speak only of their relation to one another, and of the relation of the latter poem to the subject of this essay.

"Paradise Regained" is a complete and perfect work of art. As "Paradise Lost" turns upon the contest between Satan and God, represented by his Son, in which Satan is the victor, so in "Paradise Regained" the personal contest is renewed, and the warfare and victory in the wilderness described and celebrated. Therefore it is that Milton's elaborate treatment of the temptations changes their nature and meaning more completely, and gives them a more special and limited application than do the ordinary critics and commentators. But there is yet much that is common to both, particularly in the assump-

tion that the temptations were intended to test the official character of Christ as the coming Messiah, and as having scarcely any or no wider application. In Milton's poem they are narrowed to this view. God says to Gabriel,

> "But first I mean
> To exercise him in the wilderness;
> There he shall first lay down the rudiments
> Of his great warfare."*

The angels also speak of his "entering his great duel;" and thus the scheme of the drama is laid wherein the two actors contend for a particular victory.

On such a plan as this, enlargement may be carried to any extent; and in availing himself of the poet's privilege, Milton has given us, not three distinct acts of temptation, nor three several kinds of temptation, but as many as nine presentations of or persuasives to evil; of which the first eight are to be regarded as expansions of the first and second temptations, but without a clear line between the two classes; while the ninth and last singly represents the third temptation.

Adopting the order of the temptations as they appear in St. Luke's Gospel, Milton treats the scene on the pinnacle of the temple as the third temptation; while Matthew's Gospel places the temptation on the high mountain as third in order, and the pinnacle second. We prefer the order adopted by Milton, but for a very different reason, as will shortly appear.

But first we have to deal with Milton's amplifications. Through the four books of "Paradise Regained," the temptations are distributed as follows. The close of the first book is concerned with the first temptation, addressed to Christ, after his forty days' fast, by Satan in the guise of "an aged man in rural weeds," who, addressing Christ as the newly baptized prophet, says:

> "But, if thou be the Son of God, command
> That out of these hard stones be made thee bread;
> So shalt thou save thyself, and us relieve
> With food, whereof we wretched seldom taste."†

* Book i. 155. † Book i. 342.

Observe how the last clause changes and weakens the "temptation" by adding the plea of relieving the wants of the poor, an idea wholly distinct from and inconsistent with the selfishness of working a miracle for the relief of his own hunger. By the admixture of opposite motives, the directness of the moral trial is lost. But beyond this, the temptation is carried into a different form from that of a trial by hunger; for in his reply Christ says,

> "Why dost thou, then, suggest to me *distrust*,
> Knowing who I am, as I know who thou art?"*

reducing the matter to a mere personal contest between himself and Satan, as well as changing its true moral significance. For it is distrust of God that Milton's first temptation ultimately turns upon (as we see by the references to Moses and Elijah in Christ's reply), and subsequent writers have taken the same view.

"Why then should I, from a distrust either of His power or providential goodness, undertake to supply my own wants in a manner which He has not prescribed? * * * I will trust in God; persuaded that He will himself rather work a miracle in my favour than suffer me to want necessary sustenance."†

A late writer in "The Expositor" follows a similar line.

"Where supernatural power was supposed to exist, could it be wrong to test its reality in an act so holy and excellent as the preservation of an imperilled life? But the temptation, though formidable, was victoriously resisted. Christ did not take his life into his own hands; left it in the hands of God."‡

In the second book of Paradise Regained, Satan, after consulting his peers, and accompanied by a band of spirits, returns to the wilderness,

> "Where still, from shade to shade, the Son of God,
> After forty days' fasting, had remained,

* Book i. 355.

† Hugh Farmer: An Inquiry into the Nature and Design of Christ's Temptation in the Wilderness, 4th edition, 1805, p. 95.

‡ The Temptation of Christ, by A. M. Fairbairn. Expositor, Vol. III. p. 336.

Now hungering first, and to himself thus said :—
* * * * God
Can satisfy that need some other way,
Though hunger still remain. So it remain
Without this body's wasting, I content me,
And from the sting of famine fear no harm ;
Nor mind it, fed with better thoughts, that feed
Me, hungering more to do my Father's will."*

The last two lines are more to the purpose than any we have had before, and help to justify this second act of the first temptation, on which Satan, "seemlier clad," enters afresh into colloquy with our Lord, and presents a succession of persuasives or arguments in which the moral distinction between the first and second temptations seems to us to be blurred or lost.

He first calls up the "table richly spread in regal mode, with dishes piled and meats of noblest sort," and courteously invites Christ to partake of the feast. Christ rejects the offer, and the table vanishes in the classical manner, like the banquet in the Æneid, "with sound of harpies' wings and talons heard." Then Satan, observing,

"By hunger, that each other creature tames,
Thou art not to be harmed,"†

addresses a discourse advising the security of wealth :

"Therefore, if at great things thou would'st arrive,
Get riches first, get wealth, and treasure heap ;"‡

and Christ replies on the magnanimity of self-government, and concludes :

"Riches are needless, then, both for themselves,
And for thy reason why they should be sought—
To gain a sceptre, oftest better missed."§

It is difficult to say whether this temptation of riches should be referred to the first or second temptation, but at least it leads to the second, which we shall find in the third and fourth

* Book ii. 242—259. † Book ii. 406.
‡ Book ii. 426. § Book ii. 484.

books in five forms. In the third book we find—1, the advice to secure fame or glory; 2, to obtain the kingdom and throne of David; 3, the carrying of Christ to the mountain and the exhibition of the Eastern kingdoms, and the opportunity of the war between the Parthians and Scythians for successful interference on behalf of Judea. In the fourth book we find, 4, the exhibition of the Roman empire, and the offer of the kingdoms of the world,

> "On this condition, if thou wilt fall down,
> And worship me as thy superior Lord—
> Easily done—and hold them all of me:"*

and, 5, the view of Athens, and the offer,

> * * * Be famous, then,
> By wisdom; as thy empire must extend,
> So let extend thy mind o'er all the world
> In knowledge."†

These in succession our Lord rejects; and this series of temptations closes thus:

> "Since neither wealth nor honour, arms nor arts,
> Kingdom nor empire, pleases thee, nor aught
> By me proposed in life contemplative
> Or active, tended on by glory or fame,
> What dost thou in this world? The wilderness
> For thee is fittest place: I found thee there,
> And thither will return thee."‡

It is on the occasion of one only of these several scenes and dialogues that Satan mentions the "condition" on which the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them are offered to the tempted Saviour. The tempter's price is, "If thou wilt fall down and worship me as thy superior Lord, and hold them all of me." And here observe that the demand is not the worship of the Devil as the Supreme God, or the denial of the true God as an object of worship; but it is the homage of feudal tenure to feudal sovereignty which Satan requires of Christ as the condition on which he may hold the kingdoms of this

* Book iv. 166. † Book iv. 221. ‡ Book iv. 368.

world: and the condition is attached to this particular object only, and presented in connection with and immediately after the exhibition of the power of Rome. Our Lord rejects this offer of the Roman empire in the following words:

* * * "It is written,
The first of all commandments, Thou shalt worship
The Lord thy God, and only Him shalt serve;
Get thee behind me! plain thou now appear'st
That evil one, Satan for ever damn'd."*

And so appropriates the "reply" to the second temptation to this single act of it.

It is after this reply that Satan recommences his assaults on the Mount of Vision, and presents, in connection with the advice to "Be famous then for wisdom," the vision of "Athens the eye of Greece." Thus the poet severs his last act on the specular mount from the condition of Satanic worship or homage; and the temptation is rejected on moral grounds only, and in a noble discourse by our Lord on the greater glory and excellence of the Hebrew literature over that of Greece.

While the first temptation, as set forth by Milton and many subsequent commentators, is based in the distrust of God, the second is based on the attractions of earthly power and glory, to which the worship of Satan is attached as a necessary condition. Farmer says:

"These objects were placed before Christ in their most alluring forms; * * * nevertheless, the proposal was rejected the very instant it was made, and not without a mixture of just indignation: 'Get thee hence, Satan; for it is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and Him only shalt thou serve.'"†

And thus Farmer treats the scriptural reply of Christ as an expression of indignation, and fails to see that the whole meaning of the temptation is to be found in it.

Fairbairn says:

"The temptation seems eminently gross. Yet devil-worship can assume many forms, and some of these may be most refined. * * *

* Book iv. 175—194. † Pp. 108, 109.

Jesus is recognized as seeking a kingdom, as intending indeed to found one. * * * The only question is as to the nature of his kinghood and kingdom."*

We submit that the observation about Jesus "seeking a kingdom" is a begging of the question, and a putting in the disturbing idea as to the nature of the temptation, and shall recur to it presently.

Both Farmer and Fairbairn place this temptation as the third in order,—and the latter even while characterizing it as "eminently gross," and after having said of the temptation on the pinnacle, "perhaps his self-sacrifice reached here its sublimest point." We should expect to find the order of the temptations a moral order, ascending from each point to a higher one, and so we think we shall be able to shew; but meantime it is worth while to bear in mind how the order recommends itself variously to different writers.

The third temptation in Milton's poem forms a marvellous and vigorous climax to the great "duel." Foiled in all his offers of food, fame, wealth, power and glory,—foiled too by the meekness with which Jesus had borne the terrible storm, the dreams and haunting ghosts which Satan had called up in the wilderness in the night succeeding the visit to the "specular mount,"—the Devil returns in the morning to urge his pleas and to threaten our Lord with

> * * "many a hard assay
> Of dangers, and adversities, and pains,
> Ere thou of Israel's sceptre get fast hold;"†

and on his replying,

> "Those terrors * * I contemn,
> As false portents, not sent from God, but thee;
> Who, knowing I shall reign past thy preventing,
> Obtrud'st thy offer'd aid, that I, accepting,
> At least might seem to hold all power of thee,
> Ambitious spirit! and would'st be thought my God:
> * * desist—thou art discerned."
> * * * * *

* P. 340. † Book iv. line 478.

* * "the fiend, now swoln with rage, replied:
Then hear, O Son of David, virgin born!
For Son of God to me is yet in doubt."*

The Devil now opens the doubt of Christ's Sonship:

"In what degree or meaning thou art called
The Son of God, which bears no single sense.
The Son of God I also am, or was;
And, if I was, I am; relation stands:
All men are sons of God; yet thee I thought
In some respect far higher so declared!"†

and bears him up through the air, and alights with him on the pinnacle of the temple. Then comes the challenge:

"Cast thyself down safely, if Son of God;
For it is written, He will give command
Concerning thee to his angels; in their hands
They shall uplift thee, lest at any time thou chance
To dash thy foot against a stone."‡

Now comes the climax of the poem. It is in Christ's reply to the challenge, and its immediate effect the casting down of his tempter:

"To whom thus Jesus; Also it is written,
Tempt not the Lord thy God. He said, and stood.
* * * * *
So Satan fell; and straight a fiery globe
Of angels on full sail of wing flew nigh,"§

and bore the Lord to a flowery valley for refreshment. A chorus of angels celebrates his victory, and he returns to his mother's house.

It is now evident that Milton places this last temptation third, because according to his view it contains the final answer to the final challenge which Satan makes to Christ, namely, that he should prove his Sonship to *him*, Satan; not that he should prove it to himself, Christ, which we hold to be the

* Book iv. 487—501.
† Book iv. 516.
‡ Book iv. 555.
§ Book iv. 560—582.

proper meaning. And Christ's reply in the poem is the sublime and crushing declaration of his own Deity, in which he in effect says, Tempt *me* no more. Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God. The dramatic completeness is perfect.—Now let us turn to Farmer and Fairbairn, and ask what is the underlying meaning which they and other commentators assign to the temptation on the pinnacle, for it is totally different from the meaning which Milton gives to it. Farmer says,

"The scene of this temptation was Jerusalem, the metropolis of Judea, and the seat of power; it was the *Temple* of Jerusalem, where the Jews expected the first appearance of their Messiah, that Angel of the Covenant, who was to come suddenly to it; it was the *wing* of the Temple, the eastern front of it, which commanded a view of the crowd of worshipers below. From this most public eminence, and before immense multitudes, not from the obscurities of the wilderness, is Christ required to throw himself down, in a dependence upon the Divine protection (which none could have so much reason to expect as the Son of God), that so his miraculous preservation might give evidence of his divine mission, and induce the numerous worshipers, who were eye-witnesses of it, to acknowledge him immediately as the Messiah, visibly descending from heaven, in a manner agreeable to the expectation of the Jews."*

Fairbairn says:

"What could better exalt into a divine and fearless ecstasy an imaginative soul, loving God too well to distrust Him, than the thought of a trust so boundless as to believe that the impalpable and yielding air would be made by His hands as safe as the solid earth? or what could better lift into dauntless enthusiasm a mind anxious to regenerate sense-bound men than the vision of a descent into the crowd in the visible arms of Heaven, the manifest supernatural messenger of the merciful God? The temptation was, on the one side, powerful to a spirit full of generous trust in God; and, on the other, no less powerful to a spirit full of generous designs for man."†

Milton has changed the character of the third temptation from a trial of character to a personal conflict between the Author

* P. 101. † P. 338.

of our salvation and the Enemy of mankind; but, while altering its whole meaning, he has added nothing foreign to the narrative. Farmer and Fairbairn import into the narrative circumstances connected with the place in which it is supposed to occur, and call in the crowds of the temple-court to witness an external manifestation of the Messianic claims, and to acknowledge the office and mission of the longed-for Redeemer, in case he should adopt the Satanic suggestion as to the manner in which he should enter on his mission. These unwarranted additions to the narrative appear to us altogether misleading, for they deprive the temptation of its moral character, and imply the complete Messiahship before the necessary preparation for it. Farmer labours with much ingenuity to shew that the highest pinnacle of the temple was not the best point from which the great experiment could be tried, and that the *wing* of the temple, and the eastern front of it, was best suited to meet the expectations of prophecy, and to shew the miraculous interposition of the angels to the greatest number of spectators. Fairbairn, while adhering to the theory of an imaginary public experiment, endeavours to supply the moral conditions of the problem, and inquires:

"Now what was the evil in this suggested act? It was two-fold, evil alike on the Godward and on the manward side. In the first aspect, it meant that God should be forced to do for him what he had before refused to do for himself—make him an object of supernatural care, exempted from obedience to natural law, a child of miracle, exceptional in his very physical relations to God and Nature. In the second aspect, it meant that he was to be a Son of wonder, clothed in marvels, living a life that struck the senses and dazzled the fancies of the poor vulgar crowd. In the one case it had been fatal to himself, in the other to his mission."*

We submit that there is no ground whatever in the gospel narratives for introducing the idea of a scenic impression on the people of Jerusalem by a miraculously intercepted descent from the pinnacle or wing of the temple, or indeed for putting

* Pp. 338, 339.

the public manifestation of the Messiahship into the story at all. The third temptation, like the other two, is purely personal, moral, spiritual, and, like them also, universal in its application. And we object more strongly to the additions which have been made to it by the commentators, than we do to Milton's amplifications of the whole series. The latter is allowable as an imaginary re-casting of the story for poetical purposes, and for completing the great drama of human redemption, of which Paradise Lost is the earlier and greater part; but the duty of the expositor or commentator is altogether different from this, and is confined to the discovery of the meanings involved in the text.

There can be no room for a charge of presumption in an attempt to find a key to the meaning of the temptations without seeking it outside the words of the record.

The preparation of Jesus for the work of life had much in common with the moral discipline and spiritual experience of mankind, or at least of those of the human family who have approached the perfection of sons of God. He was subject to his parents; he increased in wisdom and stature and in favour with God and man; he was led by the spirit into the wilderness, and there, and probably elsewhere, he "was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin."

The nature of this temptation we learn from the two remarkable narratives in the Gospels of St. Matthew and St. Luke, and from the brief allusion to the same event in the Gospel of St. Mark. If this temptation was of the same kind as that which besets every man—that is, every man who undergoes religious experience at all—it is not unlikely that we shall find a universal form of experience in the narratives which we are now about to consider. Our thesis is, that the three forms or kinds of temptation to which our Lord was subjected are of universal application, that they are such as cover the whole ground of moral and spiritual experience and trial, and therefore answer to the words quoted from the Epistle to the Hebrews which describe Jesus as the High Priest who had been touched with a feeling of our infirmities, who was in all

points tempted like as we are, yet without sin. The moral relation of Christ to his followers could not be placed on wider or more universal ground. With these preliminary observations we proceed to examine the temptations in their order, adopting that of St. Luke's Gospel, because it appears to be the moral order in an ascending series.

First, be it observed, that the temptations open with the alleged supposition that Christ (and the supposition may be extended to mankind generally) is the Son of God. "If thou be the Son of God," is the hypothesis which the tempter presents as the grouud upon which he tries the character of the tempted—and he presents the supposition for the purpose, if possible, of defeating it. The filial relation of man to God underlies all moral and spiritual possibilities. Man made in the likeness of God and bearing His image is the primary condition of all religion; it is declared at the commencement of the Hebrew Scriptures, it is predicated of Christ in the New Testament, and its fulfilment is the consummation of all things. But men may be driven from this ground of Sonship by the abuse of it, by the misuse of it, or by the doubt of it. The evil suggestions which beset the minds of men are all of them calculated to drive them from their Godly allegiance, and they come, moreover, in the form of a contest between our better and our worser selves, or in the form of a contest between ourselves and some external power of evil, like that of Satan in the temptations now under review. To our modern habits of thought, moral conflict appears merely as the necessary condition of moral character in the ordinary circumstances and collisions of life, and spiritual conflict as a similar discipline in the higher region of spiritual things. But the reality of this conflict is not lessened, nor are its tremendous issues to be escaped, by the use of this modern and apparently rational view of the question.

Let those who rest in the lower kinds of experience, and suppose that the nature of man includes only the moral as exclusive of the spiritual characteristics of being, bear in mind that the consequences and retributions of human life are yet the things of the widest and deepest importance, and that the

"issues of life," however some may narrow them, are the "whole of man," and are directed according to the will of the supreme Source of all morality. Leaving open the question of the extent of our moral and spiritual experiences, we approach the beginning of the trial of character as exemplified in the "temptations." The first act of the moral drama is the simplest form of probation: forty days of solitude and weariness have exhausted the body and left the mind a prey to doubts and cares. The first temptation comes with the pressure of hunger, and the Son of God is confronted by the conflicting claims of the animal life and the spiritual life. The reply of Jesus to the suggestion that he should "command this stone that it may be made bread," opens the question of the objects and sources of human life. The meaning of the temptation is in the reply, and the reply comes from the words of Scripture—"It is written, that man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word of God." It is the answer of the better self to the worser self. It is the claim of the higher or spiritual life set up against the lower or animal life. It states both what life in its best sense is, and how it is to be fed. It satisfies the doubts of every hungry soul hungering after righteousness, and solves such great questions as the following: "How will you live? To what ends will you devote your life? Will you spend the gifts and powers bestowed on you by God upon the wants of the body and the senses?" The solution of all these doubts and questions is, that the word of God is the source of man's better life—or, as it is given in St. Matthew's Gospel, "Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God." The true life is the life of God in His children, the life which is fed by every word of His spoken into the hearts of His children. We learn from this reply to reject every inducement or temptation to abuse the moral and spiritual powers and faculties by diverting them from the higher life to the lower life.

The argument is not narrowed to the use of "miraculous" endowments by an exceptional person, but is expanded to the case of all moral beings. It will now clearly appear that

Milton's singular addition to the narrative in representing the poor peasant as asking for bread to relieve his own hunger, is foreign to the lesson of the temptation, and unfortunately suggests a legitimate exercise of power. It will also appear that the first temptation is not based on distrust of God, as Farmer supposes, and as is also implied in Fairbairn's explanation already quoted.

The second temptation contrasts the kingdoms of this world with the kingdom of God, and involves the nature and object of worship. The narrative carries us up into the Mount of Vision. There are displayed all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them, and they are offered on the condition of "worship." "If thou wilt fall down and worship me," says Satan, "all these things will I give thee." What, then, is meant by worship? Personal submission of body and soul, desire, honour, devotion, self-abandonment, are all implied in the word "worship." To what, or to whom, do you submit, aspire, give your admiration, give yourself, yield and subserve your life and your spiritual longings? Behold, the kingdoms of the world, and the power and the glory of them, are for those who forsake the worship of God and His service for "all these things." Again comes from the words of Scripture the answer, "It is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and Him only shalt thou serve;" and the answer is a complete clue to the meaning of the temptation. The evil suggestion is, Will you worship and serve the powers of this world, and so enjoy its dominion and glory? And the reply, involving more than the ordinary meaning of religious worship, is, "The Lord thy God—Him only—thou shalt serve." Your life and worship shall be an acknowledgment of His sovereignty and supreme glory, and the devotion of all your heart and life and strength to His service. The evil resisted in this temptation does not lie in the attractions of power, glory and fame, but in seeking such things by the rejection of the nobler worship of God. Indeed, the details of this temptation have been suffered to overlay the nature of it, and too much has been made of the desire of power and glory, and too little of

the question of worship which is involved in it. The excellence of power and glory, when held as gifts from God and employed as such, cannot be denied; and His servants, according to their ordered ranks of nobility, are distinguished by such gifts. Bearing this in view, it becomes obvious that the temptation turns wholly upon the principle of "worship," and teaches that to worship any other power than God himself, even though all the world's rewards and distinctions may be gained by it, is evil. "Worship" may be said to cover the whole of human life. Every spiritual being deems something supremely desirable, and clothes it with "worth-ship," even though he may do it unconsciously, and may from time to time change the object of his longing. To the spiritual nature, diverted by specious desires and promises from the rightly supreme object of worship, the meaning and answer of the temptation are addressed; and so was the temptation presented to our Lord: not the demand of a partial homage or fealty for earthly possessions as distinct from spiritual things, and leaving God a separated object for religious adoration only, nor as a "gross" temptation appealing to the lower faculties, but as a temptation of the whole of his nature; and he had to learn by inward trial and conflict the meaning of the text which comforted him under it, and to reject for ever all inferior claims to his devotion, and to approve himself the Son of God by undivided and perfect allegiance to Him for ever.

The third temptation, as we have already remarked, is the highest in the ascending moral and spiritual series. It is most fitly presented to him who has surmounted the first and second forms of temptation and become settled in the primary conditions of spiritual life and worship. Every son of God passes through the first temptation to the recognition of the means and objects of life, and learns that he is to live on the word of God, to draw all his life and nourishment as a spiritual being from that source. Henceforth he has but one object in life. Neither for bread, nor for the satisfying of any appetite of his lower nature, is he henceforth to live. He is so far a spiritual being. Through the second temptation he has learned to devote

himself to God in all his desire and worship, and is thereby advanced still higher into the spiritual life. But the conflict is not ended. Doubt, the great trier of the spiritual nature, comes in the form of the question, "Art thou indeed the Son of God?" and suggests (and herein lies the evil element in the temptation), "If thou be the Son of God, try the proof of it by some direct method—stake thine existence upon it—put the proof of it upon God himself! Tempt thy God; challenge Him; fling back into His hands the life which He has given thee, and demand its return on thy own conditions!" What room is there in such a dread conflict as this for the scenery and circumstances which have been imagined and described in connection with it? What has this terrible hour of trial to do with the crowds of devotees in the temple-courts, and the introduction to them of their expected Messiah, the Lord coming to his temple in a visible descent on the wings of angels? A pinnacle of the temple is indeed the fit scene for this wager of life and death; the giddy height whence precipitation would be easy, quick and irreversible. The imagination of every Hebrew youth would be possessed with the image of the crowning spires piercing the Syrian blue up into its almost invisible heights. To such a point the tempted spirit naturally flew in thought to rehearse the dreadful moment which might solve its agonizing doubts and determine its filial character at once and for ever by the alternative of a suicidal death or a divine deliverance. Appropriate to the meditation of the great problem is the text put into the mouth of Satan. "It is written," says the mocking spirit of unbelief, drawing from Christ's own treasury the words wherewith to clothe the evil thought, and imitating the august formula of reference to the sacred books,—"Cast thyself down, for it is written, 'He shall give his angels charge over thee to keep thee. And in their hands they shall bear thee up, lest at any time thou dash thy foot against a stone.'"

The reality of the spiritual intercourse between God and man is approved in the distinction which conscience and experience universally support between a rational trust in

God and the rashness, whether of defiance or of confidence, which presumes on Him beyond the sphere of our conscious relation to Him as His creatures and children: nor is there much difference between the defiant and the overweening spirit in the "tempting" of God to which man is so prone, and which is represented in the conflict on the pinnacle. The Scripture passage quoted by Satan really refers to the rational and comforting trust of a childlike faith. The Satanic suggestion turns it into a mocking challenge.

In this instance, again, the answer of Christ to his assailant is the declaration of a truth which is the basis of the spiritual relation of man to God: "Get thee behind me, Satan. It is written again, Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God." If I am the Son of God, and because I am, I shall not tempt Him to prove it to me by myself doing any act or making any demand which is inconsistent with this relation to Him. This is the answer of faith; and by faith the most subtle of all temptations is overcome. It would not be difficult to find parallels of experience to this final trial in the histories of saintly men who have recorded the great crises of their spiritual life; such, for instance, as that of Bunyan, who, in an early period of perplexity, thought he would put his conversion to the test of a miracle by commanding the dry places to become wet, and the wet places dry, over which he was walking with downcast looks under his burden. No more intense or anxious doubt or fear can try the spirit of man than the fear that he may be abandoned of God or cut off from Him. The privilege of being a child of God is so great, and the only assurance we can possibly have of such a relationship is so purely inward and spiritual, that the suggestion of a doubt of it may well drive the troubled soul to seek for some external or miraculous method of becoming convinced of it. But the doubt is not thus to be solved; and the moral use of every struggle for assurance is obviously to bring about the conviction by the answer of *faith*, and to discover and experience the nature of faith in the most perfect exercise of it.

If the foregoing remarks are correct, it is now obvious that

Milton's treatment of the third temptation completely reverses its meaning, and the meaning of the text quoted in reply to it. That reply covers the whole ground of the relation by faith of man to God. To deny this relation is alienation from God; to doubt it speculatively is part of the discipline of spiritual men; to challenge it by any act of defiance or disobedience, is the evil from which our Lord was delivered when he found in the written precept the principle which raised him above the power of Satan, and learned that he would have forfeited his Sonship had he presumed to tempt his God.

In conclusion, we would ask whether it is possible to conjecture whence the narrative of the temptations was derived. It may be regarded as a summary of the spiritual discipline of man thrown into the form of a parable; and yet it is at the same time the result of the anxious meditations of the forty days in the wilderness, perhaps carrying their retrospect over the experiences of the previous life, and bringing them to the test of a final strife with the powers of evil. In any case it is a real experience and a spiritual fact of the utmost import. It could have been communicated only by Jesus himself. It could have been witnessed externally by no one; and, by its peculiarity as an internal experience, learned in solitude, and therefore differing in its origin and nature from the discourses and acts of our Lord, it is necessarily distinguished from these in its form and in its place in the Gospel narratives. If such be the case, it is fitly relegated to its place in the order of the events of the life of Christ, by those who collected and committed to writing the records we now possess. And while it differs in kind, as we have said, from the rest of the recorded events of our Lord's life from his baptism onwards, it also differs materially from those accounts of the infancy which are so variously related in the introductions to the several Gospels of St. Matthew and St. Luke.

One more remark is necessary to clear our view of the temptations, and it is as to the "miraculous" element in them. In the purely spiritual region there is no distinction of miraculous or non-miraculous. That region has its own scenery and objects

for the inward sight; and the "miraculous" element, however it may be defined, and inseparable as we feel it to be from the Gospel narratives, without impairing their integrity and diminishing their value, does not, in the same sense in which it relates to the wonderful works of Christ, belong to the narrative of the temptations. Indeed, in the first only of the three temptations is it even suggested; from the second and third it is wholly absent. To whatever evil thought or act the temptations were presented as inducements in the case of our Lord, in like manner they are also presented to all men, and the answers of Christ are their antidote.

In this feeble attempt to explain the awful scenes of the great conflict between Heaven and Hell in the person of our Master, we disclaim every intention to weaken its force or disparage its value; and we ask only that our remarks may be regarded as a small contribution to the careful and reverent study of the words of Scripture, by which their inexhaustible lessons of truth can best be learned.

HERBERT NEW.

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## III.—BERKELEY AND POSITIVISM.—I.

IT is a very prevalent idea that Berkeley's speculations, though ingenious and fanciful, are so immediately felt to be false by the common-sense understanding as to need no serious refutation. Lord Byron may be taken as the exponent of popular feeling in this direction. His often-quoted words occur at the beginning of the 11th canto of Don Juan:

> "When Bishop Berkeley said 'there was no matter,'
> And proved it—'twas no matter what he said;
> They say his system 'tis in vain to batter,
> Too subtle for the airiest human head;
> And yet who can believe it?"

Who indeed can believe, as he walks along the crowded streets of London and mingles in the busy life of the world, that the

true statement of the case is this—that his spirit, which is neither here nor there, but exists out of relation to space, is being operated upon by the Divine Spirit, and that the world, as he knows it, is the result of the operation—that a series of dissolving views, as it were, is being passed before him, but views, if the confusion of expression be allowed, addressed not merely to the sense of sight but to all the senses? Yet this is the sum and substance of what Bishop Berkeley calls upon us to accept. It is hard of credence undoubtedly; the difficulty, however, is one not peculiar to this system, but common to metaphysic in general. Not Berkeley alone, but all metaphysicians give a shock to ordinary notions. The moment we begin to penetrate beneath the surface, we find out that "things are not what they seem." This is an offence to the ordinary mind, which is content to take things as it finds them. Yet the antagonism between metaphysical and positive thought arises out of a mere misunderstanding. The metaphysician attempts to explain appearances, and he is credited with an attempt to explain them away. The fact seems to be, that there are two planes of thought entirely distinct from one another, the common-sense and the metaphysical. We may move safely and freely on either of these planes, so long as we confine ourselves to it; but the moment the two are allowed to intersect, confusion is sure to be the result. We may accept our perceptions and reason about them, investigating their relations of sequence and co-existence; and so long as we do this, we are moving on the plane of common sense, which is also the plane of physical science. Or, coveting a deeper kind of knowledge, in which certainty appears unattainable, we may dive under the surface of the things perceived, and inquire into the cause of our own perceptions and the nature of the percipient. This brings us to a different plane of thought—the plane of metaphysic—wherein things assume a fresh aspect and require a new language. Strangely different indeed are the two views of things, the interior or metaphysical and the exterior or common-sense view. It would be idle to maintain that there is nothing in

Berkeleyism which it is difficult for one's work-a-day thoughts to grasp. But as Berkeley moves wholly in the plane of metaphysic, his conclusions for that very reason admit more easily of adaptation to the facts of perception than the views of other metaphysicians, who, like Locke, are not wholly weaned from common sense, or, like Reid and his followers, consciously seek to conciliate it. Berkeley has never allowed the metaphysical plane of thought to intersect that of common sense, and therefore his results in the one plane may be taken up and applied to facts in the other with less difficulty than in the case of semi-idealist systems. The facts of experience, indeed, viewed metaphysically, may seem strangely distorted, as a familiar thought will sound strange when expressed in a foreign language. But when we have learnt the language we recognize the thought. All metaphysic is disquieting to our easy acquiescence in appearances and the slumber of common notions. But if we make up our minds to be metaphysical at all, we shall find it more expedient, I think, to go the whole length with Berkeley than to put up at the half-way house provided for our entertainment by other metaphysicians.

The good understanding which now exists between Idealism and Scepticism only became possible by the very points in Berkeley's doctrine on which he himself laid most stress being controverted or left out of sight. No sooner had the new philosophy, which was to serve for the eternal discomfiture of the Atheist and the Sceptic, been propounded, than it was taken up by those very foes, who have since regarded Berkeley as their patron-saint. Hume, with ironical gratitude, refers to his works as the armoury of Scepticism. Whether this compliment were at all deserved will appear in the sequel of our inquiry. As a starting-point, let us take the following passage from Berkeley's own writings, which contains a compendious statement of the doctrine of Immateriality. It occurs in the third dialogue between Hylas and Philonous.

"That there is no substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit, is to me evident. And that the objects immediately perceived are ideas, is on all hands agreed. And that sensible qualities are objects

immediately perceived, no one can deny. It is therefore evident that there can be no substratum of these qualities but spirit, in which they exist, not by way of mode or property, but as a thing perceived in that which perceives it. I deny therefore that there is any unthinking substratum of the objects of sense, and, in that acceptation, that there is any material substance. But if by material substance is meant only sensible body, that which is seen and felt (and the unphilosophical part of the world I dare say mean no more), then I am more certain of matter's existence than you, or any other philosopher, pretend to be. If there be anything which makes the generality of mankind averse from the notions I espouse, it is a misapprehension that I deny the reality of sensible things: but as it is you who are guilty of that, and not I, it follows that in truth their aversion is against your notions, and not mine. I do therefore assert that I am as certain as of my own being, that there are bodies or corporeal substances (meaning the things I perceive by my senses), and that granting this, the bulk of mankind will take no thought about, nor think themselves at all concerned in the fate of those unknown natures and philosophical quiddities which some men are so fond of."

The initial assumption which meets us here, "that the objects immediately perceived are ideas," calls for some comment. Berkeley, we see, takes it for granted as a thing past all dispute. Nevertheless, it was vigorously denied by Reid, by whom all the paradoxes of Scepticism were traced to this assumption as their fountain-head. Undoubtedly Berkeley builds his system on this foundation. It behoves us therefore to inquire whether this primary position is secure. First, however, we must endeavour to clear away the cobwebs which the ambiguity of language has gathered round the question.

When Berkeley resolved the external world into ideas, people thought he was making of it an airy nothing, a phantom of the mind, whereas the kind of ideas he meant, namely sense-impressions,* instead of being mere thoughts, are the grossest

* The term "sense-impressions" will be used throughout this paper convertibly with "perceptions" for the cognitions of the mind through the senses. The question of how much is given in the actual sense-presentation and how much is added by the intellect was not raised by Berkeley, and will not be touched here.

realities we know. If you see a fist flourishing before your eyes, and presently feel the pain of a blow, you have there two ideas in the sense in which Berkeley used the term. Clearly this is a very different sense from that which it commonly bears. When people in general talk of ideas, what they mean is thoughts, which are not sense-impressions but the reproductions of such impressions. It is a pity that the word "idea" should ever have been used to cover actual perceptions; for this looseness of phraseology has contributed more perhaps than anything else to the misapprehension of Idealism. Why then should any man of common sense lay himself open to such obvious risk of misinterpretation? Philosophers, it must be confessed, are too much inclined to the use of esoteric language. So long as they are understood by their fellow-hierophants, they think little of the profane crowd. Berkeley simply continued to use the word "idea" in the sense in which it had been employed before him by Locke. And Locke extended the term from thoughts, or the reproductions of sense-impressions, to the sense-impressions themselves, because he wanted to signalize the fact that the mind is equally concerned in both. For what, for instance, are the sight of a fist and the pain of a blow? Are they not sense-impressions, that is to say, affections of the mind? Locke saw and insisted upon the undeniable truth, that we cannot know things except as they appear to our minds—in other words, that we know with our minds and not without them. Consequently, whatever things may be in themselves, they must be translated into mental language before we can become cognizant of them. Hence he introduced the word "idea" to mark the relation which all knowledge must necessarily bear to the mind. But in this procedure no account was taken of the broad distinction between the presentative and the representative faculties—between perception and thought—though the word "idea" was then, and is now, understood to stand for a mere thought as opposed to an actual perception. So anxious was Locke to emphasize the part played by the mind in knowledge, that he compassed this end even by an abuse of language. Berkeley then could plead philosophical precedent for his use

of the word "idea." But he had a very good reason beyond this for retaining it in the teeth of objections. For it served as the flag and symbol of the insurrection he headed against the existing order of thought, marking, as it did, that Matter was deposed and that Mind reigned in its stead. While Locke had said that we know Matter only through the medium of Mind, Berkeley said much more, namely, that we know Mind only. Locke left some independent existence to Matter, Berkeley none. It was therefore very tempting for the revolutionary Bishop to retain a word already in use, which suited his own purpose better than that of its first employer. Nevertheless, the harvest of misuse has been reaped in misconstruction. If Berkeley had been content to speak explicitly of the dependence of things on the mind, instead of implying the same by his use of the word "idea," which was irrevocably devoted to a different purpose, his doctrine might now require less careful elucidation. Hume, while accepting Berkeley's Idealism, recalled the word "idea" to its original and proper meaning. The cognitions of the senses he called "impressions" and their reproductions in the mind "ideas." Perhaps Berkeley could not resist the temptation of giving sober folk a start. However that may be, we have now, I hope, disentangled his meaning. By "ideas," he means sometimes sense-impressions, at other times simply thoughts.

The lack of a general term to cover both perceptions and thoughts, which Locke and Berkeley sought to supply by an illicit extension of the term "idea," has since led to the introduction of the word "consciousness." "Our own consciousness is all that is known to us, and all else is only more or less probable inference,"* is now the watchword of a considerable section of metaphysicians. But this limitation of the sphere of knowledge would have met with no countenance from Berkeley. When that philosopher declared that "the objects immediately perceived are ideas," he never dreamt of confining the knowledge of the individual to himself. Only he would

* Charles Bray, Manual of Anthropology, p. 155.

have said that what we know beyond our own ideas, or states of mind, is known to us, not immediately, but by reason. "The deducing," he tells us, "of causes or occasions from effects or appearances, which alone are perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason." Above all things, Berkeley would have denied that there is nothing knowable beyond our consciousness; for in his view God lay beyond it. But that point we have not yet come to. It still remains for us to examine the truth of Berkeley's primary assumption, "that the objects immediately perceived are ideas."

"Surely," the objector may exclaim, "we know things as immediately as thoughts!" Even so: but things as well as thoughts are consciousness. Consciousness, Berkeley would have said, is not something which intervenes between us and an outer world: the outer world is itself a part of our consciousness. The mind does not commerce with things through means of ideas, as Locke erroneously imagined. Ideas as apart from things have no existence, nor things as apart from ideas. Setting the Deity out of sight, there are only two factors in cognition—a mind, on the one hand, and, on the other, things or ideas. That this is a true representation of Berkeley's view may be judged from the words of Philonous: "I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things, since those immediate objects of perception which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves." It might then be maintained with just as much truth that Berkeley denied the existence of perceptions as that he denied the existence of external things, since what he did was to identify the two. But this identification of things with perceptions is just what common sense revolts against. "What is perceivable," says Berkeley, "but an idea?" To this we are all ready to answer, "Things." "Oh! things of course," replies the Bishop; "but then ideas are things, and things are ideas." Our wrath rises. For have we not an ineradicable conviction that there is a difference between perceptions and things? We do more than perceive our own perceptions: we *have* perceptions *of* things. We refuse, therefore, instinctively, to accept

the identification of things with perceptions. But perhaps part of the difficulty lies, as usual, with language. Does Berkeley indeed mean the same as we do when he talks of "things"? If not, we must grope again among the ambiguities of speech in order to bring to light the real question at issue.

"The immediate objects of perception," Berkeley has just told us, "are the real things themselves." What, then, are the immediate objects of perception? Let us refer back to the quotation which we made from our author at starting. There we find him saying—"That sensible qualities are objects immediately perceived, no one can deny." Now we know what Berkeley means by "things." He means what are ordinarily called the qualities of things. The size of an object, its shape, its weight, its colour, its degree of heat, and so on, are all so many separate things in Berkeley's way of talking. This is not the meaning which the word "thing" suggests to the ordinary mind. Yet here we can scarcely tax Berkeley with a perverse misuse of language. The word "thing" means properly whatever we can think about. Now we can think of qualities as well as of concrete things or substances (using the term in its vulgar sense). Berkeley, in his psychological analysis, found that the original things, that is to say, the first elements of thought, were not substances or concrete things, but qualities. Accordingly, while using the term "thing" to signify substances, which were to his mind merely "combinations of sensible qualities," he likewise uses it just as frequently to signify the separate qualities which make up the concrete wholes. In common language, on the other hand, "thing" is used, for the most part, interchangeably with "substance" for a material body. But these things or substances, which appear to the unreflecting mind as so many simple units, far from being the immediate objects of perception, are in reality highly complicated results of thought.

The world, as it first bursts upon the nascent human being, can be no more than a confused medley of sensations. It is not till order has been introduced into this chaos that the mind learns to recognize what we call material things or substances.

Let us take some concrete thing, and see what our immediate knowledge of it amounts to; and, as we are not ambitious of novelty, let us content ourselves with the well-worn instance of an apple. What do we know directly of an apple, what can we know of it, except through the senses? It appeals to our sense of sight, our sense of touch, our sense of smell and our sense of taste. It affects us with certain perceptions of shape, colour, size, hardness, weight, sweetness or sourness, and a more or less agreeable odour. Experience has taught us that these diverse perceptions, actual or potential, have a certain connection, and we call the complex whole "an apple." We even needed experience to inform us that the tactual and visual impressions of shape and of size were uniformly co-existent, and might, therefore, be ranked together under the same names. Not till an elaborate process of experience and reflection had been gone through, could we recognize the apple as an individual object. Concrete things, then, simple as they seem to us now, are far from being the immediate objects of perception. It is with the qualities of things that we first become acquainted through the inlet of the senses. Colours, shapes, magnitudes, weights, motions, tastes, smells, sounds—all sensible qualities, in fact—these are the alphabet of our knowledge, and of these all things consist, so far, at least, as we have means of knowing them. But what are all these save so many perceptions? And to perceptions Berkeley gives the name of "ideas." His primary assumption, then, "that the objects immediately perceived are ideas," is substantially correct. It is undeniable that the rudiments of our knowledge are the individual perceptions we experience.

But it may occur to the reader that to identify "ideas" with sensible qualities, and then to lay down that "the objects immediately perceived are ideas," advances us very little towards the goal of proof that "there can be no substratum of these qualities but spirit." It is felt to be unsatisfactory to say that we merely perceive our own perceptions. For have we not perceptions of things or objects? And that, not in Berkeley's sense of the words, in which every individual perception is a

separate thing or object, but in their every-day, common-sense acceptation, as applying to real concrete things, chairs and tables, cows, horses, &c.? While, therefore, it will be granted to Berkeley that the immediate objects of perception are ideas, that is to say, our own perceptions, it will still be maintained that these ideas are consciously realized as ideas of things or objects, which we do, in consequence, mediately perceive. There exists, therefore, a whole world-full of things or objects which are independent of us and our consciousness. But let us look into this a little more closely. It is quite true that we know things or objects, and not merely our perceptions of their individual qualities. When we perceive a red apple, we are aware that we have not merely a sensation of red, but that we perceive the redness of an apple. But what does this mean? It means that the particular perception of colour in question is, or can be, accompanied by those various other perceptions which constitute for us the object "apple." We know that the impressions on our sight of colour, size and figure, are not all. We can put out our hand and touch the apple; we can put it to our nose and smell it; we can put it in our mouth and taste it. Now the apple that we perceive is not any one of these perceptions taken singly, but it is the sum-total of them. For an object as we know it is a synthesis of perceptions, and the conviction we have that our perceptions are perceptions of concrete things, resolves itself, on analysis, into a conviction that the impressions of one sense do not stand alone, but can be corroborated by those of others. We have learnt by experience that our perceptions occur together in certain groups; and these groups of perceptions we call "things" or "objects." What becomes then of our world-full of objects independent of consciousness? Concrete things, when analyzed, resolve themselves into perceptions; and each separate perception being part of our consciousness, their various combinations must be so too. In order to make this point clearer, let us have recourse once more to our illustration. The apple we perceive, it is maintained, is a synthesis of perceptions. If not, some one must shew what is left of it when the percep-

tions are withdrawn. Let us suppose we have an apple complete in all its attributes except that it is entirely devoid of odour. We should no doubt still give it the name of "apple," notwithstanding this defect. Now suppose all taste also withdrawn. It would still present to the eye all the appearance of an apple. Next we will suppose the visual perceptions of extension, shape and colour, to vanish together; for these three perceptions, though distinguishable in thought, are inseparable in fact. We are now left with those perceptions of touch which warrant a blind man in predicating the existence of an apple. We, however, not being blind, would declare ourselves no longer in contact with a real thing, but victims of hallucination. Withdraw, lastly, the tangible perceptions of extension, weight and impenetrability; and what is left us now? Why nothing; not even an hallucination. The apple we perceived, therefore, was that particular cluster of perceptions which we have imagined gradually withdrawn—and it was nothing more.

"Yes," the objector will answer, "things as perceived by us are of course made up of our various modes of perceiving them: but this only means that we know with our minds and not without them. The real things, however, are neither single perceptions nor groups of perceptions: they must have an independent existence of their own, since they are the source of perceptions to more than one person." Now what had Berkeley to say in reply to this? He said, in brief, "You mistake the meaning of Reality; there is no Reality but such as is relative to intelligence of one kind or another." His position, however, has again been obscured by the unfortunate ambiguity of language. For it will be noticed that the term "real things," as thus used, is applied to the causes of our perceptions; whereas Berkeley considered that he had common usage on his side in confining it to our actual perceptions of things. His metaphysic has been described by Professor Fraser as "an endeavour to convert the word 'real' from being the symbol of an unintelligible abstraction into that of the conscious experience of a mind." Berkeley did not deny that

there were causes of our perceptions which existed independently of ourselves, though he held a different opinion from other people as to their nature.

Philosophers prior to Locke had to a large extent held the theory of a representative perception, that is to say, they believed that the senses furnish us merely with images or pictures, the originals of which are real objects. Thus to them there were these three factors in cognition—the mind itself, then images intermediate between the mind and real things, and, lastly, the archetypes or real things themselves, which are mirrored to us by the images. Locke did much to popularize a modification of this conception by shewing that what are called the secondary qualities of bodies, such as colours, tastes, smells, could have no existence in the objects, but were merely affections of the mind perceiving them. Their causes indeed existed in the objects, and were to be found in the shape, disposition and motion of the ultimate particles of matter. Then Berkeley declared that the primary qualities of bodies are just as much affections of the percipient as the secondary. With him also there were three factors in cognition: but they were different from the former trio. There was, first, the mind itself, as before; then ideas, various groups of which were called "real things;" and, lastly, the cause of ideas, bearing no relation of resemblance to the effects. He denied that the senses had any representative function, and declared that their immediate presentations constituted what we call the real world. The only representative faculties on his theory are memory and imagination, which do furnish us with images or pictures of things, whereas our senses present us with the real things themselves.

We need not settle the sense of the term "real things," provided we discriminate between Berkeley's meaning of the term and the significance it bears to the majority of philosophers. Berkeley means the actual impressions on the senses in the various groups wherein nature or art has arranged them; others mean something inaccessible to sense that stands behind these impressions and gives them their unity; Berkeley means the

phenomenal world, others the noumenal; Berkeley the world of effects, others the world of causes. A grave objection against Berkeley's use of the term is, that "real things" by being identified with perceptions are thus rendered transitory, being perpetually annihilated and re-created—a consequence which Berkeley boldly accepts;* whereas we all associate permanence with reality. On the other hand, Berkeley has this much truth on his side, that when we talk of "real things" we certainly have before our mind's eye things as they appear to us clothed in the concrete. In the ordinary unanalyzed notion of reality, two inconsistent elements seem to be intermingled. On the one hand we think of things as we know them, with all the sensible impressions they produce on us; on the other hand we think of them as self-existent, having a permanence and reality independent of our perceptions. We endeavour, in fact, to grasp at once both the relative and the absolute aspect of things. This is a weakness incidental to our minds, which can only be triumphed over by careful reflection. We are competent to discern the nature of things solely as they stand related to us; and since our imaginative powers are wholly controlled by our experience, we are apt to picture things in themselves as wearing the aspect under which we know them. Now Berkeley saw that the two inconsistent elements which we vaguely combine in our notion of reality must be separated the one from the other. Things, if sensible, are not independent of our minds nor are they permanent: if permanent and independent, they are not sensible. And in separating these conflicting attributes, Berkeley thought himself on the side of popular usage in confining the term "real" to things as we know them and as we inevitably picture them to our minds when we speak of them. But in thus conciliating the vulgar, he gave offence to the philosophers by excluding from reality just the two notions which are most prominent in a philosophic conception of it, namely, permanence and independence of the accidents of perception. But Berkeley, like every one else who

* See Principles of Human Knowledge, §§ 45, 46.

is not a sheer sceptic, was quite ready to recognize that there must be a permanent and independent element, if not in "real things," at all events somewhere in the world of being. But this permanent element, independent of the percipient, he found not in any of the sensible qualities of things, which were all alike relative, but simply and solely in the causes of things.

It behoves us, then, to examine what Berkeley thought about the causes of things, which other philosophers prefer to designate as "the real things themselves." We shall first consider what he says they are not, though we have been led to touch upon that already; and then proceed to consider what he says they are. In this manner we shall exhaust both the negative and the positive sides of our author's philosophy.

First, then, with regard to what the causes of sensible things are not. They are not things in any way resembling the sensible impressions they produce in us. The theory of *representative* perception was already half exploded before Berkeley wrote. Only the primary qualities were supposed to exist as we perceive them in bodies. These constituted the bare "forms," which the cunning of the mind arrayed in the gorgeous robes of perception. Berkeley maintained that the primary qualities, equally with the secondary, could have no existence in bodies except as mere powers, that is to say, only in their causes. Now a cause need not resemble its effect; and as the effects in question vary indefinitely under varying relations, the cause cannot possibly be maintained to resemble all of them, and may therefore be presumed to resemble none. Moreover, the effects or ideas are passive and inert, whereas their cause, being *ex hypothesi* active, as producing impressions, cannot be held to resemble a thing so different in nature from itself. Against the notion of Bacon and Locke that the primary qualities are the cause of the secondary, Berkeley replied that the primary qualities, being themselves ideas, or sense-impressions, are no less passive and inert than the others, and can therefore have no efficiency to produce them. The primary and secondary qualities he declared, not unreasonably, must stand

or fall together. Colour and extension are inseparable in thought: must they not, therefore, be inseparable in existence? Locke and others had severed the colour of an object from its extension and shape, pronouncing the colour to be a mere impression on the mind, while the extension and shape existed as we perceived them in the object. Against this common-sense reclaims, and Berkeley reclaimed also. "No," he said, "the colour is in the object just as much as the extension: only the proper inference is, that the object itself as we know it depends wholly upon perception." The unreflecting agree with the Bishop in his first position, and recoil with amazement from the second; because they leave out of account their own minds, the one invariable factor in all cognition. What Locke and others had done was roughly this: they reduced the presentations of the other senses to terms of sight and touch conjointly. Berkeley shewed that the perceptions common to sight and touch were just as subjective as any other; or rather that the others were as objective as they. Are we then to say there is nothing gained by the many ingenious speculations of atomic philosophers, who endeavour to deduce the complex phenomena of nature from a few simple qualities of matter? By no means; for "the more a man knows of the connection of ideas, the more he is said to know of the nature of things." Nature, according to Berkeley, is a kind of language, the interpretation of which is the business of Science. What we call the sequences of cause and effect are properly signs with the things signified. When Berkeley was left standing in the rain by Swift because, if his philosophy were true, he could enter as easily whether the door were shut or open, he had just cause of complaint against the Dean for crediting him with so erroneous an interpretation of nature. The idea of a solid obstacle, rightly interpreted, is a sign of impeded motion; in other words, you can't go through a closed door. Ideas, then, may be signs of the presence or absence of other ideas; but no idea can be allowed to be the efficient cause of another. They can be causes only in the physical sense of invariable antecedents or concomitants. When we

resolve the multiform properties of bodies into the few simple attributes that are supposed to belong to their ultimate particles, we are speculating on the impressions that would be produced in us were our senses competent to the perception of atoms. Thereby we supply the missing lines in the manuscript of Deity, conjecturing from the knowledge we have gained of its contents what must be added to render it complete and consistent. But in no case in the study of nature do we get beyond the co-ordination of our own perceptions. For even when we sweep with the telescope the abysses of the empyræan, we are only inferring potential from actual impressions.

We have now seen what in Berkeley's opinion the causes of our sense-perceptions, or "real things," are not. They are not things in any way resembling the actual impressions themselves. So much as this in our author's theory is merely negative and destructive. Had Berkeley stopped here, he would have been the father of Positivism, which is one remove from Scepticism. For the Positivist admits the existence of an efficient cause of phenomena, while declaring the nature of that cause inscrutable. He admits the validity of the inference from perceptions to a cause of perceptions, but denies that intuition or reason can convey to us any knowledge with regard to the nature of the cause. But to admit the existence of a cause at all is enough to extricate us from the fleeting phenomenalism which declares that things come and go with our perceptions of them. The unknown causes of perceptions are conveniently denominated "powers." Things as they appear to us are bundles of perceptions; as existing independently of us they are bundles of powers. The term "quality" is hopelessly ambiguous, being used now in a relative, now in an absolute sense, at one time for the impressions effected in us, at another for the external power which is assumed to cause them. Now it is argued fairly enough that the use of such expressions as "an extended, solid, coloured, &c., *thing*," involves the admission that there is something more in things than a collection of sense-impressions. This is quite true; for

there is also the power to cause the like impressions in other people and in ourselves at other times. But this power resides not in what Berkeley calls the "real things," but in the cause which lies behind them. Why, then, did Berkeley refuse the name "Matter" to the efficient cause of our sensations? If we know so little about it, it would seem of small moment by what name we call it. The answer to this question brings us to the constructive side of our author's philosophy. Having seen what the causes of sensible things in Berkeley's opinion are not, we have next to inquire what they are.

Not to abandon the form of commentary, let us take a parting glance at the first quotation we made from our author, and then proceed to the consideration of another passage, which developes more fully the positive side of his teaching. When we succeeded in attaching Berkeley's sense to Berkeley's terms, we found that his premisses at all events were unassailable. The question then which now awaits us is, whether his conclusion be legitimately contained in them. "That the objects immediately perceived are ideas, is on all hands agreed." It is agreed, when once it has been understood that immediate perception is confined to sense-perception, and that ideas are the same as sense-impressions. "And that sensible qualities are objects immediately perceived, no one can deny." It is undeniable: and the only question that can arise is about the propriety of extending the term "thing" or "object" to what are commonly distinguished as the qualities or attributes of things or objects. But a moment's reflection suffices to decide this question in Berkeley's favour. We require some term to express the *summum genus* of existence, and for this purpose none seems more appropriate than "object of thought" or "thing." So much for the premisses. Now for the conclusion. "It is therefore evident that there can be no *substratum* of these qualities but spirit, in which they exist, not by way of mode or property, but as a thing perceived in that which perceives it. I deny therefore that there is any unthinking substratum of the objects of sense, and, in that acceptation, that there is any material substance." Now the cogency of

this conclusion depends entirely on the meaning assigned to the word "substratum." Berkeley will admit nothing in the objects of sense that is not perceived; and, in a literal sense, of course, it is absurd to say there is anything more. Now the objects of sense are composed of infinitely various combinations of perceptions, and perceptions are utterly heterogeneous; there is no common element in them except the fact of their being perceptions, that is, the fact of their dependence on mind. We may say, therefore, that mind is the substratum or substance wherein (not whereof) ideas consist. That was what Berkeley said about substance, the only substances in his view being spirits; that was the way he transferred substantiality from matter to mind. But if by the term "substratum" or "substance" be meant, not any common element in the very things we perceive, but simply the cause of our perceptions, then Berkeley has not proved that there can be no "unthinking substratum of the objects of sense." That he could not prove this is plain on the face of it to any one who accepts the positive principle that we can know for certain nothing more about the efficient cause of our perceptions than simply that it exists. The utmost that can be done by any thinker is to give presumption for our considering it of one nature rather than another. But instead of condemning Berkeley unheard, though that might safely be done, let us listen first to what he has to say:

"*Philonous.* Now let me ask you two questions: First, whether it be agreeable to the usage either of philosophers or others, to give the name matter to an unextended active being? And, secondly, whether it be not ridiculously absurd to misapply names contrary to the common use of language?

"*Hylas.* Well, then, let it not be called matter, since you will have it so, but some third nature distinct from matter and spirit. For what reason is there why you should call it spirit? Does not the notion of spirit imply that it is thinking as well as active and unextended?

"*Philonous.* My reason is this: because I have a mind to have some notion of meaning in what I say: but I have no notion of any action distinct from volition, neither can I conceive volition to

be anywhere but in a spirit: therefore when I speak of an active being I am obliged to mean a spirit. Beside, what can be plainer than that a thing which hath no ideas in itself cannot impart them to me; and if it hath ideas, surely it must be a spirit? To make you comprehend the point still more clearly, if it be possible: I assert, as well as you, that since we are affected from without, we must allow powers to be without in a being distinct from ourselves. So far we are agreed. But then we differ as to the kind of this powerful being. I will have it to be spirit, you matter, or I know not what (I may add, too, you know not what) third nature. Thus I prove it to be spirit. From the effects I see produced, I conclude there are actions; and because actions, volitions; and because there are volitions, there must be a will. Again, the things I perceive must have an existence, they or their archetypes, out of my mind: but being ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise than in an understanding: there is, therefore, an understanding. But will and understanding constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit. The powerful cause, therefore, of my ideas, is in strict propriety of speech a spirit."

Now we have before us the whole of Berkeley's argument for the exclusive substantiality of spirit. It leaves the world, we see, wholly mental, the creation of one mind in another, the communion of God with man. The argument occurs in various passages under various forms, but is nowhere put more cogently than in the one just quoted. Let us first criticise it in detail, and then proceed to more general reflections.

It is a ridiculous misapplication of names, we are told, to call "an unextended, active being," matter; because most people imagine matter to be extended and passive. But it is not misapplying names to alter our first hasty notion of a thing when further inquiry into its nature shews that notion to be incorrect. Let us grant to Berkeley—and many of course would not—that the cause of extension is itself unextended; still there is no very cogent reason why we should cease to call it matter. Moreover, the activity ascribed to it lies merely in the fact of its producing impressions, which is allowed on any hypothesis.

The objection of Hylas that the term "spirit" implies more

than the absence of extension together with a sort of activity is very much to the point. Had Hylas lived in our day he would no doubt have applied the term Force to his supposed "third nature, distinct from matter and spirit." It is in Berkeley's reply to this objection, however, that the real pith of the argument lies, whereby the claim to having *demonstrated* the existence of "an infinite omnipresent Spirit" must be judged to stand or fall. "My reason is this: because I have a mind to have some notion of meaning in what I say: but I have no notion of any action distinct from volition."

Now here we have first to determine what Berkeley means by "action." It is clear he does not mean motion. Motion is not confined to man: nature is full of it. The ocean is ever heaving in its bed, and perpetually advancing and receding; the streams never pause in gliding to their common goal; the trees of the forest wave their arms in the blast, and their leaves and fruits are carried earthward in the autumn—all things are full of motion. But only the savage finds himself compelled to ascribe these various movements to so many distinct acts of volition. We have all of us, in this age and country, a perfectly clear conception of motion apart altogether from volition. Nevertheless, the savage may be, in a certain sense, right; and Berkeley thought he was. But by action we are to understand, not motion itself, but the production of motion; and by an agent is meant a cause or origin of motion. Not a cause, it must be noticed, in the physical sense of a mere antecedent; for, in that sense, we are acquainted with many causes of motion; but an efficient cause, having power to produce or to refrain from producing. Now it is maintained by Berkeley, and in fact acknowledged on all hands, that we cannot find any efficient cause amid all the external phenomena of nature. Our search then, to be successful, must be directed to ourselves. And, on looking within, we do appear to find an efficient cause in Will. The appearance indeed may be deceptive. Perhaps the majority of independent thinkers now believe that it is, and that in Will we have no more than one link in an endless chain of antecedents and consequents,

some mental and some physical, a chain now buried beneath the surface in states of mind, and again emerging into view in physical phenomena. But without stopping to settle that question, this much may be conceded to Berkeley, that if we do know of any efficient cause of phenomena at all, that cause is the human will. Berkeley upheld the doctrine of Free-will. According to him, every human spirit is to a certain extent a separate efficient cause, and, under God, a joint creator of the phenomena of the universe. One short passage out of the *Dialogues* will suffice to indicate our author's views on this point:

"I have nowhere said that God is the only agent who produces all the motions in bodies. It is true, I have denied that there are any other agents besides spirits; but this is very consistent with allowing to thinking rational beings in the production of motions, the use of limited powers, ultimately indeed derived from God, but immediately under the direction of their own wills."

Now granting, for the sake of argument, all that Berkeley here claims, still his grand conclusion does not follow, and God remains an object of faith, instead of His existence, as Berkeley would have us believe, being more manifest even than that of our fellow-creatures. For allowing that we have known to us in Will one efficient cause of phenomena, it by no means follows that there can be no other. Because we are agents, must all agents be after our pattern? To say so is to generalize from a single instance, and an instance too which, from the nature of the case, is the only one accessible to us. Some phenomena, says Berkeley, are the production of Spirit, therefore all must be. This is not logical reasoning, but merely theological. When, therefore, we speak of an "active being," in the sense of an efficient cause of phenomena, we are not "obliged to mean a spirit." After Berkeley has said all that he has to say, we are still left in complete ignorance as to the true nature of the "powers without" which produce the affections in ourselves. They may be described, if we will, as so many attributes of some unknown substance; but we have no means of determining for certain whether that substance be

thinking or unthinking, nor of what nature it may be. "But how," cries Berkeley, "can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought?" To which we have only to answer, "Why not? A cause has no necessary resemblance to its effect." Again, when Berkeley says, "The things I perceive must have an existence, they or their archetypes, out of my mind; but, being ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise than in an understanding,"—we have but to substitute the word "causes" for "archetypes," for all appearance of cogency to vanish at once. Ideas, it is true, can exist only in an understanding; but we have no warrant for pronouncing that they could not be raised in us by an unintelligent substance.

And yet the heart of the Bishop prided itself on the peculiar theological merit of his system, that, whereas other philosophers sought to prove the existence of a Deity by arguments drawn from final causes and evidences of design in nature, on his own principles the mere fact of the existence of things at all was a standing proof of the being of God. For where were real things when no man perceived them? They existed, according to Berkeley, in the Divine Mind, which was a kind of storehouse of impressions. But this will not stand investigation. The Deity was not imagined by Berkeley to possess senses like ourselves; consequently He cannot have our sense-impressions; but these sense-impressions are what we call real things, whence it follows that real things cannot exist to the Divine Mind. The causes of things, indeed, Berkeley is fairly entitled to say, exist in God, whether perceived or unperceived by His creatures; but then "real things" may be supposed to exist in their causes, when unperceived by finite minds, without the assistance of a Deity at all. "But," says Berkeley, "our ideas, though not sensibly apprehended by the Divine Mind, are still intellectually apprehended." But this at once constitutes a very marked difference between the things known to us and the things known to Deity. The latter cannot, therefore, be what we call real things, since these, as Berkeley is never tired of insisting, are the actual perceptions we expe-

rience. The permanence, therefore, of real things does not consist in their being perceived by God, but in the potentiality of the recurrence of similar perceptions in similar groups; and this—unless we deny causation altogether—is only another way of saying that the permanence of things is due to their causes. Berkeley's Deity, indeed, is a somewhat perplexing conception. He is not only the cause of perceptions, but Himself also a percipient; and it is in this latter character that Berkeley is obliged to regard Him as the sustainer of the sensible universe. This follows from the meaning Berkeley, in his scare at abstraction, has assigned to real things. Real things are our perceptions; their *esse* is *percipi*, not *posse percipi*. It is not, therefore, in the Will, but in the Understanding of God, that the physical universe must find its existence when unperceived by us. In the Will of God lie only the causes of things, which are inaccessible to sense. So Berkeley endeavours to satisfy the craving for a permanence in real things by assigning to them a continuous existence in the perceptions of the Deity. But, as we have seen, the perceptions of the Deity cannot be exactly similar to ours; and, consequently, the same things that we know do not continue to exist when unperceived by us. For Berkeley would define "the same thing" to be a series of exactly similar impressions.

But, letting that pass, it is no easy matter to adjust the relations of things as perceived and of things as caused by the Deity. Things as perceived by us are acknowledged to be the effects of an extraneous power. Does the Deity then operate upon Himself, and are His volitions the causes of His perceptions? Or is it rather the other way? And are His perceptions, not being sensible impressions like ours, but intellectual apprehensions, to be considered as prior in their nature and as directing His volitions? Does God, in short, perceive as He wills, or will as He perceives? If the latter, then the intellectual ideas in the Divine Mind must occasion the volitions which create for us the physical universe.

Having now disposed of our author's claim to conclusiveness

in his constructive reasonings, we shall be in a position to enter, in a subsequent paper, on the more gracious task of examining what presumption may be offered that his account of things, or something like it, is the true one. Men may welcome as a speculation what they resent as a proof.

ST. GEORGE STOCK.

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## IV.—ENGELHARDT'S CHRISTIANITY OF JUSTIN MARTYR.

*Das Christenthum Justin's des Märtyrers. Eine Untersuchung über die Anfänge der katholischen Glaubenslehre.* Von Moritz von Engelhardt, Doctor und Professor der Theologie in Dorpat. Erlangen. 1878.

JUSTIN MARTYR has obtained through the singularity of his position an eminence in literature to which the intrinsic merits of his surviving works would hardly entitle him. In spite of his healthy and earnest tone, we do not resort to him to enrich our spiritual thought or deepen our devout feeling; few would now be won to Christianity by arguments so external in their appeal and burdened by such a perverse exegesis; and his style, though unaffected, and possessing the plain vigour of a man who says what he means, does not attract us by its literary graces. But he is the first writer from whom we have received elaborate treatises on the Christian religion. From this remark we need not except the writings of the New Testament itself; for these are rather an inexhaustible mine of spiritual suggestion than the circumscribed product of ecclesiastical thought. They reveal the inward and eternal genius of Christianity, and give us flashes of truth which illumine innumerable objects besides those with which their authors are immediately concerned; but none of them professes to be a systematic exposition of the contents, the claims, and the evidences of the new religion. The latter is precisely what is offered to us by

Justin Martyr. The first wave of inspiration has spent itself, and instead of mighty thoughts struggling into expression from a soul conscious of a new and higher communion, he offers a calm statement of doctrines which he found in existence, and accepted as guaranteed by reasonable proof. In three careful Apologies, addressed one to the Jewish, the others to the heathen world, he speaks as a member of a community which had inherited a system of belief, and had already defined its own orthodox tenets in opposition not only to the infidelity surrounding it, but to heretical aberrations within its own borders. Hence an inquiry into the Christianity of Justin Martyr is at the same time an inquiry into the beginnings of Catholic dogma; and to all who desire to understand the mutual relations of parties within the Church, the development of doctrine, and the earliest interpretation of apostolical teaching, the works of this Apologist must appear of the highest importance.

Owing to this circumstance, Justin has been an object of keen critical attention ever since the Reformation raised the banner of primitive Christianity against the traditional theology of Rome; and from the time when the Magdeburg Centuriators censured his Chiliasm and his defective doctrine of Justification, a long series of scholars have endeavoured, with varying success, to elucidate his views, and to determine his attitude in relation to apostolical doctrine and to the ecclesiastical parties of his own time. The general result has been that this Father, whom the ancient writers celebrated for his unimpeachable orthodoxy, has had to descend from his honoured station, to meet the charge of error in some of the most essential dogmas of Christianity, and to plead guilty of being under the malignant spell, according to the opinion of different writers, now of Judaism, now of heathenism.* The last careful and lucid treatise on this subject, that of Engelhardt, almost reduces him to a pagan philosopher, attached indeed to the Christian Church and to its divine Head, and therefore entitled

* See the historical survey in Engelhardt's Einleitung.

to the Christian name, but wholly unable to appreciate the essence of the gospel, and using his stock of Christian phraseology only to misrepresent and degrade it. This rather startling opinion is expressed again and again. Justin is unable to grasp "the fundamental *religious* conceptions of Christianity."* His ideas of God and of the world, of good and evil, of righteousness, sin and free-will, of redemption and salvation, atonement and substitution, faith and works, the kingdom of God upon earth, the covenant of grace, and revelation, are all astray.† His apprehension of Christianity as a "new law" contradicted the teaching of Paul and all the apostles.‡ "What Justin called 'Christian doctrine' was neither genuinely Christian nor conformed to the Old Testament."§ "He wishes to be a Christian, but cannot separate himself from his accustomed mode of thought."‖ If one who lived so near the apostolic age, who laid down his life for Christianity, and was treated with such marked respect by later writers, was thus deficient, what must have been the condition of the common herd of Gentile Christians? Strange to say, the community was, or at least had been, sound, though its leaders were corrupt. "The 'orthodoxy of the Church,'" it is alleged, ".... loses nothing of its glory, but appears in quite a new light, if one sharply distinguishes between what the Fathers say and what they teach. Their speech is orthodox, but their thought quite otherwise."¶ Such a posture of affairs is hardly credible. Surely this orthodox Church would have been painfully conscious of the defective and erroneous doctrine of its teachers and representatives. Sometimes Engelhardt becomes aware of this, and extends his charge of insufficient orthodoxy over a wider circle. Thus he infers from a comparison of the Shepherd of Hermas with Justin, that "even the laity in the Gentile Christian churches were inclined to the ethical and legal apprehension of Christianity by which Justin and Hermas are swayed."** But generally he leaves the impression that the community, in its

* P. 167. † Pp. 155-6, 167, 207-8, 233, 237-8, 267, 301-2, 361.
‡ P. 254. § P. 173. ‖ P. 372. ¶ P. 268. ** Pp. 422-3.

simple attachment to the acknowledged scriptural creed, maintained a purity of doctrine which the more cultured and philosophical men, in their inability to harmonize it with their learned prepossessions, corrupted while they endeavoured to defend.

The treatment of this subject appears to me the weakest part of Engelhardt's able and valuable work. Had he contented himself with pointing out the great decline in spiritual discernment that had taken place since apostolic times, his position would be unassailable. That Pauline Christianity is far more inward and vital than Justin's may be at once admitted. Defectiveness of spiritual vision is precisely what no mere teaching can overcome, and Justin may with the most honest intentions have misinterpreted the early records of the faith, and allowed their finest aroma to exhale; but that he should have swerved in almost every article of belief from a formal standard which had once been accepted and understood, seems highly improbable. It is likely that the community which honoured him shared the externality of his views, and indulged in the use of a phraseology which had hitherto sufficed to awaken the devotional sentiment of Christians, but had not yet been reduced into a body of consistent dogma. Two suppositions are open to us. Christianity may have been originally given as a complete dogmatic system, which is correctly represented by modern evangelical orthodoxy, and Justin, owing to the bias of his education, may have twisted and debased the doctrines which the Church had accurately formulated. But it is also possible, and to me it appears more probable, that in the middle of the second century Christian dogmas had not been to any large extent formulated, and that the teachers of the Church, instead of emptying out the meaning of inherited dogmas, were rather endeavouring to clothe in precise intellectual form the thoughts which lay concealed beneath phrases originally expressive only of devotional sentiment, and to fix the interpretation of Scriptures which leave many questions unanswered, and suggest different meanings to the varying faculty of spiritual insight. This is indeed main-

tained by Engelhardt even in regard to the cardinal doctrine of the "Son of God,"* and still more in regard to the general body of Christian dogma;† but his statements in different parts of his work leave a somewhat confused impression, and a fuller consideration of the whole question, and a more careful comparison of Justin's views with those of the apostles as expressed in the New Testament, would have been welcome. Some at least may still be found who suppose that Paul entertained the thought as little as Justin, that faith in the blood of Christ singly and alone constitutes the righteousness which is valid before God.‡

However this may be, Engelhardt's delineation of Justin's own doctrines, and of the philosophical tendencies by which they were controlled, is drawn with admirable clearness and discrimination. The contents of the two Apologies and of the Dialogue are separately examined. This method necessarily leads to some repetition, but is indispensable, since the two classes of apology were written in such different interests, and followed such divergent plans. The general result is, that amid all variety of treatment, and notwithstanding the changing prominence assigned to the several doctrines according to the object in view, Justin's conception of Christianity remains consistently the same. Faith in Jesus as the Christ, or the Son of God, the Logos, the divine and authoritative Teacher, the new Lawgiver, who presented the universal and unalterable conditions of salvation to the reason and free-will of man, constituted the essence of the system; and its requirements may be briefly summed up as the worship of the true God, and the practice of a virtuous life, resting on the belief in eternal rewards and punishments.

It would be impossible for us, within the limits of a brief review, to follow Engelhardt through all the details which present themselves in connection with this scheme of doctrine; and it will be better for us, assuming the general complexion of Justin's views, to consider, as fully as our space will allow,

* P. 425. † Pp. 372-3. ‡ P. 258.

his relation to the Church of his own time. The determination of this point affects our whole conception of the formation of the Catholic Church. If it can be shewn that Justin was at heart a Jewish Christian, and that the peculiar tone of his doctrine was derived from the Jewish section of the Church, the theory that Catholic Christianity sprang out of a fusion between the antagonistic forces of the primitive apostolic and the Pauline Gospel, receives striking confirmation from his writings; but if, on the contrary, his legalism, and his weakening of the genuine Pauline view, are the unconscious effect of his heathen culture, and are wholly unconnected with any opposition to Paul, the hypothesis which has played so important a part in modern criticism loses one of its most trusted supports. Credner* was, I believe, the first who maintained that Justin was strongly influenced by the Ebionite party, and his reasonings have constituted the ground on which later advocates of the same view have taken their stand. As this position has still some able defenders, we may advantageously notice the principal arguments in its favour.

The opinion expressed by Credner that Justin's account of his conversion† is a fiction, and that he was anxious to conceal his real indebtedness to Jewish Christians, who were already reckoned among heretics, and whose early influence upon him might easily have brought his own orthodoxy under suspicion, rests upon mere conjecture, and is inconsistent with the outspoken fearlessness of the Martyr's character. He was one of the last men to be ashamed of those to whom he owed the faith for which he was ready to die. According to his own testimony, his mind was imbued with the principles of Greek philosophy, and in passing from Platonism to Christianity he gives no intimation that he entered through an Ebionite door into that orthodox Church of which he was afterwards believed to be so pure a champion.

In the failure of direct evidence, indications of his Judaic

* Beiträge zur Einleitung in die biblischen Schriften, 1832, I. pp. 95 sqq.

† Dial. c. 2 sqq.

proclivities can be found only in the tenor of his thought. Credner appeals in the first place to his mild judgment upon Jewish Christians. He had written a work against the heresies of his time,* and refused to hold communion with their professors ;† yet he recognized the Jewish believers as true Christians, and, contrary to the practice of most,‡ held communion with them. This representation of the substance of the 46th and 47th chapters of the Dialogue contains two fatal errors. Justin did not recognize "*the* Jewish Christians," but only *some* Jewish Christians, as "true Christians," and his practice was not contrary to that of "most." The question is under discussion whether those who believed that Jesus was the Christ, and yet observed the Mosaic Law so far as was still practicable, could be saved. Justin says that in his opinion they might, and that he would hold full communion with them as with brothers, provided they did not persuade Gentiles to follow their example, declaring that the observance of the Sabbath and such things was necessary to salvation; but if any Jews said that they believed on Christ, and yet compelled Gentile believers to live in conformity with the Law of Moses or refused communion with them, then he did not receive them,—that is, he placed Jewish Christians of the more rigid type beyond the pale of salvation. Again, instead of saying that he differed from the general practice, his words imply the exact contrary. He says, "There are some who even dare not to hold communion .... with such men [i.e. Jewish Christians of the *former* class]; with whom I do not agree."§ This surely means that those who were guilty of such monstrous and un-Pauline intolerance formed an exception to the general rule. Thus the argument fails in its two essential points, and that can hardly be called a mild judgment which doomed to perdition the men of whom we read in Acts, who insisted on the lasting and universal obligation of the Mosaic Law, even though with a kind of contemptuous graciousness it was will-

* Ap. I. c. 26. † Dial. c. 35. ‡ Was die Meisten nicht thaten.

§ *Εἰσίν . . . καὶ μηδὲ κοινωνεῖν ὁμιλίας ἢ ἑστίας τοῖς τοιούτοις τολμῶντες· οἷς ἐγὼ οὐ σύναινός εἰμι.*

ing to receive the weak* brethren who were content to keep their folly to themselves.

Credner next appeals to the gentle judgment which Justin passes on those Jewish Christians who denied the supernatural birth of Jesus, and quotes a few lines, in which, without any remark, he substitutes a conjectural reading for the reading of the manuscripts. The passage occurs in the 48th chapter of the Dialogue, the next to those which we have been considering. The beginning of the chapter shews that the question about the Jewish Christians was formally closed, and the conversation turns off to a point previously mentioned, namely, that Christ had pre-existed as God. Justin carefully distinguishes this from the fundamental question whether Jesus was the Christ, and declares that if he fail to prove his thesis, it will be fair only to conclude that he was personally mistaken; for, he continues, "there are some of our race† who acknowledge that he is Christ, but declare that he was sprung as a man from men; with whom I do not agree, not even though most who think the same as I do should say so." Now there is not a particle of evidence within this passage itself that the deniers alluded to were to be found particularly among the Jews. It has been assumed that Justin must refer to the Ebionites, and therefore "*our* race" has been turned into "*your* race."‡ The whole passage seems to me more harmonious if we retain the reading of the manuscripts. Justin apparently feels throughout that he is on ground still debated among Christians, though his own conviction is decided, and he believes that he has the support of the majority, perhaps of a large and increasing majority; and unless he had regarded the "some" who dissented as mixed up with the general body of Christians, he would have made it plain that they were distinguished by their race, and owed their opinion to national prejudice. He says at the beginning of his remarks that his doctrine was especially strange to those of Tryphon's race, and

* Compare Justin's *διὰ τὸ ἀσθενὲς τῆς γνώμης* with Paul's *τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα τῇ πίστει*, Rom. xiv. 1.

† *Ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡμετέρου γένους.* ‡ *Ἡμετέρου* into *ὑμετέρου.*

this might have naturally led him to point out the influence of birth in separating the opinion of Jewish Christians from the orthodoxy universally held among the Gentiles. Tryphon also, in his reply, though stating that the doctrine of the "some" agreed with the belief held among the Jews in regard to the expected Christ, gives not the slightest hint that the Jewish Christians had been specially referred to. If, again, Justin had alluded here to Jewish Christians, he would not, if we may judge from the preceding chapters, have simply said that he did not agree with them, but would rather have discussed whether it was possible for them to be saved.

To these very unsatisfactory arguments we may oppose Justin's plain statement that the Gentile Christians were not only more numerous than the Jewish and Samaritan believers, but were "truer and more faithful."*

Credner's next argument is founded on the relation of Justin to Paul. In the first place, the Apostle of the Gentiles is neither named nor quoted by Justin, although his writings were not unknown to him. This silence in regard to a New Testament writer is, however, quite in conformity with the Martyr's usage. He quotes amply from the teaching of Christ, but does not give the names of his authorities. Only in one instance is this rule violated, where he speaks of John as the author of the Apocalypse.† As he fails to name the authors of works which he repeatedly quotes, his silence cannot be construed into an evidence of hostility.

In the next place, Credner contends that on one point Justin takes a different view from Paul's. The Apologist declares that Christians would rather be put to death than worship idols or eat things offered to idols.‡ Tryphon immediately objects that he hears that many of those who say that they acknowledge Jesus, and are called Christians, eat things offered to idols, and affirm that they receive no injury from doing so. Justin, in his tedious reply, declaims against heretics generally, and at last specifies the "Marciani, Valentinians, Basilidians,

* Ap. I. 53. † Dial. c. 81. ‡ Dial. c. 34.

Satornilians, and others." Credner thinks this is inconsistent with 1 Cor. x. 25 sq., where Paul advises men to eat what they buy in the market or what is set before them, and to ask no questions for conscience' sake. The contradiction is, however, more apparent than real. If the whole passage be read, it will be seen that Paul is no less earnest than Justin in opposing all participation in idolatry; but inasmuch as an idol was nothing, the meat offered to it could not be thereby polluted, and therefore when such meat happened to be served up apart from all connection with idolatry, there was no occasion for scruples about eating it. But if the fact of its having been offered to an idol should be distinctly mentioned, then he advises abstinence, lest there should seem to be any sanction of idolatrous worship. Now Justin does not go into this distinction; but it is evident that he has in his mind men who eat sacrificial meat precisely in that open way of which Paul disapproves. A passage in Irenæus* throws considerable light upon the language of Justin. He is speaking of the Gnostic distinction between the spiritual and the psychical. Those who called themselves spiritual maintained their superiority to all defilement through external contact. They "do things about which the Scriptures affirm that those who do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God.† For they eat indifferently things offered to idols, thinking that they are not polluted by them, and they are the first to come together to every festal delight of the Gentiles held in honour of the idols." It is clear that Irenæus agrees with Justin; but instead of supposing that he is contradicting Paul, he quotes Paul in confirmation of his view. I think, therefore, that the inconsistency which Credner points out is purely formal, and arises from the very different circumstances referred to by Justin and Paul; and I can hardly doubt that if the latter had been writing about men who mixed freely in idolatrous entertainments,‡ and maintained that the spiritual soul might

* Hær. I. vi. 2-3.

† Gal. v. 21, *idolatry* having been mentioned in the list of sins.

‡ See Justin's words, c. 35: *ἀνόμοις καὶ ἀθέοις τελεταῖς κοινωνοῦσι.*

remain as pure in the midst of pollution as gold in the midst of mud,* his language would have been no less severe than that of the Martyr.

Justin's hostility to Paul has also been inferred from the fact that he speaks of only twelve apostles. If this argument be valid, Paul must have many enemies in the world. The first passage to be noticed is in Apol. I. c. 39, where, having quoted the prophecy that the word of the Lord should go forth from Jerusalem, he says this actually took place, "for from Jerusalem twelve men went forth into the world." In the previous passage he has spoken of the crucifixion; and therefore, since Paul was a "later apostle," as Tertullian calls him,† and since he did not go out from Jerusalem, it is difficult to see why Justin should have thought it necessary to tell the Roman emperor that at a later time another man was placed on a level with the twelve, especially as he does not here call them apostles. In the Dialogue, c. 42, he states that the twelve bells which he supposes were on the robe of the high-priest‡ symbolized "the twelve apostles." To drag in Paul here would have been a gratuitous destruction of his symbol. It is perhaps not without significance that he immediately proceeds to quote two passages from the Old Testament which are also quoted by Paul§ in connection with the preaching of the gospel. As a further test of the weight of this argument we may notice Tertullian's opinion that the twelve apostles were signified by the twelve gems in the priestly robe of Aaron, the twelve fountains in Elim, and the twelve stones taken from the Jordan by Joshua.‖ Irenæus, too, speaks of the apostles as the "twelve-pillared firmament of the Church,"¶ and, explaining the parable of the mustard-seed, represents "the twelve apostles" as beautiful branches, affording shelter to the Gentiles as birds of heaven.**

In opposition to these very doubtful arguments we have to

* See Irenæus, l.c.

† Adv. Marc. IV. 2.

‡ Exod. xxviii. 33 does not give the number.

§ Rom. x. 16-18.

‖ Adv. Marc. IV. 13.

¶ Hær. IV. xxi. 3.

** Fragment preserved in a Catena; Stieren, p. 843.

set the broad fact that Justin agrees with the extreme Pauline view as to the obligation of the Law and the position of the Gentiles. In his argument with Tryphon, although he does not appeal to Paul or directly quote him, yet we are again and again reminded of the great apostle by the method of reasoning, especially by his appeal to Abraham's justification through faith, and to the time when circumcision was instituted.* One deviation from Paul is instructive. Like the apostle, he remarks that circumcision was a "sign;" but instead of regarding it as a "seal of the righteousness of faith,"† he says that it was given "in order that you may be separated from the other nations and from us, and that you alone may suffer what you are now in justice suffering, and that your regions may be desert, and your cities burned."‡ Here he deviates from Paul; but it is only to pass a harsher judgment upon Judaism, and prove that his Gentile scorn had not been tempered by any yearning towards the chosen people. It is to be observed also that he treats the Christians in the mass as uncircumcised, which he could scarcely have done had he regarded the Jewish Christians as an important section of the Church.

One other consideration seems to me to have some weight. In his work against Marcion, Justin can hardly have failed to deal with the Pauline Epistles; and if he there treated Paul as a false apostle, or as one whose writings and opinions had no value, he could not have obtained such high repute as a thoroughly orthodox writer.

I think, therefore, that we have no real ground for attributing to Justin any antagonism towards the Apostle of the Gentiles.

Credner, however, has one more argument. He says that Justin's views are Ebionitish in regard to baptism, demonology, the use of the Old Testament, chiliasm, "&c."§ It would carry us far beyond our limits if we entered on a

* See especially cc. 11, 19, 23, 39, 42, 43, 44.
† Rom. iv. 11.
‡ Dial. c. 16.
§ Pp. 97-8.

detailed examination of these points; but two considerations appear sufficient to set aside the inference which Credner wishes us to draw. There is nothing to prove that Justin's opinions upon these matters differed from the prevailing Christian doctrine of his time. A religion which sprang up on Jewish soil, and recognized the divine authority of the Old Testament, necessarily had many points of contact with Judaism, and could hardly fail to take over with it into the heathen world some even of the popular and temporary conceptions which prevailed in Palestine. The mode of interpretation which was largely applied to the Old Testament was derived, directly or indirectly, from the learned Jews of Alexandria. It was therefore inevitable that Jewish and Gentile Christians, especially in the earlier period, should entertain many opinions in common; and if a coincidence can be pointed out between the sentiments of the former and those of any particular writer, it by no means follows that there is any special relation between them. Differences are more important than agreements; and on the two main points which distinguished the Ebionites, their belief in the lasting obligation of the Law and in the simple humanity and natural birth of Jesus, Justin was emphatically opposed to them.

There seems, therefore, to be no sufficient reason for Credner's conclusion, that Justin "stood in the midst between the Jewish Christians of his time and the adherents of the freer Pauline doctrine," and still less for any opinion which identifies him even more closely with Ebionitish Christianity. We are consequently warranted in treating him as the writers nearest to his own time treated him, as one belonging to the Catholic and orthodox party.

A fact, however, remains which has been pointed out by several writers, and which is not only conceded, but perhaps almost unduly emphasized by Engelhardt. Justin's whole conception of Christianity differs essentially from the Pauline through the predominance of its legal and ethical colouring. In estimating the importance to be attached to this fact, we ought not to forget that if Justin was a Catholic Christian,

belonging neither to a Pauline nor to a primitive apostolic party, his views would be formed at least as much from the Gospels as from the Epistles of Paul, and portions of the Gospels might well seem to sanction his preceptive religion. If Christ is not there actually described as a "new lawgiver," he is, in all four, repeatedly spoken of as a "teacher;" and in the Sermon on the Mount his precepts are put forward in express opposition to the old Law, and might reasonably be regarded as constituting a new one. But even Paul himself uses phraseology which points in the same direction. To him, Christianity is "a Law of faith,"* a "Law of Christ,"† a "Law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus."‡ He delighted in the "Law of God," and with his mind served it.§ He was anxious, not to annul, but to "establish Law,"‖ and he announces it as the very object of Christ's coming "that the righteous requirements of the Law might be fulfilled in us."¶ It is not altogether to be wondered at that, with these passages before him, Justin regarded Christianity as a new Law. His calling it "new," moreover, at once separates him from the Jewish-Christian party, which saw in Christ, not the abrogator of the old Law and the founder of a new one, but rather a prophet who brought a fresh sanction to the ancient Levitical code. "Justin's legalism is," as Engelhardt so well points out, "of a totally different kind from the Jewish-Christian, and his deviations from the Pauline type of doctrine proceed from a totally different source from the Jewish-Christian opposition to Pauline Christianity." "His 'legalism' is so thoroughly unjudaic, that it everywhere betrays its source in the Greek popular philosophy, and its relationship with the ethical tone of heathenism."** It is Engelhardt's highest merit that he has established this point so clearly, and exhibited the influence of Justin's early philosophical training, not only on the general colouring of his thought, but on his conception of particular doctrines. Our space forbids us to enter this wide and tempting field, where

* Rom. iii. 27. † Gal. vi. 2. ‡ Rom. viii. 2. § Rom. vii. 23-25.
‖ Rom. iii. 31. ¶ Rom. viii. 4. ** Pp. 360-1.

we find a living and intelligible Justin, restored to his true historical relations, and, agreeably to his well-known titles, addressing us not only with the manly honesty of a Christian "Martyr," but with the cultured bias of a Greek "Philosopher." Whether Engelhardt will be considered to have finally laid to rest an opinion which has always appeared to me chiefly remarkable for its mingled temerity and feebleness, it is hard to say; but his work must be studied and his arguments weighed by those who desire really to understand the position of Justin and the beginnings of Catholic dogma.

JAMES DRUMMOND.

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## V.—HAVET: "THE ORIGINS OF CHRISTIANITY."

*Le Christianisme et ses Origines.* Par Ernest Havet. Vols. I. II. *L'Hellenisme.* 2nd Edition. 1873. Vol. III. *Le Judaisme.* 1878. Paris: Michel Lévy, Frères.

THIS is a profoundly disappointing book. There are books which never raise any expectations, and therefore never disappoint any: at the end of them, the reader thinks that the author has "said what he ought to have said," and "comes away" without either heat of dissatisfaction or glow of approval. But M. Havet first shews in his Preface that he looks at his subject in an original way, and then proves only too plainly in the body of his work that he cannot carry out his thought to fit completion. All that he has done is to bequeath a fruitful idea and some accumulation of materials to a more competent workman. The fact that the first and most characteristic part of his book has arrived at a second edition shews that he has some readers; but we cannot venture to predict for him a real and influential place in the line of religious critics. His facts are such as were perfectly well known before, while his theories, so far as they are new, are hardly worth serious consideration.

M. Havet's leading idea, which we have already characterized as valuable in itself and worth a careful working out, is, that in the investigation of the origins of Christianity a too exclusive attention has been paid to the Jewish element in it. For Christianity contains also a very large and important Hellenic element, the presence and efficacy of which have hitherto been comparatively neglected. We will quote M. Havet's own words:

"I study Christianity in its origins: not only in its immediate origins, that is to say in the preaching of him who was called the Christ, and of his apostles, but in its earlier and deeper source, the Hellenic antiquity, from which almost the whole of it proceeded. I write the history of the beliefs, the ideas, the practices which we call Christian, as I go back to the very beginnings of Greek thought; and I pursue this history, without passing the limits of the Greek and Roman world, up to the moment at which the Christians appear for the first time in profane literature, about the end of the reign of Nero: this is the First Part of my work. The Second Part, which will appear subsequently, will have for its subject the Jewish origins of the new religion, and the study of the revolution by which this religion apparently detaches itself from Judaism, in order to spread itself through the Pagan world.

"It might seem at first as if this First Part, in which as yet there is no mention of Jesus, or of the Gospels, or of Paul, were only an introduction: but it is not in this light that I look at it or present it to the reader: on the contrary, I believe that in these two volumes I have been constantly close to the very heart of my subject. For precisely what I propose to establish is, that Christianity is much more Greek than Jewish. We must distinguish the essential from the accidental, the Christian spirit from the Christian revolution. The revolution came from Judæa and from Galilee: it was made by Jews; Jews carried its flag; and this flag will always remain that of Christianity, if in no other way, yet in the very name of Christ, the Greek translation of the Hebrew word Messiah. As long as there are Christians, they will reverence the Bible and will sing the Psalms: their imagination and their heart will remain attached to Calvary or Golgotha; and the Jewish figures of the Old and New Testament will be sacred to them. But if we study Christian thought and Christian life in themselves, we shall find little beneath

these pictures and these recollections except what was in the philosophy and the religion of the Greeks and Romans, or what would naturally come out of them, under the influences to which the world was exposed about the time of the new era. To-day, Christianity is still living on the same moral and religious capital on which the pagans of the classic ages lived, modified only by the work of time, by democratic progress, by the drawing together of nations, and the exchange of manners and ideas which followed from it; above all, by the deep feeling of suffering and desolation which seized upon men's minds at the beginning of the rule of the Cæsars, and which was fostered by an overwhelming and despairing slavery, interrupted only by symptoms of disruption and ruin. It is true that at the beginning, and in the first rush of the religious revolution, Jewish ideas appeared to carry the day: there were no more temples, no more images: the absurd and sordid rites (so said the Gentiles) of a fierce people, always mourning for their liberty, seemed to prevail. On the other hand, there were as yet no metaphysics, no God-man: faith consisted in expecting a new and visible catastrophe, which the present generation would witness, and in which the world in general would be swallowed up for ever, while the elect would ascend to heaven, some yet alive, nor having passed the gate of death, others raised up with flesh and bones, to inherit to all eternity the kingdom of God. But this Galilean Christianity passed away like a torrent, and the Hellenic basis re-appeared very soon. Once more men saw temples, images, brilliant festivals. Christ became God, his mother a woman apart from all others: the worship of the saints was established, the kingdom of God receded into the background: the resurrection of the body fell into the shade: men came back to the soul and its immortality as Plato had conceived them. In short, men attached themselves at once to the practices of the old rites, and to the doctrines of the philosophers. From this time the Christian religion was almost what the religion of the majority had been in the time of Seneca—a fact which led to the notion that Seneca had been initiated into the faith of Christ."*

To M. Havet's conception of his task, which in the above extract we have allowed him to describe in his own words, we shall presently return: in the mean time we may say something of his execution of it. It is manifest at first sight

* Preface, v—viii.

that, if it is to be successfully executed, it requires a more complete and varied erudition than belongs to most men: a thorough knowledge of classical antiquity, both in its letter and in its spirit; an equally thorough knowledge of the language and the literature of the Jews; an accurate acquaintance with currents of religious and philosophical thought, both in ancient and modern times. How far he himself is from possessing these intellectual requisites, M. Havet frankly admits. His knowledge of languages is bounded by French, Latin and Greek. He knows neither German nor Hebrew, and though he once or twice quotes Shakespere, he owns that he can use English books only in translations. We hardly know which to admire most, the boldness which induces a man who is ignorant of Hebrew to write a volume, full of the most trenchant conclusions, on the history of Jewish religion, or that which impels one who knows no German to dissertate on subjects which Teutonic learning has thrown into the shape in which they now present themselves to the human intellect. M. Havet's scholarship is of a kind which, so far as we know, exists in France and nowhere else. Like some other Frenchmen, we suspect that in his secret heart he looks upon France as the natural heir of Greece and Rome in the intellectual world; that she with them makes up a truly classic triad; and that what other nations have achieved in the realm of mind is really not much worth study. It is only on such an hypothesis that we can explain the curious way in which M. Havet cites such old French classics as Racine, Bossuet and Voltaire, in connections where their authority can hardly be considered weighty or final, and contents himself with Astruc's crude hypotheses as to the Jehovistic and Elohistic documents in the Pentateuch. We do not at all mean to deny the important part which Racine, Bossuet and Voltaire have played in the development of the European, and especially of the French mind, or to detract from the merit of Astruc in having first pointed out those literary peculiarities of the Pentateuch on which subsequent scholars have founded so stately an edifice of criticism. But these citations give M. Havet's pages an air

of provincial anachronism which would be quaint if it were not almost provoking. He is like a country old maid who should come up to the world's Exposition in Paris attired in the finery that was fashionable in her youth, and utterly refuse to believe that the newest times and the concourse of the nations could furnish her with anything more becoming.

The same note of provincialism is discernible in M. Havet's treatment of the classical part of his subject. The great defect of his first two volumes is the absence of any successful attempt to determine what were the characteristic religious ideas of the Greeks; to draw the boundary-line which separated their religion from their mythology on the one hand, and their philosophy on the other; and to determine the actual points at which the streams of Hellenic and Hebrew thought began to mingle. What he chiefly does is to give his readers a long cento of passages from Greek poets and philosophers, in which he sees, or thinks he sees, the expression of ideas now usually accepted as Christian. And in its way this is a good thing, though hardly what, for M. Havet's special purpose, is chiefly wanted. No thoughtful men can suppose that the ethics of the New Testament are wholly, or even in large part, original. The leading principles of morals must be identical, whether taught by Isaiah, or Aristotle, or Christ. To predicate absolute novelty for Christian morals is to assert that until Jesus taught, the whole world was lying in ethical darkness, a statement equally repugnant to fact and to any worthy conceptions of Divine Providence. M. Havet, therefore, must be considered to have done a good work in thus culling from the great and fertile garden of Greek literature those flowers of fine thought and happy speech which still bloom to prove to us, if proof were necessary, how completely that wonderful Hellenic race had discerned the real conditions and true secret of human living. At the same time he has, for us at least, spoiled the whole effect by translating every passage which he quotes into French. He does not even give the original at the bottom of the page. No doubt to a writer who thinks Racine's Phèdre and Iphigénie as truly classical as

their prototypes in Euripides, French and Greek are the same thing. But they are not the same thing to us. We have a very great and an increasing admiration for the French language as a medium of expression for clear, logical thought and the refined by-play of social emotions; but when it comes to representing the majestic harmony, the boundless variety, the native and unspoiled grace of Homer and Sophocles and Plato in the dialect of a French Lycée, it is like reducing music written for a vast organ to the compass of a penny whistle. All that we can thank M. Havet for is his references at the end of his volumes, and these only make us wish for more.

But M. Havet's argumentative treatment of these passages is not satisfactory. Take, for instance, the religious and moral ideas of the Homeric poems, in itself a subject of large compass and great interest. Every careful reader of the Iliad and the Odyssey must have derived from them vivid impressions of the religious and ethical life which they half-unconsciously depict, and would gladly have those impressions at once confirmed and reduced to form and order. The mythological belief needs to be separated from the current of genuine religious feeling which runs beneath it, and both from the more developed mythology and more philosophical faith of later times. Then, on the moral side, the foundations of heroism in physical strength and prowess, the frank naturalness of the relations between the sexes, rising in some instances into noble conjugal love, the unshamed cruelty and the admired craft of the leaders of men, the sacredness of hospitality, the feudal relations between kings and peoples, and a thousand traits of the same kind, unite to form a picture which for distinctness of outline and variety of colour has hardly a parallel in literature. M. Havet attempts little or nothing of all this. He despatches Homer in very few pages, and those filled with general observations. Some even of these are strangely impertinent, if we may use that word in its literal signification.

"Re-read in the Iliad," he says, "the farewell of Hector and Andromache: watch the grave and tender husband, protesting that he shall be hidden by the earth before outrage has compelled his

wife to utter a cry; holding up his child towards heaven, asking of the gods that he may become the defender of his people, and that he may be a better man than his father; afterwards giving him back to his mother, who smiles for a moment in the midst of her tears, but who returns pensive, and already mourns in her heart for the husband who has been her all. Search in the Bible or elsewhere for a like scene, or one of a like moral effect. For we cannot compare it to that incomprehensible Holy Family, where there is neither husband nor father, where the mother brings forth without having loved, and doubtless also without having suffered, for whom, in a word, neither life nor death are serious things, because she is outside of all human conditions."*

What likeness there can possibly be discerned between the family life of Andromache and that of Mary, and how they can be brought together upon one scale of higher and lower, we do not pretend to know; all we desire to point out is, that such comparisons are not criticism, and do not help criticism, any more than scientific geography was helped by Fluellen's comparison between Monmouth and Macedon. All they are good for is to give M. Havet the opportunity of a fling against the Bible and Christianity. Yet surely any impartial critic would say, that in regard to a natural human pathos, a simple and searching recognition of the deep realities of life, an inexhaustible power of interesting unspoiled minds, the Bible may hold its own against any other book in the world. For in many of its earlier portions it shares with the Iliad and the Odyssey the inestimable literary advantage of being the voice of humanity's vigorous youth, conscious of strong and simple emotions, and expressing them in a language not yet degraded to common uses.

M. Havet's direct treatment of the Bible, when he comes to it, is not less summary than the indirect treatment, of which we might give many examples more. He boldly brings down the Law to the age of Ezra. "Neither before nor after the Law was Israel ever what is called monotheistic."† "It is impossible to doubt that the bull Jehovah was the God of Elijah

* I. 22. † III. 11.

and Elisha, as well as of Jehu, and the only Jehovah who was known at that time."* If the first four books of the Law date only from Ezra, "it is certain that the fifth book is more recent than the four others, and separated from them by a considerable interval, during which the situation of the Jews, as well as their sentiments and ideas, underwent considerable change. The date of the book must then be that at which the Jews had to do with the Greeks, and the kings who inherited Alexander's empire."† M. Reuss thinks that some of the Psalms are as late as the time of Antiochus Epiphanes; M. Havet, improving on the lesson, would bring the close of the collection down to Herod,‡ if not further, and thinks that in the 137th, "By the waters of Babylon," Babylon may mean Rome, and the allusion be to the joint siege of Jerusalem by Herod and the Romans.§ The Prophets he transfers in a lump to the time of Antiochus Epiphanes and the Maccabees. "It is not only probable, but certain, that no prophetic book can have been written before the time of Cyrus."‖ The Prophets must be subsequent to the first four books of the Pentateuch; and if these belong to the time of Ezra, the inference is simple and clear. Isaiah xix. 25 belongs to about the year 150 B.C.¶ The so-called Lamentations of Jeremiah, M. Havet is inclined to believe, allude to the siege of Jerusalem by Herod and Sossius. Most modern critics place the book of Daniel in the time of Antiochus; but what if Isaiah and Jeremiah, Micah and Hosea, are already there? The conclusion is obvious: when the prophet seems to point to the Syrian, he really means the Idumæan tyrant, and the whole composition is of the age of Herod.** If M. Havet can find out all these fine things without knowing Hebrew, what might we not have learned if only he had mastered its rudiments?

But enough of M. Havet's shortcomings in the execution of his self-appointed task. It will be pleasanter for us, as well as more useful to our readers, to conclude this paper with one

* III. 23. † III. 157. ‡ III. 250. § III. 252.
‖ III. 178. ¶ III. 183. ** III. 307.

or two observations on the task itself, and the lines on which its successful performance is alone possible.

Christianity does not differ from all other historical phenomena in being isolated. It is not among religions what Melchisedec was among priests, "without father, without mother, without descent." The theological conception of the incarnate Son of God, descending upon mankind at a particular point of time to bring a message of reconciliation and of pardon—of the eternal Logos, the everlasting Wisdom suddenly made vocal upon the lips of Christ—necessarily tends to obscure the fact that the way for Christianity had been slowly and carefully prepared; that Jesus of Nazareth was the natural product of his race and his age; that in his, as in any other great human personality, the whole past of humanity was implicitly contained; and that, to understand him, that past must receive patient investigation. Up to a comparatively recent period, even the idea of the preparation for Christ, though admitted, has been misunderstood. The world, it is true, was conceived of as getting ready for a great event. The unity of administration of the Roman empire, the diffusion of the Greek tongue as the universal language of literature and civilization, the dispersion of the Jews in every centre of Mediterranean commerce, were forces concurrently working to an end at once unknown and external to themselves. To use a frequent metaphor, they were preparing a seed-bed, in which, at the right moment, a divine seed would be sown from on high. But this conception misses the thought that the seed was being prepared by the same kind of natural force as the seed-bed; and that the formal morality of the Law, the pure and passionate ethics of the Prophets, the legendary marvels of the chosen race, the sweet and strong devotion of the Psalms, the quaint wisdom of the Rabbis, the pious simplicity of a Hebrew home, had all been combining to form the character of the Christ, and to give his teaching its individuality. No doubt, if Judaism is to be completely understood, currents of national influence which have mingled with it must also be traced and estimated. Recent discoveries seem to shew that the contact

between Jewish and Assyrian, or Accadian civilization, was not wholly hostile, and that their most ancient legends may be traced to the same source. It is more than possible that Egypt lent to Judæa the symbol of the calf. The results of the contact in Babylon between Jewish and Persian monotheists are yet visible in Christian mythology. The extent to which Jewish thought was Hellenized in those three centuries B.C., with the history of which we are so imperfectly acquainted, is a perplexing though most important subject. But it is in the totality of these mingling forces, and in their varied interaction, that we have to search for the secret of Christ and his teaching.

The question assumes another aspect when for Christ we pass to Christianity, and regard it, not as an ideal system of religion which commands our own allegiance, but as an actual historical fact. For if Christ was the product of the past, and is to be understood by its investigation, it is no less true that his teachings, from the moment that they dropped from his lips, fell into a world of conflicting forces, by which they were very soon profoundly modified. And that world was largely Greek. So far as we can see, the church at Jerusalem, which after the destruction of the city by Titus turned its back upon mankind and fled to Pella, was hardly more than a synagogue of reformed Jews, without the wish or the power to deliver a message to the Gentile world. It was by addressing itself to the Greek-speaking peoples that Christianity secured its first possibility of life, although in so doing it submitted to as well as exercised influence. Something is involved in the very fact that the New Testament, as we have it, is written in Greek—not very good Greek, it is true—the Greek of foreigners trying to make themselves understood in a strange tongue. But language moulds thought, as well as thought language, and the New Testament stammering the dialect of Herodotus and Plato is a very different thing from what it would have been if written in the Hebrew of Isaiah or the colloquial Aramaic of contemporary Palestine. Still much more than this remains behind. To confine ourselves

for a moment within the limits of the New Testament, how shall we adequately estimate the Hellenizing influence of Paul and the author of the fourth Gospel? Paul was a native of Tarsus, where Greek studies were sedulously pursued: he quotes Aratus and Menander, if not Epimenides: he must be credited with some knowledge of Greek philosophical thought: unlike the apostles that "seemed to be pillars," he ranged the Gentile world, coming into contact with many men and various manners: his whole intellectual attitude is of one consciously standing between Palestine and Greece, an interpreter and a mediator. Who was that profound and subtle religious genius who hides himself behind the mask of John the son of Zebedee, or on what genuine fund of evangelical tradition he worked, we do not pretend to know; but it is clear beyond dispute that he had breathed the air of Alexandria, that through Philo he traced his intellectual descent on one side to Moses, on the other to Plato, and that the most characteristic germs of the subsequent philosophical development of Christianity were introduced by him into the New Testament. Whether or no there was any Greek leaven in Christ himself, we detect its presence in Christianity the moment it begins to make its way in the world. For Greek thought and feeling filled the air of the first century; nor was it possible to breathe that air and yet escape its influence.

The farther from its source we trace the stream of Christianity, the more plainly is it swelled by waters from strange fountains. At first it was essentially and chiefly a spiritual life, burning and spreading in obscure places, the hope of the slave, the consolation of the woman, everywhere the joy of "the poor in spirit." But when the time came for moulding it into a system, the work was done by men who had received their training in the schools of Greek philosophy and under the pressure of philosophical polemic. Such men as Justin, who had tried the philosophies all round in vain, and had taken refuge in Christianity at last as the truest wisdom, first endeavoured to throw the new faith into a form satisfactory

to themselves, and then to defend it from objections taken from their own old armoury. It is not our present business to trace at length the process by which first the Nicene and then the pseudo-Athanasian Trinity were slowly developed from the dogmatic statements of the fourth Gospel: it is enough to note that Platonic speculation supplied the form of the new doctrine, while the impulse which led to its adoption, the desire to deify Christ, was not only essentially Greek, but absolutely abhorrent to Hebrew thought and feeling. As we descend the ages, and find ourselves at last in full presence of mediæval Catholicism, we must frankly admit that the difference between Christianity and the old Polytheism is one more of name than of fact. A new Pantheon of gods and goddesses reigns in heaven. The statues are in the niches once more,—only, as Goethe has it,

Wunderthätige Bilder sind meistens schlechte Gemälde,

and for the divine creations of Pheidias and Praxiteles we have daubs from the pencil of apostolic painters, and dolls that fell from heaven. The shrines of Mary, "Stella Maris," are hung with the votive offerings which Horace's shipwrecked sailors once offered to Venus, or the great Twins. The processions and the pilgrimages have begun again: the priesthood are just as willing as ever that the willing people should be deceived, and have acquired a new and potent engine of tyranny in the conception of a purgatory, from which sinners may buy exit, and a hell in which the impenitent burn without hope. Christmas commemorates far less the birth of the Saviour than the Roman Saturnalia; and the fires at Midsummer, though lighted in the name of St. John, are a survival of Teutonic superstition. The old life that was in the world seems to have been too strong for the new vitality which Christianity poured into it: there has been a change of names and forms, but that is all. And when the Renaissance comes, with the Reformation in its train, an ardent and uncompromising Hellenist might say that it was again Greece, the

perpetual moving spring of human affairs, that woke from temporary lethargy, and Greek philosophy that won its second victory over Greek paganism.

The importance of the Greek factor in Christianity it is thus impossible to question. But it is all the more necessary that its history and development should be treated with a rigid adherence to philosophical method. The pursuit through the pages of Greek poets and historians of passages which bear a near or remote resemblance to Biblical texts, and the proof that a high and humane morality was taught by heathen sages and formed an integral part of heathen life, are very interesting from many points of view, though under the present circumstances somewhat superfluous. No rational critic denies the independent development of Greek religion and ethics, or supposes that the great principles of human conduct were left to be revealed by Christ. That all systems of morals are, at similar stages of human development, fundamentally the same, is not only abundantly vouched for by facts, but a necessary corollary from the unity of the race. What we want in these parallels between Greek philosophy and the gospel is, not adduction of similarity, but actual proof of affiliation. We have, for instance, such proof in the case of the Golden Rule. When R. Hillel says, "Do not unto another what thou wouldest not have another do unto thee: this is the whole Law, the rest is mere commentary,"—and Christ, by a stroke of true ethical genius, gives the precept a positive instead of a negative form, it is impossible not to believe that we are watching an actual process of growth. But when, to take at random one of M. Havet's instances, he quotes Euripides Phœnissæ, 565,

> Οὗτοι τὰ χρήματ' ἴδια κέκτηνται βροτοὶ
> Τὰ τῶν θεῶν δ' ἔχοντες ἐπιμελούμεθα.
> Ὅταν δὲ χρῄζωσ' αὖτ' ἀφαιροῦνται πάλιν.

and connects it with Job's, "The Lord gave and the Lord hath taken away: blessed be the name of the Lord," we simply feel that we are in presence of a coincidence, and that not a

very striking one. What any investigator who wishes to work out M. Havet's main conception has to do, is first to determine, with all possible accuracy, what Greek ethical and religious thought was, and then to point out its actual and unquestionable points of impact upon that historical fact which we call Christianity.

One difficulty which besets the inquiry at the outset arises from the fact that the close and essential connection between religion and morality, which is characteristic of Judaism and Christianity alike, and which a Christian critic is therefore tempted to assume as existing in the nature of things, is much looser upon Hellenic soil, and can be affirmed only with caution. If the stories of the loves of Zeus or the frauds of Hermes are in any sense to be called religion, *causa finita est*, morals and faith are at direst discord. So the first work the historical critic has to do, is distinctly to mark off mythology from religion; to trace the former to its origin in the conceptions of the natural beauty and order formed by the childhood of the race; to shew how, on the one hand, it survived as the form of popular religious belief; how, on the other, it was plastic in the hands of the poets, and made by them to serve an ethical purpose. But next it would be necessary to follow the awakening of the speculative intellect, and the gradual rise of philosophical theology, in connection with which, and especially under the successive influence of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, morality first received a systematic treatment. The Hebrew theory of the relation of morality to religion is shut up in one word, "The righteous Lord loveth righteousness." But it would be hard to find a parallel to this conception in Greek literature or life. The gods were indeed to be propitiated by festive dance and pompous procession, by costly shrine and punctual sacrifice; but there is little or no recognition of the fact that human life is to be consecrated and cleansed by union with the divine. No doubt this was not equally the case at every stage of the national development. At an earlier period, and in the hands of some poets, a religious feeling attached itself to the old mythology, which

afterwards was chiefly manifested in connection with the doctrines of the schools. But there was always a peculiarity in Greek conceptions of religion, which, if they are not to be confused with quite other manifestations of a similar kind, require careful description and, where possible, exact definition.

But even when mythology, philosophy, morals, religion, have been accurately distinguished from each other, and their mutual relation and interaction traced as minutely as may be, a further and perhaps a more difficult question presents itself. What was the actual religious life of the Greek people, and how did it influence their morality? Were the gods that dwelt on Olympus real personages to them? Did they give implicit credence to the old legends? What value did they set upon the ancient rites, which were kept up long after the first simple faith that established them had faded away? What was the secret of the mysteries, and how much or how little genuine belief waited upon the responses of the oracles? Was there any general faith in a future life, and what influence had its existence, or its non-existence, upon the moral conception of the life present? We know to a certain extent what Æschylus and Sophocles, what Thucydides and Socrates, thought of these things; but what we want to know much more, for our present purpose, are the opinions of the Athenian cobbler, or the farmer on the plain of Marathon, and these are to be deduced from extant Greek literature only doubtfully and inferentially. In one or two important particulars the Anthology will do much to help us, and the inquirer ought to know all that inscriptions have to tell. Then the question of the actual moral condition of the Greeks is of great interest and importance at this point. For the most part, those who ask for information in regard to it are put off with dissertations, very valuable and interesting in their way, on the Stoical or Epicurean system of morals, which is as if a disquisition on Hume and Berkeley, Shaftesbury and Butler, were given in answer to an inquiry into the ethical condition of England in the 18th century. What did their philosophy and their morality, their mingled mythology and religion, do for the

Greeks in the building up of national character? Were they cruel and cowardly, or magnanimous and brave? What force did they allow to the obligation of speaking the truth? What sense of fitness ruled the relation of the sexes? How far was their distinctive view of life ethical at all, or was it not their national way to look at conduct from the side of the natural or the beautiful rather than of the good? We have said that Christianity, almost from its infancy, was obliged to breathe Hellenic air; and it is only by answering these questions that we shall discover of what ingredients that air was composed. The great moving minds of Greece come into no personal contact with Christianity; all they do is, at many removes, and with necessary loss and degradation of influence, to mould the commoner souls that accept the new religion, and half-unconsciously accommodate it to their own opinions and wishes. What Plato would have thought of Paul, who can tell? If the book of Acts is to be believed, the apostle was not very successful even with the degenerate disciples of Zeno and Epicurus. Possibly his Gentile converts, highest in the intellectual scale, were men to whose minds some pale and ineffectual tincture of the discipline of Porch or Garden had been imparted, and who were philosophers at fifth hand. And to know what they thought and felt we must understand, not the schools, but the people.

At this point, however, a further complication is caused by the fact, that though the intellectual air of the first century was Greek, it was, through a large part of the civilized world, Greek with a difference. Nothing is more curious than the way in which the Romans, a people of singular force and individuality of character, meekly went to school to Greece in arts and letters, and accepted with absolute docility the intellectual impress of a people whom they oppressed politically and despised socially. Whatever Latin literature ever breathed a national spirit or took a national form, has long since disappeared; and from Plautus to Boethius, the ambition of Roman writers seems to have been bounded by the successful imitation of Greek models. Of Roman speculative thought,

properly so called, there is absolutely none; but some forms of Greek philosophy, especially the Stoic, adapted themselves so naturally to the Roman character as to enter upon a fresh course of development upon their transplantation to Rome. At the same time, they naturally suffered some modification. The Roman view of religion and life was not the Greek. It was stronger and sterner on the ethical side; more under conventional restraints; less swayed by a sense of beauty; perhaps more bound up with political considerations and a patriotic pride. All this renders it needful that an inquirer should undertake some adequate search into the springs of Roman thought and feeling, and ascertain the degree to which, and the particulars in which, Greek influence upon Christianity was modified by the Latin medium through which it in part passed. And this is the more necessary because, by a singular caprice of fortune, the Latin, and not the Greek, Church has been in modern times the living and growing branch of the Christian tree. Up to the sixth or seventh century, the motive power in the development of Christian doctrine was emphatically Greek. But the doctrine of the Trinity, once defined, can hardly be said to have a history. The majority of men have quietly accepted it as part of the theological furniture of their minds, while modern controversy has turned much more on those questions of grace and free-will, of predestination and atonement, which have had a Latin origin and development. Nor did the Greek Church make any converts, except that one huge Muscovite, beneath whose brute inertia its life has been crushed; while the Latin communion inherited the fresh vigour of the Northern races whom it is one of her chief glories to have brought into the fold. The Greek factor, then, in Christianity is purely Greek only at the first; it soon admits a Latin taint; and as ten centuries roll by, the original Hellenic impulse grows weaker and weaker.

Currents of world-influence mingle, not, as rivers join, at single points, but by a perpetual process of anastomosis, sometimes larger, sometimes less. But there are well-marked

periods at which the contact between Hebraism and Hellenism is of special importance and interest. The first of these is the age of the later Antiochi, when a vigorous Hellenizing process went on, to which the revolt of the Maccabees was the great, though only a partial and temporary, counterpoise. Closely connected with this is the second, of which the key-words are Alexandria and Philo. By a natural process of transition, the second leads to the third, the Hellenic element in the New Testament, and especially in the fourth Gospel and the letters of Paul. From this we pass to the fourth, the social atmosphere into which Christianity was received, and the philosophic favour or opposition which gave it its first systematic shape. Next, in the fifth place, the special influence of Greek philosophical thought in moulding the doctrine of the Trinity deserves careful consideration; and the last branch of the discussion should be a comparison between the general form and spirit of mediæval Christianity and those of Greek and Roman paganism. These periods could not, it is true, be treated quite separately: they would be found on examination to melt into one another by gradual transitions, and to form part of one great historical development. But it is only by the application of a strictly philosophic method of this kind that the amount and influence of the Hellenic element in Christianity can be satisfactorily determined.

A further question of great practical interest, not remotely connected with the foregoing, can only be briefly alluded to in this place. How far do Hebraic and Hellenic elements mingle in the life of Englishmen to-day? How far are both modified and controlled by influences due to our Teutonic descent and institutions which are to be traced to an ultimate Teutonic source? To what extent is it possible consciously to aim at a harmonious and symmetrical union in our individual and social life of whatever is truest and best in all of these elements, and so to make present humanity the ripest fruit of the past? A strong reaction in the direction of Hellenism is going on at the present moment in the bosom of English society: even granting that Religion is Hebrew,

which after what has been said above can be affirmed only in a modified form, Science and Art and Politics are all Greek, and to these a constantly larger share of energy and attention is being devoted. But reactions are apt to be blind and stupid things: surely the time has come at which it is possible for thoughtful men, who aim to direct the progress of humanity, to strive towards a definite goal by paths carefully surveyed and chosen. And certainly, so far as religion is concerned (and with religion alone we have chiefly to do in this place), that goal will not be the crude revival of any form of faith hitherto recognized as flowing from a Hebrew fountain. There can, indeed, be nothing truer and deeper than the fundamental truths of religion and morality as enunciated by Christ; but they are far fewer and simpler than most men take them to be, and much less mark off Christianity from other forms of faith than bind them all together in one great and comprehensive unity. Still, while the religion of the future will not become, in the best sense of the word, less Christian, it will certainly grow less Jewish. Yet we hardly think it will be Greek, after the fashion in which the Nicene Creed is Greek. The Hellenism which it must embrace, or run the risk of shrinking into a narrow and obsolete sect, will be that of an earlier and better time—the Hellenism which, turning a frank face to the universe, strives to pierce the mystery of its wonders, and is not reluctant to learn their lesson—the Hellenism which aims at the complete development of humanity from the side not merely of reverence and of right, but of beauty—the Hellenism which seeks in the constitution of human nature for the secret of its perfection, and finds in what is truly natural what is seemly at once and good. The world is growing too old, knowledge too vast, humanity too conscious of its unity, for race-religions: the only kingdom of heaven henceforth possible is one in which Jew and Gentile, Semite, Aryan and Turanian, can find an equal and a rightful place.

CHARLES BEARD.

## VI.—HISTORIES OF THE DEVIL.

*Demonology and Devil-lore.* By Moncure Daniel Conway, M.A., B.D., of Divinity College, Harvard University, &c. With numerous Illustrations. London: Chatto and Windus, Piccadilly. 1879.

ANY work which deals with the Devil or his angels and ministers may reckon upon exciting considerable initial curiosity and interest.

Many of the current stories about the Devil are sufficiently quaint and amusing to evoke a desire to hear more of their hero, and perhaps we retain just enough reverence for his majesty to give a zest to the flippant familiarity with which he is often treated in the legends.

Again, the weird and extravagant fancies represented by the words *witchcraft* and *magic*, so closely connected with Demonology, still command a speculative interest which reflects, however faintly, the terrific fascination which they must have often exercised over the minds of those who believed in them as veritably existing. Now and then we have cast a momentary glance down the long line of grotesque and fearful images which these words call up before us, and there is something almost irresistibly attractive in the offer to reveal the whole system and machinery of the infernal actions and agents which have only flitted through our general reading, like the witches in Macbeth, to leave us with an awakened but utterly unsatisfied curiosity.

Yet again, while promising to satisfy an irrepressible curiosity and to provide considerable amusement on the one side, books of devilry seem to draw us on the other side close to one of the deepest and most absorbing of the ever-recurring problems of the universe—the origin of evil. And even if we are sufficiently strong-minded to relegate speculations upon such subjects to the limbo of "lunar politics" so far as we ourselves are concerned, we can hardly fail to recognize the varying solutions of this great problem which have been given or attempted

through the ages, as possessing a deep historical interest, and as throwing a light on the development of moral conceptions which cannot fail to secure them respectful attention.

On these and many other grounds, any attempt to write a history of the Devil or a treatise on Demonology is almost sure to find that initial interest which is often the one thing needful to secure success.

And yet, though scholars and writers of very varied qualifications have in late years written from the most diverse points of view upon this class of subjects, it would probably be impossible to point out a single recent work on the Devil which has succeeded in establishing itself as a really valuable and permanent addition to the library of the historical and philosophical student.

M. Réville's ingenious epitome of Roskoff's *Geschichte des Teufels** is probably the best known of them all, but even that is rather a disappointing book.

The fault seems to lie after all with the subject. It by no means fulfils its promise. The dulness and monotony of the devil stories soon pall on the wearied attention, and the nearer we get to their original forms the more totally devoid of humour and imagination on the one hand, and of all serious significance on the other, do they appear.

Witches, again, are only interesting as long as they are shadowy, and the titillation of curiosity soon yields to overpowering somnolence in face of the endless repetition of trivial absurdities of which the annals of witchcraft consist; while the ghastly chronicles of persecution, the only substantial outcome of the whole inquiry, turn the heart sick with horror.

In a word, if any one wishes to find amusement in devilry and witchcraft, he cannot do better than stick to the "Ingoldsby Legends" and the "Lancashire Witches," and set all serious study aside.

But of course the grave authors who write elaborate works on these subjects aim at something far more than amusing

* See Theological Review, Vol. VIII. (1871), pp. 30 sqq.

their readers. It may be presumed that their purpose is to present a systematic survey of a distinct and important branch of human thought, to trace it to its origin, to follow it into its manifold developments, and to indicate its practical bearing upon life and character; and if, one after another, they fail to accomplish anything really noteworthy, we may perhaps learn from their failure a lesson quite as important and considerably more encouraging than anything that their success would have been likely to teach us.

For the inherently chaotic and parasitic nature of evil is impressed upon us afresh by every fresh failure to present a systematic view of the attempts that have constantly been made to erect it into an organism possessing its own laws of development and expression. Mr. Conway remarks,* with more than usual profundity, that the conception of an absolute fiend, or personified Principle of Evil, has always evaded, and must always evade, the popular grasp, remaining at best the exclusive possession of a small circle of speculative thinkers; for a personified being, to be popular, must act upon principles roughly appreciable by the average human mind; and the principle of absolute and intrinsic preference for evil is unintelligible and unrealizable; it falls to pieces by its own incoherence. Elsewhere the same or a kindred thought is tersely put as follows:

"Spinoza's aphorism, 'From the perfection of a thing proceeds its power of continuance,' is the earliest modern statement of the doctrine now called 'survival of the fittest.' The notion of a Devil involves the solecism of a being surviving through its unfitness for survival."†

In the same spirit, St. Augustine, in his keen analysis of the motives to sinful action,‡ resolves even the most seemingly gratuitous vice into some kind of corrupt and perverted pursuit of good and imitation of God; and in this sense the well-known aphorism that Satan is the ape of God, frequently alluded to by Mr. Conway, gains a far more profound signifi-

* Vol. II. pp. 8, 9. † Vol. II. p. 441. ‡ Confessions, Book ii.

cance than was originally put into it, and goes far towards demonstrating the impossibility, not only of the Devil's existence, but even of systematic treatises on his supposed significance.

This necessity of attributing an adequate motive to any personal being, makes it simply impossible to conceive of a fundamental dualism as at once *personal* and *moral*. If the great Spirit of Evil has no plan or ultimate purpose whatever, but is simply obstructive, he loses all dignity, and ceases to be in any sense co-ordinate with the Spirit of Good. And, conversely, as soon as he is raised to any independence and dignity, we are forced to credit him with some statesmanlike object, so to speak, and he ceases to be wholly evil. Even Ahriman, as expounded by Mr. Conway,* very often seems to be a defeated candidate for the throne, indulging a natural though reprehensible love of thwarting his successful rival, rather than the absolute Principle of Evil.

In fact, the only fundamental dualism conceivable is that between God and Matter, not between God and the Devil. A stubborn and chaotic ὕλη (whether material or spiritual in the ordinary sense of the words), yielding or failing to yield to the evolving spirit, a chaos ever threatening to engulf the cosmos and defeat its designer, is conceivable enough; and we may likewise imagine a mighty spirit, impelled by wounded ambition or any other personal motive, throwing all his power on the side of chaos, and giving a kind of direction to the blind and mutinous resistance of the intractable ὕλη; but when we reach even this point, the antithesis, in becoming to some extent personal, has ceased to be wholly moral, inasmuch as the opposing spirit already acts from some motive other than gratuitous love of evil, and is, in fact, the great "Second Best," as Mr. Conway is rather fond of calling him.

Let philosophers and theologians do what they will, therefore, it remains a fact that no personification of Evil can be even approximately complete. The Evil Principle must exist

* Vol. II. pp. 20 sqq.

independently of the Devil, and, what is more, the Devil's own alliance with evil can only be incidental and partial, can only be a means to an end.

Any *Will* absolutely identified with evil must itself be a kind of unorganized spiritual ὕλη, and must stand in the same relations of mingled subjection and resistance to the Supreme Organizer as those in which the rest of his unfinished creation or evolution are supposed to exist.

True Devils, then, are only conceivable at that low stage of nature and development which is simply mutinous, which never looks beyond its blind and vulgar instincts of lawless and heartless rebellion, or asks itself the question, "What should I do if successful?" No sooner is any internal discipline or definite purpose imported into the diabolical ranks, than they cease to be wholly diabolical.

This fact, which probably lies at the root of the failure of books on the Devil, is strikingly illustrated by what may be called the poetical history of Devils.

If, for instance, we pass under review the representations of Dante, Tasso and Milton, we shall find that just in proportion as the poets allow the diabolical agents in their dramas to rise into independent significance and interest, and constitute one of the true "motives" in the development, they are compelled to divest them of their purely diabolical character.

To begin with Dante. The devils in his great poem take an absolutely subordinate place. In a general sketch of the Inferno, it would hardly be necessary even to mention them. Hell is not in any strict sense their own domain; nor do we feel that they would for a moment sustain its hideous order and discipline, were not their own brutal and senseless recalcitrance itself held under sternest and most immediate discipline, even within the boundaries of Hell. No organization whatever depends upon them; and it is possible, therefore, to represent them as true devils, without any single impulse of a potentially constructive character in their composition. They have no self-discipline, no loyalty, no purpose. Resenting the pressure of the yoke they cannot break, they have nevertheless

learnt, perforce, to bear it, and to find what scope they can for their infernal energies within the limits prescribed them; but anything which reminds them afresh of their subjection, invariably leads to a burst of wildest fury, that only yields to abject terror.* In spite of the demon garrison of the city of Dis, in spite of the Malebranche, in spite of all the other devils that have their parts assigned to them, we feel throughout this awful poem that a Higher Power reigns even here, and holds in their places forces which if left to themselves would instantly lapse into wildest chaos.

Dante's devils, with their obscene gestures, their brutal ferocity and their low wit, chopping logic over the dismayed sinner, snarling at the delivering angel that carries off the soul saved "by a sorry tear," taunting the doomed wretch as he falls into their boiling pitch, or screaming defiance at the poet and his guide, are as ready to fall out amongst themselves as to torture their victims, and the momentary agreement of the Malebranche (aptly signified by the line of tongues thrust through the mocking teeth), though inspired by a purpose to deceive, has not cohesion enough to keep them together for an hour; and when last we see them, two of them have fallen into the pitch as they buffet and tear one another, and the rest are madly pursuing the two poets with a baffled fury that has forgotten even the dreadful penalties that would surely wait upon its indulgence!†

These are real devils, and for that very reason they could not take any place except an entirely subordinate one in Dante's conception of Hell itself.

Satan, the great arch-fiend, looms fearfully over the central lake of ice, and champs in his eternal jaws the three great traitors; but we are scarcely allowed a glimpse into his psychology after his fall, and find no traces in Hell of the action of his mind or will.‡

When we turn to Tasso, we find a very different order of

* Compare, e. g., Inf. viii. 82—ix. 105, xxi. 64—87.

† See Inf. xxi.—xxiii. 57, xxvii. 112—123; Purg. v. 103—129.

‡ See Inf. xxxiv., and compare Par. xix. 46—48, xxvii. 22—27, xxix. 55—57.

conceptions. Hell is with him the kingdom of the devils, and there at least they are free to govern and combine on their own principles. We find them capable of deliberation and of concerted action; and their attempts to thwart Godfrey and his host, whether on their own motion or under the potent spells of Ismeno,* rise into one of the principal motives of the epic development of the poem. But all this necessitates a complete change in the manner in which they are represented. At the terrific blast of the arch-fiend's horn, the legions of Hell assemble to deliberate, and their leader addresses them with passionate eloquence, reminding them of all their sufferings and wrongs, appealing to the still unconquered daring that had once armed them against Heaven, and which still maintained them, even in the face of their defeat, in the glory of invincible courage. Finally, with a pathetic cry to them as his faithful companions, as his only strength, he urges them to the fray. And before the words are fully out of his mouth, his legions burst from Hell and speed to do his bidding.

The mere fact that they are capable of such enthusiasm removes them more than half-way from Dante's sheer devils to Milton's infernal demi-gods.

It is in vain that Tasso attempts, by loathsome physical descriptions, to make his devils hateful. It is in vain that he speaks of their hoofs and horns and knotted tails; in vain that he subjects them to the ignominious treatment they tamely endure from the archangel Michael;† in vain that he makes stench and smoke and gore issue from the Devil's jaws as he harangues his followers; for in order to enable them to take a leading part in his drama, he has been compelled to give them some measure of discipline, of loyalty, of enthusiasm; and having given them these, he cannot make them simple devils again in virtue of physical repulsiveness, or even submission to archangelic insolence.

Passing now to Milton, we find Tasso's conceptions developed

* See, e.g., Gerusalemme Liberata, Canto iv. Stt. i.—xix., and Canto xiii. Stt. i.—xii., and subsequent cantos.

† Canto ix. St. lxv.

and exalted, and almost all attempt to disarm or qualify them practically abandoned. To all intents and purposes, Satan is the hero of Paradise Lost; and in order to qualify him for holding such a place, Milton has been compelled to endow him with such noble attributes that he rivals Prometheus as the type of heroic fortitude; and whenever he stoops to ungenerous or undignified conduct, the poet feels constrained to explain and apologize!* On the other hand, he is satisfied with the barest formal attempts to maintain his hero's infernal character, and, with truer instincts than Tasso's, perceives that, having once made the Devil a hero, he must be sparing in his use of undignified physical adjuncts.†

Thus we see that devils cannot be raised to the dignity of serious treatment without, so far, ceasing to be devils. Once let a clear purpose command their assent, and introduce cohesion and discipline into their ranks, and they are no longer devils.

Is not this the real explanation of the utter insignificance of the great mass of stories of the Devil? We look in vain for the vast embodiment of Evil, the grand proportions of the incarnate opposition to God, and find nothing but pettifogging and often stupid cunning or mere animal ferocity.

In the great dualism of good and evil, of truth and error, of order and chaos, of discipline and licence, of self-sacrifice and self-seeking, the power of order and development can be conceived as personal, the power of disorder and inertness cannot. The Devil cannot really be made the author and embodiment of evil. At the very most he can only be a being who has made himself the champion of evil for some intelligible and therefore not wholly evil purpose.

Mr. Conway himself would, I think, quite endorse all this. Indeed, he gives very striking utterance to one aspect of the

* See, for instance, the celebrated passages, Paradise Lost, Book iv. 32 sqq., 358 sqq.

† See, however, Book x. 504 sqq.; compare Dante, Inf. xxv. 34—144, where the description excels Milton's as much in appropriateness as it does in power. Such scenes have no true place amongst Milton's devils.

central conception I have been trying to illustrate, in the words: "The fact of evil is permanent.... Were starry Lucifer to be restored to his heavenly sphere, he would be one great brand plucked from the burning, but the burning might still go on."*

It is this "burning," this resistance to the divine evolution, this shadow that haunts the divine creation, this rebellion against the discipline involved in the divine order, this parasitical growth of evil which has no principle of life or being of its own, and gnaws into the life which supports it,—it is this that constitutes the really absorbing problem, but it is this that histories of the Devil and treatises on Devil-lore do not touch.

And even if they did, the history of the Devil would still remain an abortive and preposterous study. It would be something like a Parliamentary history which should take cognizance of nothing but the Opposition. Theories of chaos have no meaning except in connection with and in subjection to theories of the cosmos. Theories of evil cannot be the centre of any coherent exposition, for they are but the reflex of theories of good. A history of non-development, a chart and plan of chaos, is an impossibility.

Mr. Conway's own theory of Good, it need hardly be said, is summed up in the two words "Evolution" and "Science." If people would only believe in these two, they would instantly be saved. We should therefore expect the Unevolved to be our author's Evil; but as a matter of fact he seems rather to like it, as supplying material for Evolution.

"To the artist, nature is never seen in petrifaction; it is really as well as literally *a becoming*. The evil he sees is 'good in the making;' what others call vices are voices in the wilderness preparing the way of the highest."†

Again, our author quotes, from a poem by Cranch,‡ the following fine lines, put into the mouth of Satan:

* Vol. II. p. 393. † Vol. II. p. 447.

‡ Satan: a Libretto. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1874.

"I symbolize the wild and deep
And unregenerated wastes of life,
Dark with transmitted tendencies of race
And blind mischance; all crude mistakes of will
And tendency unbalanced by due weight
Of favouring circumstance; all passion blown
By wandering winds; all surplusage of force
Piled up for use, but slipping from its base
Of law and order."

On which he observes:

"This is the very realm in which the poet and the artist find their pure-veined quarries; whence arise the forms transfigured in their vision."*

All this prepares us for the optimistic view of things in general which Mr. Conway's two talismans, "Evolution" and "Science," enable him to take.

"The hare-lip, which we sometimes see in the human face, is there an arrested development. Every lip is at some embryonic period a hare-lip. The development of man's visible part has gone on much longer than his intellectual and moral evolution, and abnormalities in it are rare in comparison with the number of survivals from the animal world in his temper, his faith, and his manners. Criminals are men living out their arrested moral developments. They who regard them as instigated by a devil are those whose arrest is mental. The eye of reason will deal with both all the more effectively, because with as little wrath as a surgeon feels towards a hare-lip he endeavours to humanize."†

And yet we have fancied in reading these volumes that when the Unevolved, the arrested mental growth, takes the form of disbelief in Evolution and Science, or belief in an Omnipotent Will, or, above all, faith in a Priesthood, Mr. Conway's caustic is applied with a little more "wrath" than suits his philosophical creed, and his knife is brandished in a style not strictly surgical.

We are very far from complaining of this. A surgical calmness in the face of what we regard as pernicious error is happily

* Vol. II. p. 447. † Vol. II. p. 439. Query: is "he" 'the eye of reason'?

impossible, and we are all of us practical dualists at heart. All earnest men have their moral antipathies, rising, if not into wrath, at least into indignation.

Even Mr. Conway, philosopher as he is, cannot deal with priests quite as graciously as he does with serpents. "Taught by Science," he says, when speaking of the latter,

"Man may, with a freedom the barbarian cannot feel, exterminate the Serpent; with a freedom the christian cannot know, he may see in that reptile the perfection of that economy in nature which has ever defended the advancing forms of life. It [i. e. Science] judges the good and evil of every form with reference to its adaptation to its own purposes."*

But when he is speaking of priests, Mr. Conway seems to feel no desire to "justify their place in nature," or to "judge the good and evil" of this special form of existence solely "with reference to its adaptation to its own purposes."

*Superstition*, then, in Mr. Conway's mind, appears to be that form of the Unevolved which approaches most nearly to a positive principle of Evil, and a desire to reclaim this waste-land appears to have inspired the more serious purpose of his volumes.

"The natural world is overlaid by an unnatural religion, breeding bitterness around simplest thoughts, obstructions to science, estrangements not more reasonable than if they resulted from varying notions of lunar figures,—all derived from the Devil-bequeathed dogma that certain beliefs and disbeliefs are of infernal instigation. Dogmas moulded in a fossil Demonology make the foundation of institutions which divert wealth, learning, enterprize, to fictitious ends. It has not, therefore, been mere intellectual curiosity which has kept me working at this subject these many years, but an increasing conviction that the sequelæ of such superstitions are exercising a still formidable influence."†

Elsewhere Mr. Conway gives us an elaborate allegory founded on the fate of a certain holy tree in Travancore:

"Why should that particular tree—of a species common in the district and not usually very large—have grown so huge? 'Because

* Vol. I. pp. 418 sq.

† Vol. I. p. vii.

it is holy,' said the priest. 'Because it was believed holy,' says the fact. For ages the blood and ashes of victims fed its roots and swelled its trunk; until, by an argument not confined to India, the dimensions of the superstition were assumed to prove its truth. When the people complained that all their offerings and worship did not bring any returns, the priest replied, You stint the gods and they stint you. The people offered the fattest of their flocks and fruits: More yet! said the priest. They built fine altars and temples for the gods: More yet! said the priest. They built fine houses for the priests, and taxed themselves to support them. And when thus, fed by popular sacrifices and toils, the religion had grown to vast power, the priest was able to call to his side the theologian for further explanation. The theologian and the priest said—'Of course there must be good reasons why the gods do not answer all your prayers (if they did not answer some, you would be utterly consumed): mere mortals must not dare to inquire into their mysteries: but that there are gods, and that they do attend to human affairs, is made perfectly plain by this magnificent array of temples, and by the care with which they have supplied all the wants of us, their particular friends, whose cheeks, as you see, hang down with fatness.'"*

Evolutionist as he is, Mr. Conway can really look upon this as an adequate view of ecclesiastical history!

But to go on with the tree. In the end it was cut down by an English missionary to make the planks and beams of his own church, and, continues our author,

"The victorious missionary may be pointing out in his chapel the cut-up planks which reveal the impotence of the deity so long feared by the natives; and perhaps he is telling them of the bigness of *his* tree, and claiming its flourishing condition in Europe as proof of its supernatural character. Possibly he may omit to mention the blood and ashes which have fattened the root and enlarged the trunk of *his* holy tree."†

If we ask what this holy tree of the Europeans is, we cannot clearly ascertain whether it is belief in God or in the Devil, because Mr. Conway has a confirmed habit of mixing

* Vol. I. pp. 301, 302. † P. 303.

up the two; but it is evidently one or both of these beliefs, as appears from the following very powerful passage:

"All that man ever won of courage or moral freedom, by conquering his dragons in detail, he surrenders again to the phantom forces they typified when he gives up his mind to belief in a power not himself that makes for evil. The terrible conclusion that Evil is a positive and imperishable Principle in the universe carries in it the poisonous breath of every Dragon. It lurks in all theology which represents the universe as an arena of struggle between good and evil Principles, and human life as a war of the soul against the flesh. It animates all the pious horrors which identify Materialism with wickedness. It nestles in the mind which imagines a personal deity opposed by any part of nature. It coils around every heart which adores absolute sovereign Will, however apotheosised. . . . .

". . . . Happily the notion of a universe held at the mercy of a personal decree is suicidal in a world full of sorrows and agonies, which, on such a theory, can only be traced to some individual caprice or malevolence. However long abject fear may silence the lips of the suffering, rebellion is in their hearts. Every blow inflicted directly or permissively by mere Will, however omnipotent, every agony that is consciously detached from universal organic necessity, in order that it may be called 'providential,' can arouse no natural feeling in man nobler than indignation. . . . . The heart's protest may be throttled for a time by the lingering coil of terror, but it is there."*

We have now, perhaps, a pretty clear idea of Mr. Conway's purpose in writing this book, and may see more clearly than ever that a history or systematic survey of the most objectionable portion of the Unevolved, can only rise to importance in proportion as it forsakes its own impossible centre of vision, and becomes a chapter in the history of Evolution. Demonology and Devil-lore are only interesting when they become branches of folk-lore, or hover in constant retreat upon the margin of theology, philosophy or science. The attempt to isolate them and treat them as independent centres of interest, must inevitably fail.

This, then, is the lesson taught by the failure of books on

* Vol. I. pp. 426, 427.

the Devil: Although there exists in every heart and in the world around us a terrible dualism that no optimistic philosophy or theology can completely solve, although the hearts that trust most faithfully in the Good are most grievously conscious of the Evil, although the moral opposition experienced by every earnest man raises his life to the intensity of a personal conflict with hostile powers, yet Evil, unlike Good, has no independent principle of life within it, no organic germ of growth and development, no internal centre of cohesion, and cannot even be conceived as directed by any conscious purpose, or as aimed at any final goal; and consequently every popular representation of the Powers of Evil has invariably sunk below the dignity of the real moral dualism which confronts us in life, the Devil has never been co-extensive with Evil, and the only true history of Evil is contained and implied in the history of Good.

And now, returning in conclusion to Mr. Conway's book, I hasten to acknowledge the traces it bears of very extensive and protracted, though often careless, study, including a considerable amount of personal search in cathedrals and elsewhere for the subjects of the admirable illustrations, and a store of personal reminiscences and observations which are often remarkably fresh and suggestive.

Mr. Conway marshals his uncanny protégés in three main divisions, as Demons, Dragons and Devils.

The Demon, according to Mr. Conway, is essentially a creature which becomes cruel or destructive in the gratification of some natural passion or appetite, and genetically an impersonation of some one of the obstacles with which the physical man is forced to contend, such as Hunger, Heat, Enemies, Barrenness, Darkness, &c.

The Dragon—a term which Mr. Conway uses with great latitude—is a sort of generalized Demon on its way to becoming a Devil, an embodiment of general and gratuitous harmfulness, but as yet without any purpose of distinctly moral evil.

Then comes the Devil, the morally evil Will.

"The physical pain incidentally represented by the Demon, generalized and organized into a principle of harmfulness in the Dragon, begins now to pass under the shadow cast by the ascending light of man's moral nature."

"As the light which cast it was intense, even so intense was the shadow it cast beneath all it could not penetrate. Passionate as was the saintliest man's love of good, even so passionate was his spiritual enemy's love of evil. High as was the azure vault that mingled with his dreams of purity, so deep was the abyss beneath his lower nature. The superficial equalities of phenomena, painful and pleasurable, to his animal nature had cast the mould into which his theories of the inward and the moral phenomena must be cast; and thus man—in an august moment—surrendered himself to the dreadful conception of a supreme Principle of Wickedness."*

These lines are boldly drawn, and the framework they lay down is sufficiently ample to accommodate all the host of Demons and Devils "out of every nation under heaven" which Mr. Conway delights in bringing together in his pages. Following the thread of real or fancied analogies, he skips from century to century and from clime to clime with a rapidity that takes away our breath, and unrolls his diabolical panorama with an easy certainty that is at first very reassuring.

But unfortunately, whenever we find him upon soil where we are not altogether strangers—in Italy, Greece or Palestine, for instance—we detect that demon of inaccuracy sticking to him "closer than a friend;" and unless we belong to that happy class of readers who are characterized by an easy indifference as to whether they set their foot upon a swamp or a rock, whether they follow the pole-star or a will-o'-the-wisp, we soon learn the need of caution.

A long list of mistakes would be neither interesting nor valuable, but the statements we have made must be substantiated by a few instances of the extraordinary blunders and the rash and unwarrantable assertions which so completely shake our confidence in our author.

What are we to say, then, to the assertion (I. 188), "The

* Vol. II. pp. 1, 8.

Samaritan Pentateuch opens, 'In the beginning the Goat created the heaven and the earth'"? It would be quite as true, and would have quite as much verisimilitude, to say that the Vulgate or the Douay Version opens with this extraordinary substitution.

Again, what does Mr. Conway mean by saying (I. 62) that the word "Moloch" signifies "sacrifice"?

When our author declares (I. 395) that the Greek tragedians, while displaying the irresistible power of the gods, "do so without reverence for that power," we have perhaps no right to do more than express our amazement at the impression he has derived from the perusal of their works; and when he declares (I. 420), "The Moira, or Fate with Homer, is only a secondary cause, if that, and simply carries out the decrees of her father Zeus. Zeus is the real Fate,"—we ought perhaps to accept the statement as "near enough," though the problem is really one of great difficulty by no means to be thus lightly solved;* but what are we to say when we find the Holy Ghost figuring in company with the devils?

The argument is worth summarizing. The third person of a trinity is generally destructive; e.g. Osiris (creator), Horus (preserver), Typhon (destroyer). We might therefore expect the Holy Ghost to take that rôle. Our anticipations are confirmed by finding that sin against the Holy Ghost will never be forgiven, and that Ananias and Sapphira are killed for lying to the Holy Ghost. Then, again, the Dove is the symbol of the Holy Ghost, and the Dove is related to the Serpent in mythology; it hovered over the world, for instance, as it emerged from the flood, just as the Serpent broods over the primal egg in Egyptian mythology. Christ, too, brings the Dove and the Serpent into relation, although he also separates them, when he says, "Be ye wise as serpents, and harmless as doves;" and when the Holy Ghost descended upon the

* Compare, for instance, Iliad xvi. vv. 431—461, where Moira appears as a kind of collective decree of the gods, which any one of them might if he chose violate up to his power, but which all were morally bound to reverence. I am not aware that Homer ever calls Moira the daughter of Zeus.

believers, it took the shape of the serpent's cloven tongue. In a word, though the Holy Ghost is not a Devil, yet it has so much in common with Devils that it deserves to be treated in connection with them, and indeed "it is probable that no more terrible form of belief in a Devil survives than this Holy Ghost Dogma," i.e. the belief in the unpardonable sin.*

I pass over the parallel drawn by Mr. Conway between the wrath of Jesus with those that *sold doves*, and the wrath of Peter with Simon Magus, who wished to *buy the Holy Ghost*, because I do not quite see where it fits into the argument; but I trust I have done the argument itself no injustice.

Is it possible to conceive a more reckless substitution of wild speculations and perverse ingenuity for the sober methods of sound investigation? We do not find in all this chapter the slightest attempt to trace the historical progress of the personification of the Holy Ghost, or to ascertain what the term really meant to the early Christians. Half an hour's serious and impartial investigation would have convinced Mr. Conway that he was on the wrong track, but a natural pity for the poor victims of what he calls the "Holy Ghost Dogma" had set him to work to diabolize as far as might be the Holy Ghost, and this is the result!

But we will not carry our examination any further. We sometimes find it difficult to believe that Mr. Conway is in earnest, and can hardly do better than quote one of the many admirable stories which are scattered through his book. "Othello," he tells us, was once performed in a certain district of California.

"When the scene of Desdemona's suffocation approached, a stalwart miner leapt on the stage, and pulling out his six-shooter, said to the Moor, 'You damned nigger! If you touch that woman I'll blow the top of your head off!' A dozen roughs, clambering over the foot-lights, cried, 'Right, Joe! We'll stand by you!' The manager met the emergency by crying, 'Don't shoot, boys! This play was wrote by Bill Shakespear; he's an old Californian, and it's all in fun!'"†

* Vol. II. pp. 226—239. † Vol. II. p. 427.

Perhaps Mr. Conway is an old Californian, and his book all in fun, in which case we have been swearing at him rather too seriously. At any rate, there are many good things in the book—the wonderful drama of "Harischandra,"* for instance, and Mr. Call's fine lines on Thomas Aquinas's supposed prayer for the Devil†—and if we could wish to see more signs of care, at any rate there are ample signs of work in it.

But if Mr. Conway really wishes to dedicate himself to the service of those great deities, Science and Scholarship, let him remember that they are as jealous as any Jehovah, and will not suffer strange fire upon their altars.

PHILIP H. WICKSTEED.

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## VII.—NOTICES OF BOOKS.

### 1. PHILOSOPHICAL BOOKS.

*Chapters on the Art of Thinking, and other Essays.* By the late James Hinton. With an Introduction by Shadworth H. Hodgson. Edited by C. H. Hinton. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1879.

THIS collection of Essays will serve to give to careful readers a tolerably complete idea of the characteristic features of James Hinton's philosophy. It contains the most striking of his contributions to periodical literature, several important essays not previously published, and some interesting reports of conversations in which he unfolded his views,—the whole being introduced by a very thoughtful estimate of his position in the world of recent thought, from the able pen of Mr. S. H. Hodgson. It is rather to be regretted, we think, that no use has been made of the bulky octavos printed some years ago, for private circulation only, from Mr. Hinton's philosophical note-books; for, as his son remarks, "these volumes would form the most available source to whoever wished to make a study of the course and bearings of my father's inquiries." The first of these volumes has been for some time in the Library of the British Museum, and we hear on good authority

* Vol. II. pp. 35 sqq. † Vol. II. p

that Mrs. Hinton has now presented the whole series to that institution. We have little doubt that the work now under our notice, together with the "Life and Letters of James Hinton," will awaken in some readers an ardent desire to form a more intimate acquaintance with a mind so rich in original thought and so aglow with divinest charity. To such-kindred spirits, these printed note-books, giving as they do a faithful transcript of the author's mental life in its most fertile periods, will be of high interest and value; and we can promise those who read them that, while they will sometimes find themselves following our thinker into paths of speculation which turn out to be hopeless *culs-de-sac*, where "no thoroughfare this way" stares us in the face and compels us to retrace our steps, they will nevertheless be often led by him to points of view where serious mental difficulties appear to resolve themselves, and the vision of the intellect falls into nearer accord with the insight of the conscience and the heart. For those, indeed, who are able to accept fully Mr. Hinton's fundamental doctrines, his philosophy must be a revelation of the grandest significance. We do not belong to this class, but we still derive from the study of his writings high intellectual and spiritual benefit; for he is continually throwing out luminous and far-reaching suggestions, which may readily be appreciated and appropriated by readers who cannot admit some of the leading postulates of his philosophical creed.

The original feature in James Hinton's system is, that what we call the physical or phenomenal world is nothing else than the spiritual world inadequately perceived. The law, for instance, that movement takes place in the direction of least resistance—a law which in Hinton's view explains not only all evolution in the inorganic realm, but also all the forms and functions of organized creatures—is only the phenomenal form or appearance of that Eternal Love which furnishes the needful supply for every want. How is this discovered? By the insight of the emotions: for in Hinton's theory the emotions perform the same part which is performed by the intuitions of "the reason" in Coleridgian philosophy. In one of the essays in this volume, Hinton explains in a very vivid way how our knowledge of material objects is derived from the concurrent exercise of the two senses, sight and touch. These two senses, he says, give us very different impressions of the same object. Our apprehension of a solid body by the eye may be utterly unlike our apprehension of it by the hand; and speaking in general terms, we may say that "the touch gives us an apprehension of the object as

it is—the sight, of an appearance only." The eye requires educating; and when educated, it is not to be immediately relied on, but *used*, and used with reference to a faculty different from itself. We are accordingly related to all objects of sensuous apprehension in two modes, one of which is subordinate to the other, and only gives us true knowledge when it is made to speak another language than its own. Well, just as in our impressions regarding material things the sense of touch is intended to furnish the means of interpreting the deliverances of the sense of sight, so in regard to our view of the universe as a whole, the spiritual faculties (the insight of the emotions, the moral reason) are intended to enable us to interpret the *appearances* which the senses and the intellect apprehend and unravel, that we may come to see the spiritual *reality* of that which presents itself to our scientific faculty as physical nature and physical law. Intellect (including sense) answers to sight; the conscience, the moral apprehension, the spiritual appreciation, answer to touch.

"If we adopt this view" (writes our author), "a great consequence follows. Instead of thinking that we are in two worlds, a physical and a spiritual one (as all religious men affirm), we shall think that we are in *one* world apprehended by two faculties. The physical world will become to our regard no more a distinct existence opposed to the spiritual, but that spiritual itself, as apprehended by faculties which perceive but the appearances of things, and present them to us not as they are. These two worlds—that which intellect (using sense as its servant) *sees* on the one hand, and that which conscience, and the other faculties which relate us to the spiritual, *feel* and touch, upon the other—will unite and coalesce into one; presented to us in a two-fold way—as material objects are—that we may better, more truly, and more fully apprehend it." P. 147.

In another essay, in which he discourses on Dr. Tyndall's view of the religious emotions, Mr. Hinton says:

"The 'problem of problems of our day,' then, is this: So to use the Senses, the Intellect, and the Emotions *together*, as to learn from the appearance which is presented to us in Science some truer fact, in respect to which we shall be able to understand why it should present to us this appearance."—P. 79.

And accordingly he supposes the question to be asked, What is the nature of that spiritual universe which constitutes the reality, of which the universe as apprehended by sense and science is only the appearance? and his reply is:

"Imagination faints and staggers at the thought, and cannot answer. What can be vaster than the infinitude of space, more than the countless

orbs of heaven, more real than the solid earth; higher, lovelier, more perfect than this organic frame, bounding with life? What universe should eclipse this utterly, and show it but a pictured vision, narrowed to the sweep of mortal thought? Imagination cannot answer. Nor need it. Happily the question is not one for imagination, but for learning. Not proud assurance, nor hasty speculation, but humble willingness to be taught, and patient interpretation of the facts, will avail us here. The field is open. By self-abandoning study of all that God presents to us, bending and uniting to one end all our faculties, we shall learn what God's world is."—P. 155.

Truly Hinton's words invite us to enter upon a glorious study; for they promise that if we be only faithful in diligently exercising upon the universe around us the companion faculties of intellectual and of spiritual discernment, we shall find that, so far from these faculties giving conflicting reports, they direct themselves upon one and the same reality, and the vision of the conscience and the heart only reveals the deeper verity which causes and explains that superficial phantasm called the physical world. Tempting as this theory of Hinton's is, we cannot say that it wholly satisfies us, and we had intended to subject it to some criticism. We find, however, that to do this at all adequately would carry us far beyond our allotted limits. We must content ourselves therefore with saying that it seems to us quite clear that this concurrence of our intellectual and spiritual vision goes on in every mind; and that thereby we discover that in and through all natural phenomena there works a Power invisible to the senses—a Power which, if we try to imagine what its nature is, we can only represent to ourselves under the form of Eternal and Omnipresent Will. The forces in nature of whose correlation and conservation we have of late years heard so much, appear to be best interpreted as the body of which the Eternal Will is the soul. Matter vanishes in this view, being replaced by the idea of Force; and just as we, by the action of our personal will, control in some measure the transformations of the small measure of force which is stored up in our body, so must we imagine the Eternal Will causing the force which constitutes the universe to pass through those countless and successive transformations, the laws of which science detects, and the history of which forms the grand drama of Evolution, with its inexhaustible beauty and interest.

In Mr. Hinton's view, however, the theory we have just sketched would, we think, be discarded, as belonging rather to the realm of appearance than to that of reality. In talking of Will and Force (as

well as Space and Time), he would say that we are dealing with phenomena merely, with ideas derived from our own states of consciousness; and the whole of what we have called the drama of Evolution is simply the outward show, whose hidden and spiritual meaning we have failed to detect. Possibly it is so; but does our emotional faculty or our moral reason afford any clue to the discovery of the nature of that spiritual verity of which the words Will and Force only describe the appearance? We must leave the decision of this question to those who have drunk more deeply of our author's ideas. To turn to another feature in Mr. Hinton's doctrine: we are unable to see that any direction of our intellectual and spiritual faculties upon the Kosmos around us would ever lead to the assured conviction that the Power which works in nature is Eternal Love. Such an assurance seems rather to arise from the intimate communion between our spirits and the indwelling God; and so to be *imported* by us into our estimate of the character of the Power we discern in nature, rather than to be a truth detected *in nature* by cultivated intellectual and spiritual insight. To this criticism Mr. Hinton would perhaps have replied, that our idea of the perfect love of God is itself derived from the insight of our emotional nature directed upon the physical universe on the one hand, and upon our social surroundings on the other. This at least appears to be the view of some of Mr. Hinton's disciples; but we are unable to understand how the intensity and fulness which this faith in the love of God attains in many minds, could have been derived from the above sources alone. It seems to us that this faith implies also the immediate and transcendent action of the Divine Spirit upon man's inner life.

Among the subjects which most exercised Mr. Hinton's powerful intellect, Free-will held a prominent place; and judging from his frequent remarks on this topic in his printed note-books, we should be inclined to doubt whether he ever succeeded in wholly satisfying himself as to what is the true nature of this faculty. The theory, however, to which he always turned as the one presenting by far the least difficulty, is set forth both in "Man and his Dwelling-place" and in the present volume. He does not, like many of his fellow-labourers in physical science, regard our consciousness of moral freedom as illusory, but he says this power of choice between springs of action of different moral worth is a defect in our nature, which will cease to exist in so far as we realize the true ideal of humanity. In God's nature, he maintains, such a thing as choice is impossible.

God's action is perfectly free, but it is also for that reason perfectly necessary. Here Mr. Hinton seems to us to violate sound philosophical method, and to argue from the less known to the more known. Our own freedom of choice in moral action we know at first-hand, while God's assumed necessity is at the best a matter of speculation. How can we possibly know that it is not optional with the Supreme Will to create or not to create, to energize in the mode we discern in nature, or to substitute some other mode? The study of nature can only tell us what He does, and can never assure us that He could not do differently. We know what freedom of choice is, and we know what necessity is, for both of these experiences fall within our own consciousness; but surely we overstep the range of the humanly knowable when we assert that only one line of action can lie open to the Eternal Will. The unsatisfactory character of this theory of Hinton's becomes very manifest when (as in an essay of the present volume) he comes to treat of Miracles. We gather from this essay that he regarded some at least of the Biblical miracles as objective facts, and he justifies their performance by a similar line of argument to that adopted in Trench's "Notes on the Miracles," namely, on the ground that unless God occasionally deviated from the ordinary course of physical law, men would forget that these physical laws are the expression of His divine activity.

"How" (he asks) "should an activity, that is everywhere, reveal itself; a power which is never absent within us or without be made palpable to us as a thing apart? There is but one way; it must be made less; for a moment, for a point, withdrawn. Then we perceive it—an action to which necessity is wanting, a miracle; an action arbitrary, like our own, the not-divine."—P. 198.

So it appears that the necessity of God can divest itself of its necessary character; for sufficient reason He can act arbitrarily (which is Mr. Hinton's way of saying, He can exercise freedom of choice). But if we know that He acts arbitrarily in one country at one particular time, who is to prescribe limits to God's exercise of this free choice? In fact, the dogma of His necessity vanishes, and we can have the assurance that His actions are necessary (i.e. conformed to law) only so far as we have the evidence of observation that they are so. We should mention, however, that this essay on Miracles was written about twelve years before his death, and we have been told by one of the most intimate and distinguished of his friends that Mr. Hinton's faith in these physical miracles grew very flickering later on, even if it did not go out altogether.

In thus alluding to the chief points in which we find ourselves unable to accompany James Hinton in his philosophical and theological views, we have exhausted our space; but it is quite as well, perhaps, that we have no room to attempt a sketch of the many original and beautiful thoughts in which this book abounds; for it is impossible to get at the pith of James Hinton's philosophy of nature and of human life by reading review notices. There is nothing for it but to turn to the volume itself, and enjoy invigorating contact with a singularly fresh and healthy nature, in which the science of the nineteenth century and the fervid faith and love of the first century managed to live together in perfect amity.

*Philosophical Fragments, written during Intervals of Business.* By J. D. Morell, LL.D. London: Longmans and Co. 1878.

This able little volume, written at various intervals during the last fifteen years, "chiefly as affording a little intellectual recreation and some change of ideas from the ordinary duties of school inspection," deserves a hearty welcome, and ought to more than realize its author's hope that "it may be of some interest to the few who shall continue to devote attention to the most unpopular of the sciences." We could have wished that Dr. Morell had found leisure to re-write and continue up to the present date his interesting and valuable "Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century," but the publication of the present "Fragments" may probably be regarded as evidence that their author has no expectation of being able to revise and enlarge his earlier work. The first Part of the present volume contains some fine essays on the History of Philosophy, including an account of Leibnitz and Kant, and of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century, the last of these being particularly good. In the second Part, Dr. Morell expounds his "Theory of Human Knowledge," and arrives at the conclusion that the inductive method is the real and proper method for the human intellect to follow even in the most recondite and metaphysical researches.

It is to the third Part, however, that most importance attaches, for it consists of three lectures on "Psychology applied to Education;" and we need not say that Dr. Morell's wide acquaintance with mental philosophy, and his long and varied experience as an inspector of schools, eminently qualify him to deal wisely with this great practical question. These lectures make it clear that psy-

chology is destined to exert a powerful influence in economizing and directing teaching power, though we agree with the author that "the time has not yet arrived for attempting to lay *a complete psychological basis* for education." Dr. Morell has, however, announced some sound principles, which we think further investigation will confirm and expand.

The volume closes with a *postscriptum*, giving a very telling sketch of "the latest phase of Edward von Hartmann's Philosophy." This philosophy of the Unconscious has exercised a strangely powerful and widespread fascination over the German mind. We will quote, in conclusion, a passage from this paper, which will give some idea of the worth and vivacity of these "Fragments:"

"The reader will see that 'The Unconscious' stands for what we should call the unknown substance—power, life, energy, intelligence—which constitutes the whole *being* and the whole *working* of the universe, mental and material. Previous to the Darwinian criticisms, 'The Unconscious' was the direct agent in shaping the phenomena of organism, life, instinct, intelligence; now these are mostly referred to secondary causes, and 'The Unconscious' stands further behind the screen, shaping the primary laws by which these secondary causes operate. Schopenhauer took as his great primary agent and essence *the will;* but unhappily the will, severed from thought and intelligence, appeared to others a very insufficient agent to conceive and carry out all the wonders of creation,—indeed, some irreverent critics termed it *das absolute Dumme*—the absolute and eternal Stupid, i.e. blind power without thought or intelligence. 'The Unconscious' of Hartmann can hardly be termed *the absolute Stupid*, inasmuch as it unfolds itself gradually through nature from absolute ignorance up to absolute wisdom and knowledge; but whether the 'absolute Stupid' or the 'absolute Unconscious' can really in the long run assume the place in the human mind and soul which has down to the present time been filled with great and glorious conceptions of a personal Creator and a universal Providence, does not appear to us a matter of much doubt. That our theistic notions change and develop with the progress of science and ethics, is a fact almost self-evident; but that our reason and moral nature will find satisfaction in any pantheistic or semi-pantheistic theories such as those above explained, or that the German culture which has evolved them stands so high above that of other countries in which the practical belief in personal Deity still prevails, appears to us to be the dictate of an overweening pride, much more than the sober conclusion of a reverent and truly scientific spirit."—P. 277.

C. B. U.

## 2. German Theology.

*Geschichte Israels.* Von J. Wellhausen. In Zwei Bänder. Erster Band. Berlin. 1878.

We have here the first volume of a new History of Israel, written from the standpoint of the school of critics represented by Graf, Duhm, Kuenen, Kalisch and Colenso. The author has earned for himself considerable reputation as an acute critic, and this first volume of a more ambitious work than he had before attempted is not likely to diminish it, while it will also entitle him to rank as an exceptionally able writer. The first half of the work is devoted entirely to the examination of the sources of the history. It is, as the author says, simply an inquiry into the history of the historical documents of the Old Testament. This inquiry is conducted in the following manner. We have, first, an examination of the ancient *sacra* of Israel, including the place of worship, the sacrifices, the festivals, the priests, and the priests' revenues. This examination is so made that the reader "sees how the layers of tradition follow each other as in the history the successive stages of development." We have, secondly, a history of Israel's treatment of her own history, traced backwards from the books of Chronicles to the Pentateuch, and giving the author's view of the influence of the ideas and tendencies of successive ages upon the historical documents. Thirdly, we have the critical result of the foregoing examination, with a statement of general views preparatory to the history to be told in the second volume. It should be taken note of that the author's examination of his sources does not include more than references to the writings of the Prophets. This is an omission which his second volume will have to make good, if he is to free himself from the suspicion, greatly favoured by his whole treatment of the historical books, of having been unduly influenced by a theory. It is also deserving of careful note that Wellhausen has in this volume used the *sacra* of Israel, almost to the entire neglect of the *religio* in the strict sense, as the decisive *criterion* of the date of documents. On this point also the second volume must supply a significant omission.

As regards the position held by the author, in common with the school of critics to which he belongs, in assigning the Levitic legislation, including the whole Book of Origins, to the post-Babylonian period, this is not the proper time to speak. We shall look with great interest for our author's second volume. For it is evident enough that

the real test of this re-arrangement of the writings of the Old Testament must be the rich and full details of the history of the people. Our author himself heaps ridicule upon all attempts, with our present knowledge, to determine the age of documents by linguistic marks, and we confess that we share the scepticism of those who place much less than full reliance upon his archæological tests. The problem is so infinitely complicated, that nothing short of evidence from very various quarters can produce conviction. The very legislation which is used as a lever to overthrow, not only the traditional, but also the generally accepted rationalistic view of the history, is confessedly a religious fiction, which could in no age be put into practice in detail. Moreover, the authentic contemporary history of the two periods to which this ideal legislation may have reference, is in each case singularly defective. Professor Wellhausen must, therefore, in his second volume, the proper history itself, shew that his view of the course of the nation's life is true to all the varied details and hints that can anywhere be found in its literature. Whether he possesses the minute and complete knowledge and the faculty of combination which such a task requires, remains to be seen. But above all, he must evince his superiority to his theory. This, we fear, he will fail to do. In this first volume he appears never to shrink from pronouncing inconvenient passages interpolations. Of course, in the case of some of the historical documents, a critic cannot be blamed for so doing. Yet let him do this frequently with crucial passages, even in such documents, and his conclusions will be doubted. But our author does not shrink from subjecting the text of the prophetic writings even to the same process. Amos ii. 4 is an interpolation, as are iv. 13, ix. 6 also; the latter passages, because the idea of God's creative omnipotence does not occur before the exile, a statement not difficult of substantiation if all the passages where this idea occurs are to be pronounced post-exilian insertions! We have the same complaint to make with reference to our author's interpretation of passages which do not favour his peculiar views. Hos. ix. 3—5, e.g., is made to bend to the assertion that in Hosea *Yahvé's House* is the land, and not the temple, of Israel. Isa. xxx. 22 is interpreted so as to support the position that Isaiah did not urge the removal of the *Bamoth*, but only their purification. Hosea viii. 1, again, must be made to suit the view that the older prophets are not acquainted with the idea of the covenant between Yahvé and Israel. The distrust created by such exegesis is increased by the incredible shallowness of some of our author's arguments. For instance, a

main reason for concluding that the decalogue was not written on the stone tables in the ark, if there were any, is, that they must then have been put in a public position, and not in the dark. In concluding our notice of this volume, we expressly reserve our judgment on it as a whole until the remainder of the work has been issued. At the same time we must add, in the interests of a just conservatism in criticism, that it appears to us that the reconstruction of the history of Israel in the direction in which our author is attempting it, in opposition to such critics as Ewald, Noeldeke, Dillmann and others, will have to be carried out with infinitely more caution and reserve than appear in this volume, if it is to be permanent.

*D. Joh. Aug. Ernesti Prælectiones in Libros Symbolicos Ecclesiæ Lutheranæ, ab anno* 1752 *et* 1777. *Vol. I. continens Tria Symbola œcumenica, Augustanam Confessionem et Apologiam ejus.* Mit einem Vorwort herausgegeben von J. M. Redling. Berlin. 1878.

The utility of now publishing for the first time Ernesti's Lectures on the so-called Apostolic, Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, and the Augsburg Confession, with its Defence, is not very obvious. Much new light has been thrown upon the history and meaning of the whole of these documents since Ernesti's days, and of none of it does his present editor avail himself. Nevertheless, whoever takes up this little volume will find in very easy, and, as Ernesti's reputation testifies, very classical Latinity, a clear and succinct account of the great scholar's views of the history and meaning of the famous texts upon which he comments.

*Der Darwinismus ein Zeichen der Zeit.* Von Albert Wigand, Professor der Botanik in Marburg. Heilbronn. 1878.

We have here in a compendious and popular form the results of Professor Wigand's large work upon Darwinism. It is written for Germany rather than for England, but may profitably be read by any one who is willing to see that very much may be said against a popular form of science and philosophy.

J. F. S.

3. *The Revelation of God and Man in the Son of God and the Son of Man: Six Sermons preached in Renshaw-Street Chapel, Liverpool, revised from the Edition of* 1859; *with two Essays from the Theological Review:* 1. *On the Doctrine of an Eternal Son;* 2. *On Prayer.* By John Hamilton Thom. London: British and Foreign Unitarian Association. 1879.

No contributor to this Review could approach the task of characterizing any work from the pen of him whose name stands on the title-page of this volume, without a sense of diffidence and a desire to turn the reader from the lines of the notice it is his duty to write to the pages of the book itself. Such feelings are the stronger when the work in question is itself a revelation of the innermost shrine of the author's religious faith and life. Few could peruse this little collection of sermons and essays without becoming conscious of an inclination to yield themselves up to simple discipleship, and to follow the master whose clear and powerful words they are studying whithersoever he may lead the way.

Yet no lesson lies more uniformly between the lines of Mr. Thom's disquisition than that of unswerving expression of personal conviction; and should we by following him in that course be compelled to diverge from other paths which he has laid down, he himself would be the first to approve the choice we make. With these preliminary observations we proceed to state what we find in this latest reproduction by the British and Foreign Unitarian Association.

We recognize on re-perusal the same rare level of spiritual insight and utterance which we had previously always discovered in this and other compositions from the same hand. An ideal of religious faith and a demand of religious life so exalted characterize these pages, that we find ourselves at the same time lifted into a purer atmosphere than men breathe every day, and trembling lest any hearer or any reader should be so abashed by the brightness of the mirror held before his gaze as to turn away dejected from a glance into spiritual depths in which he cannot recognize his own image and dare not hope he ever will.

To us there appears to be no possible answer on the part of writers like F. D. Maurice and Mr. Richard Hutton, even to the mere intellectual criticisms of Mr. Thom on the Trinitarian position, and particularly the dogma of the two-fold nature of the Son; but it is still more inconceivable to us that any successful vindication could be made of the superior religious helpfulness of their position

to that of the view of God and Christ developed in these chapters, and especially in the article reprinted from this Review on "the Doctrine of an Eternal Son in Organic Communion with the Human Soul." It is unnecessary for us to unfold Mr. Thom's demonstration of the necessity of the purely human nature of the Son if he is to be to us a true helper towards the Father, inasmuch as it cannot fail to abide in the reader's memory.

The volume before us, in its happy combination of kindred writings lying a whole generation apart in date, presents us with a full statement of what is now counted as the older Unitarianism, in its noblest phase. In thus describing Mr. Thom's position, we desire to affix to it no label, but merely to classify it historically among the writings arising in the bosom of the little group of Free Churches in England. There is in those churches at the present day a younger form of religious belief which diverges from the older in its presentment of Christ, and the place it assigns to him in the formation of Christian faith and character. Which of these may be destined to say of the other, "It must increase, but I must decrease," we do not now inquire; but we ask, with some interest, what are the difficulties which for the present, at any rate, prevent those who walk on the newer path from directing their steps along the same road with fathers in the church whom they venerate and love? What are the doubts which are likely to beset thoughtful and earnest men of the more recent type in presence of a book which will have for them so powerful a charm as Mr. Thom's?

We imagine that a difficulty will arise in the absoluteness of the terms in which Mr. Thom speaks of the perfections of him who bore the two transcendent titles, Son of Man and Son of God. For our own part, we have never yet met with language cast in relative forms which seemed to us to exceed the bounds of what is probably just in characterizing the love, the tenderness, the strength, the filial wholeness of the soul of Christ. No eloquence we ever heard or read has seemed to us to exaggerate the theme, so long as the terms employed were terms of comparison. But the moment absolute language is used, we confess that we find ourselves thrown into a painful difficulty. We are reluctantly forced into questioning. That Christ towered in moral and spiritual grandeur above all others of whom we have had knowledge or been told, we may persuade ourselves by simple historical study combined with a careful reading of the deliverances of our own ethical and religious judgments. That God's spirit was poured out on him and absorbed by him in measures surpassing that in which it has been received by any other saint of

whom we have record, we may be ready to admit, or even eager to testify. But that he enjoyed that spirit *without* measure, who can tell? That he was Perfect, never once sinned in deed or thought, exhausted the moral possibilities of human nature, how can we know? It may be true, but who is to shew it?

The answer, of course, may be, that it is established by authoritative statements, ecclesiastical or biblical,—statements which are the mediate utterance of God himself, and are amenable neither to cross-examination nor to criticism. Mr. Thom, however, we believe, would decline to rest the absoluteness of Christ's perfection on that basis. His asseveration is, that in Christ we have absolutely the fulness of God's image in human nature, that humanity is absolutely "complete in Christ." What is the source of this conviction?

The second possible answer seems to be, that this persuasion concerning Christ is a matter of direct insight,—that Christ is realized in actual communion like as God is realized,—and that as the human spirit drinking in the Spirit of God recognizes intuitively the Perfectness of the Source of the holiness that is poured into it, in like manner it recognizes the Perfectness of Christ. But Mr. Thom does not, if we rightly apprehend him, teach that there is any present communion of mankind with the living Christ in the same sense that there is with the living God.

Lastly, the view we hold of the character of Christ may be (as, indeed, where neither external authority nor internal vision is recognized, it must be) based on the priceless documents which have preserved for us the story of his life. But let there be no dispute about authenticity, variation of text, or any other question of modern criticism, yet after all at best these records are fragmentary patchwork, with one week rescued from the childhood, and the sayings and doings of a day here and a day there from the last few months of the otherwise unrecorded career. The light that shines from those ancient chronicles may abundantly suffice to assure us that here is a man transcending all that we know of humanity elsewhere; in what they tell we may discover no flaw or sign of flaw; we may infer with confidence that the life left unrecorded was a life of growth perpetual and steadfast in the spirit, and that, throughout his days, this being was of the rarest, nay, let us say unique. But that that solemn and awful word "Perfect" is to be applied to him, that there never was in him fault or flaw, how, resting on the broken lines of these scanty Gospels, can we possibly dare to allege it? Where are the premises for an inference so tremendous?

While finite terms are used in portraying Christ, more and more,

as we ourselves are purified, we are drawn to seek reverent fellowship with his beautiful soul, in which the spirits of God and man seem indeed to meet. But when the unmeasured leap from the finite to the infinite is made, at once the sense of unreality strikes home to our hearts.

But Mr. Thom's book beautifully demonstrates the oneness of religion even in varieties of forms which seem so nearly to touch it in its essence as differences of sentiment as to our relations with Christ. Throughout and steadfastly he displays as the heart and core and substance of religion, communion with God the Father. The Perfect Son is to him a Mediator without whom he believes that we never could have known God as He is now revealed to every Christian spirit. But even the Perfect Son he permits no man to put between him and God. With God, once known, his communion must be direct and personal. And so, if there be any who, without conscious dependence on Christ, have still entered into that holy fellowship, they would win Mr. Thom's immediate recognition as brethren in faith and life. Whether, indeed, mankind can permanently sustain the highest religious life without conscious dependence on the revelation of God in Christ, is the problem that lies before the churches for solution.

We have left ourselves no space to note at length any of the exquisite utterances in the book before us on matters incidentally included in the treatment of its great and sacred theme: the dissolution of the difficulties of religion in obedience (p. 57), the holy nature of true church fellowship (p. 73), the disappearance of Trinitarian theology in all the highest literature of Christendom (p. 91), what we should carry away in our bosoms from public worship (p. 97). We can only express the fervent hope that this new and supplemented edition of "Christ the Revealer" will be read and studied in sympathy of spirit by every reader of this notice, and by many more into whose hands this notice will never fall.

R. A. A.

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### 4. Miscellaneous.

Dr. Millar Nicolson, in a modest and careful little volume,* gives us the fruit of much attentive comparison of the Greek text

* Classical Revision of the Greek New Testament, tested and applied on Uniform Principles, with suggested Alterations of the English Version. By W. Millar Nicolson, M.A., D.Sc. (Edin.). London: Williams and Norgate. 1878.

of the New Testament with the Authorized Version. His leading idea is this: if the New Testament Greek is not a mere *patois*, but a language "based essentially on the classical model," the rigorous but judicious application of the rules of Greek syntax of the classical epoch must give legitimate results in more exact translation. In an orderly arrangement, the points now acknowledged to be necessary to close rendering are noted, and under these heads are grouped instances of the observance, and of the violation, of them by the translators of the A. V. The statements as to classical use of tenses, sequence of tenses, &c., are clear and precise (especially pp. 42, 76, 96); and many emendations gained from a strict application of them, both in narrative passages, and particularly in the arguments of Paul, are undoubtedly valuable. But one thing is lacking—one which we greatly desiderate, and which Dr. Nicolson's note-books would surely furnish. It is obvious that the "New Testament Greek" is not by any means uniformly "based on the classical model," and that the rules of Greek syntax of the classical epoch may be legitimately applied to one page much more strictly than to another. We should have been glad to see an estimate of the varying degrees in which the canons of classical usage have been found to be really applicable to the different New Testament books. The contrast between the rugged style and the disjointed tenses of the Revelation, and the smoothness and correctness of, say, some parts of Acts, is apprehended readily enough; but such a tabular view as we suggest, compiled by a student who has examined the New Testament distinctly with an eye to classical accuracy of syntax, or the absence of it, would prove a valuable addition to those lists of words peculiar to each author, or peculiarly used by him, with which many scholars have supplied us. A few excursus close the volume; the first, which does not by any means convince us, proposes to render 1 Cor. xv. 29 thus: "Else, what advantage shall the baptized have over the dead? If, in general, dead men do not rise, why are people baptized at all?"

Mr. Cuckson has produced a book* which may be of real value to Sunday-schools. It is specially designed to meet a situation which is continually becoming more common, namely, where it is felt that something of the nature of a religious service may advantageously take the place of morning school, or where at any rate a morning

* Religious Services for Sunday-schools. Edited by John Cuckson. London: Sunday-school Association, 37, Norfolk Street, Strand. 1878.

service, specially adapted to children, is held on every Sunday. He gives us, therefore, twenty-seven services (seven for special occasions), consisting of hymn, scripture lesson, prayer, followed by the Lord's Prayer from the scholars, address, and hymn, all being supplied except the address. There are also the same number of afternoon services, consisting simply of a hymn and prayer. The hymns and lessons have been selected with great taste and judgment, and the prayers are for the most part well suited to the devotions of children, though the language might sometimes be a little more simple. But we are inclined to think it a fault of omission that the book contains no responses for the scholars. These are just what children can be trained to render very nicely, and they form the best feature of the services compiled for the Sunday-school of the Free Christian Church, Bolton. Children are far more likely to attend to what is going on when, after every few sentences, they have themselves to utter a response; and the same object is very far from being attained by simply giving them, in every service, the Lord's Prayer to recite. The general "get-up" of the book is decidedly good.

"Extra Physics and the Mystery of Creation"* is an able attempt to shew that physical science and purely physical science theories fail to furnish an adequate interpretation either of material nature or of human nature. The conclusion of the writer, therefore, is, that if we are to have an intelligible and harmonized system of things, we must postulate God and the soul. Two qualities are very important in an author who deals with the grave questions here raised. He requires to be both a master of the facts, and to possess a faculty for philosophical exposition. The writer has each of these qualities in rich measure, and adds to them a poetic style which makes both his science and his philosophy eminently readable. If our readers imagine a competent disciple of Carlyle adding metaphysical to physical science, they will have an idea of the author, who deserves to be known by his own name. He criticises Tyndall, Huxley and Darwin in a trenchant, though not bigoted, fashion; and we think he frequently succeeds in proving that they all, Professor Tyndall particularly, make admissions which, if logically wrought out, would necessitate what he calls "Extra Physics." The book deserves a longer notice than we can find room for.

* Extra Physics and the Mystery of Creation; including a brief Examination of Professor Tyndall's Admissions concerning the Human Soul. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1878.

The widow of the late Dr. Rowland Williams has collected from his note-books fifty-five fragments on various topics connected with religion.* To them is added the Essay on Faith, reprinted from the "Hebrew Prophets," where it appears in the introduction to Habakkuk. The little volume contains many weighty thoughts and valuable devotional utterances, though the fragments, being originally notes for private use and not intended for publication, are simply suggestive and often manifestly incomplete. It is scarcely necessary to add that the whole is characterized by freedom and breadth of thought and deep moral and religious earnestness.

The Rev. Stephen Jenner† has aimed at answering doubts as to the authenticity of some of the books of the New Testament by an appeal to what he calls "intrinsic evidence." He cites three witnesses, the Apostles Peter, James and John. In regard to each of them, he compares the characteristics assigned to him in the history contained in the Gospels and Acts with the peculiarities of the letters that bear his name, shews the numerous cases of accordance between the two, and draws the conclusion that there are undesigned coincidences of sentiment and expression which prove the distinct personality of each of the writers, and establish their right to be listened to as witnesses to the truth of Christianity. Thus with regard to Peter, the similarity of the discourses attributed to him in the Acts to passages in his letters is dwelt on. The second part, which lays stress on the change in the appellation applied to Jesus before and after the crucifixion, and on the evidence arising from emphasis, tense, the use of special terms and the accurate distinction of words, contains much that is interesting, but is less satisfactory as an argument than the former one. Throughout, the points raised deserve serious attention, and while there are statements which admit of question, and we must sometimes demur to the conclusions drawn from them, they none the less merit careful consideration from students of the Scriptures. The writer shews himself a thoughtful scholar, and generally a calm and candid reasoner.

"Supernatural Revelation"‡ appears to be intended as an answer

* Stray Thoughts from the Note-books of Rowland Williams, D.D. Edited by his Widow. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1878.

† The Three Witnesses; or Scepticism met by Fact; in fresh Evidences of the Truth of Christianity. Addressed to all Earnest Inquirers. By Stephen Jenner, M.A. London: Longmans. 1879.

‡ Supernatural Revelation, or the First Principles of Moral Theology. By the Rev. T. R. Birks, M.A., Professor of Moral Theology, Cambridge. London: Macmillan. 1879.

to "Supernatural Religion." Mr. Birks seems to consider himself as the great champion of orthodoxy against a host of foes, enumerating among those whom he has aforetime engaged, Strauss, Colenso, Comte and Davidson. These he likens to Moorish Paladins and Paynim leaders, while he calls the author of "Supernatural Religion" an "audacious Goliath." It is impossible in a brief notice to enter on the many arguments of the work, most of them being of a doubtful character, and admitting of reply more or less cogent. The literary style is as unpleasing as is the tone assumed towards adversaries. Thus we read, "Some geologists suppose that our present continents are being carted away, grain by grain, by sub-aerial denudation" (p. 7), and find F. W. Newman and Parker described as "demi-semi-believers" (p. 225). The high claims set up for the Bible and Christianity seem to ignore all exceptions, imperfections and difficulties. But whatever the value a writer attaches to his own convictions, it surely does not justify him in calling his opponents "sentimental dreamers," "dim-sighted theorists," "jackdaws in borrowed feathers," or in ascribing to them "moral darkness," "gigantic falsehoods," "blasphemous philosophy." Many more such flowers of controversy may be found in this volume. Did space admit, we would gladly discuss its matter; here we can only protest against its manner.

Dean Merivale has given us a valuable little book in his Lectures on Church History.* The subjects are St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, St. Leo the First and St. Gregory. In connection with them he treats of the first union of the Christian Church with the State, the rise of the Papacy and the early missions of the Church. As historical sketches, the Lectures are interesting and instructive, the tone is calm and judicial, and the theological references shew a spirit of candour and moderation.

The Rev. Orby Shipley's work on Sin† consists of eleven Addresses to those "in retreat." A preliminary chapter on "the Neglect of Dogmatic Theology in the Church of England," was written before the author joined the Roman Catholic Church, and has a postscript stating briefly his reasons for doing so. The discourses, besides an introductory and concluding address, consist of three triads:

* Four Lectures on some Epochs of Early Church History, delivered in Ely Cathedral. By Charles Merivale, D.D., Dean of Ely. London: Longmans. 1879.

† Principles of the Faith in relation to Sin. Eleven Addresses, delivered, during a Retreat of Three Days, to Persons living in the World. By Orby Shipley, M.A. London: C. Kegan Paul. 1879.

(1) God as the Creator, the Redeemer and the Inspirer of Man; (2) Man as created, purchased and inspired by God; (3) The Incarnation, the Sacrifice of the Cross and the Sacraments of the Church. This necessarily leads to considerable repetition. The special object of the Addresses, the constant appeal to the authority of the Church, and the weight laid on dogmatic theology, that is, the creed of the Church, render it impossible for those who do not sympathize with the writer on these points to find any common ground on which to meet him. There are some valuable practical suggestions; but to one outside "the Church," the size of the book seems out of all proportion to its substance.

"Evangelistic Baptism"* is a plea for organized gratuitous labour, in order to spread among the people religious knowledge and influence, as understood by orthodox believers. It is founded on the experience of the writer in home missionary labours in Glasgow, and aims at advancing such labours and shewing the means by which they may be made successful. The special consideration urged is, that the baptism of the Spirit may be gained by all true Christians, and that this is indispensable for those who wish to take part in the work. It is argued that injury is done by the idea that what is required from Christians is the gift of money rather than of their hearts and their lives. The spirit of the work is devout and earnest, though the theology will be considered by many as somewhat narrow.

The anonymous author of "the Coming Truth"† evinces a broad spirit of sympathy with the professors of all forms of faith. His main purpose is to reconcile the teachings and discoveries of modern science with the essential parts of religious belief. His references to science shew wide reading, but sometimes betray a superficial acquaintance with the topics he handles. He fails to grapple successfully with some of the difficulties he encounters, and in labouring to unite antagonistic tendencies is betrayed into self-contradiction. Thus in one passage he argues that we should avoid speaking of the "supernatural," since enlarged views of nature make it altogether divine, while in another he speaks of the Hebrew Scriptures as "generally inspired by God." The defects of his style may be judged

* The Evangelistic Baptism indispensable to the Church for the Conversion of the World. By the Rev. James Gall. Edinburgh and London: Gall and Inglis.

† Shadows of the Coming Truth: a Consideration of the broad Aspects of Religion viewed in connection with the Doctrines of Development. London: Elliot Stock. 1878.

of by one quotation. "It will be felt by every rational reflector, and from such in due time radiated to the rest, that although doubtless all the principal faiths of the world took their rise in those who were pure well-wishers of their race—and who it may be allowed were inspired by the Divine Spirit, to lead their followers towards such differentiations as accorded with the great Will and subserved the great Purpose—all such founts, however pure in their source, must necessarily have become contaminated in a greater or less degree during their progress through the world, according to the *circumstances* in the channel of which they have flowed and with which they have contacted, and consequently that each can but imperfectly and in part exhibit its original character." There are, however, many useful hints in this volume, and its purpose and spirit command our sympathy.

The "Religion of the Future"* is interesting on account of the subjects chosen and the manner in which many of them are handled. It is free, thoughtful and candid, but far from profound. The writer's belief in the reality of the manifestations of "spiritualism" is made prominent. This takes with him the place of the bases of religion generally relied on by Christians. But even those who do not agree with him in this, may find much that is instructive in his essays.

A book† comes to us across the Atlantic which is puzzling to one not well versed in the phraseology employed by the author. He may be excused for any defects of style, since he pleads broken health (which he curiously says has lasted "ever since last May, now more than a year ago"), but he might surely have expressed himself in more simple language. Mr. James is a disciple of Swedenborg, though he strongly protests against being supposed to attach any *authority* to that teacher's writings. He tells how he was "vastated," that is, reduced to a state in which all belief had left him, and was rescued by a perception of the "sheer and abject phenomenality of selfhood in man." Sometimes he speaks of man as a manifestation of God in a way that sounds pantheistic; but then, again, he warns us against the evil of "selfhood or proprium."

* A Forecast of the Religion of the Future; being Short Essays on some important Questions in Religious Philosophy. By W. W. Clark. London: Trübner. 1879.

† Society the Redeemed Form of Man, and the Earnest of God's Omnipotence in Human Nature: affirmed in Letters to a Friend. By Henry James. Boston: Houghton, Osgood and Co. London: Trübner. 1879.

We suppose he has himself a clear idea of his system of theology, since he seems to value it deeply and devoutly, but we must confess a total inability to gather any such idea from his work.

It is difficult to understand why "Religious Strife in British History"* was written. It is not meant for a child's book or a school-book, and yet it does not contain a thought or a fact with which every adult reader of history is not familiar. The author conscientiously avows what are the sources from which he derives his materials, and they are such as are easily accessible to all. Not one statement or idea can we find in the book that is not thoroughly commonplace.

"Supernatural Religion"† has reached a seventh, which its author calls a "complete," edition. It has been completely revised, and the author "has not hesitated to make any alterations, omissions or additions which seemed to him likely to improve it." The only recorded change in his intellectual position is, that he is now convinced "that Marcion's Gospel was based upon our third Synoptic," and has accordingly so far modified his results. The "conclusions" have been re-written, the effect being to throw them into a decidedly more agnostic shape. The preface prefixed to the sixth edition, in which the author conducts a lively polemic with Dr. Lightfoot, chiefly in relation to the Ignatian Epistles, is here reprinted. As to the value of the work itself, we do not feel the necessity of modifying our previously expressed opinions: those who wish to possess it will no doubt recognize its value in the form which it has finally received at the author's hands.

We cannot recommend to our readers Dr. Plumptre's "Popular Exposition of the Epistles to the Seven Churches of Asia."‡ It is full of statements which are at once loose and bold—a particularly dangerous combination when we are treading on difficult and disputed theological ground.

E.

* Religious Strife in British History. By the Hon. Albert S. G. Canning. London: Smith, Elder and Co. 1878.

† Supernatural Religion: an Inquiry into the Reality of Divine Revelation. 3 vols. Complete Edition, carefully revised. London: Longmans. 1879.

‡ A Popular Exposition of the Epistles to the Seven Churches of Asia. By E. H. Plumptre, D.D., &c. Second Edition. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1879.

THE

# THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

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## I.—BERKELEY AND POSITIVISM.—II.

Having now disposed of our author's claim to conclusiveness in his constructive reasonings, we are at leisure to take a general view of his teaching, and to enter on the more gracious task of examining what presumption may be offered that his account of things, or something like it, is the true one. Men may welcome as a speculation what they resent as a proof.

The first remark we have to make is one which is obvious and trite enough, though its reiteration has been necessitated by a long course of the wildest misrepresentation. It is, that whatever use may have been made of Berkeley's principles by others, he is himself in no sense open to the imputation of scepticism. Whether that term be used in its religious or in its philosophical signification, it is equally inapplicable. Berkeley surrendered none of the spontaneous beliefs of mankind, except one, and that every metaphysician alike surrenders. He did not question the existence of his own mind or spirit—that he acknowledged was given in consciousness; nor the existence of other minds like his own—that was an inference so simple and certain as to be equivalent, for all practical purposes, to an intuitive conviction; nor the existence of a world independent of our perceptions; least of all, the existence of the Supreme Spirit, the Creator and Sustainer both of finite spirits and of what we call the world without us. What he did was to exhibit all these in a new relation. Let us take each point in its order.

Whoever believes in his own existence and identity, whoever is persuaded that he himself is a mind or spirit, and not a mere waft of consciousness, a passing succession of sensations, thoughts, volitions, of hopes and fears, and joys and sorrows, and loves and hates, without any underlying unity to give them coherence—whoever, in short, believes in an Ego, believes in it on precisely the same evidence that satisfied Berkeley. He believes in it on the testimony of consciousness; for by consciousness it is known, or it is not known at all. *Cogito ergo sum* is the sole argument that was ever adduced for one's own existence. And the only question can be, whether the form of argument is not superfluous; and whether *I* am not known to myself as directly as are my states of mind.

Again, whoever believes in the existence of other minds like his own—and he is indeed a sceptic who does not—has no other data for his conviction than what satisfied Berkeley. We do not acquire the knowledge that minds other than our own exist by any "awkward experiment of intuition," as Charles Lamb so plaintively puts it, but by "the recognizable face, the sweet assurance of a look." We learn by experience that certain sense-impressions are indications of our own mental states, and where we find similar sense-impressions, apart from the particular collections which constitute our bodies, we judge them to be accompanied by similar trains of consciousness.

Neither did Berkeley ever mean to assert that the world was imaginary, though his ambiguous use of the word "idea" has lent countenance to such a notion. Thoughts and perceptions, or ideas (in Hume's sense) and impressions, differ from one another by the whole distance between imagination and reality. What Berkeley undertook was to give an explanation of reality; and, discarding the philosophic conception of the absolute, he confined the term to what we practically have in our minds when we talk of "real things," namely, the appearances they present to us. The one spontaneous belief of mankind which Berkeley did attack was the unreflecting

notion that things as they appear to us can continue to exist when withdrawn from that relation. Their causes indeed may exist, ready to affect other intelligences with impressions exactly similar to our own. But take away all finite intelligences, and though the causes remain, the phenomena they produce are gone. It is a mere contradiction in terms to say that things as we perceive them can exist apart from a percipient. The table I have before me is a collection of impressions on my mind. The same impressions, in the strict sense of identity, can of course exist in no other relation. But we are all ready to say that the same table exists when we are out of the room, because we believe that the same cause will produce similar effects in any people who happen to be present, provided their organs of perception be similar to our own. The great lesson, in fact, which Berkeley has to teach us is the relativity of knowledge—a principle which is now more or less a commonplace among philosophers, but which amid the bustle of life we are all apt to lose sight of. But the metaphysicians who fall short of Berkeley in the completeness with which they assert this principle, do not, for all that, harmonize with the mistaken belief of the crowd, but rather make confusion worse confounded by admitting some appearances to be absolute, while declaring others, inseparable in thought from them, to be relative. The world that exists when we are gone, they would have to be a world of shapes and sizes and solids and motions and numbers, but rayless and hueless and soundless for ever. Against such a world as this Berkeley revolted in the name of common sense; but then common sense had to abandon her pet contradiction of the absolute existence of relative perceptions. On this latter point Berkeley was inexorable. However, as we have seen, he threw in a sop to Cerberus in the spurious permanence accorded to human perceptions by the existence of their counterparts in the mind of God.

The charge against Berkeley that the world on his principles was reduced to a thing of fancy, is commonly supported by saying that he rendered it purely subjective. For did he

not resolve concrete things into perceptions? He did: but in so doing he did not confound subject and object. The distinction between subject and object is the distinction between the percipient and the thing perceived. This is a necessary distinction of which our minds cannot rid themselves. Now the things perceived, according to Berkeley, were sense-impressions, or, more properly, certain orderly and recurrent combinations of them. These impressions may, on Berkeley's system as on any other, be hollow of reality (though not in his own sense of that term), as in hallucination; but they are none the less perceived, and therefore properly fall under the head of "object," not "subject." But if the term "object" be used, as it often is, not for the things veritably perceived, but for the causes of perception, then, on Berkeley's system as on any other, there are still the "powers without" distinct altogether from the subject. The world, on Berkeley's theory, is no unreal phantom, but firm as the fiat of the Almighty, and unalterable as His Will. So long as beings exist endowed with similar perceptions to our own, so long our world will last. Remove all such beings, and it would still exist in the Will of God, ready to start into existence again on their re-appearance. And, dispensing with the idiosyncrasy of Berkeley's belief, it is plain that no other permanence can, without absurdity, be assigned to the phenomena of sense, than an existence in the inscrutable recesses of their cause.

Berkeley has himself lent plausibility to the charge we have been considering by his manner of repelling it. For, while claiming to believe in an external world like other people, he explains externality on his principles to mean that ideas of sense are not, like other ideas, dependent upon our wills, but impressed upon us by a power not our own. But this looks like an admission that externality to him is something different from what it is to other people; whereas the fact is, Berkeley believed in an external world in precisely the same sense in which every one else believes in it. He believed that there was a world external to his body. Externality is a relation which holds among phenomena, not between phenomena

and the Ego. We can say that there is a world external to our bodies, but not, except by a violent metaphor, that there is a world external to our minds, unless, indeed, we conceive of mind as an extended substance. All that we can in propriety say is, that there is a world independent of our minds.*

Least of all did Berkeley deny the existence of the Supreme Spirit. This point need not detain us; for we have already seen to what lengths of bad logic he went to prove it.

But the novelty and originality of Berkeley lay in his conception of the relations between God and the world and man. The Trinity of existence or perception—for they were the same thing—consisted of patient, effect, and agent. There was, first, God, the cause of all things; next, subordinate spirits emanating from Him; and lastly, the whole phenomenal world, produced by God in finite minds, and so depending, though in a different respect, on both—for its cause on God, and for its being on the percipients whom His Will affected. The clumsy notion of a representative—or misrepresentative—perception, the carpenter-and-chair theory of creation, and creation itself to all intents and purposes, vanished under the magic touch of his thought. And though Berkeley, as we have seen, did not take the ground from under Materialism so completely as he imagined, he did succeed in shewing it to be a mere hypothesis. This was in reality quite sufficient for the practical purpose he had in view. For once this point has been thoroughly understood, once the fallacious appearance of a basis of hard fact has been withdrawn from Materialism, the action of the anthropomorphic instinct, though incapable of logical justification, inevitably confers a preference on the rival theory of Spiritualism. Between these two stands Positivism, which abstains from all inquiry into causes, and soberly refuses

* For this I am indebted to a letter of Dr. Collyns Simon's, as quoted in the Spiritualist for May 19, 1876, by Mr. H. G. Atkinson. "What I hold is this..... Each group is external to the other, and all are external to the Ego as far as this word 'external' can apply to a nature which is unextended, and which has therefore neither an inside nor an outside. It is more correct to say 'independent of' than 'external to' in this place and sense."

to pronounce where we cannot know. But of all systems which go beyond the "how" into the "why," the Idealism of Berkeley, in its main idea, is not only the simplest, but has the strongest presumption in its favour. But here are one or two assertions thrown out which require to be vindicated in detail. And first, of the superior merits, as a speculation, of Spiritualism, or Idealism, over Materialism.

The question which Positivism relegates to the unknowable, but which Materialism and Spiritualism alike profess to solve, is—What is the efficient cause of phenomena? "It is an unintelligent substance, which we call Matter," say the Materialists. "It is the Will of an Intelligent Power, whom I call God," said Berkeley. The sympathies of Comte, so far as they could be enlisted at all in such a question, were wholly in favour of the latter response. "If we insist," says that philosopher, "upon penetrating the unattainable mystery of the essential Cause that produces phenomena, there is no hypothesis more satisfactory than that they proceed from Wills dwelling in them or outside them." And though Comte here says "Wills," not "Will," the unity and consistency of Nature clearly gives the palm to the speculation of the Monotheist theologian over that of the Polytheist. But let us consider the two answers. The Matter of the Materialist is confessedly invisible and impalpable—"essentially mystical and transcendental"—in its nature. It is, therefore, what in loose, popular phraseology is styled "immaterial," quite as much as Spirit or the Will of God can be. The question, then, might seem narrowed down to the inquiry whether this invisible and impalpable somewhat, which causes our perceptions, be intelligent or not. On this point, again, Comte is wholly on the side of Berkeley. "The order of Nature," he says, "is doubtless very imperfect in every respect; but its production is far more compatible with the hypothesis of an intelligent Will than with that of a blind mechanism." But this, it may justly be replied, is an unfair way of treating the question; for Matter, though invisible and impalpable to sense, is still possessed of extension and solidity, and some other of the

properties of sensible bodies, and therefore belongs to a wholly different sphere of existence from Will, which has none of these things. The question then, fully stated, comes back to this—Is the efficient cause of phenomena an unintelligent substance composed of solid and extended particles inappreciable by sense? Or is there no more to be said than that our perceptions are willed by a superior being? Berkeley adopted the latter view, and his refutation of the counter hypothesis to his own is summed up in the question, "How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought?" More diffusely he states it as follows: "That a being endowed with knowledge and will should produce or exhibit ideas, is easily understood. But that a being which is utterly destitute of these faculties should be able to produce ideas, or in any sort to affect an intelligence—this I can never understand." Now it is quite true that no one has ever been able to understand how Matter, or the supposed unintelligent substratum of sensible phenomena, should be able to affect Mind. If it seem intelligible at first sight, and a thing of daily experience, that is only because Matter, in its philosophical acceptation, is confused with material objects, or "real things," which have been found, as before shewn, to resolve themselves into affections of Mind. But this incapacity of ours to understand proves nothing; for, in the absence of other experience of efficient causes, we cannot expect to understand the operation of a given one, since all explanation implies analogy. Berkeley's refutation, therefore, falls harmless on the head of his opponents. Their theory, however destitute of plausibility, is beyond the reach of contradiction, unless some analogy be forthcoming to teach us the nature of an Efficient. But how fares it with Berkeley's own answer to the question? Does that carry with it any presumption in its favour? We shall have to consider this matter separately from the two standpoints of Necessity and Free-will.

It is one of the freaks of language that the doctrine of Necessity above all things asserts that there is no necessary connection between any cause and its effect. Every human action has its antecedent in the state of the emotions at the

moment of its committal. But between an antecedent of this kind and its consequent there is no stronger tie discoverable than between the impact of one billiard-ball and the motion of another. It is experience alike in both cases that informs us of their conjunction. On this view of things it is of course impossible to have any notion of an efficient cause at all. What our knowledge reveals to us is one mighty chain of sequences, some mental and some physical, stretching we know not whence or whither: beyond the few links irradiated by experience, all is dark. Judged from this standpoint, then, Berkeley's answer might seem as empty of plausibility as that of the Materialists.

The upholders of Free-will, on the other hand, maintain that there *is* a necessary connection, in the sense of a power of efficiency, between one cause, at least, namely, the human will, and its effects. They maintain that man's will is, within certain circumscribed limits, an actual source or origin of events—a king sitting in the midst of his courtiers, the passions, listening to their promptings, swayed to and fro by fear or favour, but still vested with a prerogative, sometimes exercised, to overrule their counsels. Those, therefore, who accept Free-will have one analogy to go on in determining the nature of an Efficient, and that analogy is wholly in Berkeley's favour. But we must be careful to estimate this analogy at its proper value. The most strenuous advocates of the freedom of the will have not as yet been heard to claim for it creative power. But to ask, What is the efficient cause of phenomena? is to ask, What is the power which creates, or calls into existence out of non-existence, those collections of perceptions which we term material things? Now the will of man is regarded as impotent to create. All that is claimed for it, in its relation to the external world, is a free power to transmute the qualities and alter the relations of things. Given certain perceptions, it can substitute others for them within the bounds prescribed by the conditions of co-existence and succession in Nature. It is an efficient cause of change. But if the will of man can effect a change of perceptions, it seems no very great

leap to suppose that a power akin to it, but indefinitely higher, is what starts perception in us, or creates the world of matter.

The above seems on close consideration to be all that Berkeley had to urge in support of his opinion that the material world is the product of Will. But is it all that can be urged? It is evident that Berkeley's argument appeals only to those who, like himself, believe the will of man to be in some sort an efficient cause. If the will, though an antecedent of change, be itself determined by pre-existent causes, it has no longer any title to be singled out as the type of efficiency. But this is just one of the things a Materialist at the present day would maintain most strongly, so that Berkeley's argument, based as it is on the assumption of Free-will, would have no weight with him. What presumption, then, can be alleged which it is open to a Positivist or Necessitarian to accept, that Will and not Matter underlies the world without us? I will endeavour in a fresh paragraph to indicate some answer to this question.

The reason why Positivism includes both Spiritualism and Materialism under the same ban, as mere guessing in the dark, is because the material universe is regarded as "a singular effect." The creation of matter, it is held, or the production in us of perceptions, is a thing which we find, once for all, to be; and we must be content to accept the fact. There being no analogy to guide us, to search for its cause is a hopeless task. But if creation, or the production of matter where no matter was, were to become a thing of common experience, the Positivist, without abandoning the method or spirit of his philosophy, would extend the horizon of his inquiries. He would not seek now, any more than before, for the efficient cause of phenomena, being persuaded that succession and co-existence are the only relations which the human mind is competent to discover between any one fact of existence and another. But, given any instance of creation, however confined or transitory, he would bend every effort of his mind to ascertain the antecedent of a fact so startling. And if he found that there was one antecedent, and one only, to be discovered in the various instances of partial or temporary creation which came under

his notice, he would consider himself to have gained a fair presumption for believing the same antecedent to be present in all creation whatever. If he found that antecedent to be Will, he would henceforth register it among the sequences of Nature that creation was preceded by Will; and, unless checked by contrary evidence, would apply the analogy boldly to cases transcending his powers of observation. In a word, if this supposed case were a real one, we might be led by strict inductive logic to coincide with Berkeley's theory of things. And is it not a real one? Has not modern psychological experience given us a peep into the "modus operandi" in the production of perceptions? I refer to the phenomena of mesmerism. There we see transacted on a small scale what Berkeley supposes to take place on a large one. The "subject" under control is thrown into a world of the mesmerist's creation; every one of his senses is supplied with its object; he can bring none of them to detect the fallacy of the others. But the mesmerist's effort of will is temporary and confined in its action, and so we call the subject's state a delusion; the Divine Will is continuous and universal, and we call the world around us a reality.

If Berkeley were alive now, or had given his metaphysical views to the world a little later than he did, we might have imagined that his theory had been suggested by the very facts we have spoken of. The father of Idealism would have hailed with delight the advent of Mesmerism. In every itinerant professor of that mysterious art he would have seen a practical exhibitor of the truth of his theory, bringing it down out of the clouds of speculation by applying the crucial experiment which was needed to shew Will to be a *vera causa* in the production of perceptions. As the case stands, however, Berkeley's theory was in nowise suggested by new facts, but was struck out by sheer force of inward meditation. Given the facts which had been staring the world in the face for ages, the solitary genius of the Irish Bishop put an interpretation upon them which, to those who accept it, has turned the world upside down, or rather inside out, more completely than the substitu-

tion of the Copernican for the Ptolemaic system in physical science. It may be that we have as yet seen only the beginning of the revolution in thought which Berkeley inaugurated, and that Idealism, under one form or another, has a career before it far more important than the half-acceptance which it has hitherto met with from the philosophic fraction of the world. What if Idealism should yet become popular! Time has brought round revenges as strange as that. While our perceptions, of course, remained precisely what they are, we might come to accept the appearances of things in general with as widespread a mental reservation as when we see the sun *manifestly* springing above or sinking below the horizon. We might come, I mean, to have metaphysical, no less than physical, science ever ready as a corrective of our spontaneous notions—and that, too, without altering the received modes of speech. All that is necessary is to avoid confusion between ourselves regarded as physical organisms, and ourselves regarded as so much mind, spirit, or consciousness. There is a material world external to, and independent of, our bodies: there is not, and cannot be, such a world independent of our minds. All that exists independently of our minds is the cause of Matter. And if we inquire into the nature of that cause, we find some presumption for believing it to be Will, and no presumption at all for believing it to be anything else.

The reader will observe that in what is here urged in Berkeley's favour, Will is spoken of as possibly a creative, but not as an ultimate cause. The object of the foregoing remarks has been to shew that we have some ground for believing Will to be the phenomenal antecedent of the presentation to our faculties of an objective world, in which case we may push the chain of cause and effect one step further back than it is usually carried without venturing to assert that we thereby reach the ultimate cause. The writer himself shares the opinion that we know nothing of "cause" except as a term in a series.

One word now as to the simplicity of Berkeley's theory. Hitherto we have contrasted it only with that sheer Material-

ism which would ascribe efficiency to unintelligent atoms. That theory is simple enough, yet Berkeley's is simpler still. For the former postulates a world without us, resembling, to some extent, the world we are conscious of, and forces us to distinguish between objective and subjective qualities of matter, whereas Berkeley abolishes this artificial distinction, declaring all our perceptions alike to be directly produced in us by an external cause no way resembling them. But what figures in Berkeley's writings under the title of Materialism is not this simple, though groundless, hypothesis, but that theory of perception which, while ascribing the origin of all things to God, regards His Will as operating upon us, not directly, but through the intervention of a created substance called Matter. Our philosopher sapped the foundations of this conception, still dominant in theology, by taking the properties of Matter, one by one, and shewing them to be affections of Mind. What then, he could ask, did God create beyond our perceptions? "Force-centres," say certain thinkers at the present day; and the answer no doubt deserves serious consideration, though the present writer can find in it—at least when combined with belief in a Deity—nothing but an attempt to localize volitions, which sounds like a contradiction in terms. It is, in truth, hard to understand why any one who agrees with Berkeley in accepting the existence of a Deity as an unquestionable fact, should persist in running up a partition-wall between Him and His creatures. When Berkeley has said all that he has to say, it is still quite open to us to believe in the existence of Noumena, or things in themselves; but if we also believe in a Deity who made them, it is certainly simpler and more reasonable to cut out the unnecessary link. Here, if anywhere, we may apply the famous principle of William of Occam: Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem; frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora.

All that now remains is to glance at the deep religious significance of Berkeley's conception of the universe. So long as Matter was regarded as an independent entity, there was danger of its usurping the place of Deity, a danger to which

Berkeley was keenly alive. If our perceptions could be aroused in us by a lifeless substance, what need to seek further for the living God? But in our author's scheme of things, Matter was relegated to an essentially relative and subordinate position. It was but the impress of God's spirit on man's—a strain drawn from the human soul by the touch of the Divine Musician, as expressed by one who thought not of Berkeley when he wrote—

> "A spirit went forth from the Lord,
> To play on the spirit of man,
> That thrilled like a wind-shaken chord
> When the hymn of the ages began."

Thus Matter was doubly dependent, existing by reason of the Will of God, and in, though not by reason of, the mind of man.

Again, a sense of nearness and intimate communion with the Divine Being has been characteristic of the religious mind in all ages. Men have retired into the wilderness to feel alone with God. But, on Berkeley's view of things, retirement is needless, for even amid the din and stir of life men are alone with God. All the thronging perceptions that constitute the outer life of man proceed as truly and immediately from God as the "still, small voice" of the inner spiritual consciousness.* All Nature everywhere is but the language of the Almighty Father, whereby He imparts His thoughts to His children—thoughts couched under sensible symbols, as all instruction to children must be. The more we learn of science—the more unerringly we detect the connection of the sign with the thing signified—the more we come to know of the thought of God, unfolded gradually in the sublime panorama of the universe. It is not too much to say, that of all philosophies which have ever been given to the world, Berkeley's is the best adapted to conciliate piety with strong common sense. Based wholly

* This applies in the fulness of its meaning rather to the junction of Hume with Berkeley—the fusion of Positivism and Spiritualism—which is proposed in this paper. For Berkeley did not consider God to be the only agent, though we look in vain in his writings for any clear demarcation of the limits and relations of divine and human action.

upon experience, it thrills and glows with religious fervour. Yet this was the philosophy which Beattie and the chorus of the orthodox denounced as "atheistical," while magnanimously acquitting its author of ill intention—a philosophy which could tinge with deeper meaning even the devout declaration of the Psalmist—"By the word of the Lord were the heavens made; and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth."

ST. GEORGE STOCK.

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## II.—SAMUEL RUTHERFURD THE COVENANTER.

THE name of Samuel Rutherfurd* is well known as that of one of the Scottish Commissioners to the Westminster Assembly of Divines, in connection with certain letters which have always enjoyed a high degree of popularity in evangelical circles in Scotland, and as having obtained the somewhat doubtful honour of mention by Milton in his verses on "the new forcers of conscience under the Long Parliament," ending with the familiar line,

"New Presbyter is but old Priest writ large."

But apart from these facts, it may be suspected that to the general reader he is little more than a mere *nominis umbra*. Even his Letters, highly valued as they are wherever the traditions of Scottish Puritanism retain their vitality, are probably better known to the profane world through the cento of passages strung together for purposes of ridicule in a certain famous chap-book, than in their collected form. Yet the author of the work which was pronounced by Bishop Heber to be "perhaps the most elaborate defence of persecution which has ever appeared in a Protestant country," and of letters of which a man of so refined and catholic a mind as the late Thomas

* Contrary to the general usage, I adhere to the spelling which I find on the title-pages of Rutherfurd's English works, and with the more confidence as I see that this form is not yet obsolete.

Erskine of Linlathen thought it worth while to edit a selection, must be deserving of some study and attention, and it is under this conviction that the following sketch is here offered to the reader.

Samuel Rutherfurd was born, it is believed, in the last year of the sixteenth century, in the village of Nisbet, not far from Jedburgh. In that ancient town, in the Latiners' alley, as it was expressively called, under the walls of the fine old abbey, it is probable he may have received his schooling; but the fact is that, except for the single statement that he was "a gentleman by birth," which has itself been called in question, nothing certain is known of his parentage or early years, or of the influences under which he grew from childhood to youth. The statement of Wodrow that he was "sprung of mean but honest parents in Teviotdale," hardly warrants the inference that his father was a respectable farmer, and Rutherfurd's letters are singularly wanting in those autobiographical touches which are sometimes our chief sources of information respecting a great man's life, and always lend such a charm to the compositions in which they occur. The single anecdote which remains of his childhood has been thought, however, perhaps not unreasonably, to furnish evidence of the early influence of those religious impressions which afterwards sank so deep into his mind. One day, the story goes, little Samuel, while engaged in play, chanced to fall into a well, and when his companions, having run away in a fright, returned and found him sitting, all wet but unhurt, upon a stone, the explanation he gave of the affair was, that "a bonnie white man had come and lifted him out." That he gave early proof of eminent abilities may easily be believed, and in due time, accordingly, we find him entered as a student in the College—not yet the University—of Edinburgh, for which considerable proficiency in Latin would be necessary, that language being then commonly used in the class-rooms. In the year 1621 he took his degree of M.A., and in 1623 he was chosen, from among four candidates, Professor, or, as the title then was, Regent of Humanity. This office,

however, "having given some scandal in his marriage," so a contemporary writer informs us, "he was forced to demit," in the end of the year 1625.

It would of course be extremely pleasant, if it were possible consistently with truth, to hide the one blot on the character of so good a man; but if the matter must be referred to at all, it is useless to affect any uncertainty as to the nature of the charge against Rutherfurd. A baptismal entry, dated April 14, 1626, and indicating that a daughter was born to him at that time, within four or five months therefore of his marriage, tells a sufficiently plain story; and accordingly when Murray, his biographer, after admitting that the charge "was not unfounded," proceeds to argue that "it may have been false or at any rate grossly exaggerated," on the ground that it was never brought up by Rutherfurd's enemies, and did not stand in the way of his preferment, he is only trying to mystify his readers. It was in consequence of an application by Principal Adamson "for commissioners to investigate the subject," that Rutherfurd resigned his Professorship, and, considering the gravity of the case, it is futile to suggest that he may have done so from timidity rather than from conscious guilt.

It may have been at this time that Rutherfurd's mind was first awakened to a lively sense of religion; but his letters unhappily afford few glimpses into his own spiritual history, unless indeed his confessions of depravity, as when he speaks of himself as "a rotten mass of sin," are to be understood as pointing to some real burden on his conscience, rather than as the conventional language of the Calvinist. However that may be, it is certain that he now gave himself up to the study of divinity, and in the year 1627 he was called to the parish of Anwoth, in Kirkudbrightshire, an appointment which he owed to Lord Kenmuir, a young nobleman in whose spiritual condition he took the deepest interest, by whose dying bed he sat, and of whose "Last and Heavenly Speeches and Glorious Departure" he wrote the history.

At this time the Scottish Kirk was groaning under the

tyranny of the bishops forced upon her by King James VI. The Five Articles of Perth, enacting that the Communion was to be taken kneeling, insisting on the observance of Christmas and the other chief festivals of the Church, and permitting or enjoining other practices which every true Presbyterian holds in abhorrence, had been passed some years before (1618), while the days of Jenny Geddes and her cutty-stool had not yet arrived. According to law, Rutherfurd ought to have received episcopal ordination on his induction to his parish; but it is believed that, by the influence of his patron, Lord Kenmuir, and with the connivance of Lamb, Bishop of Galloway, whose temper fortunately corresponded with his name, this compromise of principle was not insisted on. He was able therefore to enter on his duties with a clear conscience.

The little church, which is now roofless, its walls richly mantled with ivy, lay romantically buried among the hills that rise above Wigton Bay. Of the manse which stood hard by no stone remains, but the site is still pointed out; and the traveller who may be induced to make a pilgrimage to the spot, will admit that there could not well be a more charming place on earth in which to pass a life consecrated to pious meditation. Rutherfurd at once gave himself up to the duties of his ministry with extraordinary zeal. He rose, it is said, at three o'clock every morning, and spent his whole time in reading, praying, writing, catechising, and visiting the sick; in season and out of season, as he himself testifies, "warning and stirring up the minds of his parishioners." In his sermons, which were distinguished by their earnestness and eloquence, he preached the terrors of the law no less than the promises of the gospel, nor did he spare to attack the Popish and Prelatical principles which it was the object of the government to revive, so that, as he expressed it afterwards, "the very timber and stones of his church walls could bear witness that crossing in baptism was unlawful, that no days except the sabbath should be kept holy and sanctified with preaching and the public worship of God, and that idolatry and adoring of Christ by kneeling before bread and wine was unlawful."

(Let. 148.)* To this day the "stones of witness" which he set up as his testimony against certain sabbath-breakers who would not desist from playing ball, at his bidding, upon the holy day, are held in superstitious awe; and the old woman who repeated the story to the writer significantly added that one Mr. Blyth, who took away a part of one of them, died shortly afterwards.† By degrees his fame spread far and wide through the neighbouring parishes, and his little church, which would barely have held two hundred and fifty, was crowded by eager listeners, who in those troublous times were concerned for the maintenance of what they considered the true worship of God as well as for their personal salvation.

In his quiet home at Anwoth, Rutherfurd received a visit from the famous Ussher, the learned Archbishop of Armagh, who, it is recorded, coming as a stranger and unannounced, joined in the family worship in the evening, and being asked in his turn, according to the custom of the time, how many commandments there are, answered, "Eleven." Corrected by his host, he maintained his position, quoting in its defence the words of John xiii. 34, "A new commandment give I unto you, that ye love one another." The next morning, which was Sunday, having been overheard praying for all who should meet for worship that day, he was discovered, and was prevailed on without difficulty to preach on the new commandment from the pulpit of the Presbyterian divine. It was here, too, that he became acquainted with Mistress Marion M'Naught, wife of Provost William Fullerton, of Kirkudbright, to whom, as "his well-beloved and dear sister," many of his most touching letters are written, and who, after his wife's death, it seems, was for some time an inmate of his home. It was at her husband's house that he met the Rev. Mr. Blair, who, as he was on his way from London to Portpatrick, was seized with

* "Letters of the Rev. Samuel Rutherford, carefully revised and edited by the Rev. Thomas Smith, D.D.," to which edition all my references are made.

† Perhaps it is only fair to add that she was corrected by a still more ancient dame, who cautiously interposed, "We do not *know* that that was the cause." Is rationalism penetrating even into these peaceful valleys?

a desire "to visit both Mr. Rutherfurd at Anwoth and Marion M'Naught at Kirkudbright; but not knowing how to accomplish both, had prayed at the parting of the road for direction, and laid the bridle on the horse's neck. The horse took the way to Kirkudbright, and there he found both the friends he so longed to see."

But there was no one perhaps in whom Rutherfurd took a warmer interest, or to whom he wrote in more heart-moving tones, than the Viscountess Kenmuir, widow of his patron, to whose death reference has already been made. This nobleman died September 12, 1634. He was exercised, Rutherfurd says, "with heavy pangs of conscience and torture of mind, for not countenancing the cause of God when he was publicly called thereunto in Parliament;" the fact being that nine months previously, having come to Edinburgh to attend the Parliament there assembled, not having the courage, as was alleged, to stand by his principles when the cause of God (i.e. of Presbytery) was in hand, he left after the first day, "under pretence," says Rutherfurd again, "that his body was sick." If he expressed contrition for his conduct on that occasion, no doubt Rutherfurd received his dying confession; yet under the circumstances it seems a little hard to have assumed that his illness could have been nothing more than a pretext for desertion. It may be, however, that, in the stern eyes of the Calvinistic divine, his early death was nothing short of a judgment upon him for the pusillanimity of his conduct, and was itself therefore an evidence of his guilt.

Meantime, our preacher, while called upon to administer consolation to others, was not without his own sorrows; for, besides the public trials of which mention must be made presently, his wife died after thirteen months of severe suffering, insomuch that he was constrained to write, "My life is bitter unto me, for my wife is so tormented night and day, that I have wondered why the Lord tarrieth so long." And he adds, "I bless my God that there is a death and a heaven; I would weary to begin again to be a Christian, so bitter is it to drink of the cup that Christ drank of, if I did not know there is no

poison in it." (Let. p. 484.) Rutherfurd married again after an interval of ten years, but continued to be sorely tried with family afflictions. Of seven children by his second wife, only one survived him, and the two by his first wife both died young. At this time, too, he suffered himself from a tertian fever, so that, as he complains, he could preach "but once on the sabbath with great difficulty." (Part ii. Let. 8.)

He had not been many years at Anwoth before he drew on himself the hostility of the Prelatical party, and in the month of June, 1630, he was summoned to appear before the High Commission Court, at the instance, he says, of "a profligate person in this parish, convicted of incest." What his fate would have been, had the trial taken place, is indicated in the following sentence: "Our prelates (the Lord take the keys of His house from those bastard porters) assure us that for such as will not conform, there is nothing but imprisonment and deprivation." But, fortunately for him, the weather proved so tempestuous, that the Archbishop of St. Andrews was unable to cross the sea to Edinburgh, and one of the judges favouring his cause, the diet was deserted. Presently, however, Lamb, Bishop of Galloway, was succeeded by Thomas Sydserff, a man of violent and intolerant character, and at the instance of this prelate he was again threatened with prosecution. A work which he published in the beginning of the year 1636 in defence of the Calvinistic doctrine of grace, and which was considered by those who shared its views a triumphant refutation of Arminianism, was thought sufficient to incriminate him, and he now accordingly appeared before the Court at Wigton, charged with nonconformity, with preaching against the Five Articles of Perth, and with the authorship of the book just referred to. As a proof of the stubbornness of his principles, it is recorded that "he would not give the Chancellor (being a clergyman) and the bishops their titles by lording of them;" nevertheless, he found friends in some of the members of this Court too, especially in Lord Lorne, afterwards the famous Marquis of Argyle. The Bishop of Galloway, however, was resolute, and threatened that "if he

did not get his will of him, he would write to the King;" and accordingly, being found guilty, he was sentenced to be deprived of his ministry, and to confine himself, during the King's pleasure, within the town of Aberdeen, before the 20th of August following; and, what he felt most keenly, he was "inhibited from speaking at all in Jesus' name within this kingdom, under pain of rebellion." The sentence was pronounced July 27, 1636.

At Aberdeen, which was at that time a perfect hot-bed of prelacy and of whatever else is most abhorrent to genuine Puritanism, Rutherfurd spent, sorely against his will, rather more than a year and a half. "This town," he writes, "hath been advised upon of purpose for me; it consisteth either of Papists or of men of Gallio's naughty faith;" and he found there few to sympathize with him in his misfortunes, or who were willing to benefit by his counsels. Amid such hateful surroundings, separated by a distance of eight score miles from his home and all the associations of his daily work, forbidden to open his mouth in public or discharge any of the duties of the ministry, it was no wonder if it sometimes seemed as if Christ had no further need of his services, and "had cast him," as he expressed it in his quaint language, "over the dyke of the vineyard like a dry tree." Earnestly did his soul yearn for his beloved parish. "I am for the present thinking the sparrows and the swallows that build their nests in Anwoth blessed birds." (Let. p. 535.) Often he complains of his dumb sabbaths. "Oh," he exclaims, "what service can a silenced man do in Christ's house? I am a dry tree, alas! I can neither plant nor water. O, if I might but speak to three or four herd-boys of my worthy Master, I would be satisfied to be the meanest and most obscure of all the pastors in this land." (Ib. p. 136.) It was not long, however, before the clouds of despondency gradually lifted, and he found within himself a spring of consolation which was able to heal his sorest wounds. There were those too, if not near at hand, yet at a distance, on whose sympathy he could rely—disciples who had sat at his feet, devout women who had received God's message from his

lips—and to whom he could now pour out all that was in his heart. In fact, the repressed religious enthusiasm of the Puritan preacher, forbidden, as it was, to utter itself in the accustomed way, now poured itself out in those remarkable letters which, not unnaturally, have become, as has been already hinted, a sort of hand-book of devotion in evangelical households in Scotland, and Rutherfurd's doubly widowed heart found in the realms of the religious imagination an Object on which it could freely spend itself, and which abundantly satisfied its most tender emotions.

In these singular compositions the writer speaks of his Saviour with the freedom of a lover and with the fervour of a saint. He is able to tell, in words generally borrowed from Scripture and chiefly from the Song of Songs, how he comes in and goes out from day to day, dines and sups at his board, lies down with him at night, and steals away before the morning comes, and to describe the very scent of his breath and the flavour of his kisses. Nor is this intimacy, as between lovers of a more earthly type, without its quarrels, its jealousies and its reconciliations. The language, it is true, is figurative, but the feelings which it expresses were undoubtedly real, and they probably had some kindred (to what extent I will leave it to keener psychologists to determine) with the emotions which accompany a more sensuous passion. It remains that we have here the extraordinary phenomenon of one who was no mere ignorant fanatic, but a man of learning and refinement, and able to hold his own in controversy with the most accomplished scholars of his time,—no cloistered monk, to whose imagination fasts and vigils might have given an unnatural stimulus, but a man of the world and the father of a family, in Protestant Scotland too, no longer ago than the 17th century, indulging a morbid and semi-sensuous pietism, such as we are accustomed to associate exclusively with the solitude of the cell and the darkest period of the middle ages. The language of the Letters would disgust us by its extravagance, its familiarity and its occasional coarseness, the images would weary us by their repetition, were it not for a constant undertone of

solemn and pathetic earnestness, as of one who has been sorely smitten in the battle of life and learned to fix all his hopes on things unseen.

I had intended giving here a few extracts from the Letters, but the space at my disposal forbids, and at any rate they are easily accessible. We will now resume our narrative.

Faith has had its trial, but is now to have its triumph.* On the 16th of July, 1637, the new Prayer-book from England, against which Rutherfurd had solemnly warned his flock, was to be read in the High Church at Edinburgh. This was the day on which, according to universal consent, the immortal Jenny Geddes flung her stool at the head of the Dean of Edinburgh; and although the learned Mr. Hill Burton has demonstrated that Jenny's claims to be the heroine of the story rest on no solid foundation, and that it was at a later period of history and in a different way that she rose into fame, it is satisfactory to know as a fact on which there rests no shade of doubt, that a stool was actually thrown, and that "the *Bishop* of Edinburgh (if not the Dean) narrowly escaped a blow on the head."† A large concourse was gathered in the church. The Dean stood up to read, and announced the collect for the day. "The deil colick in the wame of thee, thou false thief!" roared Jenny; "wilt thou say mass at my lug?" A tumult ensued.

* The Trial and Triumph of Faith is the title of one of Rutherfurd's best known works.

† It is satisfactory to find that Rutherfurd bears testimony to the particular stool with which it is generally supposed the riot commenced, as well as to the fact of its having been thrown by a woman and at the Dean. "God's beginning of great works is small. What could be said of a poor woman's throwing of a stool at the man who did first read the new service-book in Edinburgh?" (Trial and Triumph of Faith, p. 268.) Mr. Burton's argument (History of Scotland, VI. pp. 150, 151, note) is, that Jenny is unknown to any contemporary writer, and is first mentioned as taking a prominent part in the rejoicings at the Restoration. The passage quoted by Mr. Burton from a contemporary news-writer, which, he says, contains the earliest historical notice of the lady in question, need not here be reproduced, but it is worthy of remark that it describes her as "the immortal Jenet Geddes." Does not this, then, countenance the view that Jenny may have first gained her immortality by the affair of the stool, and that, having thrown it in her hot youth, she lived long enough to rejoice at the return of Scotland's covenanted King?

Books, stools and other missiles flew in all directions. The Dean's surplice was torn off, and some of the bishops had a narrow escape with their lives. This was the beginning of the end of Prelacy in Scotland, and on the 1st of March in the following year the National Covenant was signed.

After this there was nothing to prevent Rutherfurd leaving Aberdeen. He was a member of the Glasgow Assembly of 1638, which made such short work with the bishops, excommunicating eight, deposing four, and suspending the remaining two, on their timely submission, from all ecclesiastical functions. A bad set they must indeed have been if the charges against them were substantiated; but the judges were strongly biassed, and it is easy to imagine that the evidence would not be too carefully sifted. One's moral sense, too, is apt to get a little confused between the ecclesiastical and the moral offences, and one hardly knows which those zealous Covenanters considered the more heinous crime—finding great comfort in a crucifix, or the fornication and drunkenness with which the bishops were so freely charged. The charitable Baillie, to whom excommunication seemed "so terrible a sentence," was at first opposed to this extreme measure, but found only five or six to support him. The first of the bishops to incur this penalty was Rutherfurd's old enemy, Galloway, who, says Baillie, "besides common faults, was proven to have preached Arminianism (!); to have had in his chamber a crucifix, and spoken for the comfortable use he found in it; to have indicted two anniversary fasts in his diocese, and acted in his synod a communion for his ministers at all his posterior synods: he was found to have deposed ministers, fined and confined gentlemen for nonconformity, embraced excommunicated Papists, and professed more love to them than Puritans; to have contemned the exercise of prayer in his family; to have profaned the sabbath-day in buying horses, doing anything of his civil affairs openly on it."* Whether Rutherfurd was one of the five or six who supported Baillie in his advocacy

* Baillie's Letters and Journals, I. p. 128.

of milder measures, we are not informed. On the whole, one must fear not. He and Baillie acted together on the Committee "for consideration of the corruptions of the book of service, canons, ordination, and high commission," all which were abolished by the Assembly.

The following year Rutherfurd was appointed Professor of Divinity in the New College, St. Andrews, when, in the quaint language of an old writer, "God did again so second this eminent and faithful servant, that by his indefatigable pains both in teaching in the school and preaching in the congregation, St. Andrews, the seat of the Archbishop and by that means the nursery of all superstition, error and profaneness, soon became a Lebanon, out of which were taken cedars for building the house of the Lord almost throughout the whole land; many of whom he guided to heaven before himself, who received spiritual life by his ministry, and many others walked in that light after him."

A little later we get another glimpse of Rutherfurd from a passage in the letters of worthy Principal Baillie, which brings him vividly before us; and this time at least it is pleasant to observe he is on the side of tolerance; but then it was a tolerance which was to be shewn, not towards black Prelatists and Papists, but to brethren the soundness of whose faith was unquestioned, but who had fallen, through the force of evil circumstances, into some little laxity in practice. Some Scotch Presbyterians in Ireland, it seems, "being pressed there by the bishops to countenance the liturgy and all the ceremonies, did abstain from the public worship, and in private .... did comfort themselves with prayer and reading and other exercises of religion." A serious matter, no doubt; for if such meetings were countenanced, the question might come to be asked, What need of a professional ministry, and what security would there be against the spread of all kinds of unauthorized and heretical opinions? Nevertheless, these brethren, on coming to Scotland, were kindly received and borne with, until they excited the animadversion of a certain Mr. Harry Guthrie, of Stirling, who took every opportunity of denouncing

this practice. When the question became the subject of a stormy debate in the Assembly of 1640, in which the said Mr. Harry Guthrie, with Lord Seaforth, opposed the more moderate views that seemed to be approved by the majority, "Mr. Rutherford all the while was dumb, only in the midst of this jangling he cast in a syllogism, and required them all to answer it: 'What Scripture does warrant, an assembly may not discharge; but privy meetings for exercises of religion, Scripture warrants; James v. 16, Confess your faults one to another, and pray one for another; Mal. iii. 16, Then they that feared the Lord spake often one to another, &c.; *Ergo*, thir (these) things could not be done in public meetings.' A number greedily haunsht at the argument—Mr. Andrew Ramsay, Mr. J. Adamson, and others—but came not near the matter, let be to answer formally. Mr. Harry and Seaforth would not have Mr. Samuel to trouble us with his logic syllogisms."* Eventually a compromise was arrived at, an act being passed declaring that read prayers were not unlawful, but that it was not permitted to any one to expound scripture to the people save only ministers and candidates approved by the presbyteries, and that family worship should be confined to persons of the same family.

On the 1st of July, 1643, the celebrated Westminster Assembly met for the first time in King Henry VII.'s chapel, from which, as the weather grew cold, they removed to Jerusalem Chamber, "a fair room," says Baillie, in Westminster Abbey; and Rutherfurd, being appointed one of the Scottish Commissioners, arrived in London with his colleagues on the 20th November. On the 30th of the same month, we find that he "spake very largely" in the debate on Church officers, and from that time till towards the close of the year 1647, when its work was finished, he continued to take a leading part in its affairs. As a speaker, he did not perhaps equal "that noble youth Mr. Gillespie," as Baillie calls him; "a singular ornament," he adds, "of our church, than whom not one

* Baillie, Let. 14.

in the whole Assembly speaks to better purpose, and with better acceptance by all the hearers;" but his learning, his reputation, and his known piety and amiability of character, ever gained him an attentive hearing, and lent weight to his influence in the discussion of all matters of doctrine and church government.

The disjointed notes which alone are preserved of the debates of the Assembly, do not afford us many opportunities of watching the attitude of Rutherfurd in relation to the various points brought up for discussion; but here is at least one interesting entry, which shews him to us, while himself leaning to the extreme, or supra-lapsarian, doctrine of God's eternal decree, yet questioning whether the other might not at least be permitted:

"*Sess.* 520.—Oct. 20, 1645.—Monday morning. Proceed in the debate about permission of man's fall; about 'the same decree.'

"Mr. Rutherfurd: All agree in this—that God decrees the end and means, but whether in one or more decrees is not. . . . It is very probable but one decree, but whether fit to express in a Confession of Faith . . .

". . . . If there can be any argument to prove a necessity of one and the same decree, we would be glad to hear it."

The four years that Rutherfurd spent in London attending the meetings of the Assembly, were also among the most fruitful in literary effort. During this period he published several works bearing on the controversies of the day, among which was one, entitled, "Lex Rex, or the Law and the Prince," which has been rather absurdly praised as anticipating "some of the more advanced principles of the enlightened political science of recent times," and which at the Restoration gained the distinction of being burned by the common hangman. The Free Disputation against pretended liberty of conscience was not published till the year 1649, after his return to Scotland.

The Lex Rex is a defence, based on reason and Scripture, of constitutional government, in reply to the extreme advocates of the divine right of kings. In this work Rutherfurd maintains that "monarchy *de jure*, that is, lawful and limited

monarchy, is best," and contends for the lawfulness of a people punishing their king to death, "for matters capital," in this following Grotius, whose authority he quotes; but whatever admiration his enlightened views on this subject might awaken is considerably modified when we find him confronting the pretensions of the sovereign with others equally monstrous, and, with all the assumption of "old Priest writ large," claiming for Presbyteries to "have the keys of the kingdom of God, to open and let in believing princes, and also to shut them out, if they rebel against Christ." He does not, however, go the length of the Papists in holding that a king may at once be dethroned for heresy, but maintains that "nothing can dethrone a king but such tyranny as is inconsistent with his royal office." The work, like most of its author's compositions, is written in a rude, unpolished style—its pages "strewed," as Mr. Burton remarks, "with Latin, Greek and Hebrew," and, he might have added, though that is perhaps a matter of course, with copious citations from Scripture—and is scarcely redeemed from insufferable dulness by an occasional happy expression and a few vigorous paragraphs.

Several other works there are in defence of the principles of Presbyterianism, such as his "Peaceable and Temperate Plea for Paul's Presbytery in Scotland" (1642), "The Divine Right of Church Government and Excommunication" (1646), &c., which, except for the light they throw on the controversies of the time, it is perhaps hardly worth while to disturb from their repose among other volumes of mouldering divinity; but the "Free Disputation" may fairly claim some notice at our hands, if for no other reason, on account of its open advocacy of the persecuting principles embodied in the Westminster Confession.

Admitting, as every one must admit, that religion and faith cannot be forced on men, Rutherfurd contends that it does not hence "follow that the magistrate therefore can use no coercive power in punishing heretics and false teachers." The all-important question here is undoubtedly how far heresy is a punishable offence, and Rutherfurd, drawing no distinction

between sins and crimes, decides that it is "a heinous transgression against God," and unhesitatingly places errors in religion on a par with breaches of the moral law. It is needless to follow him through his sixteen arguments against "pretended liberty of conscience," but a few of the more striking may be quoted as examples. The first is, that toleration, which he characteristically defines as "the permitting men to speak lies in the name of the Lord, hath no warrant in the Old or New Testament."—"2. Toleration leads necessarily to many religions, but there is only one; therefore it cannot be of God." "3. Toleration leads to scepticism."—"7. What the patriarchs and godly princes of Israel and Judah were obliged to do, all kings and rulers under the New Testament are obliged to do; but they commanded the putting away of strange gods, and the worship of the true God." Abundant examples in support of his thesis Rutherfurd of course finds in Scripture, as of Moses, Phineas, Elijah destroying the priests of Baal, or St. Paul smiting Elymas the sorcerer with blindness, as well as many precepts expressly enjoining persecution; nor does he neglect to notice any passages, such as the parable of the tares, which seem to tell in the opposite direction. On the whole, the book is one of which the Presbyterian churches may well be ashamed, shewing, as it does, the consequences to which their doctrines inevitably tend; but, notwithstanding, its logic is unanswerable, nor is it possible to evade its conclusions if once its principles be admitted.

Returning to St. Andrews in 1647, Rutherfurd was appointed Principal of the New College, and afterwards (1651) Rector of the University; and there, notwithstanding some pressing invitations both from abroad and to other spheres of labour in his own country, he spent the remainder of his days. In 1649, there was a proposal to remove him to Edinburgh as Professor of Divinity; but this, Baillie says, was "thought absurd," and was accordingly rejected by the Assembly. The year before, he had declined an invitation to the Chair of Hebrew and Divinity in the new University of Harderwyck, and he was afterwards elected, without his knowledge, Professor of Divinity

at Utrecht, to succeed Charles de Maets (Dematius), who died April, 1651. This call, though he consented to consider it for six months, he also eventually declined, on the ground that "he could not think of abandoning his Church in the perilous circumstances in which she then stood." Rutherfurd never reconciled himself to Cromwell and toleration, nor, on the other hand, could he have any sympathy with those, including some among his own colleagues, who favoured any departure from the strictest principles of the Covenant. He was the sworn foe of the Malignants, as all such persons were called, and actively opposed any relaxation of the laws against them. This adherence to his principles involved him in unseemly strife with his colleagues, one of whom, Mr. James Wood, having become "weary of his place exceedingly," on account of Rutherfurd's daily contention with him, had to be removed from the New College, and was made Principal of St. Leonard's. When, previous to his coronation at Scone, Charles II. visited St. Andrews, Rutherfurd had an opportunity of lecturing him, which he did in a Latin speech, "running much on what was the duty of kings." It is possible the infliction was not forgotten when Charles came to his throne. He lived to see the restoration of the monarchy, but, happily for himself, died in time to escape the fresh outburst of persecution by which it was followed. The account of his last hours is touching. His Lex Rex was burned, as has been said, at the Cross of Edinburgh, and also under his very windows at St. Andrews by order of Archbishop Sharpe. He was himself deprived of his offices, and summoned to appear before the next Parliament on a charge of high treason. "Tell them," said he to the messenger who brought the news, "I have got a summons already to a superior Court and Judicatory, and I behoove to answer my first summons; and ere your day arrive, I shall be where few kings and great folks come." Some days before his death he said: "I shall shine; I shall see him as he is; I shall see him reign, and all his fair company with him; and I shall have my large share; my eyes shall see my Redeemer, these very eyes of mine and no other for me; this may seem a wide

word, but it is no fancy or delusion; it is true, it is true; let my Lord's name be exalted, and, if He will, let my name be grinded in pieces that He may be all in all." He died March 20, 1661, trusting in his Saviour, and looking forward with joyful confidence to meeting him in Paradise. "Glory, glory dwelleth in Immanuel's land"—these were his parting words.

To this brief sketch it is not necessary that I should add much in the way of summary and conclusion. Rutherfurd was essentially a man of his time, in no respect in advance of his time. He possessed its learning, he believed in its theology, and he shared in its superstitions. Of his outward form and features, unhappily, no semblance has been preserved, but a contemporary has described him, with one characteristic touch, as "a little fair man."* His fanatical principles did not prevent him cherishing a sweet and tender piety, and however stern he could be to those whom he regarded as rebels against Christ, there can be no doubt of the amiability of his private character or the beauty of his daily life. According to Wodrow, he was "one of the most moving and affectionate preachers in his time, or perhaps in any age of the Church;"—this despite the fact that his elocution was not good and his voice rather shrill; and we are told that "when he came to the subject he delighted in, his manner became so animated that it seemed as if he would have flown out of the pulpit." To Baillie, who knew him well, and for some years must have had almost daily intercourse with him, he was "my sweet colleague, Mr. Samuel;" and to the generation following his own, "that Flower of the Church, Famous, famous Mr. Samuel Rutherfurd."†

ROBERT B. DRUMMOND.

* "I went to St. Andrews, where I heard a sweet, majestic-looking man (R. Blair), and he shewed me the majesty of God. After him, I heard a little fair man (Rutherford), and he shewed me the loveliness of Christ."—M'Crie's Sketches in Dr. A. Bonar's Introduction.

† Title-page of a sermon called "Christ's Napkin."

## III.—POLITICAL ECONOMY FOR QUESTIONS OF THE DAY.

*The Theory of Political Economy.* By W. Stanley Jevons. Second Edition. Macmillan. 1879.

*Science Primers.* Political Economy. By W. Stanley Jevons. Macmillan. 1878.

*Some Leading Principles of Political Economy, newly expounded.* By J. E. Cairnes. Macmillan. 1874.

*The Character and Logical Method of Political Economy.* By J. E. Cairnes. Second and enlarged Edition. Macmillan. 1875.

*Tales in Political Economy.* By Millicent Garrett Fawcett. Macmillan. 1874.

*The Nineteenth Century. August,* 1879. *Article on the "Wages Fund."* By W. T. Thornton. C. Kegan Paul and Co.

"THANK God, I have never learned any Political Economy," was the remark made by one of the speakers at a recent conference of ministers in Manchester, a remark which illustrates not only the dislike of the so-called "dismal science," but also the misconceptions prevalent about it; for the speaker immediately proceeded to enunciate a number of sound economic principles, and to found a very practical argument upon them. It is curious to contrast the present state of feeling on the subject with that which existed for a few years nearly half a century ago. Then the publication of a series of tales on Political Economy raised Miss Martineau from her provincial obscurity into a position of European celebrity; then the provisions of the Budget for 1834 were revealed to "the little deaf woman from Norwich," as Lord Brougham called her, before they had even become Cabinet secrets, and equal eagerness was shewn to secure the advocacy of her pen on behalf of the New Poor Law. Mrs. Fawcett can now publish a very nice little volume of economic Tales without its attracting the

attention of the whole western world; and though the Professor is certainly a Member of Parliament, he sits below the gangway, and does not seem to be troubled with any excessive anxiety on the part of Cabinet Ministers *in esse* or *in posse* to secure his support. It is not that political economy has failed to fulfil the promises that were then made on its behalf. Its achievements are in danger of being forgotten, simply because the victory has been so thorough. It has revolutionized our fiscal policy, laid the basis for an enormous development of material prosperity, and there is no returning to the old ways. The *Times* states that we no more argue the truth of Free-trade principles than the truth of Copernican astronomy; and even Mr. Chaplin, M.P., remarkable as he is for courage, dares hardly hint at what he hopes from the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the present agricultural distress. No thoughtful person who knows anything on the subject doubts the value of what political economy has done in the past; but, on the other hand, a great deal of the best thought of the time seems to despair of deriving from it any further advantages. Nor is the ground of this difference of view far to seek. The great work which economic science has done has been almost entirely destructive—the removal of hindrances to the free development of industry, proving that *laissez-faire* ought to be the rule, and ought to be modified only when the advantages of Government interference are clearly demonstrated. The work that has lately been demanded of it is constructive—to solve the problem of wages and adjust the relations between capital and labour, or to settle the land question and deprive farmers of every legitimate cause for grumbling. And because it can give no equally decisive answer to these vastly more difficult questions, and indeed does not hope ever to do more than furnish a portion of the data upon which social problems will have to be decided, there is a growing feeling that a purely economic science is now barren, if not obstructive, and that it should resign in favour of a more competent successor.

This successor is, of course, some form or other of sociology,

a science which conveniently includes the whole study of man as a social being. The limitations which political economy assumes, and which render its problems manageable, and give a decided neatness, but also a certain air of unreality, to their solution, are here laid aside. The social state is studied in its entirety, and this must be done on the field where all the forces involved can be seen in action, viz., the field of history. It is the historical method of study to which we are told we must look for the solution of the various questions of social well-being.

Now, seeing what great minds have been and are engaged in the development of sociology, it would indeed be foolish to disparage it; nor would there be the slightest temptation to do so, were it not for the persistent attempt on the part of some of its devotees to disparage political economy. It is aggravating to see a science which certainly has done great things, perpetually snubbed by another whose glories lie wholly in the future; and in vindicating the position of the former, one is naturally inclined to draw invidious comparisons in regard to actual achievements. It is quite evident, however, that any real contest as to the respective merits of these rival studies will ultimately be decided by the test of fruitfulness, and to this test we may be well content to leave the matter. In the mean time, it will not, we think, be difficult to shew, (1) that by a natural and legitimate development, by the further application of its present principles and extension of the method hitherto employed, political economy has every prospect of being able to furnish invaluable data toward the complete solution of many an urgent question of the day; and (2) that there still exists important work which can be best done by the science as at present constituted.

What political economy is, and what is the method by which it has hitherto advanced, has been shewn in the most masterly manner by the late Professor Cairnes.* It is the science of wealth, and Cairnes speaks emphatically on the importance of

* The Character and Logical Method of Political Economy.

treating it as a science, not as an art; i.e. its immediate aim must be to discover truth, not to lay down rules for practice. This of itself would do much to disarm prejudice, and dispel the notion that political economy can be opposed to the interests of one particular class, or can take sides in any industrial strife. It preserves a scientific neutrality, and simply helps both sides to learn what is the truth. But though it is a science, Professor Cairnes altogether denies that it is amenable either to induction or to mathematical reasoning, and asks to be shewn a single economic truth which has been discovered by either of these methods. It rather resembles what J. S. Mill calls the concrete deductive sciences, having, however, its own peculiar characteristics. It postulates (1) certain facts and laws of external nature which have been proved by science or may be ascertained by ordinary observation, and (2) certain mental propensities which are known to be widely prevalent. As an example of the former class of facts, we may take the diminishing fertility of soil; i.e. the fact that, after just the first, an increase in the labour devoted to cultivating a particular piece of land will not produce a corresponding increase in the crop. As an example of the latter class, we may take the desire to acquire wealth at the least possible sacrifice. For each problem it has to investigate, political economy selects certain data, and then, *leaving all other considerations out of view*, it calculates the result, i.e. reasons deductively what would be the effect produced by these physical facts and mental propensities if they had free play, with nothing to hinder or supplement their action. This one assumption involved in supposing the isolation of the selected causes is the only hypothesis admitted. The data are always known facts, and in this respect it is distinguished from many of the physical sciences, such as physical optics, which is founded on the undulatory theory of light, or chemistry when it bases its reasonings upon some hypothesis about atoms. If, then, the reasoning, which is generally tolerably simple, be correct, the conclusions are sure to be true, subject to the hypothetical limitation just mentioned. They tell us of tendencies rather than of laws—

inform us that certain causes known to be at work will produce certain results, unless their action is modified by the co-operation of causes which have not been taken into account. Of course the value of the conclusions depends entirely upon the judicious selection of data; they will approximate to the actual state of things in proportion to the completeness and accuracy with which all the essential causes are apprehended and estimated. Hence the importance of verification and the use of statistics. If the tendency of the causes already taken into account is to produce a state of things different from the reality, this must be because some important co-operating influence has been overlooked, and the conclusion, though theoretically true, is practically valueless. The terms of the problem must therefore be altered; search must be made for the missing cause, care being taken that only a *vera causa* is admitted. Probably it will not be far to seek, being readily suggested by the facts ascertained in the verification; and the amended problem, with its new conclusion, will be available for application to the future. This, according to Cairnes, is the method by which all great economic discoveries have actually been made, and by which further investigation should be conducted. It is a method which accounts for the whole past development of the science, and readily enables one to understand how political economy seems so easy and is so difficult a subject; propounding alternately obvious truisms and startling paradoxes; compelling its students to admit its conclusions, but constantly leaving them with the feeling that there is something more to be said; tempting inquirers of every variety of mental calibre to publish their lucubrations, but allowing only the gifted few to contribute anything that is at once new and important. Probably nearly every affirmative proposition stated with ordinary care is true in the sense intended by its author, and indicates the tendency of real causes; but unless the selection and estimation of the data are done with the utmost judgment, the conclusions will be of little or no practical value.

This seems at first sight a somewhat rough and ready way of dealing with economic phenomena, and perhaps appears

more superficial than it really is. A method which has led us to truths which have established free-trade and discovered the true theory of rent, which has enabled us to see that the only legitimate way to encourage population is to increase the means of subsistence, and has proved that moral means alone can permanently improve the economic position of our race, shewing that material prosperity will only be temporary unless accompanied by moral advance—to quote a few of the more important of economic commonplaces—such a method is not to be despised or readily abandoned. But it is quite obvious that it admits of indefinite development in two directions: first, as regards the accuracy of calculation in the required deductive reasoning; and, secondly, as regards more and more completeness in admitting all the causes which co-operate in actual history to produce economic results.

The "Theory of Political Economy," of which Professor Stanley Jevons has just published a second edition, may be taken to represent the extreme limit of the former of these two lines of development. Professor Jevons believes that economics—to borrow the convenient term he wishes to substitute for the usual dual appellation — ought to be treated mathematically. He thinks it possible to assign quantitative relations to the most important economic data, and assuming that this may be done, he develops with great ingenuity the various formulæ which would become applicable in each case. If we accept the problems in the form in which he puts them, it may be at once granted that these various formulæ do correctly represent the facts of the case, and that they would only have to be worked out in accordance with well-known mathematical rules to give the required solution. Whether any errors in details exist in any of the more complicated theorems, and some are fearfully and wonderfully evolved, is a point which must be judged by those who possess more mathematical knowledge than is laid claim to here. But however this may be, it cannot be doubted that a great many ordinary economic propositions can be correctly expressed by algebraic symbols, and that this is simply putting in language of the

utmost clearness and precision, truths which are usually expressed in a rougher and less definite form. Economists are perpetually dealing with quantities, and arguing about them in a way which is really calculation of magnitudes of one or more dimensions; only these calculations are usually left in the rough, and resemble the rule-of-thumb reasoning of a practical workman, not the accurate estimate of the student. It must tend to clearness of thought on economic subjects to have the ideal type of this reasoning distinctly shewn; and the special attention Professor Jevons has had to pay to many of his fundamental conceptions, e.g. that of Utility, should have a permanent effect on all future treatment of the science. Moreover, Mr. Jevons has given us not only algebraic formulæ, but also diagrams where lengths and areas admirably represent economic facts, and "curves" are employed with striking effect to illustrate the gradual diminution or other variation of some economic quantity. The value of these pictorial representations we estimate very highly, and should gladly see them transferred to the pages of the ordinary manuals. The theory of Rent is perhaps the one which lends itself best to this kind of illustration, but both the theory of Exchange and that of Labour will be made far clearer to many minds by Mr. Jevons' ably-planned diagrams.

All this may be freely and thankfully admitted, but it will not nearly content Mr. Jevons. He thinks, indeed, that English economists have been living for some time in "a fool's paradise," whither they have been guided by "that able but wrong-headed man, David Ricardo," and "his equally able and wrong-headed admirer, John Stuart Mill." We shall be glad enough to learn of a better way, and are by no means disposed to regard our present position as a paradise, whether of fools or wise men; but is the new method proposed by Professor Jevons likely to lead to happier results? We fear not, and are a good deal surprised that he should have published this second edition without directly replying to the trenchant criticism passed by Cairnes and others upon the first. Mathematical formulæ and diagrams can illustrate economic truths that

have been already ascertained; they are impotent to discover new truth. They can effectively represent the general statement of a theory; they cannot solve the problem of its specific application to any practical case. And the reason is simply this: it is impossible to assign quantitative relations to the most important economic data. Statistics may give you some approximation to this for events that have already taken place; you can never ascertain it in time to predict the future. Take, e.g., what has been termed "the most fundamental fact in political economy," the diminishing fertility of the soil; how could that possibly be ascertained beforehand? The Royal Commission will doubtless learn all they can about it, for the investment of fresh capital in agriculture is just now a question of primary importance; but who supposes that they will supply information resembling the data upon which astronomical calculations are based? Or take what is certainly Mr. Jevons' fundamental conception, that of Utility, according to which the value we attach to any commodity diminishes proportionately with the amount we possess of it; how would it be possible to estimate this ratio, either for individuals or larger masses of men, with the accuracy required for mathematical calculation? This criticism can really be met only by doing the thing which is said to be impossible. It is just the problem of which it will have to be said, *solvitur ambulando*, if it is ever solved at all. And to labour at it will need a good deal of faith in the method.

We might raise minor objections to Professor Jevons' theory, such, e.g., as are suggested by his adoption of Jeremy Bentham's *dictum* that "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters—*pain* and *pleasure*," and the extreme utilitarianism based upon this supposed fact. But we will only point out how entirely this whole way of dealing with the subject is opposed to the general drift of thought and feeling on economic questions. People are getting more and more impatient with the artificial limitations required for the adoption of the deductive method in any form, and specially stringent where mathematical formulæ are to be employed.

They want to get as close as possible to particular cases and actual facts, and care less and less for general propositions, which, however undeniably correct in the abstract, cannot be applied to the actual state of things except under limitations which deprive them of all living interest.

We are more hopeful of results from the second line of development, that which continually aims at closer approximation to the actual condition of things, by admitting among the data more and more of the causes which co-operate in nature. This may seem like an admission that economic should, after all, give place to social science, but it is really nothing of the kind. We would start from the well-established propositions of the ordinary orthodox kind, and still pursue the same method of deductive reasoning and hypothetical exclusion of all but definitely selected economic data.* We would appeal to history and statistics only for purposes of verification and suggestion as to the inclusion of new data. The adoption of this course has led to a steady development of the science under the hands of Adam Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, J. S. Mill and Cairnes. These men stand in a definite line of succession, each one using his predecessor's conclusions as his own starting-point, and pursuing essentially the same method of inquiry, but continually able to improve the statement of old conclusions, as well as to reach new ones of great practical value. These conclusions are being perpetually quoted and acted upon in the House of Commons and Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture, and control the tone of every leading journal† in the country. What is more probable than

* The reason for confining the data to those that are purely economic, is, that you then have a practical system of classification, and that your phenomena would require to be classified differently if you admitted other social facts. Farmers and their landlords, e. g., are generally classed together as the agricultural interest as opposed to the manufacturing; for economic purposes it is generally necessary to arrange farmers and manufacturers in the class of capitalists, or employers of labour, and landlords in the totally distinct class of owners of monopolies.

† It is worth noting how confidently the *Economist* could prophesy in 1873 that the inflation in the price of coal would be only temporary, because it was due to a mere excess in the market demand for an indispensable commodity, not to an increase in the cost of production.

that they only need a further revision and adaptation to the changes of the last twenty years to be still able to afford us guidance of the highest practical value?

Take, as an instance, the well-known economic maxim, that "a demand for commodities is not a demand for labour, and does not determine either the number of labourers to be employed or the amount of their remuneration, but only the direction in which their industry shall be exerted." Nothing is more certainly true than this maxim as properly understood; it has been proved over and over again, both by direct reasoning, and indirectly by the contradictions and absurdities which flow from a contrary supposition. But cannot something more be done to relieve the paradox it presents—a paradox specially obtrusive at the present day? For a long period we have been suffering from a severe depression in trade, and in every important industry wages are down and men out of work. Yet all along there has been an abundance of capital, both fixed and free. Expensive machinery is standing idle, bankers are only too glad of satisfactory opportunities for lending the wealth committed to their charge. The one thing wanting seems the demand for commodities. There has been a great falling off in the demand for the goods which England has special facilities for producing—notably in the cotton and iron trades. This falling off can be traced to various causes, among which two are prominent—poverty, the result of famines, wars, wasteful expenditure, &c., among some of our foreign customers, and the adoption of protective tariffs by others. The decline in one trade has affected another; and now it seems as if there was hardly an industry in the country in which an increased demand for commodities would not have as its direct result an increase in the general demand for labour. We have been accustomed to hear from economists that a falling-off such as has taken place cannot injure (except temporarily) the position of the labourer if only the amount of capital remains undiminished. If people won't buy what he has been accustomed to produce, he can set to work to produce something else—in the last resort, the things which he wants for himself—if only the capital exists to aid and support

him till the product is ready for consumption. Well, there has been no lack of capital available for any form of investment, but it has shewn no tendency in this country to devote itself to the production of labourers' necessaries. We are importing food more largely and cheaply than ever, and seem on the very eve of an extensive change of arable land into pasture. It is evident that some important data have been omitted from the problem. Hardly enough attention seems to have been paid to the enormous amount of loss and discomfort involved in anything like a change in the direction of a nation's industry; a generation or two of "hard times" may perhaps be endured rather than encounter the greater hardships of such an alteration. But there is something which lies deeper than this. As compared with a large part of the rest of the world, England has great advantages for manufacture, and lies under corresponding disadvantages for agriculture. Even if North America surpasses us in facilities for some branches of manufacture, it surpasses us to a still greater degree in facilities for raising wheat, bacon, and most other agricultural products. Under these circumstances, it is to the economic interest of both countries that we should largely import food from America, sending it manufactured goods in return, and for this purpose a great deal of our capital has been invested and our labour trained. If now a protective tariff shuts us out from our natural market, i.e. the market for which nature renders our industry most productive, we cannot make the change and devote our capital and labour to fields where our industry is less productive without suffering a loss in the reward of industry. There will be less to divide as wages and profits, and the only way in which the old scale can be kept up is for capital and labour to emigrate together to lands where nature will give them more assistance. When the "demand for commodities" becomes a question of international trade, and the free interchange of commodities is hindered by hostile tariffs, emigration is the remedy which must take the place of the mere change of employment which may suffice to meet the fluctuations of fashion.

No doubt there is ample room on English soil for the em-

ployment of all our spare capital and labour; the question is, what will pay? This is what the Royal Commission is to try and find out. There is some evidence to shew that high farming still does pay and need not fear foreign competition, and that facilities and security, such as legislation can afford, for the investment of capital, together with increased intelligence and willingness to adopt improved methods, are the things needed to ensure a satisfactory return on the investment. The next thirty years may very probably see a vast extension in the amount of capital fixed for agricultural production, and a corresponding extension in the home trade generally, and all this will involve a steady, healthy demand for labour here, subject, for the most part, only to fluctuations for which we ourselves are responsible. But we may be quite sure that a very large proportion of English capital and labour will always continue to be devoted to the manufacture of goods for export, and here the foreign demand for our goods—a demand liable to be affected by a hundred causes over which we have no control, and where we can often exercise little foresight—will be the immediate regulator of the demand for home labour, and if it permanently declines, no satisfactory remedy will be found except in the joint emigration of capital and labour to newer and more fertile countries.

These limitations to the economic maxim we are considering, are just indicated in J. S. Mill's Principles of Political Economy,* but very little attention is paid to them. He admits that a demand for commodities is a demand for labour when the labourers are already supported but not fully employed. Well, that is exactly the condition at present of a very large proportion of the labourers in the country. He also admits that an increased demand for commodities, by rendering possible increased division of labour and more efficient production, will increase the demand for labour. Extend this principle to international trade, and you get the results already shewn; but this extension of the theory, all-important to

* Book i. chap. v. § 9.

English interests, we do not remember to have seen made in any standard economic work. Cairnes, however, just alludes to the possibility that a transference of the demand for the commodities produced by one country to those produced by another, might lead to a permanent fall in the wages of the former, and corresponding rise in those of the latter, without there being either gain or loss to the world generally. But even this hardly meets the whole of the present condition, regarding it as mainly due to the poverty caused by famine and waste, and the perversity which shews itself in Protection. The two cases which he investigates at length are, (1) where, aggregate expenditure remaining the same, a change takes place in the direction of the demand; and (2) where aggregate expenditure, and therefore the aggregate demand for commodities, undergoes increase. Had he lived a few years longer, he would doubtless have expounded, with equal lucidity, the third case of the aggregate demand for commodities undergoing decrease.

The practical value of a thorough investigation of the connection between the demand for commodities and the demand for labour, especially in times of depression, would be apparent whenever a dispute arose between capitalists and their employés. Take, for instance, the strike in the Blackburn cotton district in 1878. This was preceded by several attempts at amicable settlement, and the men were all along willing to submit to arbitration. Both sides agreed that business was being carried on at a loss, and that wages must come down; but the men wanted this reduction to be accompanied by short time, the employers insisted that it should not, and many of them were running over-time, both legally and illegally. In other words, the point in dispute was, whether the depression was to be met by lessening or by cheapening production, by producing only for those who could afford the old prices, more or less, or by producing so cheaply as to tempt poverty-stricken customers, and to force a way over the top of high protective tariffs. The right decision obviously depended largely on the question of foreign competition, how far this was a reality or

a bugbear; and the actual facts, complicated by the depression in the United States and the sales here of their bankrupt stocks, were very difficult to ascertain. There was a good deal of able writing on either side, but no one appeared who could speak with real authority or fully demonstrate his case; and as the employers resolutely refused either compromise or arbitration, a strike, accompanied by much bitterness of feeling, was the natural result.* After it was over, Professor Bonamy Price was sent for to inaugurate a course of lectures on Political Economy at Blackburn; but the occasion can hardly have been a favourable one to get the ear of working men, to whom alone he spoke. They had been willing to argue their cause and leave it to be decided by an impartial umpire; they were not likely to care much for lectures sent them by those who had compelled them to try the case by the test of who could starve longest. Earlier in the day, the appearance of a writer of high economic standing, who shewed that he understood not only abstract principles, but the actual circumstances under which they were to be applied, might have had a decisive influence on both sides; at any rate the leaders of the Trades-unions shewed themselves willing enough to listen to reason.

And, be it observed, this dispute, as in the case of a hundred others, was one which should have been decided solely on economic grounds, or where, at any rate, the consideration of any extra-economic facts could very well have been deferred until far more influential questions had been settled. As a rule, the more subsidiary influences are introduced into trade disputes, the more difficult they are to arrange. Commercial men understand this well enough among themselves. They say, "business is business;" they expect those with whom they have dealings to look sharp after their own interest; they will bargain as goodhumouredly as possible in regard to a rise or fall: and these very same men will often regard any attempt on the part of their workpeople to bargain with them as a kind of insult, and insist on carrying into their business relations semi-

* Exactly the same point is still in dispute throughout the whole cotton district.

feudal feelings of social position. This no doubt has its bright side, as when an employer runs his mill at a loss out of pure benevolence; but commercial men, too, often shew great kindness to one of their own number when in distress; and the frank recognition of the purely economic basis of a relation need not prevent the subsequent adornment of that relation by all the graces of Christian charity.

Another subject which sorely needs more thorough investigation and popular elucidation is that connected with the Wages-fund theory, especially as a weary mass of misconception and prejudice has gathered around a very simple and, when the limitations to it are properly understood, very useful doctrine. This theory may often have been stated in an exaggerated form, and probably it was by J. S. Mill. It was then keenly assailed by Mr. Thornton, who achieved the remarkable triumph of converting Mill to his own views. Cairnes, however, re-stated the theory in more careful terms, and it is only his statement of it that need ever be considered now. After a silence of some years, Mr. Thornton returns to the charge in the August number of the *Nineteenth Century*. Unfortunately, the long interval that has elapsed has not sufficed to enable Mr. Thornton to understand the position he is attacking. He is convinced that there is really very little difference of opinion between Cairnes and himself, that the former was nearly as much converted as Mill was, and proceeds to prove this by giving an abstract of the argument in Cairnes' "Leading Principles." The result looks very effective in the Review, but the reader who turns to see what Cairnes says for himself will find, hardly without astonishment, that the abstract stops short in the midst of the argument, just at the point where an essential principle involved is about to be explained. This method of controversy will not tend to clear the subject from the prevailing clouds of misconception.

The theory attempts to ascertain the causes which determine the average rate of wages in the country, keeping this inquiry quite distinct from an examination why wages are

higher in some employments and lower in others. The Wages-fund is simply the whole amount spent in wages in a given time, and the average rate is, of course, this amount divided by the number of those among whom it is shared. There can be no doubt that this average rate varies according to circumstances. Can these circumstances be ascertained; can they be modified; and, if so, in what way? These are the questions the theory proposes to answer. The Wages-fund partly consists of wealth devoted to the direct payment of soldiers, domestic servants and other non-productive labourers; but as this portion of it has only a remote connection with industrial interests, it need not for the present be considered. The rest of the Wages-fund consists of a certain portion of the whole of a country's capital, which may be divided into Machinery, Raw Material and Wages-fund. The Wages-fund, therefore, stands in a certain proportion to the whole capital, and, unless the whole capital is increased, cannot itself increase without this proportion being altered. The total amount of capital is governed by two well-known causes, viz., the prospect of profit, and the effective desire of accumulation, causes which are evidently beyond the power of Trades-unions to influence, save when injudicious action on their part damages the workmen's own cause. But can Trades-unions alter the proportion which the Wages-fund bears to the rest of a nation's capital? Very slightly, if at all, says Cairnes. It is almost entirely determined by the nature of the national industries. The employment of labour is only an incident in the investment of capital; and while there is nothing to absolutely compel a capitalist to employ so many men upon so much land or machinery, there is a certain proportion at which the combination is most profitable, and to this proportion things will irresistibly tend in the long run. Still this does not settle the whole matter, as may be seen from the following example. A capitalist has to invest, say, £10,000, and spends £5000 in machinery and raw material, and £5000 in paying 100 men £50 apiece. But now suppose the current rate of wages was £40; he would then have £1000 still to spend; what will he do

with this? Taking the man as typical of capitalists generally, we may safely infer that he will want to invest it in his own business. He will require additional men and machinery in the same proportion as before, and his capital will be invested, taking round numbers, thus:

| | |
|---|---|
| Fixed capital and raw material ..... | £5,550 |
| Wages (110 men at £40)..... | 4,450 |
| Total..... | £10,000 |

Similarly the current rate of wages might have been £60, and the capital would then have had to be invested as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Fixed capital and raw material ..... | £4,550 |
| Wages (90 men at £60), nearly ..... | 5,450 |
| Total..... | £10,000 |

The Wages-fund, therefore, under these circumstances, would vary from 44 to 54 per cent. of the whole investment; what would regulate this variation? It is at this point, by the way, that Mr. Thornton's abstract of Cairnes' argument ceases, leaving the reader to suppose that the latter has no more to say. Cairnes, however, goes on—taking express care to guard against misunderstanding—to point out that the controlling factor is now the supply of labour,* and he thus concludes: "The modifying circumstance, therefore, in the case, though indicated by the rate of wages, is really the supply of labour; and our analysis accordingly issues in the following conditions as the determining causes of the Wages-fund, viz., the total capital of the country (determined in the manner already explained), the nature of the national industries, and the supply of labour,—

* This position is more fully developed further on, p. 219. If the employer forced wages down from £50 to £40, how could he possibly get the extra ten men he would then want unless there was already a supply of skilled labour seeking employment—a state of things in which no strike can keep up wages? If, on the other hand, he has to bid against other capitalists for the purpose of taking away the labour which they also want, this can only be done by offering higher than the current rate of wages. Taking capitalists as a class, more labour certainly would be wanted if wages were forced down below their natural level, for this would mean that abnormally high profits were being made in that particular trade.

facts at once distinct and entirely independent of the subject of our investigation." Had Mr. Thornton really read this sentence when he wrote his article for the *Nineteenth Century?*

The Wages-fund theory, as thus explained, has only an indirect bearing on the merits or probabilities of success in any particular case of industrial warfare, but it might help to shew the leaders of the working classes what it is most important they should understand, viz., what are the limits of abstract possibility open to them, and what is the actual tendency of some of the huge forces which they set in motion, and of others to which they must needs submit. By judicious action, Trades-unions can undoubtedly hasten a rise in wages which other causes tend to bring about, and delay a similar tendency to a fall. They place workmen in a position to strike fair commercial bargains with their employers, and prevent the social inequality or the pressing need for immediate bread from exercising a paramount influence over the transaction. These advantages are probably a sufficient justification for the existence of these Unions, and, at any rate, shew how desirable it is that, since they do exist, they should be large, of long standing, well-organized, and wealthy, i.e. under the ablest management obtainable, in a position to learn by past experience, and with a good deal to lose by injudicious action. Under such conditions, we may trust to the good sense of the British workman to discover before long how impracticable are some of the projects now held up before him, and to distinguish those which are purely visionary from others which are fairly within his reach.

Nor must it be supposed that the more rudimentary economic truths have accomplished their whole mission in revealing their existence to statesmen and other enlightened people. The political impossibility of returning to a protective tariff does not mean that every one understands free-trade. The other day we met an intelligent Lancashire business man, who was quite convinced that free-trade must be bad for other countries *because* it was good for our own. More actual injury is being perpetually done by the fallacy, everywhere to be met

with, of "making work," the notion that labourers want work, whereas they really want wages—a notion which accounts for a great deal of the slovenliness and unwillingness to adopt more efficient methods, wherein we contrast so unfavourably with the United States. The most elementary study of political economy should for ever dispel this fallacy, and implant a radically different notion in regard to the whole subject of wealth. All industrial enterprize will be seen to be a sort of barter between man and nature, in which man sacrifices ease, leisure and present enjoyment for the sake of receiving from nature a reward which ultimately consists of the same things, ease, leisure and enjoyment. It will be seen that production must precede distribution, and that to render production efficient an immense amount of harmonious co-operation is required; that the interests of capitalist and labourer are identical in making production as large as possible, and become opposed only upon the subsequent question of dividing the reward, so that it is fatal to the interests of both to let disputes about the division interfere with efficient production. Can these truths, simple as A B C when viewed on a sufficiently large scale and apart from the obscuring medium of monetary transactions, be so taught to the working classes as to influence their daily conduct? We believe they can, if sufficient patience is shewn, and you begin with the younger members; and this opinion is founded upon experience gained in teaching the subject to a class in a Sunday-school, and examining a large number of answers to questions set to similar classes. Where proper pains are taken to start right, and to impart clear definitions of such terms as Wealth, Capital and Production, the leading principles of political economy may soon be made intelligible to very ordinary intellects; and though the precise application of these principles to any actual case is always attended with difficulty, an approximate solution to the problem is sure to be ready to hand and enticing; and it would be no slight thing if the conduct of all men were controlled, in however rough and ready a manner, by sound economic principles. Teachers will probably find the Science Primer by Stanley Jevons the

best introductory work on the subject, though we strongly recommend them to supplement some of its statements by a study of Mill and Cairnes, and they may derive much assistance from Mrs. Fawcett's volume of Tales. We would gladly have spoken more of this last work if space permitted, for it illustrates a wonderful amount of truth in a very small compass, and never at the sacrifice of clearness or precision. It is, however, perfectly competent to speak for itself, and for this purpose we cordially commend it to our readers.

To sum up, then, it would seem as if there were now a fine field for economic inquirers, who will begin by thoroughly mastering the established principles of the science, and then ascertain how far the application of these principles is controlled by causes which hitherto have not been sufficiently considered; and it seems equally evident that a great work remains to be done in popularizing elementary economic truths. These two aims may be well pursued together; for the missing data must be largely sought among the feelings—the aspirations and the grooves, the prejudices and the rays of partial enlightenment—of the great mass of the common people; and, on the other hand, the most efficient way to restore to the subject its former popularity is to bring it into closer connection with facts of daily experience and living interest. Political economy will be studied and valued in proportion as it can help us answer the questions of the day.

HENRY SHAEN SOLLY.

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## IV.—THOMAS ELFORD POYNTING: IN MEMORIAM.

THE name of THOMAS ELFORD POYNTING, and the many pleasant and inspiring associations it brings with it, will not speedily fade away and be forgotten. The stately church at Monton, with its earnest and united congregation, is the visible result of his able and faithful ministry; and the deep reverence

and love with which his memory is cherished in the minds and hearts of both the elders and the children of his flock, will assuredly keep alive for many generations the precious tradition of his high mental and spiritual gifts, and of his priceless work as a friend and pastor. Nor will his fellow-ministers, as they gather at their annual meetings, fail for many a year to regret his absence from their midst, and to speak of him to their younger brethren as one who, in his genial temper, his sincere and unsectarian piety, his eager receptiveness of all new truth, embodied in rich measure that liberal Christian spirit which they pray may long continue to animate their Provincial Assembly. But when we have said that Mr. Poynting was an able, faithful and successful pastor, we have not exhausted the interest that attaches to his memory. Perhaps the most noteworthy feature in his life is the fact that this country parson was an enthusiastic student of Science and Philosophy, and pre-eminently one who found in Science and Philosophy the confirmation and enrichment of his religious faith.

Boscovich and Faraday, his chief teachers in Science, brought him to the conclusion that all Matter is Force: Dr. Martineau, his guide in Philosophy, had previously convinced him that all Force is Will. In Mr. Poynting's mind these two doctrines combined, by a sort of psychical chemistry, as it were, and in their synthesis no little heat and light was evolved. His soul became all aglow with emotional warmth, as the truth came home to him that Nature, whose charms so captivated his mind and whose phenomena he delighted to study, was none other than the living word of God; its essence His volitions; its laws His habits of action; its adaptations the work of His wisdom; its loveliness and beneficence the ever-renewed expression of His Eternal Beauty and His Eternal Love. This insight into the essence of the material world seemed to him to render Religion and Theology quite impregnable to any present or future assaults of scientific scepticism. He accordingly felt no uneasiness or alarm at such utterances as those of Drs. Tyndall and Huxley; for did not the Matter, to which

they attributed so much promise and potency, owe its substance and its qualities to the constant and ever-fresh energizing of the Divine Mind? Assuredly, then, wherever Matter was, there was the Creative Spirit, and in that Creative Spirit was potentially present all of life, beauty and intelligence that has been or will be progressively evolved. Believing that the doctrine that Matter is only the phenomenal form of Spiritual Energy must at last commend itself to every reflective mind, and that under its influence the foundations of Materialistic Atheism would be removed, he felt it to be his special privilege and mission to present and illustrate this idea.

To the wonderful transfiguring influence which the attainment of this view of Nature exercised over his inner life, his writings and his conversation bore repeated testimony. In the novel called *Norton Purnell*, which appeared in the *Quiver* in 1865, it is evident that Mr. Poynting, in depicting his hero's mental history, is drawing largely from his own personal experience. Norton Purnell, an enthusiastic lover of nature and an earnest social reformer full of schemes for the education and moral elevation of the working classes, is overtaken by sudden calamity, and in his distress laments that his study of science has removed God from him, for "the laws of nature are so perfect, so all-pervading, that they seem to leave no *need* for Him, no *room* even for His presence." He unbosoms his trouble to a thoughtful and devout friend, who assures him that a great mistake lurks in this word "Law," for that really the laws of nature are the Habits of Action of the indwelling God. Norton ponders over this new idea, and at length grasps it in its full significance.

"'It is so,' he cried one morning in ecstasy. 'Eureka! I have found it! The last difficulty is gone. There is no law of nature, except the law of God's living action. God is *here!* by my side and dwelling in me. Father of life, I have found Thee.' It was a grand day, that, in the history of Norton; a day of unspeakable awe and worship. He felt just as the young patriarch may have felt, when he awoke feeling heaven around him, and said, 'How awful is this place! this is none other than the house of God, and

this is the gate of heaven.' Now he could pray—words of heartfelt earnest prayer—as he had never prayed before. Oh, the great and solemn thoughts that seemed to roll through his soul as to the meaning of the world and the destiny of man! For him the world was quite transfigured. It was a new creation. There was a new heaven and a new earth. The universe was filled, to his imagination, with an unspeakable light. The solid earth, the fields, the hills, had become, as it were, transfigured, glowing with an inner life."

As the main object of the present paper is to attempt some picture of our friend's most characteristic philosophical opinions, we can devote but very little space to the sketch of his outward life or to the study of his character. Fortunately this is little to be regretted, for the obituary notice in the *Inquirer* of March 9th, 1878, gives a full and accurate biography, and portrays with truth and delicacy the more striking qualities of his mind and heart. As the writer of that notice truly says, "it must not be supposed that Mr. Poynting's work was purely and simply ministerial." To acquire knowledge and to impart his mental gains to others, was the work in which his soul specially delighted; and with him, teaching and preaching were but different stages of the same divine vocation. To his pupils he unfolded (often with much originality of method) the truths of science, language and theology; to his congregation he discoursed of the sacred duty of obedience to physical and moral laws, and then again he taught them to regard these laws as but the living voice of the Eternal; while either by direct exposition or by some beautiful allegory, he awakened in their souls the inspiring sense of personal contact with that invisible and self-subsisting Mind, whose presence, spiritually discerned, so often flooded his own inner life with quite rapturous emotion. We would fain say a word or two descriptive of the fine tone and temper of his mind; and the following sentences, written by one who most intimately knew him, so well depict our own impression, that we are glad to be permitted to transfer them to these pages:

"In an article on Mr. Poynting," writes the Rev. George Beau-

mont, "you ought to say something of the perpetual freshness of his mind and affections, of his passionate love for knowledge and truth of all kinds and in every direction, of his sympathy with every form of intellectual doubt and difficulty, and of that high attainment of Christian charity, which made him a perfect gentleman in all his thoughts and ways, which restrained his tongue from every unkind and painful word, and which filled his heart and life with consideration and love for all men. He had a feeling which seldom found formal expression, but which would sometimes get utterance in the closer confidences of friendship, and which he has expressed to me many a time in letters and in words, that he had a *mission*, a prophetic function in the exposition and diffusion of his spiritual philosophy. Of this sentiment few were aware, though most of his friends were cognizant of his delight in unfolding his views, and of his continuous toil in working them out."

Let us now allow ourselves a rapid glance over his career as a learner and teacher. At the age of twenty we find him employed as clerk to a solicitor in Bath, and even at that time managing to give instruction in Latin, French and Mathematics, before and after office hours. Soon after, he became the master of a school, and also "one of the most active members of a class of young men, formed for the study of botany, geology and zoology." From Bath he passed to Flowery Field, to take charge of the late Mr. Ashton's school, he teaching the boys, and Mrs. Poynting the girls. Here also he gathered a class of young people about him for the purpose of study in special branches of science, among which chemistry was now included. That his own higher intellectual culture had not meanwhile been neglected, is shewn by the fact that two or three years later (at the age of thirty) he passed the senior examination of Manchester New College, and entered upon the Divinity course. At college his intellectual and spiritual life received a powerful impulse and a new direction. We have already mentioned and shall presently recur to the central philosophical idea which he owed to Dr. Martineau's influence, and that will afford us occasion to advert to the chief difference between Mr. Poynting's later views and those of his beloved and revered master in

philosophy and theology. After a successful course at college, he began, towards the end of 1845, to preach as an assistant to the Rev. Robert Smethurst, after whose death in 1846 he was appointed his successor in the old Presbyterian chapel in Monton Green. "Here, after his wanderings," to quote again the words of his friend and biographer, "he found a resting-place, from which nothing could ever induce him to remove. As year by year rolled on, he found himself ever in closer bonds of sympathy with his people. The trust under which the chapel was placed, being simply 'For the worship of Almighty God by Protestant Dissenters,' gave him all the liberty of expression which he desired; and the reverence and tenderness with which he treated even the opinions he had discarded, always secured a patient, if not at once a welcome hearing for the newer views which he felt it his duty to uphold."

Side by side with the performance of his ministerial duties, he gave much of his time to various branches of study, as well as to private teaching, and in 1853 he published "The Temple of Education," a treatise covering the whole ground of physical and mental science, and indicating what he conceived to be the most efficient methods of imparting to young pupils the rudiments of a sound and comprehensive culture. Though the aim of this book is too ambitious, and the form of it somewhat fantastic, the practical educationist may still cull from it many useful hints; and the chapter in which the author forcibly and eloquently insists on the claim of Theology to be treated as an indispensable factor in a healthy and complete education, has much present interest and value as a seasonable condemnation of the now prevailing sentiment and practice.

During the seven years that elapsed between the publication of this book and that of the "Glimpses of the Heaven that lies about us," Mr. Poynting combined with those philosophical studies which he had commenced under Dr. Martineau's guidance, an eager attention to the discoveries and theories of the great masters in physical science, especially of those who, like Faraday, Ampère, Joule and Grove, experimented and speculated concerning Force; for out of the study of this mysterious

something, imperceptible by the bodily senses yet indispensable to both ordinary and scientific thought, Mr. Poynting felt assuredly that the true reconciliation of Science and Religion would ultimately emerge. The doctrine of the Correlation of Forces, in alleging that the various forms of energy are but the metamorphoses of one Protean essence, gave scientific support to the philosophical doctrine adopted from Dr. Martineau, that all Force must be regarded as the volitional activity of one all-pervading Divine Mind. Thus Science and Philosophy seemed to concur in shewing that Nature, on its dynamic side at least, owes its being to the energy of Mind or Spirit; but could Science and Philosophy carry their unifying work still further, could they get rid altogether of the popular notion of Matter as the seat and vehicle of Force, and, by representing the supposed solid nucleus of each chemical atom as simply the centre of lines of Divine Energy converging from an infinite distance, account for all the phenomena of physical science on the simpler hypothesis that Spirit and Space are the only realities? This question Mr. Poynting felt no hesitation in answering in the affirmative, and the grounds of his confidence will be found given at length in the "Glimpses," and more recently and fully in a paper which appeared in this Review (April, 1875), on "Materialism, an Unscientific Habit of Thought." It is to be regretted, we think, that in the former of these writings Mr. Poynting did not confine himself entirely to that prosaic mode of stating his doctrine which he employs in the second part of the work. The allegorical dress in which the theory is presented in the former part of the book, so far from prepossessing the mind by its supernatural and visionary character, rather excites an unjust prejudice against the theory, and leads the hasty reader to suppose that the substance of the doctrine, as well as its form, is more the creature of the author's subjective fancy, than the result of deep philosophical reflection and of careful observation of scientific facts.

It must not be forgotten that in this important discussion as to the essential nature of Matter, Mr. Poynting is supported not only by the example of Dr. Priestley, but also by the high

scientific authority of Michael Faraday. Faraday thought it a tenable hypothesis that the force of gravitation not only pervades but actually *constitutes* Matter, and that, accordingly, the so-called atoms are but centres and spheres of force mutually interpenetrable, and each extending throughout the whole of the physical universe. Force seemed to him to be an Entity residing all along the lines in which it is exerted, and the vibrations of light and radiant heat are but tremors passing along these lines of gravitation. Mr. Poynting, in adopting this view and ingeniously applying it to the explanation of the various physical phenomena, represents it as forced upon our acceptance by the law of Parcimony. It will account, he says, for all the facts, and it violates no law of thought; therefore we are bound to apply to the common notion of the physical universe the sharp edge of Occam's razor, "Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem," and cut away from our idea of the essence of Matter all those qualities which lead us to regard it as a dead, inert substance, having an existence independent of that energy which is supposed to act upon it, dwell within it, and to issue forth from its recesses. With Faraday, the doctrine that Force constitutes Matter was confessedly a speculation; he regarded it in the light of a tenable hypothesis, to be finally tested by its power to explain all natural phenomena. With Mr. Poynting it assumed a higher rank; for he found an *à priori* confirmation of its truth in the logical analysis of our ideas of Matter, Force and Space. United in his mind with the companion doctrine that Force is Will-power, it furnished a cosmogony so satisfactory to his reason, to his poetic impulses, and to his passionate love of Nature, that he could not but feel certain that a view which brought with it such intellectual harmony and such spiritual joy must be the true theory of the material universe,—the theory destined to extinguish irreligious materialism, and to bring Science and Faith into everlasting accord. The exhilaration of his soul as he felt that he had thus thrown off for ever an incubus that had long weighed down his higher life, reminds us of the like cheerful confidence with which Bishop

Berkeley and the late James Hinton announced to the world their similar panaceas for all materialistic ills. It would be an interesting task (but one which cannot be attempted here) to compare the methods by which these three thinkers interpreted Matter as the phenomenal effect of Spiritual Activity. We may remark, however, in passing, that in one important respect Mr. Poynting's view differs from the views of the other two. Though he called himself a Monist, he was, we believe, no Idealist, for he seems to have maintained the objective reality of Space, a feature in his doctrine which, as we shall presently see, is of some theological importance.

These views on Matter and Force, as expounded in the "Glimpses of the Heaven that lies about us," are summarized and critically examined in the second half of Dr. Martineau's article on "Nature and God."* In regard to the characteristic portion of Mr. Poynting's doctrine, Dr. Martineau remarks: "This hypothesis, in its resolution of Matter into Force, bears an essential resemblance to Boscovich's; and, as might be expected, breaks down at the same point,—the attempt to step, with only quantitative help, to the qualitative phenomena of Nature;" that is to say, it affords no explanation why one set of nervous vibrations should be followed by the sensation of sound, another set by the sensation of light, and so on. To this objection Mr. Poynting could give, we think, no other answer than that he never claimed that his Monistic theory of the physical universe would explain the passage from the molecular physics of the nerves and brain to the varied phenomena of sensation. For the solution of this problem he would regard his view and the dualistic view of the outer world as equally incompetent, and would probably say that our sentient nature is so constituted as to respond in modes qualitatively different to nervous vibrations, which, so far as science can analyze them, present only quantitative variations. But it must be carefully borne in mind that the Monistic theory of Nature is by no means vitally bound up with Faraday's doctrine that all Force

* Nat. Rev. Oct. 1860.

is Gravitation, or, indeed, with the doctrine that *all Force is qualitatively the same.* On the dualistic hypothesis, the Divine volitions to which the phenomena of gravitation are ascribed must also be supposed to impart to Matter those peculiar dynamic properties which enable it to produce in our consciousness the various forms of sensation; and, so far as we are able to see, no sound reason can be urged why these different dynamic effects on our minds should not be immediately caused by the varied modes in which the omnipresent energy of God acts upon our sentient nature.* Dr. Martineau further says that if "this spinning machinery of atoms" really goes on, he is not anxious to wrest such things from the men of science and their "secondary laws," in order to claim them for the primary. It is probable, we think, that Mr. Poynting would freely assent to this view, and would admit that in theorizing on the probable mode of God's activity on the outer world, he is labouring entirely within the domain of science. Hence all that he advances respecting converging lines of force in explanation of the phenomena of attraction and repulsion, is only intended to be tentative and provisional. Mr. Poynting was, we suppose, entirely at one with Dr. Martineau in believing that it rests with the *savant* and not with the philosopher to determine the plan which the Divine Mind follows in creating and sustaining the physical world. All that seems essential to Mr. Poynting's main philosophical position is, to shew that the contents of our idea of Matter are fully provided for on the assumption that the external universe is Force acting in Space. In a letter to the present writer, penned a few weeks before his death, after stating his entire adhesion to Dr. Martineau's philosophy of Conscience, Mr. Poynting continues:

"I do not know that I differ from Dr. Martineau on other points except in my conception of the Power which I behold (in thought)

* It may further be remarked that the mystery, to which of late so much attention has been directed, of the interaction of mind and matter, would seem to be in part cleared up, if we could regard matter as a mode of the activity of the Divine Mind, and so consider the human consciousness and the physical objects which it affects and by which it is affected, as similar in their essential nature.

in Physical Nature—the '*noümenon.*' This, which I find in its simplest form in Gravitation, I think of, with Newton and Faraday, not as an abstract quality residing, say, in Sun and Earth, but as an Entity present in all Space. I do not carry my thoughts further to ask if this Entity is *dual.* I know it only by its Power; when I try to think of it, I find I am thinking only of Power (of course, the Power of God). Of this Entity I suppose all material creation to be formed. It has always seemed to me that this conception offers more help to the Theist in meeting Materialism; and in essence it is no more Pantheistic than the Dualistic view. For if Matter is only the passive medium of God's Power, it is the Power after all that is the Cause and Essence of things."

In one of his unpublished writings* he says:

"And if it is objected that we cannot think of power but as inherent in something, I answer, Well, I think of gravity as inhering in the All-pervading Mind just as I think of power as inherent in my mind."

And again:

"Perhaps some will say, I cannot form such a conception. I cannot conceive of Space as being occupied by an invisible, incomprehensible Power. I answer, This is a mistake: you have from your earliest years formed such a conception. When as a child you experienced the resistance of the air, when you ran against it or moved your hand or your stick, or drew your kite swiftly through it, you were obliged to form the conception of something occupying all the space, of which you conceived and of which you knew nothing but that it exerted power against you."

Of the qualities that are held to characterize Body or Matter, its Three-fold Dimension and its Divisibility have reference to

* This and most of the following quotations are from a MS. copy of his Lectures to the students of the Home Missionary Board (of which Institution he was the Theological Tutor during the last three years of his life). From the circumstances under which they were delivered, these Lectures are not in the shape in which Mr. Poynting would have presented them to the public. He intended, had his life been prolonged, to embody the more important arguments in a systematic treatise. The samples we can give in this paper of the teaching in the Lectures will convey a very inadequate idea of its worth. It is to be hoped that these ripest results of Mr. Poynting's thought will in some form be made accessible to the reading world.

the Space which it is supposed to occupy, and its only remaining quality, its Incompressibility, manifestly conveys no other idea than that of Power occupying a certain Space, and so resisting the occupation of that Space by another Power: hence Mr. Poynting's assertion, that "as a simple matter of fact, when we analyze to the utmost our notion of Matter, nothing remains but the notions of Space and Power," is, we incline to think, well grounded. While Mr. Poynting felt himself unable to accept that portion of Dr. Martineau's religious philosophy which represents Matter as eternally objective to the Divine Mind, he recognized, as we have already said, with warmest gratitude the profound truth and the incalculable theological value of Dr. Martineau's demonstration of the identity of Force and Will. "This grand doctrine," he says, "is the Jacob's ladder of our philosophical theology, by which we climb from earth to God."

The criticism of Mr. Poynting's views in the article on "Nature and God," suggests the question how far, if at all, he is justly amenable to the charge of Pantheism. Dr. Martineau thinks that our friend's exposition of God and Nature "is open to the objection which attaches to every scheme of mere Divine self-evolution; it is, or in the mind of consequential thinkers it must become, Pantheistic." The applicability of this stricture to Mr. Poynting's matured philosophical system would appear to depend upon the question whether he did or did not regard Space as *objective* to the creative power of God; for we believe that we are correct in saying that Dr. Martineau, in one of the series of papers in *Old and New*, while still upholding the doctrine of an eternal material datum objective to God, yet allows that the recognition of Space, as the only objective condition of God's activity in nature, is quite compatible with the philosophical requirements of a Theistic creed. In conversations between Mr. Poynting and the writer of this paper, the former distinctly stated that he did regard Space "*as entirely objective to the Divine Will*," and therefore as eternally present with God, though he rather inclined to the opinion that it should be viewed, not as being in any sense outside the sphere of the

Divine Nature, but as forming what we may call the Eternal, Self-subsisting Body of God. We are disposed to think that this view relieves his theory from the charge of Pantheism, so far at least as the conditions of God's activity in Nature are concerned. It must, however, be admitted, that in his eagerness to substantiate the doctrine that God is present *in His physical and spiritual laws*, he has been tempted to ignore the other mode of God's revelation of Himself to His rational creatures, and has sometimes failed to do justice, in language at least and probably in thought also, to the essential Christian idea of free personal communion between the Holy Spirit and the spirit of man. He has ably emphasized the truth that the laws of Matter and of Mind are the habits of action of the Immanent God; but he has not given, we think, sufficient attention to the complementary truth that, both in the human and the Divine personality, "habits" are not the highest or most characteristic feature, and that it is on the power which spirit possesses to transcend habits by the free exercise of an inexhaustible reserve of personal creative energy, that the highest interests of human life, and the vitality and power of all theological belief, essentially depend. From the outline which we have given of our gifted friend's favourite studies and of his mental history, it may be inferred with some probability that Mr. Poynting was a poetic Naturalist first, and a Mental Philosopher and Christian Theist afterwards; that he found God in Nature before he found Him in the Conscience and in spiritual experience. To minds of this type, who begin with the study of Nature and pass on later to the study of Humanity and Theology, the temptation to treat the human spirit as one among other phenomenal products of the creative energy of the Eternal is exceedingly strong; and though Mr. Poynting in the main successfully resisted this tendency, and preserved the human Will from absorption in the Divine Causality, yet, as Dr. Martineau points out, his language, implying the exclusive presence of Divine Law in man's rational and emotional life, seems at times to deprive the human personality of the conditions necessary for the exercise of moral freedom and the

maintenance of true individuality. It would, however, be a great misrepresentation of Mr. Poynting's views to describe him as a Pantheist, in any of the ordinary senses of that word. Indeed, he often distinctly disclaims, as in the following passage from his Lectures, the Pantheistic conception of the universe:

"We must avoid the mistake of that Pantheism which makes God absolute, so as to leave no room for the Individuality and Free-will of man,—and that Pantheism which, in thought at least, tends to hold the All, the Universum which we see, as God; not merely 'God is all,' but the 'All is God.' . . . . We avoid the First Pantheistic mistake by thinking that in all consciousness God, whilst still the living source of the individual life, *makes a sort of semi-separation between Himself and the individual; lets out a part of Himself, as it were, to have an individuality of its own.* To this conception we are driven by the fact, that whilst a necessary belief of our minds makes us put conscious power as the underlying cause of all phenomena, and therefore we live in Him, another equally necessary belief makes us feel that we are free. How the two are reconciled we cannot understand. The reconciliation is beyond our conception, as Sir William Hamilton remarks, because it lies in the world of the unknowable; it lies among the mysteries of God. We can only try to shape some links between the two by which the mind shall steady itself a little in its bewilderment; but after all we must confess that the thing is too high for us: we cannot attain unto it. We avoid the Second Pantheistic error by keeping in mind that the universe that we know is but the Phenomenal manifestation of the Eternal Cause or Being, that He himself fills the Beyond, and must be infinitely more and greater than His manifestation. And, secondly, that it is absurd to think of that Cause as unconscious, which has thought out the universe and made all its objects have thought-relations."

The reader of this quotation may well ask, What, then, did Mr. Poynting mean by terming his religious philosophy, as he often did, the Higher Pantheism? It would appear from portions of the above extract that, notwithstanding Mr. Poynting's ascription of free-will to man, he does not reject the doctrine that all action is finally determined by the Will of God. In

like manner, when treating in another Lecture of the individuality of man, he says:

"How thus resting on God, living and moving and having our being in Him, we are yet individual and have a separate life and consciousness of our own, we cannot understand. We can know only the two facts like the two pillars of an arch. We see only the pillars, the existence in and by God, and the existence in a separate self; but the arch that unites the pillars and bridges the gulf between them is hidden from us away in the unknowable."

We do not know how to define his position more clearly than by saying that he was psychologically Theistic and metaphysically Pantheistic. In his Lectures, however, as well as in his conversations with the present writer, he declined to admit that his views on this subject involved mutual contradictions, adding, "We do not know enough how God exists or how our minds exist for us to see a contradiction, but we cannot see the union; we cannot understand how the one fact is made one with the other." He thus appears to accept, with Mr. J. A. Picton, what the latter calls "the fundamental paradox of mysticism." While our own sympathies are with the Theism of Dr. Martineau and Professor Newman, we must not forget that our friend's doctrine places him in the company of such choice spirits as Saint Augustine, Descartes and Sir Wm. Hamilton. Probably Mr. Poynting's "Higher Pantheism" serves to explain in part the tone of those papers in the *Inquirer* in which he discussed the philosophical worth and theological significance of Dr. Tyndall's celebrated Address, one of which papers elicited from Dr. Tyndall a request to the editor of the *Inquirer* to "express to T. E. P. my cordial acknowledgments for his able and sympathetic article on my Belfast Address, which appeared in the *Inquirer* for Sept. 5th, 1874." By those, however, who have heard or read Mr. Poynting's Tutorial Lectures, the articles in the *Inquirer* will be seen to convey a very inadequate idea of the nature and degree of his dissent from the school of thought in which Drs. Tyndall and Huxley are eminent leaders. It was unfortunate, we think, that in those articles Mr. Poynting singled out the doctrine of the Immanence of God in Nature

as the most important and distinctive theological feature of the Belfast Address. "It is," he says, "the thought of an Almighty Artificer separate from Matter that Science cannot tolerate." There is something, we cannot help thinking, which our recent Evolutionists find it very much more difficult to tolerate than even the idea of God as a Great Artificer, and that is the idea of a God who exerts at any stage in the process of evolution a new phase of energizing, which has no logical or scientific continuity with the previous condition of things. The God to whose present activity appeal is made to explain either in nature or in the soul of man any new phenomenon not otherwise explicable, this is, we believe, the God whom they most vehemently repudiate, and this is precisely the only God whose living presence can explain spiritual experience or satisfy the religious yearnings of the soul. If this be not so, how comes it that now-a-days whenever, in their study of the evolution of the universe, the *savans* in question encounter the first appearance of conscious life, for instance, they never dream of regarding it as an entirely new phenomenon, or of suggesting that it is a fresh and higher manifestation of the creative power of God? No one has ever asserted with more unqualified positiveness than Dr. Tyndall did in 1868, that there is no conceivable scientific passage from molecular physics to states of consciousness; yet rather than allow for an instant that there may be a case of fresh creation here, he and those who think with him prefer to take refuge in the unverifiable and (to us) unintelligible assumption that life is somehow present but *latent* in the inorganic world; that the elements which, when duly blended, form the consciousness of spiritual love or of the pangs of remorse, were already pre-existent in the individual molecules which have been gathered together in the brain; for these molecules must now be supposed to have *internal* as well as external states; and it is the former of these which in their complex combination produce all the forms of human sensation, intellect, emotion and volition. This we believe to be a perfectly fair statement of the kind of Monism that is implied in the Belfast Address, and which has since

been explicitly enounced by the late Professor Clifford, Häckel and others. We have attempted to depict it, not for the purpose of criticism, but simply to let our readers see that, be it true or false, it is unquestionably not the Monism in which Mr. Poynting found so much satisfaction, and has, indeed, no real philosophical or theological affinity with that Monism. In proof of this position, we extract the following passage from our friend's Lectures:

"If the creative Will is ever and has been ever at work throughout all the universe, then it may well be that when He began to form each centre of phenomena, i.e. each atom, He already thought of the organic life which He intended hereafter to be associated with it; that He settled it then as the law by which He would act, that as soon as He had worked out the conditions favourable, He would build these centres of phenomena into groups of protoplasm fit for life, *and then would breathe the life into it.* Can we not conceive that the Creator, thus seeing the end from the beginning, pre-established thus the invariable law or habit of action which He would observe throughout all the countless ages, so that there should never be found a condition favourable for life, and a germ there existing, that He would not from it begin to create additional protoplasm and endow it with life?"

No further quotation is needed, we feel assured, to prove that Mr. Poynting clearly recognized creation *de novo* in the process of Evolution, thus taking the Theistic side in this great controversy, and distinctly violating what appears to us to be at the present time the fundamental article of faith in Evolutionist circles.

One of the most important of the discussions contained in the Lectures turns upon the distinction between two possible forms of Monism, which Mr. Poynting names respectively the Phenomenological and the Ontological, and which in his opinion our *savans* are in the habit of confounding together, with results very disastrous to both Science and Theology. When we are told, for instance, as by Professor Huxley, that conscious life, the property of protoplasm, *results* from the properties of the chemical components of protoplasm, just as the properties of water *result* from the properties of the oxygen

and hydrogen, "we would like to ask these theorists, in what meaning they use these words, and where they conceive themselves to stand. Do they speak as men of Science standing within the world of Phenomena known by observation, or are they going, as I suspect, outside the world of Science and Phenomena into the Beyond—the world of Being, Cause, Substratum, *Noümenon?*" Science, we are told by Prof. Huxley, is limited to the observation of phenomena and the generalization of them under laws, and Matter and Spirit are names for the imaginary substrata of groups of natural phenomena. All, then, that Science proper is entitled to say about water is, that it is an invariable law that when the groups of natural phenomena called oxygen and hydrogen are united with the natural phenomenon an electric spark, there follow the new group of natural phenomena which we call water; and it is entitled to give a precisely parallel report in the case of Protoplasm and its elements.

"This conclusion," continues Mr. Poynting, "I suppose no one denies. But then neither Professor Huxley nor Professor Tyndall need assume an air as if they were going to say something shocking and dreadful, like the fat boy in *Pickwick*, when he says to his mistress, 'I wants to make your flesh creep.' 'What do you think I see in this very arbour last night?' Surely Professor Huxley need not frighten us after accepting these harmless conclusions by these awful words: 'But I bid you beware that in accepting these conclusions you are placing your feet on the first rung of a ladder which in most people's estimation is the reverse of Jacob's, and tends to the Antipodes of Heaven.'"

Mr. Poynting then proceeds to shew that the *savans* who adopt this ominous tone and language have really stepped outside of what they themselves call the legitimate limits of Science, and have entered the Unseen or Ontological region, a region which Professor Huxley elsewhere declares is the world of the absolutely unknowable. Hence they commit an absurdity; they make definite affirmations about that which they have declared utterly inaccessible to human thought, thus "planting themselves on a branch of knowledge, and sawing

it off at the same time!" Their affirmations, put into terms in accordance with their conception of the Unknowable, might be rendered in some such fashion as this: "The *unknown and hypothetical cause*—the imaginary substratum of the groups of phenomena called oxygen, hydrogen, electric spark, is the same *unknown hypothetical cause*—the same imaginary substratum of the group of phenomena called water;" and, *mutatis mutandis*, the same account may be given of the relation of protoplasm to its chemical constituents. "But what an absurd tissue of contradictions is this! It is the new Athanasian Creed for the nineteenth century. The substratum of oxygen is unknown, the substratum of hydrogen is unknown, the substratum of water is unknown, and yet there are not three unknowns but one known. For surely to assert sameness or identity of the substrata is to know a great deal about them, is to know, indeed, quite as much as the superstitious Theist professes to know."

Space does not permit us to follow in detail Mr. Poynting's exposition. He proceeds to point out that if scientific men will press into the sphere of Ontology and make affirmations concerning Substance and Cause (as, indeed, they cannot help doing), they must recognize and use the only faculty which man possesses for the knowledge of these unseen realities, namely, the faculty of Intuition, and using this they will find themselves compelled to interpret their Unknowable as Causal Power, and this, again, as the Energy of an All-pervading and Eternal Mind.

Dr. Tyndall's assertion respecting the wonderful promise and potency present in Matter, suggests to Mr. Poynting another line of reflection and criticism of considerable interest. He emphatically condemns the use of the term "Matter" in the Belfast Address as eminently fitted to mislead most of the hearers. To them the word "Matter" would convey a merely phenomenal meaning, indicative of bodies (made up of exceedingly minute solid atoms) of various colours, sizes and shapes; but this is clearly not what Dr. Tyndall means. He is evidently using the term as a symbol for the ontological substratum which he conceives to underlie the phenomena of both

Matter and Mind. It is really to this invisible Cause and Substance that the promise and potency of all terrestrial life is ascribed.

"To insist, then" (to quote Mr. Poynting's own words), "on calling the Power 'Matter,' is a gratuitous and wrongheaded application of a name, which all the while we must be conscious misrepresents the Reality, and has a tendency to lead the multitude of more superficial thinkers utterly astray. No, say what we will, the final analysis of our thought declares that we *must* think of the great Reality that underlies both matter and mind as Power, i.e. as Mind. The true Monism, then, is not Materialism, but, using Spirit as synonymous with Mind, Spiritualism. And now we see in the light of the Philosophy that consists in reading our laws of thought what Materialism really is. It is the representation of the objects of our thought by that which is given by an intermediate stage rather than by that which is given by the ultimate analysis. By these laws of thought, then, it is pronounced to be illegitimate. In this Monism, which I shall call the Higher Monism, God, the one Eternal Mind and Will, is the substratum of both Matter and Mind."

Dr. Tyndall tells us that in order to enter into his ideas and reasonings, "we must radically change our notion of Matter," to which statement Mr. Poynting appositely replies:

"Exactly so: we must change our notion of Matter till it will equally suit our notion of Mind. For observe, we are not required to change our notion of Mind till it will suit our notion (that is, our ordinary notion) of Matter. For by analysis we have found that the ordinary notion of Matter does not represent the Reality; that Reality is found to be simple Power; and when we try to conceive of Power, say in Gravitation, we find that we are thinking of Mind in one of its states—i.e. Will or Volition."

We must here bring to a close the attempt to give some idea of our friend's contributions to philosophical and theological thought. In the Lectures, from which we have freely quoted, there is clear evidence that his teaching must have been highly stimulating and rich in fertile suggestions. That his religious philosophy had attained perfect self-consistency in its various parts, we are by no means disposed to maintain. His mind had strong natural affinities for that poetic Pan-

theism of which Dr. Tyndall is a brilliant expounder; but the powerful influence of Dr. Martineau's teaching, combined with his own strong ethical intuitions and warm Christian sentiments, always held him back from any real abandonment of the philosophical foundations of his Theistic creed; and as to his Theistic *faith*, that, we need not say, was always conspicuously firm and fervid. Nevertheless, his writings exhibit, we think, occasional traces of futile endeavours to reconcile the irreconcilable, and to extend a common sympathy to philosophical doctrines which seem to us radically antagonistic. This, however, is matter of opinion. Many readers will no doubt recognize in those features of his thought to which we refer indications of the greater catholicity of his philosophical insight and sympathies; nor must it be supposed that we undervalue the real advantage as a thinker which he owed to the unsectarian character of his philosophical and religious views, or that we for a moment doubt that in some important respects, and notably in his theory of the essential nature of Matter, he has done good service to both Science and Theology, and helped to pave the way towards their final reconciliation.

C. B. Upton.

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## V.—COLENSO ON THE PENTATEUCH.

*The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua critically examined.* By the Right Rev. J. W. Colenso, Bishop of Natal. Part VII. London: Longmans. 1879.

At length Bishop Colenso's laborious and searching criticism has reached its legitimate conclusion in the publication of a seventh Part, seventeen years after the first (1862). The work, now that it is completed, is seen to be yet greater in its conception and in the ethical and intellectual character impressed on every portion of it, than in its physical bulk and the multifarious research of which it is the product. To undertake it

at all was probably a grander and more difficult moral resolve than has been encountered by the author of any book of this age; to pursue it to the end, the note of an indomitable perseverance which very few of the most ardent spirits would have maintained in like circumstances. If its inception was beset by countless anticipated dangers, which soon shewed themselves from every possible quarter, and threatened to stifle the book and bury the author under obloquy from which he could never rise again, its completion was rendered difficult and disheartening through the neglect which the later parts encountered. Yet the Bishop steadily worked out his argument, with equal care and elaboration, whether it attracted much or little notice, whether the critics rushed at his volumes to scold and condemn, or let them lie as unworthy their examination. The book thus successfully completed under almost inconceivable difficulties seems to me from these causes one of the grandest achievements of this century; and this it is, quite independently of the value we may attach to many details of the criticism it embodies. No doubt, if its criticism, though honest, were altogether wrong-headed and narrow-minded, it would be impossible to attach so high a moral value to it. But we are happily not left in the position of having merely to respect the honesty but lament the wasted ingenuity of the writer; we can truly say that he has brought light into places that were dark before, has broken down many idols and set up again the true spiritual God, has fearlessly shewn who are His true prophets and spokesmen, and who the babblers who take His name on their lips while their heart is far from Him, has shewn the time and occasion of the most important sayings in the Old Testament, and thereby determined the exact significance and value of each, and thus done much to reconstruct the ancient history of the Hebrews on a firm basis which it lacked before.

Time and occasion determined the form which Bishop Colenso's book was to assume, as well as the nature and arrangements of its arguments. As we survey it in retrospect, we may easily see that the form was not abstractedly the best for the

development of the ideas to be inculcated. Kuenen, who from his professorial chair could choose his own mode of treatment according to philosophical principles, bases his history of the religion of the Hebrews, not on the data furnished by the oldest and obscurest age, but on the later period and teaching of the prophets, of which we have contemporary records; and having established a firm footing here, then attempts the journey into the darkness of antiquity lighted by the torch provided by the previous investigation. So Colenso, if he had similarly wished to advance from the known to the unknown—from the obvious to the obscure—would have commenced with the determination of the work of the Deuteronomist, then investigated the remaining Legislation to decide its date or dates, and then the earlier history, discovering on the way all indications of time and of single or plural narratives, and finally reached the obscurest portion, the ancient and the prehistoric times of the book of Genesis. And his work might very probably have gained in persuasive force by such a treatment. Many, who received a violent shock on being asked to relinquish their faith in the literal truth of narratives about the great Patriarchs and the Exodus, would have acquiesced in the cogent reasoning which establishes the different spirit separating the Deuteronomistic from the Levitical legislation, and been weaned from their habit of regarding both or either as due to Moses or his time. The laws concern them but little, and they would not withstand the assault of reason and learning. The mind would thus be prepared for further concessions on subjects in which feeling rather than reason had dominated the mind. But Colenso was not prepared to take this course; his own mind, indeed, was apparently not sufficiently made up as to the proper treatment of the later books of the Pentateuch to make it possible; and the commencement of a labour of seventeen years must have been indefinitely postponed. With the strong conviction he had gained as to the history in Genesis and Exodus, he could not keep silence longer; and far be it from us to regret his decision. If he provoked hostility more unanimous than might otherwise have been pronounced against

him, he may surely plead that such hostility must come, and that it was the part of a brave and honest man to invite it at the outset where he felt his strength, rather than to approach it by more cautious moves through regions where his ultimate purpose would be less clear. The only serious reason that I feel for wishing that his work could have taken the other order is, that I think the latter might have had an important influence on the treatment of the earlier parts of the Pentateuch. It might, and probably would, have led him to regard the Elohist (E, the author of the Book of Origins), from his acknowledged similarity in style and ideas with the later writers, as later, not earlier, than the Jhvhist (J). As it is, he was pledged from the beginning to the belief that E wrote the first complete though brief narrative, which was subsequently filled in by later accretions by J and others. To this belief, gained from Ewald and the earlier works of Kuenen, and supported by all his earlier studies, he still zealously adheres, although it becomes difficult to hold it when we pass the critical point in the history at Ex. vi. 13, where God reveals his name Jhvh.

To the first Part of Colenso's work it is not necessary now to refer. Its aim was to vindicate a free historical treatment of the Pentateuch as the necessary basis of the criticism that was to follow. This was effected by placing side by side passages which presented insoluble inconsistencies or impracticable impossibilities, involving either mathematical absurdity or an assumption of such huge unrecorded miracles as the boldest of the literalists would hesitate to adopt. This mode of argument was probably the best at the outset, when addressed to people trained in the most uncompromiting literalism, on whom no argument could have any force so long as their inherited beliefs remained unshaken. It is true that such an assault, which aimed at the destruction of old beliefs and did not as yet offer anything in their place, could not but raise a strong feeling of repulsion, from which many were never recovered; but such a clearance of the ground was necessary. To us, on the other hand, who were prepared to submit the Pentateuch to the acutest and severest historical criticism, this Part was unneces-

sary, and seemed unduly to emphasize inconsistencies which we knew it to contain.

The true criticism of the Pentateuch, therefore, commences with the second Part. Here the author very naturally begins by pointing to the different names of God, especially Elohim and Jhvh.* In the *history* of Pentateuchal criticism the use of these two names holds the most distinguished place; for it furnished the main, and at first the sole, criterion by which two or more authors were discovered to have written the stories which were afterwards merged into one book and called the First Book of Moses. But for the criticism of Genesis at the present day, the use of these names was not sufficient, and was in great danger of misleading the unwary critic. This is the first and the main point on which, as I said above, I think the arrangement of Colenso's book unfortunate. He began when he was least experienced with a division of Genesis among various writers on the basis of their employment of the one or other of these names. To this division he naturally adhered afterwards, and it coloured his treatment of later books, which but for it might have been differently dealt with; and conversely the light afterwards gained from those later books might have shewn Genesis in a new aspect. Colenso assumes, as Astruc, De Wette, Ewald, &c., had done before, that Elohim is the older name (as is stated in Ex. vi. 3), and the writer who uses it exclusively the older writer. He supports this belief, not only on the nature of the Elohist's subject-matter, which he conceives to have a more antique character than that of the Jhvhist, but on the fact, which he considers himself to have proved when by his critical method he has eliminated all Jhvhistic or other foreign matter, that the Elohist's story is continuous, whereas the other passages appear to be disjointed fragments inserted into the former. After a consideration of many questions bearing with more or less weight on the main thesis, and including an examination—neither very profound nor very relevant to the

* I write the latter according to the Jewish method, leaving it to be pronounced Yahveh or Yahweh, or even Jehovah, if the reader wishes to adhere to the form printed in our hymns, &c., for in the English Bible it is scarcely ever employed.

question, in my opinion—of the use of the Divine names in the Psalms attributed to David, Bishop Colenso in his third Part deals in a masterly way with the book of Deuteronomy (of which I may speak subsequently), and in his fourth and fifth reverts to Genesis, with the object of submitting it to a minute verbal analysis, which shall decide on the evidence of language and style what portions are due to each writer. In the main this procedure must be pronounced necessary and its result satisfactory. Two writers, who differ so conspicuously as to call their God (whose name is constantly on their lips) by different names, cannot have had the same vocabulary and style for everything else. With the clue furnished by the Elohistic and the Jhvhistic accounts of the Creation (Gen i. 1—ii. 4a, and ii. 4b—iv. 26 respectively), other divergences in the use of words may be noted in those passages, and these applied to other passages to determine their authorship, until a large vocabulary of words used by each writer is collected, which may in the end prove adequate to determine the authorship of passages in which the chief test-words, Elohim and Jhvh, do not occur. Such vocabularies had been given before, but never so fully, and certainly not with such an exhaustive apparatus of references, as by Colenso. The labour must have been enormous; the analysis is far more voluminous than was necessary for scholars, because the quotations, though of course based upon the original Hebrew, are given in English (generally without the Hebrew, which is to be regretted; but the whole work, even this portion of it, was intended to be generally intelligible). The importance of finding accurate criteria of authorship independent of the Divine names, is seen when we turn to Exodus vi. There the Elohist seems at once to justify his employment up to that point of the names Elohim and El Shaddai only, and to intimate that after it he will be free to use Jhvh. God says there that to the Patriarchs He was only known as Elohim and El Shaddai, but now He reveals a new name, Jhvh, by which He is to be called. The writer of this would therefore have been guilty of an anachronism if he had used the name Jhvh in describing God's intercourse

with the Patriarchs; and of a neglect of the very words he had just written, if after that date he failed to use the new name. Hence some other distinction of style beside the Divine names is imperatively required after Ex. vi. 3.

But difficulties accumulate when we pass this point. In some respects Genesis is the easiest book of the Pentateuch to interpret. It consists solely of stories, written as we now know by various hands, and easily separable by the modes of criticism I have described between two or more authors—so easily that most scholars are agreed what passages to refer to each.* When the Exodus is passed, the subject-matter becomes so different that we are bewildered, and know not whether the writers can be the same or not. Short passages of simple narrative alternate with long chapters of legislation on the minutest points, and directions for the construction of a magnificent Tabernacle. As for the narrative, recording the passage through the desert with its attendant circumstances such as the rebellion of Korah, the spies' exploration of the land of Canaan, the wars, the final entry into the land beyond the Jordan, and the death of Moses, it can be dealt with satisfactorily by the criteria previously laid down. But the legislation presents serious difficulties. For his treatment of this, Bishop Colenso had already prepared, by interrupting his examination of Genesis in order to insert in Part III. a disquisition on the book of Deuteronomy. This was shewn conclusively to be almost entirely the work of a writer previously unknown to us in the Pentateuch, a man of strongly marked individuality and bearing the character of a prophet; and the history of the finding of the Book of the Law in the Temple in the reign of Josiah (2 Kings xxii.) was found to contain so much that pointed to Deuteronomy and agreed with no other part of the Law, that the book alluded to was declared to be Deuteronomy; and it was further made probable that the actual *writing* of the book coincided very nearly with the time of the so-called finding.

* The ultimate origin of the stories is of course a distinct question, not to be decided without more precise knowledge than we possess at present of the earliest history and even mythology of the neighbouring nations.

This being the case, which we may assume, as the evidence is very strong, and Colenso here expresses the views of all the best scholars, the chief question remaining to be solved is, What is the date and origin of the remaining legislation (contained in Exodus, Leviticus and Numbers), both absolutely and relatively to that in Deuteronomy? With this question Colenso deals in Part VI. The comparison of the matter of the legislation is here the most important criterion; and to this Colenso turns, abandoning for a time the criteria derived from vocabulary and style. Contrary to the received opinion of the early (Mosaic) origin of the legislation of the earlier books, and the comparative lateness of the so-called recapitulation in Deuteronomy, he shews the two to bear an utterly distinct character, and Deuteronomy to be on the whole the earlier. The Deuteronomist knows of no distinction between Priests and Levites, and so far from assigning any cities to that tribe for dwellings, treats them as homeless wanderers who have a claim to charity. He knows of no feasts but the three great ones—the Passover, Feast of Weeks or harvest, and Feast of Tabernacles or ingathering; and in these the priests have no function. He always calls the Mount of the Law Horeb, not Sinai. Events narrated in the earlier books confirm these peculiarities, and especially the status of "the priests the Levites" (the most important of all); see, e.g., the curious story of Micah the Levite who performed priest's functions, in Judges xvii, xviii, and that of the vagrant Levites in Judges xix, xx. The other books differ in all these points, but most remarkably as to the social position of the tribe of Levi, which has special cities assigned to it, and the distinction now made between Priests and ordinary Levites, together with the precise enumeration of all the functions, dues and immunities appertaining to each. On account of the immense increase in the power of the Levites, this legislation is appropriately termed Levitical Legislation, compendiously abbreviated by Colenso into LL. As the mean position assigned to Levi by D agrees with what we know of the early times, so this state of splendour corresponds with their position at the return from the Captivity, as

described in Ezra and Nehemiah; moreover, some of the laws were demonstrably not in existence at any earlier date. Hence the entire completion of the Levitical Legislation must be later than D, and belong to a time after the Captivity; though its growth must have been gradual, and much may have existed earlier. This Levitical Legislation may be roughly said to comprise from Ex. xxv. to the end of Numbers. But besides these two later systems of law, a small body of law is found in chaps. xx—xxiii. of Exodus, which seems to date from a much earlier period, and to be the base upon which the later elaborate legislations were erected.

This is the result attained by comparison of the contents of the parts of the Pentateuch following the Exodus, independently of the results of the examination of the earlier portion. Each investigation has been distinct from the other: it now remains to settle the relation between the writers of the two periods. Judged by his style and vocabulary, LL agrees with E (the Elohist of Genesis), while J is conspicuously distinct. The Elohist is more strictly correct in avoiding anthropomorphism, and in ascribing paternal feelings, but not human passions, to the Deity; he is fond of the conception of covenants between God and man and among men, and regards human life as regulated by laws of divine origin—blood, which is the life, shall not be eaten; and whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed. The Jhvhist is the reverse of this: he is more fully human in every way—God is human, in seeing, smelling, repenting, being angry and cursing; men are often lawless and subject to guilty passions, but also capable of noble and generous conduct and amiable sentiments. It is obvious that the ethical as well as the literary character of the Elohist bring him very near the LL. Hence most writers have identified them; the earlier scholars, including Ewald, by attributing to both the early date which they had assigned to the Elohist; Kuenen (in his later works), by treating the late date of LL as certain, and arguing therefrom that the Elohist of Genesis must belong to the same age. Colenso began by assigning a very early date to the Elohist;

historical considerations convinced him of the very late date of LL; and consequently he found himself left in the peculiar position of agreeing with Ewald as to Genesis, and with Kuenen as to the Legislation. This was only possible by the expedient of severing the connection, which the two opposite schools had agreed in maintaining, between E and LL. Colenso declares that the entire narrative of E ends at Ex. vi. 5. He believes LL to be a different writer, distinguished by his strong sacerdotalism, to which he finds nothing analogous in E; and he endeavours to disprove the identity of style which every one else had recognised between E and LL.

In the latter effort I cannot consider him successful. Of course the vocabulary of so vast a literature as LL is not limited to the few words required in the few chapters of E; and of the additional words so employed some are naturally to be found in the list of words previously marked as peculiar to J. But this proves nothing, unless it be that we were wrong originally in ascribing to E quite so limited a vocabulary. Colenso has remarkably little to say on this point, one of the most important intrinsically, and one of the most generally disputed in all his book; in fact I hardly find any argument to answer. Perhaps he thinks that his decision in favour of the antiquity of the Elohist is sufficiently defended by his tone, so different from the sacerdotalism of LL. But it appears to me that that very difference of tone is a strong argument for the identity of E and LL. Let it be remembered that LL for the first time imported a powerful sacerdotalism into the Hebrew ritual. The Deuteronomist only mentioned Aaron as the maker of the golden calf, and the tribe of Levi as set aside for the *ministry* (or menial service) of Jhvh, and only occasionally as judicial arbitrators exercising any exalted function. But the Levitical legislation changes all this. The one central Sanctuary, with its complicated arrangements for sacrifices on all events of life, now to be offered by priests, afforded employment for great numbers; and the forty-eight cities assigned to them gave them wealth and social standing. The central idea seems to be, that religion, as understood by priests, is to enter

into every act of life. But when we ask whence its sanction is derived, we are told that this religion had its origin at Sinai, where the name and nature of the God of Israel were revealed to Moses, and a formal covenant established. The writer is surely not inconsistent with his principles if, in describing the age before Moses, when Jhvh's name was not known, he artfully refrains from using it. And further, as the commands of Jhvh with reference to ritual (especially sacrifices) were given only to Moses, and can have had no existence at an earlier period, when the appointed agents (the tribe of Levi) had not been set apart for these functions, the writer can imagine no acts of sacrifice as being possible previously, and consequently ascribes no religious acts to the Patriarchs. One important exception must here be made, but it is an exception that proves the rule. The Elohist does attribute one act, regarded as religious, to the Patriarchs—that of circumcision; but this formed no part of the Levitical legislation, being obviously known by him to be of much older origin than the Law of Sinai.* He therefore ascribes it very freely to persons in the Patriarchal age. Again, the Covenant at Sinai was not necessarily nor probably the only one of the kind; God, though not Jhvh, had held similar relations with the ancestors of the people of Moses' time, and thus prepared them for that crowning act; hence he tells of similar covenants with Noah and the Patriarchs. And he himself, while describing the institution of the Sabbath (Ex. xxxi. 17), explains it as a memorial of the Lord's rest after the six days of creation; consequently he inserts in Gen. ii. 2, 3, an account of that rest; but he is consistent with himself in never attributing the observance of the Sabbath to any human personage in the early age.

But arguments like these will surely not convince Bishop

* He assumes it in Ex. xii. 48 as already existing among the Hebrews; and incidentally mentions it in connection with the ceremonial regulations to be observed by women in childbirth, Lev. xii. 3. The words in Gen. xxxv. 14, "a pillar of stone; and he dropped a drink-offering thereon, and he poured oil thereon," though given by Colenso to the Elohist, are surely an interpolation by the Jhvhist, to whom he assigns the almost identical phrase in xxviii. 18.

Colenso, nor any one who has analysed Genesis as carefully as he has, and demonstrated to his own satisfaction that the Elohist's story, when separated from extraneous insertions, forms one continuous and consistent narrative, whereas all the passages by other hands appear to be isolated fragments, and therefore most naturally explained as subsequent insertions in the groundwork furnished by E. This argument, if well established, is certainly weighty, though not perfectly conclusive; and it has had great influence on me. To deal adequately with it would demand a renewed study of Genesis in the first instance, and partially of other books, comparing almost every verse with every other—a work for which I have not found time. But as a contribution towards the settlement of the question, and as a suggestion to others who may aid in this important branch of Biblical criticism, I may be allowed to mention some points that have come under my notice.

It is, then, a question whether the work of the Elohist is continuous. Bishop Colenso himself allows a gap after xxviii. 9: "There occurs here the first hiatus, as we suppose, in the Elohistic document—the original statement of the marriage of Jacob (which was probably as brief as that of Isaac's marriage by the same writer in xxv. 19) having been removed to make way for the more circumstantial narrative of the Jhvhist in xxix." And again he admits that none of the history of Joseph as we have it, unless it be two or three verses, are by the Elohist; yet, since Joseph is mentioned by him in Ex. i. 5 as being in Egypt before Jacob's migration thither, the writer must have told his story; hence Colenso is here again reduced to the same conjecture—that the Elohist's brief narrative has been removed and replaced by the lengthy one now standing in Genesis. But there appear to be other gaps, not noticed by Colenso. The account of the birth of Esau and Jacob in Gen. xxv. 21—26, of which Colenso gives all but 21a, 22, 23, to the Elohist, cannot be by him;* and their birth is another neces-

* xxv. 21—26 must be all by a Jhvhistic writer: Col., Pt. V. Anal. § 158—161, has to contend only for the *possibility* of certain phrases used by the Jhvhistic writers being here used by the Elohist, and very inconclusively, I think. But the

sary event not found in E. The explanation of the meaning of or reason for the giving of names, and the changing of names, is eminently a characteristic of the Jhvhist; and it may well be doubted whether the Elohist ever gave these comments, or did more than simply announce the name without explanation. The only undoubted exception to this is the change in the names of the two first parents of the Hebrews, Abram (emphatically "*the* Hebrew," Gen. xiv. 13) and Sarai, into Abraham and Sarah (Gen. xvii. 5, 15), which is the human counterpart to the change in the name of the Deity announced by the same writer in somewhat similar language in Ex. vi. 3—7. But no such reason exists for the change of Jacob's name into Israel; and it is to be observed that while the old name Abram is never once used after the promulgation of the new name Abraham, the Elohist never once adopts that of Israel for Jacob; from which we cannot but infer that he either knew it not, or did not choose to acknowledge it as the name of an individual, and that in either case Gen. xxxv. 10 cannot be by him. The only cases in which explanations of personal names appear to be probably given by the Elohist, are those of Isaac and Ishmael in xvii. 17, 19; 18, 20.* Again, the account of Jacob's

stories palpably invented to account for the names Esau and Jacob in v. 25, 26, decide the point. Also v. 26, Isaac was sixty years old בְּלֶדֶת אֹתָם *at begetting them*, is conclusive, for יָלַד Kal, *to beget*, is only used by E; translators have falsely inserted the mother in this phrase (as if it had been בְּלִדְתָּהּ *at her bearing*), and made it "when *she bare* them," a mistake which Hupfeld, Böhmer and Colenso, seem not to have noticed. Moreover, this sentence, that Isaac was sixty years old, cannot be by E, who wrote in v. 20 that Isaac married at forty, unless the sentence about Rebekah's barrenness in v. 21 is also by him, which is impossible (Jhvh twice). If the story from v. 21 onwards is Jhvhistic, these difficulties disappear.

* The following are the instances in which the Jhvhist gives a personal name with an explanation: Gen. ii. 23, iii. 20, iv. 1, 25, v. 29, ix. 27, x. 25, xvi. 11, xviii. 12, 13, 15, and xxi. 6 (*laughed*, to account for the name Isaac), xix. 37, 38, xxvii. 36, xxix. 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, xxx. 6, 8, 11, 13, 18, 20, 21, 24 and 25, xxxii. 28, xxxv. 18, xxxviii. 29, 30, xli. 51, 52, xlix. 8, 13, 16, 19, 20. In all of these in which the name is imposed by the parents at the birth, it is the *mother* who gives it, except in the case of Joseph's sons, xli. 51, 52, in which the religious interpretation of the name and the fact of the mother being an Egyptian probably made it unsuitable in the writer's opinion to allow her to give it. Besides these

marriages and children in ch. xxix. and xxx. consists, according to Colenso, of fragments of Elohistic narrative overlaid with Jhvhistic insertions; but this arrangement produces frequent gaps in the former, notwithstanding that the explanation of names in xxx. 6, 8, 11, 12, 18, 20, 23, is attributed to the Elohist. Far simpler and more in accordance with the evidence is it to assign both these chapters to Jhvhistic writers; in this case the Elohist's sole account of Jacob's children is that in xxxv. 22—26, in which the daughter Dinah is not mentioned; and there is a gap between his arrival in Padan-Aram in xxviii. 5, and his departure with wives, concubines and children, in xxxi. 18 and xxxv. 9, 11—14a, 15, &c. Again, Colenso assigns xxvi. 34, xxviii. 6—9 and xxxvi. 1—5, all equally to the Elohist: the two former give one, and the last another, account of Esau's wives and children. The last seems to be the more authentic, since it agrees with the following genealogy, and it is decidedly Elohistic. The two former passages, with which perhaps the isolated verse, xxvii. 46, may be associated, are surely Jhvhistic; they are utterly inconsistent with the other story; but the two go naturally together, since xxviii. 6—9 presupposes a marriage of Esau with Canaanites. The passage xxviii. 6—9 is by an apologist of Esau, who wishes to shew that just as Jacob obeyed his father in taking a wife, so did Esau also, taking a descendant of Abraham to make amends for having previously taken Canaanites. The removal of these two passages will render the history of Jacob free from extraneous interruptions, though not entirely consecutive.

instances of persons, the Jhvhist interprets the names of places in xi. 9, xvi. 14, xix. 22, xxi. 31, xxii. 14, xxvi. 20, 21, 22, 33, xxviii. 17, 19, xxxi. 47—49 xxxii. 2, 30, xxxiii. 17, xxxv. 7, 8, l. 11. Hence it is evident that the interpretation of names is an object of primary importance to this writer or writers. The instances of the explanation of personal names given by the Elohist are only xvii. 5, 15, 17, 19, 20, referring only to Abraham, Sarah and their two sons; and of explanation of a local name, perhaps one, Bethel, in xxxv. 15. When the Elohist mentions the imposition of a name at birth, he makes the *father* give it, v. 3, xvi. 15, xxi. 3. The remaining instances, which Colenso attributes to E, and I to J, are xxv. 25, 26 (Esau and Jacob), and xxxv. 10 (Israel), and the names of Jacob's sons in xxix. and xxx. In all these latter the *mother* (or mistress of the concubine) gives the name, which ought to have decided the question.

Another gap appears to exist in the Elohistic narrative, if it is true that no part of the story of the destruction of Sodom belongs to it, whilst yet it is alluded to in xxix. 29 E. For these and other reasons I believe the continuity of the Elohistic narrative as it now exists to be very far from certain.

But if it were demonstrated, would its antiquity be thereby determined? Surely not; for the nature of the contents might be such as to preclude any high antiquity, or to decide the actual date. I must confess that I cannot imagine so dry and colourless a story as the Elohist delivers to proceed from an ancient date. In opposition to Mr. Gladstone, I find it impossible to accept the idea of an original perfectly pure and spiritual monotheism, from which mankind have undergone a gradual but constant descent into the polytheistic superstitions of later generations. Among the Hebrews, at all events, this appears like an inversion of the truth. The Jhvhistic stories, which contain so much of the human element, i.e. find their motives in the passionate side of our nature and attribute to God also the same feelings, are felt to be much nearer the source of legend and history than the dry philosophic propriety of the Elohist; much as the cycle of stories about Troy, about the Nibelungen, and about Arthur and the Round Table, are incomparably more ancient than Plato's Republic or Lucretius' philosophy. And when we have compared the whole of Genesis with the portion picked out as the work of the Elohist, we can hardly repress the feeling that the latter, however well it may hang together and betray the workmanship of a single hand, cannot have preceded the rest. Much of it is only interesting as affording a skeleton to be clothed by the stories that we know from other writers. The writer appears not so much to know nothing of those stories, as purposely to avoid them; and his aim in that case would be to write an expurgated history of the Patriarchal age. It is scarcely possible to believe that the Elohist, in whatever age he lived, knew nothing of the quarrels between Jacob and Esau, who represent respectively the Hebrews and their most

constant enemies, Edom, Amalek, &c.; yet of the quarrel he says not a word. So, too, it appears essential to the history of Joseph to know that Rachel, though not the first, was the best beloved of Jacob's wives. There seem to me also to be distinct signs that the Elohistic work was positively late. The first chapter of Genesis has long struck me, long before I was prepared to build upon the idea, as a quasi-scientific attempt to solve the mystery of creation. The very attempts which have been renewed from time to time to enlist it in the service of science and make it speak the language of modern physics, testify to this character. It groups the various parts of the universe in classes well known to ancient science: earth, heaven, water; animals, vegetables; fish, fowl, cattle, wild beasts; herbs, trees. This looks more like the speculation of a Hebrew Lucretius than a legend of hoary antiquity.* The use of the word *Firmament* in i. 7, 8, to describe the heavens, before the name Heavens had been given, indicates scientific precision of language, which is repeated in the use of Dry-land and Gathering of water respectively, for earth and sea in vv. 9, 10. The legend of Eden (Jhvistic) bears a far more antique character, and reminds us of similar stories in other ancient nations: it must be extraordinarily strong evidence that should force us to treat Gen. i. as older than that. And this brings me to perhaps the most important line of evidence. If the contention of those who believed in the antiquity of the Elohist was, as I suppose, that he told the history as it was understood in his day, and that the new legends added by the other writers were really new, the product of the age between the Elohist and the Jhvhists, then the discoveries made by Assyriologists must have sorely troubled their peace of mind. It

* The language of this story contains some peculiar and certainly comparatively late words: e.g. "*their army* (host)," ii. 1; the word צְבָא, at least in the sense of the "host of heaven," being never used before the time of Isaiah, Jeremiah and the Deuteronomist. (See my arguments and Colenso's answer, both from the old standpoint of the antiquity of the Elohist, in Theol. Rev. Vol. X. 1873, pp. 175—177, 599—606.) בָּרָא *to create*, can scarcely be an old word; it becomes a favourite one in the writings of Isaiah and the later Isaiah.

appeared that the Assyrian accounts of the Creation, Deluge and Tower of Babel, knew nothing of our subtle distinctions, and that they, though of unquestioned antiquity, bore a strong resemblance, which could not be accidental, to the Jhvhistic stories. From other sources of great antiquity also, especially Persia, but to a less extent India and Greece, mythical legends were gathered which might be coeval with the Hebrew stories of the Garden of Eden. In all these cases it was more probable that the age which produced the one version of the legend diffused it till it appeared in the other forms, than that the Hebrew version was a loan supplied at a much later date, since in the latter case the Hebrew story would have been a mere copy of the older one, not an independent and differing version of it. On these grounds it would seem quite natural, if not necessary, to regard the Jhvhistic legends themselves as belonging to a very ancient age indeed, and their committal to paper to an age when they still possessed interest and were not wiped out by the sacerdotal principles that practically knew nothing of any period before the legislation at Sinai. Other indications of the lateness of the Elohist may be found in the promise to Abraham, "kings shall come out of thee" (xvii. 6), and in the list of the kings of Edom that reigned "before there reigned any king over the children of Israel;" for these expressions imply a long list of kings of Israel, comparable with those of Edom, who must have preceded the writers' age. The parenthetical explanations of obsolete names of places, as "Kirjath-arba (this is Hebron) in the land of Canaan," xxiii. 2; "Ephrath (this is Beth-lehem)," xxxv. 19, which are usually assumed to be insertions by a later (Jhvhistic) writer, may well belong to the Elohist himself, if he belongs to a late date when the old names were generally forgotten, and to a learned (Levitical) body, which knew both the old and the new.

The mode in which the various writers' stories in the book of Genesis were finally compounded together, is after all our investigation not so easy to be determined as it was thought before. Still no advance whatever can be made so long as any

relevant consideration is suppressed. If the Elohist's story is continuous, Bishop Colenso thinks it must be early; at a late date no one would write a simple narrative with all the fuller personal details omitted. As I have said, I doubt its continuity; but waiving that point, it seems to me not only natural but almost necessary to the Levites of the later age to have a history of the Patriarchal age which should contain nothing inconsistent with their pretensions,—a history which would admit no sacrifices, no distinction of clean (i.e. sacrificeable) and unclean beasts, no feasts, no sabbath, no Jhvh, in the age prior to the existence of the Levites themselves. This history was so compact, concise and well arranged, that it was adopted by the final collector of the materials that make up the Pentateuch as his basis or text-book, into which he inserts the stories left by various Jhvhistic writers, generally in their right places, as far as a place could be right where there were frequently discrepancies as to fact. As to the latter point, the collector doubtless avoided the more obvious contradictions, but thought the lesser ones unimportant; and was more anxious to omit nothing that was interesting or valuable, than to maintain perfect consistency. The Levitical Elohist would doubtless, on Colenso's own arguments with reference to the Levitical legislation, belong to the age of Ezekiel. The collector who adopted his work as the basis and inserted in it the various Jhvhistic legends that had come down from earlier times, must of course have been still later; he must have been not a priest or levite, but a man of wider sympathies and more imaginative temperament, to whom the beautiful garden of Eden, the romantic story of the old servant Eleazar faithfully and gallantly seeking a wife for his master Isaac, and the wonderfully adventurous story of Joseph, were dear. He may have performed his work shortly before or during the Captivity, or immediately after the Restoration and before Ezra. To his name we have no clue; and I must here express disapproval of the practice of assigning works of unknown authorship, without any evidence, to well-known characters in history.

Colenso shews such striking similarity of thought and language between the Deuteronomist and Jeremiah, and between the Levitical legislator and Ezekiel, and gives such good grounds for referring their works to the ages of those prophets respectively, that it is impossible to condemn him for assuming their authorship, especially as it is a material aid to memory. But when he suggests that his Elohist may be Samuel, I cannot approve the practice, nor could I were I ever so firmly convinced of the age being the right one.

The analysis of the Pentateuch and its division among various writers is one of the most laborious tasks which Bishop Colenso has not shrunk from in this great work. It gives tangible proofs instead of the vague expressions of "peculiarity of style," &c., used by many writers, which demonstrate nothing and convince no one. Colenso, on the other hand, ought to convince many, if at least many will undergo the labour of verifying the copious references that form an essential in this mode of proof. Perhaps almost all, certainly a very large proportion of passages in the Pentateuch are now assigned to their true authors, although we have unfortunately no names for these authors, but must content ourselves with the rather repulsive designations that I have used above. I am desirous to emphasize this point, as it is really independent of the question of dates, on which I cannot altogether agree with Colenso. But I am compelled to add that his analyses should be carefully tested, as I have found many that seemed to me not to warrant his conclusions as to authorship. Several times when I have doubted the authorship given by him, on referring to the analysis for his proof of it, I have found it inconclusive or mistaken.* But on the whole, the separation of the

* This is conspicuously the case in Pt. VI. App. § 84, 85, the critical instance where Bishop Colenso attempts to distinguish between the Elohist and the LL, and finds a difference of style between Ex. vi. 2—5 and 6—8; and in the note on p. 583. I have noticed, I think frequently, the grave inaccuracy of confounding the words אֵל El, and אֱלֹהִים Elohim (which are from different roots and have nothing to do with one another), as on p. 585: "five names compounded with 'Elohim'—Israel, &c."

"Original Story" from the "Later Legislation" in Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy (for even that book is not wholly by the Deuteronomist, but has interpolations) and Joshua, is extremely skilfully effected; and it is wonderful how much of beauty and interest these books gain by being separated into their component parts and having their continuity of text restored.

The Pentateuch itself was put into its right position, as conceived by Bishop Colenso, and all questions connected with that position duly considered, in Part VI. The new volume undertakes to shew what must be the dates, relation in point of time and subject to the Pentateuch, of the other books of the Bible. If the position of a large part of the Pentateuch be changed (as I have suggested) from the first to the latter age of literature, some of these questions must of necessity wear a different aspect. On this account I cannot attempt at the end of an article to offer any detailed criticism of this volume. But I must say at once that its importance can hardly be exaggerated. The preceding volumes have placed the books of the Law in a place in the history of Israel utterly different from that usually assigned to them by the readers for whom these volumes are mainly intended. If the Pentateuch, instead of preceding by many centuries the other books of the Old Testament, was not commenced, or scarcely commenced, before other kinds of literature began, and was constantly added to down to almost the latest age of Old Testament literature, the other books must also wear a new aspect. By the new light now thrown upon the origin of customs, rites and legends mentioned in the Pentateuch, we can now read the evidence for the date of other books in which those same things are present or absent, in a new sense: our previous decisions require revision. This revision Bishop Colenso has undertaken in this volume, and carried out with his usual labour and with a large measure of success. His criticism of the historical books is especially acute; and his exhibition of the thorough untrustworthiness and actual mendacity of the books of Chro-

nicles is deserving of all praise. If thoroughly sifted and mastered as it ought to be by any one who cares for the truth of history and desires to have an opinion on that of the Hebrews, it ought to supply a caution against ever quoting these books as an authority. It will be remembered that F. W. Newman, as long ago as 1847, in his "History of the Hebrew Monarchy," pointed out the gross exaggerations of the Chronicles; and he had a precursor in De Wette. It must also be noted that the greater portion of the arguments of this volume are equally cogent whatever date we assign to the Elohistic writer in Genesis. The arguments concerning each book or portion of a book of the Old Testament turn chiefly on the questions: Does it betray any knowledge of, or subserviency to, the full Levitical legislation and supremacy of Levitical priests? or, on the other hand, speak in the freer tone of the earlier prophets, of Jhvh as loving and ready to forgive His people? Does it shew any allusion to the exile and abode among strangers? Does it speak of the House of Jhvh, and, if so, in such a way as to point unmistakably to one single sanctuary at Jerusalem? Now these are questions which would be dealt with in the same way by all scholars holding Colenso's and Kuenen's views on the Deuteronomist and the Levitical writer of the Pentateuch, whatever be their opinions on the composition of Genesis. It is chiefly when Colenso treats of poetry that I find myself frequently unable to endorse his arguments. There historical references are more scanty, and poetical ideas, phrases and form play the chief part in determining the age and circumstances of the composition; and these last are not such tangible evidence. Yet evidence they are, and may be absolutely conclusive to one who has read himself thoroughly into the style of various ages. I cannot pretend to such instinctive appreciation myself, and still less would I force my conclusions upon any one else. But I must say that I can never acquiesce in any but a very high antiquity—perhaps the highest in the Old Testament—for the Song of Deborah and Barak in Judges v. Its whole

construction and expression bear a most antique character, to which no other poem, even of those which possess (if they do not affect) great individuality, exhibits anything really similar. I cannot therefore assent to Colenso's judgment that "It appears most reasonable to assign the composition of this Song to the golden age of Hebrew Literature in David's time, to which (according to our view) we owe the poetry of the 'Blessing of Jacob,' Gen. xlix., the 'Song of Moses,' Ex. xv., and the 'Prophecy of Balaam,' Num. xxiii. xxiv."

I think the Song of Deborah is thereby placed as much too late as the Prophecy of Balaam is too early. I have recently discussed the latter in this Journal,* and it will be seen from my remarks there that I must also demur to Colenso's expression, "the golden age of Hebrew Literature in David's time." This indicates what seems to me a somewhat radical error in Colenso's position. He has broken loose from the old moorings, but has not found new ones that are really safe. He has, on many points, stopped in the middle between the old and the new views. No doubt, proverbs in plenty can be quoted to give him full justification on *a priori* grounds—in medio via tutissima est (or something of that tenor), *juste* milieu, &c. But the practical question is not whether the middle point *seems likely* to be the right one, but whether it is *proved* by all available evidence to be so. When the Levitical law is admitted not to have existed in David's time, when the Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch is given up, when the Davidic authorship of the Psalms is deemed highly doubtful at least,—then it appears very questionable whether the reign of David was "the golden age of Hebrew Literature" at all. The phrase sounds like one retained unthinkingly by a modern commentator out of an old book that rested on different premisses. No doubt Bishop Colenso may consider himself justified in using it, as he identifies the Elohist with one earlier than David—Samuel; but even then, very little writing

* Vol. XV. pp. 327—365, especially pp. 356—361.

had preceded, and the Jhvhist was only just beginning to record the Patriarchal history. The centre of gravity of the Old Testament literature has been shifted further than Bishop Colenso allows. Instead of the reign of David being the golden age, and that of Solomon the age of weariness and satiety after the brilliancy that could not be permanent, we now learn to regard the eighth century, the age of the earlier prophets Amos, Hosea and Isaiah, and the kings Azariah, Jotham, Ahaz and Hezekiah, as the great literary age; and the question with regard to the undated books is now, Are they from before or after the Captivity, from before or after the reforms of Josiah?—rather than, Are they from David's age? We learn to regard the time of David as an age of rapidly increasing prosperity, but of only commencing literature, when the fluent and elegant style of the Hebrew books of the best age was certainly not yet born. Hence I feel great hesitation about referring any book to the age of David, unless it bears unmistakable signs of great antiquity. Thus, for instance, I must differ from Colenso when he refers the book of Ruth to that date, since it is even more modern in style than most books. Similarly I cannot, with him, think that the book of Judges "may have been composed by writers of the prophetical school established by Samuel, in the latter part of Saul's reign and in the beginning of David's." No doubt the greatest Hebrew writers in early times were prophets; but we have not the slightest indication that any prophet before those whose works we have, wrote any books at all: so, for instance, Samuel, Nathan, Elijah and Elishah. It is an interesting speculation what was the nature of the Schools of Prophets said to be founded by Samuel; but it is surely too hazardous to conjecture that any of our existing books are due to the alumni of those institutions, of whom we only know that they used musical instruments ("a psaltery and a tabret and a pipe and a harp," 1 Sam. x. 5) in the exercise of their office.

No sufficiently detailed criticism of the various parts of Bishop Colenso's work having appeared in this Journal at the

time of publication of each, it has been my endeavour on this last occasion, when taking leave of a work which has given many of us abundant food for thought for a long series of years, to supply the defect as far as possible. I fear I have been thereby led into the vice of indulging too largely in detail respecting the points on which I cannot agree with him. I must plead in excuse that these were mainly points which seemed to rest on false premisses, and that a critic has no more urgent duty than to see whether the base on which the whole structure rests be sound. If I appear to some to have done little but take exception to Colenso's arguments, others, especially those who are familiar with his work, will perceive how large a portion of it has been distinctly adopted by me as sound in reasoning and fruitful in excellent results, remodelling our understanding of Old Testament history. To give a perfectly faithful conspectus of the whole book, in which its excellences and its deficiencies would each appear in due proportion, was beyond my power in the space allotted me. I can only reiterate at the close, what I said at the beginning, that this book marks a great epoch in Biblical criticism. It puts Englishmen for the first time in the position of being able, without a knowledge of foreign languages and the need of collecting a large library of histories and commentaries, to understand the positions assumed and the opinions expressed by the most learned and sagacious critics of this and other countries on well-nigh all questions concerning the Pentateuch, and very many concerning the other books of the Old Testament. And these opinions are so clearly and impartially expressed—generally in the words of the writers themselves—that the reader never feels that his judgment is being forced by the author to accept a result which he might not have reached by his unaided intellect.

RUSSELL MARTINEAU.

## VI.—THE SOZZINI AND THEIR SCHOOL.—II.

1. *Roma Racoviana et Racovia Romana.* Authore Gulielmo Jameson. Edinburgi: Andr. Anderson. 1702.
2. *Die Protestantischen Antitrinitarier vor Faustus Socin. Nach Quellen und Urkunden geschichtlich dargestellt. Zweites Buch: Lelio Sozini und die Antitrinitarier seiner Zeit.* Von F. Trechsel. Heidelberg: Winter. 1844.
3. *Gli Eretici d'Italia, Discorsi Storici.* Di Cesare Cantù. Torino: Unione Tipografico-Editrice. 3 vol. 1865-7.

PROFESSOR HUXLEY'S eulogium, on the occasion of the unveiling of Birmingham's marble atonement to the memory of Joseph Priestley, began with a reference to the theological system which Priestley espoused. "In season and out of season," said Mr. Huxley, "he was the steadfast champion of that hypothesis respecting the Divine nature, which is termed Unitarianism by its friends, and Socinianism by its foes."*

This distinction is only what we might expect from a non-theological speaker, anxious to be fair in his phraseology. Socinian is a term which has come to be applied and resented as a theological taunt. "It is used in our own day," says Professor de Morgan, "by the small fry, the unlearned clergy and their immediate followers, as a term of reproach for *all* Unitarians. I suspect they have a kind of liking for the *word;* it sounds like *so sinful.*"† The followers of Priestley have shewn themselves more sensitive than their leader to the odium involved in bearing this historic name. Priestley himself had no objection to the term. Writing from Leeds to Joshua Toulmin in 1771, he says:

"Your scheme of a Life of Socinus strikes me very much as peculiarly seasonable at this time; but you overrate my acquaintance with history, if you imagine I am able to direct you to any materials for it. Besides, a critical life is not the thing I wish to

* *Macmillan's Mag.* Oct. 1874. † *Budget of Paradoxes*, 1872, p. 85.

see so much as a plain and judicious narrative, calculated to give a favourable idea of his principles, and to inspire the lukewarm Free-thinkers among us with a greater zeal for truth, and more serious endeavours to promote it."*

Again, in a letter to Joseph Bretland from Calne in 1777, he remarks:

"I think I shall have done some good by tracing to their source the Athanasian and Arian hypotheses, which, as far as I know, had not been done by former Socinian writers."

In his *Memoirs*,† the following passage occurs:

"By reading with care 'Dr. Lardner's Letter on the Logos,' I became what is called a Socinian soon after my settlement at Leeds [1767, æt. 34]; and after giving the closest attention to the subject, I have seen more and more reason to be satisfied with that opinion to this day, and likewise to be more impressed with the idea of its importance."

Any one, therefore, who employs the term with an intelligent sense of its theological meaning, may vindicate himself, with Dr. Halley, by saying: "I here use the word 'Socinianism,' not offensively, but because Dr. Priestley used it."‡ Historically, this name has a definite value, as marking an important stage in the process of theological change. Priestley did not mean to identify himself in all points with the Italian dogmatist, but he saw clearly enough that to the school of Sozzini his own opinions properly belonged, and that by the labours of this school they had gained their footing in the world of theological thought. With the exception of a slender intermittent stream of Servetianism, which in England at least has never attained the proportions or the influence of a school of theology, Liberal Christianity has always owed the largest debt to the Socinian

* Dr. Toulmin's work (*Memoirs of the Life, Character, Sentiments and Writings of Faustus Socinus*, by Joshua Toulmin, A.M., 1777), though now out of date, is a better book, historically speaking, than this purely didactic recommendation would suggest. It very fairly presents all the facts within the author's reach.

† Written at Birmingham 1787, revised at Northumberland Pa. 1795, published (by his son) 1805. For the quotations, see *Works*, i. pp. 69, 152, 303.

‡ *Lancashire: its Puritanism and Nonconformity*, 1869, ii. 417, note.

impulse. It may not, therefore, be an altogether useless contribution to the history of religious opinion in our country, if we can present a summary view of the rise of that exotic theology which, with the necessary modifications, the learned Bidle, and later on the gentle Lindsey, exerted themselves to plant on English soil as a Unitarian church.

FAUSTO PAULO SOZZINI was born at Siena, two hours and almost three quarters before sunrise, on the 5th December, 1539.* His father was Alessandro (1509-41), the younger Mariano's eldest son, who married, some time in 1538, Agnese, daughter of Borghese Petrucci. Apparently, Fausto was the earliest fruit of this union. His first and best known baptismal name was doubtless the expression of his parents' hopes; yet, from the time of the ill-starred Faustus Sulla downwards, this name, in spite of the promise of its etymology, has borne a sinister omen as though it were but Infaustus in disguise. His birth was succeeded by that of a daughter, Fillide, in 1540; and there was another son, Alessandro.†

Most of the many sons of Mariano died comparatively young. In the case of Alessandro, Fausto's father, a career of remarkable expectation was cut short in its thirty-second year; and Fausto, deprived in infancy of a father's care, was brought up without any regular education. While this accounted for many defects which in after life he was the first to acknowledge, it afforded scope for a home training and for home attachments which exercised the strongest influence upon his

* *Opp.* i. 490. According to the New Calendar it would be 15th December. The record of his baptism runs thus: "1539—Fausto Paulo figlio di Ms. Alexo Sozini si battezzò il di do [5 Dec.], e nacque il di detto. Fu compare Ms. Lco [Lodovico] Dell' Armi gentiluomo bolognese." *Lib. dei Battezzati* '39—'41, carte 21. For this, and numerous other important extracts from original sources, we have to thank the abounding courtesy of the learned antiquarian, Padre Alessandro Toti, D.D., of San Giovannino, Siena.

† A posthumous child, on this reckoning, since his father died 26 April, 1541. It is just possible, however, that Alessandro was the eldest born. His birth probably took place out of Siena, for he is not entered in the Libro dei Battezzati. Camajani's letter (5 Sept. 1558) speaks of Fausto as "fratello di M. Alessandro Sozino," proving that Messer Alessandro had some standing in his profession at a very early age.

character. Brilliant as they were in accomplishments, and splendid in juridical talent, the men of the Sozzini race were not always noted for moral stability. The gaming propensities of the famous Bartolomeo dragged a great name through the mire. Alessandro, Fausto's great-grandfather, is only known as the author of a jest-book in the Italian taste. Fausto's grandfather, the younger Mariano, after his wife's death, hastened his own end by his excesses.* But the morale of the Sozzini family was invigorated by its virtuous alliances. Tradition says that when the elder Mariano had wedded Niccola Venturi, he was asked why he gave up his public prelections. "I have a wife." "But Socrates had a wife, and still he taught." "Xanthippe was peevish and probably ugly; my wife is both fair and good."† On Fausto the influence of the women of his house, noble ladies in every sense of the word, was permanently impressed. His mother, his grandmother Camilla Petrucci, his aunt Porzia Pecci, his sister Fillide Marsili were throughout his early life his best instructors.

Of his tribe of uncles, Celso had the most direct share in the promotion of his mental growth. Lelio left Siena before Fausto's birth, and his subsequent visits to it in Fausto's fourteenth year were of no long duration. But Celso was a leading spirit in the literary and freethinking circles of Siena. In 1554 he founded a literary society, the *Accademia dei Sizienti*, having for its emblem a winged lion on the summit of a mountain, with the suggestive motto, *Quamdiu sitient.*‡ Of this *Accademia*, suppressed in the following year, Fausto, a lad of fifteen, was probably a member; a volume of manuscript sonnets, apparently contributed by the associates, contains the first effort of his pen, a school-boy production in

* Panzirolo, *De Claris Legg. Interpp.* 1721 edn., pp. 269-72.

† This story is also in Panzirolo; Cantù tells it of the younger Mariano, who married Camilla Salvetti.

‡ *Codice della Biblioteca A. V.* 19, p. 475. In Dr. Brady's communication to the *Athenæum* (11 Aug. 1877, p. 180) the motto is given thus: *Non diu sitient sitientes.* Dr. Brady says the mountain is Helicon, with the river Castalia flowing from its side. If Helicon be the mountain, the stream must be Aganippe or Hippocrene.

Latin trochaics and iambics.* The existence and popularity of these *Accademie* or *Compagnie* formed a distinctive feature in the intellectual life of Siena, which has continued almost to the present day. In 1530, Antonio della Paglia (Aonio Paleario) describes such a resort of the Sienese youth (the *Accademia Grande*, founded by Enea Silvio in 1420), whose discussions were carried on in the vulgar tongue, a practice which tends, he thinks, to the neglect of the classics. The most famous of them was the *Accademia degli Intronati* founded in 1525 by Antonio Viguali, to which in due time Fausto was promoted, receiving, in accordance with the custom of the society, the academic name of *Il Frastagliato*, "the jagged"—not an unsuitable nick-name all things considered, and remembering the many loose ends which his defective training must have implied.

At Scopeto they still shew a low-walled seat, once surrounding the venerable stem of a huge holm-oak, the *Ilex Scopetiana*, beneath whose ample shade young Fausto mused or read. That he early shewed indications of ability may be gathered from the remark of his grandfather's pupil, Guido Panzirolo, who cannot close his account of the jurist house of Sozzini without a mention of "Faustus, præclari ingenii juvenis," and the expression of a hope that the young man is destined to tread in the footsteps of his ancestors.† Jurisprudence, however, had never any charms for Fausto, nor indeed at this period had connected study of any kind. He preferred Dante to a law-book, read Boccacio with eager delight, and turned over the pages of Poggio Bracciolini with literary interest.‡ The kind of

* *Ad Anum suos Amores odiose servantem.* Dr. Brady prints this in full, and we have endeavoured elsewhere to present it in tolerable English. *Ch. Life*, 25 Aug. 1877, p. 412; 29 Sep. p. 472.

† Panzirolo (who succeeded the heretic Matteo Gribaldo in a chair of Law at Padua) was born 17 Ap. 1523, and died 5 Mar. 1599. His notices of jurisconsults were put together during the last twenty-six years of his life, amid the miseries of failing eyesight, and afterwards edited and published by his son Ottavio at Venice in 1637. We have no data for deciding how old Fausto Sozzini was when the remark in the text was penned. It is certainly singular that it should have been first printed, and without comment, a generation after his death.

‡ *Opp.* i. 427.

esteem in which he held the profession his family had adorned may be gathered from his own language to a fellow *Intronato:*

"There is not in this world a meaner calling than the science of civil law, as commonly treated; it is no longer of any service to the general good; of all the human sciences there is not one that does more harm to the world, as carried on in so many places by doctors, advocates, auditors, and all that generation. Ample testimony of this is afforded by those cities which have made a clearance of these gentry, and which now live as quietly as can be; no poor man has to spend thirty years in litigation, and be eaten up by their palaces; Bartolo, Baldo, Cino, Alessandro, and all that crew (*canaglia*), born to fill the world with a perpetual plague, are unheard of."—"You may tell me," he goes on, "that I do ill to blaspheme as I do that profession which has been in a manner hereditary in my house, and has conferred upon it a certain name. What I write to you I should not exactly say in the streets, but since you are what you are to me, and as I see you going in that line, I am forced to speak to you on this wise."*

This letter was written 20 April, 1563, exactly two years to a day, if we rightly construe its terms, since Fausto's first sojourn beyond Italy. Nor will it bear the construction that his removal from Siena was compulsory. Rather it conveys the idea that he had voluntarily gone abroad. It is too hastily assumed that the travels of the Sozzini were the result of persecution. The religious attitude of the Sozzini family was by no means uniform. We have seen that towards the close of 1558 four of them in Siena, and one in Rome, were suspected of anti-Romish, but not of anti-Trinitarian heresy. Of these five, Camillo alone appears to have been excommunicated and condemned for contumacy, though the case of Cornelio, who was under arrest at Rome, is doubtful. Camillo took refuge in flight; nor do we meet him again till 1570, when he is accused at Chiavenna of sharing the anabaptist and anti-trinitarian opinions there afloat, but saves himself by subscribing an orthodox confession.† Celso, a wealthy man, who had twice married well, seems to have stood his ground; and

* Cantù, ii 493.

† Cantù, iii. 223.

though not free from the suspicion of (anti-Romish) heresy, he rose in position, and received the title of Count Palatine,* adding the crowned eagle to the family arms. He died in the communion of the Catholic Church, 12 March, 1570.† While he lived, Fausto would not be without a friend to furnish him, during the sequestration of the family estates, with means for study. Of the other members of the family, Messer Alessandro who had no repugnance to law and no scruples about the faith, jogged quietly on at Siena, a respectable Catholic jurist, and apparently outlived his heretical brother; we last hear of him as promoted to the highest civic rank in 1603. Dario, whose precise relationship to Fausto has not been ascertained, is mentioned in conjunction with Camillo, but seems to have had the courage of his opinions.‡ The ladies of the family, who had great confidence in Fausto, were docile recipients of his heresies as they arose, while their influence contributed not a little to the ethical genius of his system.

The letter to which we have referred is valuable, not merely as fixing the date (20 April, 1561) of Sozzini's departure from Italy, but for the indications it affords of his motives and character. It seems there was a Delia in Siena,§ and Fausto had reasons for repressing the emotions natural to a lover. That these reasons were consistent with his own high honour is evident from the strain of his appeal to his attached correspondent Scipione Bargagli. *Il Materiale*, such was Bargagli's academic name, had laid himself open to admonition on the ground of certain *frascherie*, and *Il Frastagliato* does not shrink from some wholesome speaking to his friend. His

* Ugurgieri, *Pompe Senesi*, i. 433. His academic name was *Il Sonnachioso*, "the drowsy."

† Cantù, ii. 505. In a curious letter (Siena, 12 Ap. 1569) preserved in the Breslau Stadtbibliothek, he asks the Lutheran magnate Thomas Redinger to stand godfather to his child "al sacro fonte del Battesimo."

‡ We had doubts as to whether this was really a Sozzini, but he is mentioned as a relative in an unpublished autograph of Fausto, dated 30 Jan. 1587.

§ Delia, too, is the name of the lady in the boyish verses already alluded to. There is not the slightest ground for Dr. Brady's suggestion that this "puella innocens" was a married woman.

appeal is distinguished by its skill, its good taste, its moral power, and its unaffected employment of religious sanction. Most of all is it remarkable for its tone of affectionate imperativeness, as from a master to one who was expected to be a disciple. The instinct of leadership is already very strongly developed. "Do you not know that you are mine? Do you think I have lost my rights by the lapse of a couple of years? Your legal studies do not teach you that. And if you are mine, why do you not let me make of you what I will?" John Wesley might have written this letter.

Fausto's absence from Italy, beginning soon after he had come of age, lasted a little over two years. We would gladly have fuller details than we possess respecting this particular stage in his history. About the middle of the period, Lelio died at Zürich. Previous to this event, Fausto was principally at Lyons. We subsequently find him inscribed among the members of the Italian Church at Geneva,* under the ministry of Niccolo Balbani, whose son Manfredo became his intimate friend.† We have no trace of any relations with Calvin, for whom, indeed, Fausto never shews either liking or respect. Of Beza, on the other hand, he always speaks highly.

What degree of personal intercourse subsisted between Lelio and Fausto at this time, it is difficult to ascertain. But it may be gathered that, while Fausto ever looked back upon his uncle's memory with the warmest admiration, there was at no time any very close interchange of thought between them. His picture of his uncle's mind, as drawn long after in an undated fragment, owes much to the later suggestions of a pious fancy.

"So far," he assures us, "from his possessing no religious certitude, no man ever entertained or expressed (when he thought fit) more exact views on all the dogmata of the Christian religion. But though he perceived that, after so great and so long a darkness, scarcely anything, save the few essentials of salvation, is restored to pristine purity in the churches that throw off the Roman Antichrist, he would not open his mind to every one, except in some slighter

* Cantù, iii. 104. † *Opp.* ii. 118.

controversies, lest the Churches should be disturbed, and the weak, for whom he ever had the greatest consideration, be offended, and perhaps drawn back again from the worship of the True God to idols; and lest the divine verity, proclaimed by one who exercised no function of pastor or doctor in the church, should be rejected and spurned, from the speaker's lack of authority. He saw that in some Churches the accepted opinions and customs were so strong, that even a whisper against them was received with execration; so he thought it better now and then to propose doubts and questions to men illustrious in the Church, that in this way by degrees an approach might be made to the truth, namely, by these men, in consequence of his arguments, being led in the mean time to distrust the soundness of their inveterate opinions, and so forbearing to press them on the people as axioms of Christian religion. This he did, to avoid all offence, under the plea of a desire to be taught (probably a true plea in the outset), and always professed himself a learner, never a teacher. He felt that this plan was not to the full extent approved by his friends, yet he would not comply with their suggestions. In removing this extraordinary man (*vir summus*) by an untimely death, God had a purpose, which very soon began to appear; since, almost directly after his death, some part of what he had not himself the courage to teach openly, began to appear in print, and to be made generally known; which, had he lived, would never perhaps have happened. For his friends were not till then fully indoctrinated in what he had written, since he kept it to himself; and were not so bold as to make public, against their preceptor's will, any of those things which they had learned from him. In this way it hath pleased God to make manifest to all what He had revealed to him alone; that, the darkness of ignorance being thoroughly dispelled, Christian people may begin at length with their whole mind to render unto Him faith and due obedience, and that outsiders may more readily be drawn to the true and saving knowledge of Him through Jesus Christ."*

We have cited the whole of this remarkable passage, because, in the absence of that detailed knowledge of the career of Lelio which we have endeavoured to present in a previous article, it has created the common and utterly untenable view of his relation to the Socinian doctrine.

* *Opp.* i. p. 782.

On one point Fausto really did receive direct exegetical aid from his uncle's literary remains. These were of two sorts:* (1) "quædam paucula ab ipso conscripta," being the brief Dissertation on the Sacraments, and the briefer fragment on the Resurrection, the former of which certainly does not present the views in which Fausto rested;† and (2) "multa annotata," probably written on the margins of a copy of the Scriptures.‡ Among these annotations, belonging to the year 1561, was what Fausto in 1584 described as a *Paraphrasis* on the Proem of St. John's Gospel, containing the key-words, "In Evangelii principio erat Dei sermo."§ Here was the new‖ and pregnant hint which furnished a whole system of idealistic interpretation, as applied to the capital document of New Testament Christology. The actual origin of the Word was to be sought, not with Athanasios in the unbeginning eternity of God, nor with Areios in the interspace before time and creation began, but at the starting-point of the Gospel dispensation. Any prior existence of Christ was an existence only in the Divine idea. His deity was a deity of function, not of nature; his creative power was for the institution of the spiritual cosmos. On this basis Fausto drew up and printed anonymously, in 1562,¶ an *Explicatio* of the Proem (to verse 15), being moved thereto, he tells us, by the desire of friends.**

During his absence from Italy, then, the Christology of Sozzini assumed its definite and final form. He had yet to complete his soteriology; and, as preliminaries, to bring out

* *Opp.* i. p. 362.

† Fausto refers (*Opp.* i. 423) to "two writings" of Lelio on the Sacraments, which may be illustrated by the fact that, in the printed edition, the *Dissertatio* appears in two portions, with separate headings.

‡ It is uncertain to which of these classes we are to refer the lost *Rhapsodia in Esaiam prophetam* mentioned by Sand, *B.AA.* 21, 194.

§ *Opp.* ii. 640.

‖ "Primus omnium hac ætate nostra (quod sciamus) docuit [Lælius]." *Ibid.*

¶ *Opp.* i. 497.

** His preface demonstrates that the unwillingness to publish, which he afterwards ascribed to Lelio, was his own. Indeed, this preface verbally anticipates what he afterwards wrote in criticism of the motives of Lelio.

in dogmatic form his view of the office of revelation "in questo oscurissimo mondo," as well as his impression of the natural mortality of man, the "morte perpetua" of the wicked, and the promise afforded to the good "a ritornar in vita," through the power of the example and the resurrection of Christ.*

Let it not be thought that Sozzini conceived himself impelled to start at once on a mission of religious reform. The *rôle* of a heresiarch was little to his taste; to his latest day he resented this interpretation of his career.† Yet the course which he adopted in 1563 is in many respects surprising. He entered at Florence the service of that very Cosimo de' Medici who, not more than four years previously, had rejected Lelio's strongly supported appeal for a restoration of the family estates. Probably we may trace in this arrangement the influence of Fausto's uncle, Count Celso. His own portion in those estates was thus secured to him; and he remained a faithful servant of Cosimo, employed in many offices of political trust, till his master's death. It is evident that during the eleven years of this service, Sozzini remained a conformist to the Catholic religion. In 1571 we find him at Rome on a political errand, in daily and confidential intercourse with Cardinals, an impossible task if he had been known as a heretic.‡ Two things may have contributed to this attitude on his part. He had found a method of construing much of the phraseology of Romish worship in an ideal sense; the preface to his *Explicatio* expressly refers to the use of the Proem in the canon of the Mass. His feeling about the Protestant movement in its existing shape probably approximated to that of *Vaticanus*, who reasons that if we are to have in religion an autocrat at all, the sway of Rome is in some respects easier and at the same time more conducive to right morals than the tyranny

* Cantù, ii. 494.

† "Nullo prorsus pacto possum ego hæresiarcha vocari, cum nec alios in iis, quæ ad religionis nostræ decreta spectant, docendi provinciam hactenus mihi sumpserim, sed tantummodo vel plane provocatus ac lacessitus, vel amicorum & fratrum precibus ac jussibus coactus, aliquid hucusque scripserim, mea autem ipsius sponte nihil; nec dogma ullum," &c. *Ep. ad Mart. Vadovitam*, 14 Jun. 1598.

‡ See his letter to Bargagli from Rome, 27 April, 1571. *Athen.* ut sup.

of Geneva.* He looked, perhaps, as Ochino originally did, for a new reform within the Church, as distinct from the Protestant revolution.

By no means was Sozzini's mind altogether immersed in the political duties of his situation. The ablest of his constructive writings, the *De Auctoritate S. Scripturæ*, dates from this period. It was composed in Italian in 1570, at the instance of a great personage, probably his patron Isabella de' Medici, and a Latin version of it, by the author, was circulated in manuscript. Its literary history constitutes a striking tribute to the power of the book, which indeed marks an era in Scripture science. A Jesuit father, Dominic Lopez, published it at Seville in 1588, taking to himself the credit of the work, though his preface allows a knowledge of God by the light of nature, altogether contradictory to the argument of Sozzini. To the French translation in 1592, by Nicolas Bernaud, is prefixed the approbation of the ministers of Basle. Grotius borrowed from it the most substantial arguments of the third book in his *De Veritate Religionis Christianæ*, 1639. It won the approval of Bishop Smalbroke, who had written against Arians as idolators, and thought Newgate a fitting confutation of Woolston. A good translation of it was made by an English clergyman, Edward Coombe, who dedicated the work to Queen Caroline in 1731, with an apology for its closing citation of so profane an authority as Dante Alighieri, by reference to the example of St. Paul.

Nor need we wonder at these successive testimonies to the merits of Sozzini's treatise. Of the whole modern literature of rational credence in Scripture, this is the fountain head. What Spinoza is to the school of rationalistic criticism, that Sozzini is to the school of rational credence; with this difference, that while the positions of criticism are infinitely variable, the principles of credence remain substantially unaffected by the course of time. The treatise of Sozzini might serve as the charter of the Christian Evidence Society. His object is

* *Cont. Lib. Calv.* cij, ciij, cvb, xij. Who *Vaticanus* was, is unknown.

simply to prove that the authors of both Testaments were credible men, writing *bonâ fide* in a historical spirit. In conducting this thesis he anticipates, in substance, without burdensome details, every point elaborated in the bulkier works of the credibility-writers, of whom Lardner is the chief. Beneath the structure of the book lies Sozzini's own theory of religion; and it is worth inquiring what is the intellectual basis of the credibility-argument at its source. By nature man is a moral being but not a religious being, "cum religio res naturalis nequaquam sit," as he repeatedly assures us.* Religion is a mere superstition, unless it be "patefactio quædam divina." Of all religions, Christianity is the only one offered as truth to the human race; and by Christianity is here meant the uttered message of Christ, "revera hominem divinum." Prove that the history of Christ is conveyed in a record substantially correct, and you thereby prove the authority of Scripture, so far as it needs to be proved. For the New Testament is based upon the word of Christ, while the Old Testament has for the world at large no independent authority, being valid only in proportion to its conformity with the New.† A modern critic would naturally ask how, if divine knowledge is something altogether shut out from the faculties of the natural man, it has been communicated to the appointed revealer; and how its communication can be demonstrated. The answer of Sozzini must be sought outside his treatise *De Auctoritate.* He has no doctrine of inspiration whatever. Christ, just

* *Opp.* i. 273. He refers to the existence of "nationes omni prorsus religione carentes," for example, in the Brazils.

† It is only fair to add that in later life Sozzini became more conservative as regards the letter of Scripture. He writes to Matthæus Radetzki (8 Jan. 1586), that by a special providence the Scriptures have never been corrupted "neque ex toto neque ex parte." If there are errors in some codices, they may be corrected by the aid of others. Should any passage of Scripture appear to us inconsistent with truth, it is better, as St. Augustine says, to confess our own ignorance, than to call Scripture in question. (*Opp.* i. 386.) And in a fragment on the Apocalypse (*Opp.* ii. 803) he goes so far as to say, "Cavendum diligenter est, ne vel apicem quidem unum in receptis ab ecclesia libris, nedum ipsos libros, in dubium vocari illis [i.e. qui Jesu Christi invocationem prorsus negant] aliqua per nos occasio præbeatur."

before he entered upon his ministry, was taken up bodily into heaven, and there instructed in the divine message. Our conviction that the report is authentic depends entirely upon our persuasion of the messenger's veracity. And so, in their measure, of other revealers.* What would Camillo, what would Lelio, Camillo's pupil, have said to this strait localisation of the fountain of divine knowledge?

On the death of Cosimo (21 April, 1574), Sozzini declined to continue his services under Francesco Maria, son and successor of the late Grand Duke. This refusal has called forth the panegyric of William Penn, who was justly impressed by the fact that Sozzini, "being a young Man, voluntarily did abandon the Glories, Pleasures and Honours of the great Duke of Tuscany's Court at Florence, (that noted Place for all worldly Delicacies) and became a perpetual Exile for his Conscience."† Sozzini's motive was in part political, an unwillingness to be the instrument of Francesco, whose evil life and disastrous influence had already been sufficiently conspicuous at the Florentine court, and who, in the end, "undid all the good which Cosmo had done."‡ There was another and a yet more powerful, because a more personal, motive at work in his mind, leading him to quit politics altogether, and to embrace a new career. In September 1572, Girolamo Zanchi§ published his *De Tribus Elohim* a Scriptural defence of the Trinity. Fausto's anonymous *Explicatio* of the Proem (1562) was attacked in the body of this work; but Zanchi, being doubtful about its authorship, spoke of it simply as the production of *nebulo quidam*. Between the printing and publishing of the volume, Zanchi had found it expressly set down in Beza's preface to the *Acta Valentini Gentilis*, 1567, that the *Explicatio* was the work of Lelio Sozini. Zanchi, who had married a daughter of Celio Secondo Curione, was himself at one time a good deal mixed up with erring thinkers, and had wavered in his Protestantism. Being now

* *Christ. Rel. Inst. Opp.* i. 675. † *Innocency w. her open Face*, 1669.

‡ Hunt, *Hist. of Italy*, 1878, p. 177.

§ Born 1516; died 1590. His wife, Violante, died 13 Nov. 1556, æt. 22. Cantù, ii. 206.

quite reassured in the evangelical faith, he waxes fierce against "Lælii Socini impiam interpretationem," and thus discourses in the preliminary remarks to his book:

"This Lelio, born of a noble and honourable family, was well skilled in Greek and Hebrew, and of blameless life and conduct; on which account there had been between him and myself no common friendship. But the man was full of various heresies; which however he never put forward unless for the sake of discussion, and always in an interrogative form, as though he were desirous of being taught. The Samosatenian heresy, in especial, he cherished many years, and drew whomsoever he could into this form of error. He perverted not a few. Of me also he made trial, as I have said, with divers reasonings, to see if he could involve me with himself in the same error and everlasting perdition; as Matteo Gribaldo and others had also done before."

The passage would seem to have influenced the mind of Sozzini in more ways than one. From it, we believe, he got the notion that behind his uncle's expressed doubts there lurked a definite system of heresy. By it he was at the same time made to feel that it was his act which had thus dragged his uncle's name before the public, with the stigma of impiety upon it. On him therefore it devolved to win the world's respect for principles which he believed he owed to one for whose memory he preserved so deep a reverence and so admiring a regard. Isabella, daughter of Cosimo and wife of the Duke of Bracciano, was acquainted with the inner workings of his mind. Though she, as well as her brother, endeavoured in vain to retain Sozzini at Florence, his share of the family estate was secured to him during their lives; Isabella stipulating only that he should withhold his name from anything that he might publish.* He retained and always expressed the most fervent loyalty for the ruling house of Tuscany.†

We now approach the most important of Sozzini's theological

* Cantù, ii. 490. He kept this promise faithfully. Isabella died in 1578, Francesco in 1587. Hereupon Sozzini lost his Italian property, but he did not put his name to any publication till 1594.

† *Opp.* i. 493.

labours, the treatise *De Jesu Christo Servatore*. The achievement of this work constitutes the main service, or disservice, according as we may view it, which Sozzini rendered to Christian theology. This treatise, partly negative and partly positive in its character, has indeed been chiefly effective on its negative side. It has proved the great storehouse whence all the modern argument against the mediæval doctrine of Christ's satisfaction for sin has been drawn. Yet its internal strength is due to the simplicity and power of its affirmations. That its main line of thought was not original to himself, Sozzini not only allowed but contended, in his anxiety to repudiate the title of heresiarch. His *sententia* had been *aperte expressa et inculcata* in the *Dialogi* of Ochino.* And with Ochino, as we have seen,† the doctrine that Christ came to move not God but man to reconciliation, was a distinct development of Scotism. Sozzini went far beyond Ochino, not only in the elaboration of his thesis, but in the view which he took of Christ as pre-eminently the Revealer rather than the Reconciler; yet without the influence of Ochino and his school the soteriology of Socinianism could never have come to the birth. It is instructive to remember also that Siena, that hotbed of heresy, was a stronghold of the Franciscans, that is to say, of Scotism; while many of the emancipated minds beyond Italy, of whom Lismanin is a conspicuous example, had belonged to the same Order.‡

The origin of Sozzini's treatise is extremely characteristic, and as the history of its growth may serve as a sample of his ordinary method of conducting a controversy, it is worth detailing. Quitting for the last time his native land in 1574, Sozzini took up his residence at Basle. Here he speedily attracted to himself a sort of *clientèle* of young and inquiring

* *Opp.* i. 475.

† *Theol. Rev.* Oct. 1876, p. 553. What is there said of Lelio Sozini's influence on Ochino is in reversal of the facts.

‡ Andreas Dudith, one of the most liberal and pungent writers of that age, the idol of Robert Robinson of Cambridge, had a copy of Ochino's *Dialogi* which had belonged to Valentino Gentile and to Giorgio Biandrata, and was copiously annotated by all its successive owners. Wallace, ii. 304.

spirits who eagerly resorted to his clear and stimulating conversation, though they were often shocked by the radical divergences of his thought from the lines of established doctrine. Among his associates we find the names of Geronimo Marliano, Juan Francisco a young Castilian, and Manfredo Balbani of Lucca, already mentioned. He kept up at the same time a diligent correspondence with his friends at Siena, of which fragments, both edited and unedited, remain. He seems to have had no definite plan of theological work or study before him, but allowed casual opportunities to direct his investigations and his pen. Never a very laborious student, though an indefatigable writer, he confesses that he had no books at hand to aid his thoughts except the Bible.* Always given to poetising, and the author of some of the most doleful sonnets it is possible to imagine,† he employed some of his leisure in turning the Psalms of David into Italian rhyme, and got at any rate as far as Ps. xii. But this was his pastime, not his purpose. His young friend Marliano and others, who clung to the ordinary Evangelical faith but found Sozzini's intellect too strong for them, were anxious to have the points at issue settled in some decisive manner. Sozzini, who felt that his own powers were keenest in controversy, bade them find a suitable disputant to conduct their case. There were hopes that Giambattista Rota, a young Paduan divine and the minister of a French church at Geneva, would have undertaken the task. These hopes were disappointed. By chance, however, there came to Basle in 1577, on his way to the Easter fair at Frankfort, a certain Jaques Couet, a Parisian student, travelling from Geneva in company with Manfredo Balbani. They put up at the same lodging where Sozzini resided, and a considerable party sat down to supper. Before the meal, it had been arranged that Couet was to draw Sozzini on the subject of the satisfaction of Christ. Couet, then a rising light of divinity, fresh from the schools, was by no means averse to the plan. He expected an easy victory; and thought Sozzini would be

* Cantù, ii. 497.

† See specimens in Cantù, ii. 495.

all the more ready to engage with an adversary whose dress betrayed no sign of the ministerial character, as he travelled in the ordinary garb of a business man. He miscalculated alike the shrewdness and the theological eagerness of his opponent. Scarcely had they sat down to table, when the practised ear of Sozzini detected the Calvinist preacher beneath the lay doublet. Couet's long grace before meat was much too professional to be a commercial traveller's spontaneous effort. And the detection greatly increased instead of diminishing Sozzini's willingness for an encounter. He accepted Couet's conversational remarks as a challenge, and the discussion at once began. It was impossible to conclude it that night, and Couet had to start at early dawn on his Frankfort journey. He begged Sozzini to put upon paper the heads of the matters in dispute, and let him have them before he left. No sooner said than done. Sozzini sat down in his bed-room to draft the document. Finishing it in haste, he carried it to the chamber of Couet, who had already retired to rest. Then and there the exact terms of discussion were agreed upon between the two men. A few weeks later, Couet forwarded to Basle, by the hands of Juan Francisco, his examination of the theses, briefly but ably handled. The communication is dated 1 April, 1577. Sozzini felt that the matter demanded of him a full and careful treatment, and accordingly set himself to compose an exhaustive reply. The progress of the work was interrupted by the outbreak of the plague at Basle, and by another controversy of which we shall speak presently. At length on 12 July, 1578, the labour was finished, and in the shape of a bulky treatise was intrusted to Juan Francisco, who promised to send it to Couet's brother at Geneva. By some mischance, the manuscript never managed to reach Couet at all. While it was at Geneva, it fell into the hands of Giambattista Rota, who thought of replying to it on his own account; but his brethren in the ministry advised him that the best answer was the suppression of the manuscript.* Meantime, copies were made

* Rota is the same Jean Baptiste Rotan who, as minister of Rochelle, played fast and loose with his party in reference to the conversion of Henry IV. of France.

at Basle, and diligently spread abroad by the friends of Sozzini. An extract from it, referring to Justifying Faith, was printed without the author's knowledge in 1592.* The whole treatise was published in 1594 at the expense of Elias Arciszewski. It was the first publication to which Sozzini appended his name. In addition to a full account of the origin of the controversy, he embodies the whole of Couet's paper, that readers might see both sides. This was an honest and open method of polemic. Similar fairness was exhibited to the memory of Sozzini himself by Sibrand Lubbert of Franeker, who in 1611 issued a volume *De Christo Salvatore*, containing entire the treatise *De Jesu Christi Servatore* which he was criticising. Whether Couet, who afterwards came back to Basle as minister of the French Church there, took any notice of Sozzini's work on its publication, we do not know. His *Apologia pro nostra Justificatione coram Deo* has not come under our notice, nor have we ascertained its date. He survived Sozzini four years, dying 18 June, 1608, æt. 62.

Before we speak of the effect of the circulation of the *De Jesu Christi Servatore*, we must refer to the singular controversy which interrupted the progress of its composition.

Among the temporary associates of Sozzini was an eccentric Florentine of high connections, Francesco Pucci by name. His bent was towards literature and philosophy rather than theology. Though his family had given three Cardinals to the Church, he forsook the communion of Rome, and, leaving Italy, embarked in a mercantile business at Lyons. The idea of advancing the work of the Reformation took possession of him. He repaired to Oxford, where he was admitted to the degree of M.A. on 18th May, 1574.† But his views and his disputations made him obnoxious to the high Calvinism which then held sway at Oxford. "It pleased God," writes Dr. John Raynolds, in 1576, to the Vice-chancellor, "to stirr up your haste with the grace

* In the impression of this extract, the author's name was given as *Prosper Dysidæus*, a pseudonym which Sozzini had himself used in 1584.

† Cantù says (ii. 499), "nell 'Università di Oxford fu dottorato il 1574;" but this is an error. Our information is from Wood's MSS. E. 29.

of his holy Spirit for the removing of Puccius."* Nor did he find more favour in London. His denial of an outward Church, his insistance upon the necessity of a new dispensation, his inability to find any definite scheme of doctrine in Scripture, his belief that faith in God was implanted by nature in all mankind, were "flat burglary" to the elect, while his attitude towards existing orthodoxies was that of a scoffer.

On the advice of Francisco Betti of Rome, a tried and faithful friend of Sozzini, the enthusiastic Pucci came from England to Basle in 1577, to discuss matters with the cool, keen intellect of his countryman. Their disputation was narrowed to the question of the natural immortality of man, a position which Pucci strenuously maintained, holding it, however, as part of a doctrine of the general immortality of all creatures. Sozzini went to the other extreme. Mortality, not immortality, is the normal issue of human life. Death is not the product of sin, but the uniform attendant of every finite nature. Even supposing the primal man had never fallen, his soul must nevertheless have died.† It is the special grace accorded as a privilege and reward to goodness, the special hope and promise of Christianity, "a ritornar in vita, sì come ha fatto Cristo."‡ Of the fate of the wicked and the heathen, Sozzini nowhere gives a very clear account. That they literally perish is the logical deduction from his language. In the manner of its progress and the delay of its publication, the debate closely resembled the discussion with Couet. The controversy was carried on in writing. Pucci sent in his ten arguments on 4th June, 1577. Sozzini replied to them on the 11th of the same month. Pucci indited a defence of his views on the 1st July. Then came an interruption to the debate. Pucci had to leave Basle in consequence of publicly proclaim-

* Wood's Hist. and Antiq. Univ. Ox. 1796, ii. 180.

† Sozzini alludes (see letter in Cantù, ii. 497) to Athanasius as holding a similar view. Such is not the case. The teaching of Athanasius was, that although before the appearance of Christ there were πολλοὶ who had not committed actual sin, death reigned even over them (*Contr. Arianos*, iii.). They were involved, that is to say, so far as regards the penalty of death, in the tranagression of Adam.

‡ Cantù, ii. 492.

ing the opinion that all men had by nature a share in the righteousness of Christ, and a right to eternal blessedness, which they could lose only by actual sin in adult life. Sozzini, however, finished a long refutation of his adversary's defence at Zürich* on 27th January, 1578. When he finally left Basle for Transylvania, he forwarded this manuscript to Pucci, who made no formal reply, contenting himself with marginal annotations on the copy transmitted to him. This copy was long afterwards returned to Sozzini through Dr. Cornelius Daëms, of Brussels. The publication of the whole controversy, deferred till after the death of both men, did not take place till 1610, when it was issued with the title, *De Statu Primi Hominis Ante Lapsum Disputatio.*

Pucci's subsequent fate was erratic. For a time he joined himself in Holland to a *Concilium Peregrinantium Christianorum.* He encountered Sozzini again in Poland, and was then anxious to discuss, on grounds of reason and Scripture, the question of the naturalness and universality of faith in God. He fell, however, in Poland into the hands of the famous Dr. Dee and his coadjutor Edward Kelly, who, having initiated him into the mysteries of Spiritism, got rid of him, as his *mores* were not *grati* to their wives. He expected the re-appearance of Enoch and Elijah, in the capacity of interpreters of the lost meaning of the Scripture revelation. Finally, at Prague, he was once more converted in a sort of fashion, through the influence of angels, to the Catholic Church, and meditated a visit to Rome, there to lay his numerous writings before the sovereign Pontiff. But in November, 1592, while on his journey, he was thrown from a vehicle; he lay some months, with a broken thigh, at Salzburg. There he probably died, under arrest, in 1593.†

The success of the *De Jesu Christi Servatore* formed the

* Whither, after a visit to Baden (see his letter in Cantù, ii. 498), he had retired on the outbreak of the plague at Basle.

† *Joannis Baptistæ de Gasparis Commentarius de Vita, Fatis, Operibus et Opinionibus Francisci Puccii*, in A. Calogierà's *Nuov. Raccolta d'Opuscoli*, &c., 1755, Vol. xxix. Conf. *Soc. Opp.* i. 378.

turning-point in Sozzini's career. To all who perused the widely-circulated manuscript, the fact must have become patent that the cause of heresy had at last secured the powerful aid of a constructive dogmatist. Up to this time, the stray efforts of anti-trinitarian criticism might fairly have been regarded, by independent thinkers as well as by the orthodox, as of comparatively little account. Their promoters aimed at the rectification of thought and phraseology on purely transcendental points. For the most part they studiously contended that questions of vital moment, in relation especially to the scheme of salvation, were left untouched by their speculations. This, for example, was the case with Ochino, with Lelio Sozini, and with the existing leaders of the anti-trinitarian movement then going on in Poland and Transylvania. But here was a closely reasoned proposal for a radical revolution of the whole moral theology of Christendom. The expression which concludes the well-known couplet written for Sozzini's epitaph—*sed fundamenta Socinus*—conveys no empty boast. Those who reject are at one with those who adopt the Socinian solution of the mystery of salvation, in regarding it as "the only consistent rival"* to the satisfaction scheme which the genius of Anselm had identified with Christianity. Only individuals here and there, it is probable, are deeply interested in the metaphysics or even in the arithmetic of Deity. But the question of human conduct and its issues, in relation to Divine justice and mercy; the means and process of the soul's purification; the doctrine of salvation here and life eternal hereafter; these are, for every human being, topics of momentous and pressing concern. And when Sozzini proclaimed, with no hesitating voice, that the great office of Christ was to make a new moral impression upon mankind; when he treated the Saviour's death as the seal of his exemplary life, and more especially as the gate of his entrance to a heaven thus opened to his followers; when he removed the ground of

* Dr. W. Cunningham, *Historical Theology*, 1863, ii. 183. See the whole chapter for one of the ablest expositions of Socinianism, as "a system of positive opinions," from a Calvinistic point of view.

the substitution theory by declaring that God asks not punishment, but only repentance, as the condition of His forgiveness; when, finally, he destroyed the possibility of a pre-ordained selection of candidates for heaven, by maintaining that the conduct of responsible agents is incalculable by omniscience, does not "come within the scope of what may be known, even by an Infinite Being,"†—it must have been plain to all who loved the old paths that the deaf Italian from Siena, the ex-diplomat of the Tuscan court, who had been silently working at Basle with his Bible and his mother-wit, was no mere critic to be fenced with, but an enemy of strength and resolution, determined to oust mediævalism from the field. On the other hand, the men who longed to see the Churches fully freed from the curse of the old theology but had neither the intellect to perceive, nor the courage to pursue for themselves the path of a complete emancipation, hailed in Sozzini the appearance of their deliverer. His whispered name went round from heretic to heretic, from exile to exile, the synonym for dogged earnestness, unflinching candour, fearless defiance of authority and unimpeachable purity of motive and life.

No one rejoiced in this discovery of the powers of Sozzini with a more eager joy than Giorgio Biandrata of Saluzzo. The very man for his purpose had arisen. 'Come to Transylvania,' he said. 'We have a wide field to be newly planted; you can sow the seed. We are in straits; you can help us.'

Biandrata was a man of every shining talent, but of no soundness of character. Morally speaking, the court physician of Poland and Transylvania was a scoundrel in grain. Of an ancient stock, for the De Blandrate were a powerful family from the early part of the 13th century, Giorgio, the youngest of

† Cunningham, ii. 173. Sozzini, however, had doubts respecting the proper infinity of the Divine Essence, and did not think this doctrine could fairly be deduced from the ideas of limitless power and knowledge (*Opp.* i. 685). His conception of God is of a Being possessed of infinite qualities, personally dwelling in the immovable sphere of the third heaven (*Opp.* i. 42). In this view of the non-immanence of the Deity, he exactly coincides with the founders of another Unitarian system, still extant though little known, that, namely, of John Reeve and Lodowicke Muggleton. The doctrine of Serveto goes to an opposite extreme.

three sons of Bernardino Biandrata, was born at Saluzzo about 1515. Of precocious cleverness, he had graduated in arts and medicine at Montpellier in 1533. But in arts, medicine, or theology, he was never better than a charlatan. He made the functional and nervous disorders of women his specialty,* and this circumstance forms the key to his subsequent opportunities of advancement. His first acquaintance with Hungary was in 1551, but in 1553 we find him with Alciati in the Grisons, and in 1557 he spent a year at Geneva, in constant intercourse with Calvin. His deceitfulness,† even more than his heresies, disgusted the great Reformer, who told him to his face that his countenance was the index of a bad heart. Nevertheless, the supple physician managed to keep on good terms with the rugged Autocrat, at the very time when he was deftly plotting anti-trinitarian sedition in the bosom of the Italian Church at Geneva.‡

In 1558, Biandrata found it expedient to place himself beyond the reach of Calvin's arm, and betook himself to Poland. Here he became an acknowledged leader of the heretical party at the Synods of Pinczow (1558) and Ksionzh (1560 and 1562). His plan of action was the suppression of all extremes of opinion, on the basis of a Confession verbally drawn from Scripture. At the same time he was pushing his worldly fortunes, having obtained the post of court physician in attendance on the old Queen Dowager, the Milanese Bona Sforza, an unscrupulous woman, whose character formed a strange comment upon her baptismal name. She had been

* Some of his early treatises on this subject, including the *Cimelia Muliebria*, still exist in MS., and are described by V. Malacarne in his *Commentario delle Opere e delle Vicende di Giorgio Biandrata Nobile Saluzzese, Archiatro in Transylvania e in Polonia*. Padova, 1814. (Portrait.)

† *Perfidiam, et fallacias, dolosque tortuosos.* Calvin's Letter to the Brethren at Wilna, 9 Oct. 1561. See also Calv. to Zurkinden, 4 July, 1558.

‡ He attended professionally the wife of Count Celso Massimiliano Martinengo, preacher of the Italian Church of Geneva. This was an English lady, Joan Stafford, first married to Williams, an elder in the English Church at Geneva. She died 26 Feb. 1557, about a year after her second marriage. Burns, *Hist. of Par. Registers*, 1872, pp. 285-6.

instrumental in the execution of Katharine Weygel, burned alive at Cracow in 1539, at the age of eighty, for Unitarian opinions. Not very long after this, she placed Ochino's *Dialogi* in the hands of Lismanin, her confessor; and had around her a band of conspirators who were bent on destroying the influence of the Catholic religion, without any very clear idea of what they were to put in its place. From Poland, in 1563, Biandrata transferred for a time his medical services and his heretical schemes to the Transylvanian court, where the daughters, Elizabeth and Anne, of his first patroness were married to ruling princes. He returned to Poland in the train of Stephen Báthory in 1571. It is not a little instructive to know that throughout his Polish career he was accompanied by his two brothers, Ludovico and Alphonso, the former being a Romish ecclesiastic, Canon and Vicar-General of the diocese of Saluzzo. Thus he had every string to his bow.

In Transylvania, Biandrata worked upon the popular mind through his influence over a truly noble and patriotic soul, Ferencz Dávid, the most trusted and the most enlightened of the native clergy, whose story has at length found a worthy narrator in Elek Jakab, keeper of the National Archives at Pest.* Dávid was at once a man of the highest character, and of independent and progressive mind. His deepening hold upon spiritual religion made it impossible for him to remain, or allow his people to remain, in the condition of doctrinal suppression to which Biandrata would fain have reduced the whole Reforming movement. Moreover, the revelation in 1578 of Biandrata's moral vileness, changed admiration on Dávid's part to abhorrence.†

It was at this crisis of affairs that the arrival of a copy of the *De Jesu Christo Servatore* convinced Biandrata that the very man for his purpose was to be found in the person of his

* *Dávid Ferencz Emléke.* Jakab Elektöl. Budapest, 1879.

† The good Wallace glosses Biandrata's *peccatum Italicum* as "a spirit of revenge, which is said to be the besetting sin of Italians" (ii. 259). There is, however, unhappily no ambiguity about the *foeda Sodomiæ* charged against him by the Transylvanian ministers. Bod. p. 383.

compatriot at Basle. The name of a Sozzini, the personal character and growing repute of Fausto, the intellectual proportions of his work, his indefatigable method in controversy and withal the evident bias of his mind to doctrinal finality, his independent position as a layman, and his diplomatic training, all marked him out in Biandrata's cunning eye as the successful antagonist to the views of Dávid, whose course he felt that he could no longer calculate or control. Immediately the court physician made overtures to this unexpected creator of a new orthodoxy, the vanquisher alike of Pucci and of Couet, who had so admirably shaped his course between the radical and the evangelical extremes.*

Sozzini was not slow to respond. Already the age had listened to dreams of Hungary, as a possible field for a Christian church to be re-constituted from the foundation on new principles. In the 27th Dialogue of Ochino, a certain *Eusebius* is introduced as having tried all the various communities of the Reformed without satisfaction to his conscience, and as having at length resolved to betake himself "in Hungariam, ubi spero, Dei ope, constiturum esse Ecclesiam, ab omnibus iis, quæ mihi in cæteris displicuerunt Ecclesiis, incontaminatam." The period for a discussion between Sozzini and Dávid was arranged; and Dávid, with characteristic frankness, opened his house at Kolozsvár to his Italian visitor.†

The discussion between the native Bishop and the proffered leader turned upon the religious honour due to our Lord as part of the devotions of the faithful. The title of *Deus*, and the homage of prayer, had been secured to Christ by the terms of the toleration granted, under Biandrata's influence, to the Minor or anti-trinitarian Church. Within these terms it was Biandrata's purpose to restrain the enlarging spirit of heresy. The charge against Dávid was that he had publicly exceeded them. If the Transylvanian divine would be convinced by

* "Media est inter duo extrema," says Sozzini himself of his doctrine of Justification. *Opp.* i. 621. Conf. i. 483.

† A son of Dávid was then living at Basle, and to this son Sozzini afterwards paid a suitable sum in acknowledgment of his father's hospitality.

Sozzini of his theological error, well and good; if not, Biandrata was resolved to suppress him. No result came of the discussion; as might easily have been predicted, when it is recollected that Sozzini distinctly proclaimed from the first that his mission was not to inquire with, but simply to instruct his adversary. When nine months of this unsatisfactory procedure had elapsed, Dávid ascended the pulpit in the grand old gothic church of Kolozsvár, and, summoning all his eloquence to his aid, denounced the *cultus* of Christ as the remains of Romish superstition, on a level with the *cultus* of Mary and the saints. That sermon was his destruction. An imprisonment and trial on the charge of innovation followed, and the venerable Bishop ended his days amid the accumulated horrors of incarceration at Déva, on the Maros—the Unitarian Wartburg, as it has been called. Yet though the guilty triumphed, and the light of an honest man's testimony was extinguished, who would not prefer the fate of Dávid to the victory of Biandrata? The end of Biandrata was not peace. He amassed a fortune, and returned to be whitewashed in the all-hallowing communion of Rome. A nephew, Bernardino Biandrata, who found it irksome waiting for a dead man's shoes, strangled him at last in his bed, somewhere about 1590. The date is not known; the place was probably Alba Julia (Karlsburg). Thus perished one of those men who are not so much the reproach of a particular community as the opprobrium of human nature.*

The story of Dávid's trial does not form any part of the history of Sozzini, who was neither present nor in any way an accessory. In itself, even as it stands in the pages of the Calvinist historian Peter Bod, it presents one of the most pathetic scenes in the whole record of religious persecution. It is fitting, however, that some account should be here given of the position to which this trial lent so fatal a prominence, and which is usually regarded as the capital doctrine of Socinian orthodoxy, the Invocation of Christ.

* Malacarne treats the story of his murder as an invention of Sozzini, and thinks the nephew had returned to Piedmont before the uncle's death; but the information given by Sozzini (*Opp.* ii. 538) is too precise to be set aside by mere conjecture.

In fixing the precise nature of the religious regard due from Christians to their Master, Sozzini distinguished between *adoratio*, the homage and emotion of the heart, and *invocatio*, the appeal of the lips in prayer. The former he regarded as strictly an essential of the Christian character; the latter as a privilege, which Christians are perfectly free either to exercise or to disuse at their discretion, provided they are not guilty of depriving their fellow-christians of a similar privilege. No man who did not "adore," that is, offer the religious homage of his heart to Christ, could be a Christian on Sozzini's view. On the other hand, while no one could be bound to direct his prayers to Christ, no one should be prohibited from doing so.* This direction of prayer to Christ was not indeed an act of lesser or secondary worship. It stood altogether distinct from the expression of such feelings as Christ on his own merits is fitted to inspire. Its lawfulness arose simply and naturally out of the representative position which Christ has received from the Father. To the Father, alone and absolutely, actual Godhead belongs. Upon Christ, in essence a *purus putus homo*, a creation *ex nilo* (whose birth of a Virgin has no theological significance and ranks as a prodigy, a sign to know him by), the Creator has bestowed an official Godship, a *divinitas* as distinct from *deitas*, a supremacy not of nature but of office. It is Christ who administers the Church and rules the human world, under the authority of God. Cantù well observes, "Ad ogni modo costituivasi *un Dio subalterno*, al quale in un dato tempo il Dio supremo cedette il governo del mondo." It follows that we may, if we please, direct the whole of our prayers to Christ; so doing, we are only presenting them to the Father's authorized representative, duly appointed to receive them. How easily this theological device enabled a concordat to be established between a Catholic form of devotion and a heretical spirit, is plain upon the face of it. Equally plain is it that the idea of such a union would have been impossible to a sensitively

* See especially his controversy with Ivan Niemojewski (*Opp.* i. 397—423) for a clear and dispassionate statement of his views.

religious nature. What Sozzini's own habit in devotion may have been, we do not know. He never conducted the services of the Church, and of his private practice we have no trace. His religious writings are, however, singularly bare of any personal aspiration towards our Lord; and comparing him in this respect with Serveto, or even with his own uncle Lelio, we are struck with the marked absence of overt signs not only of the *invocatio* which he protected, but of the *adoratio* on which he insists. Yet he continually made this topic a corner-stone of ecclesiastical unity. His great quarrel with the Arians of his day was that, notwithstanding their exalted views of Christ's dignity of nature, they could not be brought to acknowledge the lawfulness of Invocation.*

The disastrous issue of the dispute with Dávid terminated Sozzini's hopes of being useful by his presence to the Churches of Transylvania. In May 1579, before Dávid's trial actually came on, Sozzini was on his way to Poland, his departure being hastened by the prevalence of an epidemic cholic. He was now forty years of age, and anxious that his connection with the Reforming movement should assume some definite shape. He took up his residence at Cracow, and in this beautiful city or in its neighbourhood, he spent the remaining twenty-five years of his life. Twice was he compelled to leave Cracow itself. On the first occasion, in 1583, he was protected by Kristóf Morsztyn, who gave him a home at Paulikowice, and his daughter Elizabeth to wife. The second time, in 1598, a fresh excitement against his opinions having been aroused by the publication of his *De Jesu Christo Servatore*, his house was sacked and his person violently used by the rabble of Cracow, who dragged him from his bed through the streets. A final refuge was provided for him under the roof of Abraham Blonski at Luslawice. Before this second persecution he lost his wife

* This is characteristic of all modern Arians, the only exception that occurs to us being that of Micaiah Towgood. On the other hand, many Humanitarians have permitted and employed direct address to Christ; and even Mr. Belsham concedes that his friend the Duke of Grafton was possibly right "in believing that Jesus Christ in his present state can hear and help us." *Mem. of Lindsey*, 1812, p. 328.

in child-birth, and in the same year, 1587, had his family property withdrawn from him, on the death of Francesco Maria de' Medici. Francesco's successor in the Grand Duchy, Ferdinando I., had been a Cardinal, and it would never do for a quondam Prince of the Church to support a heretic.

Sozzini's relation to the Liberal Churches of Poland was peculiar. He was welcomed at their Synods and courted by their leaders, yet he never formally joined their communion. The difficulty was not so much one of doctrine as of church order. The Polish anti-trinitarians were anabaptists, and Sozzini would never consent to be re-baptized. His position about baptism was, that it was a thing indifferent; and when he was urged that in this case he might reasonably submit to the ordinance, he firmly replied that he could not thus treat an open question as if it were closed. What Christianity required was a condition of the heart; outward ordinances must be left to find their own level in the practical experience of the Christian community. As a matter of expediency and to avoid scandal, he was prepared to acquiesce in the requirement of baptism in the case of those who had never been baptized at all; but he would not go further than this. Baptism was baptism, at whatever age or in whatever form administered. Here, again, he holds out his favourite proposal for combining the incompatibles of Catholic usage and Liberal conviction. It followed from this refusal of his, that even while enjoying the highest respect of the Liberal Churches, he long remained virtually an excommunicate. Whether this non-admission to the sacred table was felt by him as a distinct loss to the spiritual life, or was unwelcome only as the withholding of a right of profession which might justly be claimed by every Christian man, it is not easy to determine. Probabilities incline to the latter view. Before his death, however, Churches arose in Poland which adopted his own view of the terms of communion. The non-necessity of baptism ultimately became a recognized tenet of the Polish anti-trinitarian community; accordingly the Racovian Catechism, in its first issue, acknowledges only one Sacrament as instituted by Christ.

It is not necessary to pursue in detail the ramifications of the various controversies with which Sozzini was from time to time engaged. His Polish life was spent in discussions, that is to say in perpetual endeavours to press home his own middle way in matters of opinion to the reluctant minds of all sorts of extreme men. From the highest Arianism to the barest Theism, every variation of theological belief presented by the Reforming movement was successively confronted by the keen logic of the Socinian compromise. Rarely did he bring out a Catholic combatant; nevertheless his discussion on the Unity of God with the Jesuits of Posen was valued by himself as the choicest of his extant polemical performances. He excepted only the treatise against Atheism, which perished in the outbreak of violence at Cracow. Here, however, the inability of an author to appraise the comparative merit of his works is once more illustrated. The truth is, Sozzini had no metaphysical genius. Nothing can be more jejune than his dreary elaboration of textual commonplaces in refutation of the subtle arguments of the Catholic dogma *de Deo*. With Arians he succeeded better than with Semi-judaizers, as he called them, so far at least as making converts was concerned. But he persistently drove the ultra-radicals, one by one, from the field.

It is in his treatment of this latter class of thinkers and doubters that the least genial side of Sozzini's character exhibits itself. In controversy he was scrupulously fair—perhaps it would be truer to say, scrupulously exact—but never sympathetic. He had nothing of Ochino's characteristic love of taking both sides of every question into his own mind, nothing of his admirable power of feeling their merits with his own consciousness. Sozzini's cold energy reminds us of Calvin. Had these two crossed swords, the career of Protestantism might have been different. Not even the Geneva steel could have encountered quite unharmed the imperturbable blade of the Italian fence. As it was, Sozzini's antagonists were never his equals in intellectual power, and he made no account of their personal claims to consideration. This im-

presses us strongly in his dealings with Dávid. Though to call Sozzini a persecutor is to speak in ignorance of the facts, yet it is observable that throughout his subsequent allusions to Dávid's opinions and death, he never lets drop a word of kindness for the man. He prided himself, and with truth, on his avoidance of irritating and obnoxious language in controversy. Nothing can be in better breeding than his restraint and his courtly civility. He set an example, of the highest use in that age, and of permanent value. Yet in estimating a man's internal worth, we somehow feel that we would rather have to apologize for his rude words than for his chilled sympathies. "A curse relieves," wrote human-hearted Charles Lamb to Matilda Betham; "do you ever try it"?* Quite free from the tendency to ecclesiastical swearing, Sozzini was equally free from the weakness of loving those he could not convince. Towards Christian Franken, the Polish Dávidite, and towards Simon Budny, who ran in Lithuania a theological career not unlike that of Dávid in Transylvania, and was publicly excommunicated, with his numerous followers, by the anti-trinitarians in 1584, Sozzini exhibited the attitude simply of a hard repulsion.

There is a still stronger case in point. Martin Seidel was a poor refugee from Olaw in Silesia, with abnormal views on religious matters. He rejected the Messianic doctrine of the New Testament, on the ground that the Hebrew Prophets had distinctly promised a mundane King, while the kingdom claimed for Jesus was of a totally different and spiritual order. He rejected the Messianic hopes of the Old Testament, on the ground that the expectation there held out was an exclusively Jewish promise, just as the ceremonial law was an exclusively Jewish code. The sum of the universal religion he discovered in the moral law, "Decalogus, qui est æterna & immutabilis voluntas Dei." This law, he said, "etiam mihi a Deo datus est, non quidem per vocem sonantem de cælo, sicut populo Judaico, at per creationem insitus est menti meæ." But the

* *Fraz. Mag.* July, 1878, p. 79.

*insitus Decalogus* being corrupted in the hearts of men by bad custom, the *vocalis Decalogus* was of supreme worth as a universal rule, "quia cum insito nobis Decalogo consentit." Seidel had made fruitless efforts to propagate this moral Theism among his compatriots, and despairing of any success, he betook himself to the Polish anti-trinitarians, "utpote ad eos qui propiùs, quàm aliæ sectæ, ad veritatem accesserunt." He made no secret of his opinions, which he frankly owned had not won a single convert, and wanted to obtain permission to open at Cracow a school for boys, where he might teach "litteras, item necessarias linguas & artes," and enjoy the comfort of living among a tolerant people. Sozzini was entrusted with the task of answering his application, when a correspondence ensued. Not a syllable did the cautious dogmatist suffer to escape from his pen in reference to the particular request of the unfortunate exile. He simply did his utmost to argue him into Socinianism. No doubt so purely spiritual a conception as that of an *insitus Decalogus* ran counter to Sozzini's whole notions of speculative fitness. The correspondence closes in a manner which is painfully moving. Poor Seidel, seeing that his application was not to be considered till he had become a proselyte, writes his farewell, thanking those few who had shewn kindness to a wandering stranger, and invoking the blessing of God on a community, whose doctrine he would gladly see embraced by all Christians, that the world might thus be freed from superstitions against which he too was contending, "sed ex aliis fundamentis quam vos facitis." Sozzini, on the other hand, coldly winds up with the ungenerous retort that it might justly be suspected that the man whom he had failed to enlighten was fonder of his own opinions than of the truth.*

Despite this inflexibility of disposition, Sozzini had grasped to a certain extent the great idea of religious toleration, on a principle which was peculiarly his own. Drawing the ordinary Catholic distinction, he dealt separately with those who

* *Opp.* ii. 806-12.

simply hold, and those who "pertinaciously" seek to propagate, opinions which may be deemed erroneous. The former class should not in any way be molested; and if they rule their lives "ad præscriptum Christi" (which, however, the Papists, being all idolators, do not), they will, whatever their speculative errors, be admitted to life eternal.* To the second class belong "heresiarchs;" and these it is lawful to control in their action, even to the extent of imprisonment, if there be no other way; but no further.† Sozzini lived in an age when Catholics zealously put in force the penalty of the stake, and Protestants resorted to the discipline of the sword, for the suppression of heresy. That he emancipated his mind from assent to this last resort of religious cowardice, was a stride in the right course, for which we must yield him all credit. In fact, his argument went further in this particular direction than the ideas either of that age or this. If it is right, argued the votaries of intolerance, to use sword and flame against the enemies of the State and of an earthly prince, why is it not right to employ them against the foes of the Church and of Christ? Sozzini found it impossible to answer this question. Accordingly, he maintained that it was wrong to resort to sword and flame in any case; that war itself, and the punishment of death or of mutilation, as well as the *auto-da-fé*, were unlawful exercises of power on the part of a Christian man. He pursued this doctrine to all its consequences; and concluded that no true Christian could hold any civil office which involved complicity with bloodshed.‡ Neither might a Christian appeal to the magistrate for the redress of private injuries. As the Hebrews were formerly under a Theocracy, so are Christians now under a Christocracy; hence the only method

* *Opp.* i. 502. † *Opp.* i. 476.

‡ The application of this doctrine to practical life presents a fruitful field for casuistry, such as the Quakers subsequently employed, and for which the mind of Sozzini was peculiarly adapted. See his letter to Elias Arciszewki, 15 Feb. 1595. (*Opp.* i. 438.) A Christian might not kill or wound even an assassin, but he might beat or bruise him; and he might wear arms with intent to scare a robber from attacking his person.

of dealing with civil grievances which they can lawfully put in motion is that of excommunication; "etiamsi," as he naively expresses himself, "in excommunicatione persequenda plus læderetur proximus, quam in civili magistratu ulciscendæ injuriæ caussa adeundo."* The controversy into which he rushed on this whole subject with Jacobo Panioto Paleologo in 1581 was the most unpopular of all his writings, at any rate with his own party. Paleologo was a leading liberal, whose imperial ancestry lent weight to his position among the anti-trinitarians, while his age and misfortunes, it was thought, should have exempted him from attack. These were always, with Sozzini, very subordinate considerations, and a pungency was added to his polemic by the fact that Paleologo had been a friend, and continued a disciple, of Dávid.†

The portrait of Sozzini, prefixed to the Amsterdam edition of his works, shews us a rather short-necked, round-shouldered man in a scholar's habit, with a wrinkled forehead exceptionally high and broad, penetrating eyes somewhat dulled by the use of the lamp, a small and graceful mouth, a trim beard of formal cut, and that slightly pondering look which deaf people often acquire.‡ The expression is grave and sweet, and very self-contained. But the true picture of the man is to be found in his letters to his friends. There he conceals nothing either of his power or his weakness. His verbosity; his un-Ciceronian Latin; his scant skill in other learned tongues; the thinness of his general culture; his late acquaintance with the elements of logic; his hatred of personalities in discussion; the cock-sure confidence of his absolute certainty where he knew; the naked frankness of his doubts where he felt he did not know; his life by rule, but without asceticism; his love of simple fare and apparel, combined with a valetudinarian nicety in food and lodging; his sensible judgment on luxuries, since

* *Opp.* ii. 92.

† See *Jacobus Palæologus, Eine Studie*, von Karl Landsteiner, Wien. 1873, a careful piece of work by a Catholic clergyman and schoolmaster, giving valuable original documents.

‡ For his early deafness, see Cantù, ii. 496.

what would be extravagance in one set of conditions is but the custom of common life elsewhere,*—all these features of the real living man are freely self-delineated, without art and without effort, in his most engaging correspondence. He patiently bears with the biting remarks of his "candid friend" Marcello Squarcialupo, though he is too sure of himself to appreciate the full force of "Tear'em's" pungent criticism. He cannot understand how anybody can consider him disputatious; he is utterly unconscious how high his voice rises in parlour debate. Devoid of passion, Sozzini is not altogether free from a suspicion of occasional peevishness. But a man who is subject to cholic and the stone may be excused for some symptoms of involuntary vexation. His domestic affections, the enjoyment of which was so sadly and prematurely cut short, were warm and true. For the education of his little daughter, whom he named after his own mother, Agnese, he was tenderly solicitous; and though he felt it right that the child should be in her aunt's care, it was a great privation to the widowed father that he could not have her always with him. His friendships were life-long; his admirations free from the slightest taint of jealousy. It was his delight in the religious eloquence and rising reputation of Peter Stoienski, the young pastor of Luslawice, which led him to fix his final residence in that pleasant spot. A busy but never a restless life, a persecuted but calm existence, a personality singularly influential but never officially promoted to posts of command, ceased at length to be. An obscure village, buried in a quiet vale encircled by the hills of Galicia, lost one of its inhabitants. On the 4th March, 1604, at Luslawice, in the mature vigour of his sixty-fifth year, Fausto Paulo Sozzini passed away from the world. The traveller who takes the pains to search for the resting-place of his mortal remains may easily identify it. Luslawice lies some thirty English miles eastward from Cracow, and the huge square block of limestone, with its defaced inscription, which covers the tomb of the departed heretic, is

* The *Axamit*, which so strangely puzzles Dr. Toulmin in this connection, is the low Latin *examitum* (ἑξάμιτον woven with six threads), our *samite*.

carefully railed round by the piety of the Catholic proprietor of the soil.

Nothing was further from the purpose of Sozzini than the founding of a Unitarian Church. The religious necessity for such an institution which pressed upon Bidle and Lindsey was a necessity of worship, and, as we have seen, Sozzini was more anxious to protect than to exclude the worship of our Lord. Apart from this question of worship, the particular opinion which came subsequently to be conveyed by the name Unitarian is a mere dogma of theological speculation, and one which was not, in Sozzini's view, of the first importance. But as the term Unitarian, which we first encounter as an ecclesiastical designation long after Sozzini's death, is often vaguely used, it may be well to specify what it means.*

There can be no controversy among Christians respecting the Unity of God. The proposition, "God is One," is received by all Christians as an essential of faith, with the same unanimity and certainty with which they hold the proposition, "God is." It is indeed a condition precedent of Christianity, rather than a part of Christianity itself, viewed as a distinct revelation. If the Unitarian doctrine meant to assert this acknowledged truth and no more, it would cease to be accounted a heresy, at the expense of being reckoned a truism or an impertinence. It is not till we get beyond the revelation of the Divine Unity to the question of the Divine Personality, that we touch the ground of conflict between the Trinitarian and the Unitarian. These terms are correlative; the one defines the other. That which the former asserts, the latter not only denies, but meets with a counter assertion. On the one hand, it is dogmatically maintained that there exists a threefold Personality in the Godhead, that God is Tripersonal; on the other, that there is no such triplicity in

* We may here state, on the authority of Elek Jakab, that the word *Unitarius* was first employed, so far as his knowledge goes, by the narrator of a discussion between Péter Juhász (Melius) and F. Dávid. We have not the date at hand, and the point requires further elucidation. In the Records of the Consistory at Kolosvár the word *Unitarius* never occurs till the year 1637.

the Divine Selfhood, that God is Unipersonal. The Unitarian doctrine means, not the bare Unity, but the Unipersonality of God; a doctrine, of course, which it is vain to seek in the express terms of the Scriptural revelation; which is a deduction from Scripture in the way either of development or of corruption in one direction, just as the Trinitarian doctrine is a deduction in the way of development or of corruption in another direction. The Trinitarian doctrine was the earlier reduced to accurate language, and the Catholic Church has decided that it furnishes the true sense of Scripture. But though the formulation of the Unitarian doctrine comes later, it claims, as every Christian doctrine must claim, to be the legitimate exposition of the records and the mind of the age of inspiration.

Now Sozzini, while he held the Unitarian doctrine, did not hold it as the centre of his system, or even as in itself an essential truth of the Gospel. Every one who believed and acted upon the precepts of Christ, either as of supreme authority (which is the Catholic position), or as of an authority practically equivalent to the supreme (which is Sozzini's own view), was entitled to all the benefits of the Gospel. Sozzini expressly disclaimed the character of a party man, "nulli sectæ sum penitus addictus."* He thought that Calvinists, Arians, and those of his own way of thinking, ought freely to make common cause in church fellowship, and constitute a national Free Church.† The only denominational name which he himself ever adopted was Christian, and his immediate followers strictly adhered to his practice. Hence the specific designations which soon came into use for the anti-trinitarian party were at first merely local (Pinczovian, Racovian, and the like), or personal (Socinian, Budnæan, &c.), or the revived party-words of controversies long extinct in their original form (Ebionite, Samosatenian, Photinian). The Transylvanian Church finally adopted Unitarian as its official designation;

* *Opp.* i. 373.

† See his special treatise on this point, *Quod Regni Poloniæ & Magni ducatus Lithuaniæ homines*, &c., 1599. *Opp.* i. 691–707.

but the Polish Church was faithful, even in exile, to Sozzini's scrupulosity, proclaiming itself a society of Catholic Christians, "quos Unitarios vocant." As late as 1762 the Church of Polish exiles at Kolozsvár re-issued their "Confessio Fidei Exulum Christi, qui ab ejus sanctissimo nomine *Christiani tantum* appellari amant."

The true missionaries of Socinianism were the printing-presses of Racow, 1602—1638, Zaslav-Losk-Wilna-Lübeck, 1572—1656, and Amsterdam (Irenopolis) 1669—1692.* Of Socinism proper, if we may thus designate the precise stage which his doctrines reached in the master's own mind, the authorized exponent is the *Catechesis Ecclesiarum quæ in Regno Poloniæ*, &c., commonly known as the Racovian Catechism. This was undertaken by Sozzini and Stoienski in 1603, but completed by Valentin Schmalz and Jeromos Moskorzowski in 1605. It was dedicated, strangely enough, to James I. of England.† This work became in fact the means of introducing Socinism to our country. It was reprinted in London, 1651, but most of the copies were burnt on 6th and 8th April, 1652, by order of the Long Parliament.

But Socinianism had to undergo a development from the original form which the characteristic caution of its inspiring mind had imposed upon it, before it reached its natural issues as a theological system. To study Socinianism as a matured science of religious thought, we turn to the *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum*. This collection does not contain, and may be said to exclude, the works of the actual associates and immediate successors of Sozzini. The series began, in 1666, with the volumes of Hans Krell the great theologian of the Neo-Socinians, and Jonas Schlichting their most distinguished commentator. Both these men studied at Altorf, and brought new ideas thence to bear upon the system of Sozzini. The works of Sozzini himself were not added till 1668. Those of Johann

* Sand. *Bib. Antitrinn.* 79, 201-2.

† It was published in Polish 1605, in German (*Der Kleine Katechismus*) 1608, in Latin 1609. See Rees' Historical Introduction. Dr. Rees' translation is not from the original Catechism, but from Schlichting's Amsterdam revision, 1659.

Ludwig Wolzogen complete the original series.* It was the Krell type of Socinianism which influenced the mind of Bidle; and Bidle found it easy to remove as a mere excrescence from the teaching of Krell that doctrine of the Invocation of Christ which had been rooted in the very heart of Sozzini's own *via media* position.

The Liberal Church of Poland had always been conspicuously a Church of refugees. Few of its distinguished leaders were men of Polish birth or ancestry. Of Sozzini's personal coadjutors, Schmalz was a Thuringian, Volkel a Saxon. Krell proclaims himself a Franconian on every one of his title-pages; Wolzogen was an Austrian baron; and Schlichting, though born at Bukowiec, was a Swiss by immediate ancestry. To this cause we may partly attribute the sudden and entire dispersion of the Polish Church under the persecuting edict of Ivan Casimir I. in 1660. Another cause may be sought in the fact that, going much further than Sozzini, the leaders of the Polish Church generally maintained the unlawfulness, in any circumstances, of civil office for a Christian man. The operation of this restriction would necessarily deprive the Church of the services of many who wished to maintain an organic hold upon the national life, and would increase the appearance of its alien character. A few scattered families kept up the tradition of worship and association on the borders of Poland, even to the early part of this century. A larger number were drafted into the neighbouring Church of Transylvania. At Kolozsvár the Polish community exhibited an independent existence till 1793.

With the dispersion of 1660, however, the existence of the Socinian faith as a separate ecclesiastical organization practically came to an end. In Transylvania, under the Unitarian name, the inheritors of the freedom of Dávid have well retained their Church life among the hardy settlements of the Szekler race; have proved themselves able to combine intense religious

* A set of the *Bibliotheca* usually includes also the volumes of Daniel Van Breen (1666) a Dutch Remonstrant, and of Samuel Przypcowski (1692) who, though the biographer of Sozzini, was a Servetian as regards the filiation of Christ.

earnestness with a large faith, a superior culture, and a comprehensive charity; and have known how to receive and apply the best of those newer theological influences, which have so largely modified the career of Liberal Christianity since the appearance of that foremost of liberal pioneers, Joseph Priestley.

ALX. GORDON.

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## VII.—NOTICES OF BOOKS.

### 1. SOME PHILOSOPHICAL BOOKS.

*The Data of Ethics.* By Herbert Spencer. London: Williams and Norgate. 1879.

WE have here the first instalment of the concluding section of the "System of Synthetic Philosophy," although the second and third volumes of the "Principles of Sociology" are as yet unpublished. This deviation from the natural consecution is due to Mr. Spencer's anxiety not to leave the most important portion of his work altogether unexecuted.

"Hints," he says, "repeated of late years with increasing frequency and distinctness, have shewn me that health may permanently fail, even if life does not end, before I reach the last part of the task I have marked out for myself. This last part of the task it is, to which I regard all the preceding parts as subsidiary. Written as far back as 1842, my first essay, consisting of letters on *The Proper Sphere of Government*, vaguely indicated what I conceived to be certain general principles of right and wrong in political conduct; and from that time onwards my ultimate purpose, lying behind all proximate purposes, has been that of finding for the principles of right and wrong in conduct at large a scientific basis. To leave this purpose unfulfilled after making so extensive a preparation for fulfilling it, would be a failure the probability of which I do not like to contemplate; and I am anxious to preclude it, if not wholly, still partially. Hence the step I now take."—Preface, p. iii.

He is the more desirous to indicate, in outline at least, his views on this subject, because "now that moral injunctions are losing the authority given to them by their supposed sacred origin," the establishment of rules of right conduct on a scientific basis is becoming imperative; for "few things can happen more disastrous than the

decay and death of a regulative system no longer fit, before another and fitter regulative system has grown up to replace it."

We do not share Mr. Spencer's conviction that the intuitional, or, as he chooses to term it, the "supernatural" view of moral insight has received a fatal blow from recent culture and criticism. No doubt, in the sphere of moral as well as of mental philosophy, the psychological and anthropological researches of recent years will effect some important and permanent modifications; but the distinction which has pervaded all philosophy from the earliest times, the distinction which the Greeks recognize under the ideas of the Real and the Phenomenal, and the moderns under those of Intuition and Experience, is, we believe, as eternal and ineffaceable as human reason itself; and sound culture, so far from undermining and eliminating either of these factors, only serves to clear away adventitious growths of speculation, and to bring out in greater clearness and beauty this two-fold source and character of all knowledge. In all our moral judgments (as indeed in all our intellectual and scientific judgments likewise), intuition and experience co-operate: the ethical intuition discloses the absolute and obligatory character of the fundamental moral principle, while ethical experience not only embodies the principle and furnishes the material out of which reflection both educes a clearer idea of the true character of the principle itself, but also discloses more efficient methods of giving it a practical expression in the conduct of life. The truth that we are bound to do justice and love mercy, has expanded as a living principle concurrently with the advance of culture. Its intrinsic breadth and depth may be more clearly realized by the modern Christian than by the ancient prophet, and the moralist of the present day may have learned by experience more effectual ways of doing justice and loving mercy than were present to the mind of Micah; still in him and in us this moral consciousness grows from the same seed, and that seed, though it needs culture and experience for its germination and rich fructification, needs also, we feel assured, a fresh Divine creation and a fresh Divine inspiration for its original appearance as a living element in the consciousness of mankind.

As we were not enabled by Mr. Spencer's "Principles of Biology" to see how the most exhaustive knowledge of physics and physiology can afford the slightest clue to the evolution of *conscious life* in the phenomenal universe, so now from his "Data of Ethics" we get no real explanation of how, save by a fresh act of creation, *the sense of moral obligation* can dawn in a being whose only original furniture

is represented as a susceptibility to feelings of pleasure and pain, and a perception of the relations of likeness and unlikeness among these feelings. We may say of Mr. Spencer's account of the origin of the sense of obligation, what Dr. James says, humorously but yet most justly, of the way in which our author smuggles consciousness into his scheme of Evolution under the name of "nascent" nervous shocks, "it is as if, like the girl in *Midshipman Easy*, he could excuse the illegitimacy of an infant by saying it was a very little one."

The "very little one" out of which the adult sense of moral obligation grows, is, according to Mr. Spencer, the faint feeling of moral reprobation which springs up in the minds of people when they contemplate the pain which certain actions cause to individuals and to society:—"neither the thought of imprisonment, nor of divine anger, nor of social disgrace, is that which constitutes the moral check on theft; but the thought of injury to the person robbed, joined with a vague consciousness of the general evil caused by a disregard of proprietary rights." It will be noticed that this theory differs from that of Mr. Bain, who regards the infliction of legal penalties by society as the source of the idea of obligation; but neither of these writers vouchsafes any explanation of how it comes to pass that either the dread of punishment or the pain arising from wounded sympathies should be metamorphosed into the quite distinct feeling of obligation which forms the essence of our moral sentiment. Mr. Spencer endeavours, indeed, to eke out his unsatisfactory account of the genesis of this sentiment by an appeal to the principle of heredity; for he says that the faint feeling of moral reprobation which is felt at the sight of others' injuries "is superinduced on a still more indistinct but voluminous consciousness due to the inherited effects of such experience on progenitors." If, however, it cannot be shewn how moral reprobation and moral obligation arose in our remote ancestors out of merely pleasurable and painful feeling, it is difficult to see how heredity can generate in descendants a product essentially different in quality from any which was present in the progenitors.

Apart from the peculiarity in the above account of the origin of the moral sentiment, the feature in this work which chiefly distinguishes it from the other Utilitarian treatises by Mr. J. S. Mill and Mr. Bain is, that in Mr. Spencer's view it is the business of Moral Science to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness,

and what kinds to produce unhappiness. "Having done this," he says, "its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct, and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery." Hence he calls his system "rational" Utilitarianism, while he refers to previous systems of the same school as "empirical" Utilitarianism. He accordingly passes in review the physical, biological, psychological and sociological sciences, and gathers up the data which he conceives them to furnish in reference to the laws which regulate human happiness. From physics and biology he derives the law that pleasures are the concomitants of the normal exercise of functions, while pains are the concomitants of excesses and defects of functions. This law confirms, he thinks, his doctrine that all conduct in which there is any amount of pain is partially wrong, and only that conduct is morally perfect which brings no pain either to the agent or to society. He admits that, "under present circumstances, in many cases pleasures are not connected with actions which must be performed, nor pains with actions which must be avoided, but contrariwise;" and he maintains that the majority of ethical theorists, misled by this fact, have failed to see that all acts the doing of which is accompanied with pain are so far wrong, and have consequently assigned to painful acts of self-sacrifice a moral rank to which they have no rightful claim.

"The ethical theories," he adds, "characterized by these perversions are products of, and are appropriate to, the forms of social life which the imperfectly-adapted constitutions of men produce. But with the progress of adaptation, bringing faculties and requirements into harmony, such incongruities of experience, and consequent distortions of theory, must diminish; until along with the complete adjustment of humanity to the social state, will go recognition of the truths that actions are completely right only when, besides being conducive to future happiness, special and general, they are immediately pleasurable; and that painfulness, not only ultimate, but proximate, is the concomitant of actions which are wrong." P. 99.

As according to this theory all action that involves pain is morally evil, it becomes a difficult matter for Mr. Spencer to determine how far morality permits us to incur suffering and inconvenience for the sake of others. There are two curious chapters devoted to the attempt to establish a fitting compromise between Egoism and Altruism. Our author, however, regards this compromise as only provisional, and he depicts in glowing language a future when Altruism shall involve no self-sacrifice; when, indeed, it shall be regarded by

all men as the greatest and most unalloyed of all pleasures, and the present Egoistic competition shall be replaced by Altruistic competition, all eagerly contending for the largest share of opportunity to confer benefits on society, so that "Absolute Ethics will eventually include a higher equity, prescribing the mutual limitations of Altruistic activities" (p. 287). We cannot here enter upon the criticism which these doctrines invite, and can only say that while in common with Mr. Spencer we aspire towards that spiritual height where virtue ceases to be a struggle and becomes synonymous with perfect joy, we think that such ethical theories as the one propounded in this volume rather weigh down the wings of the spirit than inspire them with the needful vigour for this divine flight above the sphere of all selfish considerations.

*Anti-Theistic Theories, being the Baird Lecture for* 1877. By Robert Flint, D.D., LL.D. Edinburgh and London: Blackwood and Sons. 1879.

*Studies in Philosophy and Literature.* By William Knight, LL.D. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1879.

It would seem that it is in the Scotch Universities, and especially in Edinburgh and St. Andrews, that scholarly and philosophical Theism will find its chief refuge in our island during the prevalence of that indifference and scorn towards theology which Evolution theories and other influences have occasioned. For the present, theology is under a cloud, and those who cultivate that field must not expect that the beams of popular favour will stream down on them and their work. The more honour, then, to those who, like Dr. Martineau, Professor Newman and Miss Cobbe, have laboured long and earnestly to defend and strengthen the philosophical foundations of Theistic belief. Along with these powerful defenders of a rational faith, the two Scotch Professors to whom we owe the above-named books must now be included. We noticed at some length Dr. Flint's work on "Theism," and must be content to say of the sequel to it, the present "Anti-Theistic Theories," that the favourable estimate we formed of the former volume fully applies to this one also. It is, like its predecessor, pre-eminently a book for the minister's library; for while it contains the most effective criticisms which have been directed against Materialism, Atheism and Pantheism, by English, French and German writers, it is by no means deficient in clear indications that the writer is not only a singularly industrious and discriminating collector of the reasonings

of others, but is also himself a valuable contributor to philosophical and theological thought. We could have wished that his style had been more brilliant and varied; but the absence of the lighter literary graces is a secondary defect in such a work as this. The reader will be disappointed to learn from the Preface that the particular form of Anti-Theism which is now in the ascendant—we mean, of course, Agnosticism—is not discussed in this volume, but is reserved for some future work. On reading this statement, it occurred to us that, if we could have our desire, we would much rather that Professor Knight, the author of the "Studies in Philosophy and Literature," should undertake this important task. We may well be mistaken, but it seems to us that this charming writer has himself drunk deeply of that poetic Pantheism which is now so popular, and if so, he would, in treating of Agnosticism, be able to enter more fully into its spirit and do greater justice to its advocates than would be possible to Dr. Flint, who seems to be such a sturdy, well-defined and uncompromising Theist, that we doubt whether the Anti-Theistic influences which beset Dr. Tyndall when he is not in his "highest moods," would make the slightest impression upon Dr. Flint's very judicious but not highly imaginative soul.

There are two long papers in Professor Knight's present volume to which we heartily invite the attention of our readers, a paper on "Personality and the Infinite," and one on "Theism—Desiderata in the Theistic Argument." In the former, the belief in the Personality of the Deity is vindicated, but we are cautioned not to identify the notion of what constitutes personality in God with our concept of personality in man. The treatment of the Freedom of the Will in this essay, though ingenious, is hardly, we think, satisfactory. In the other paper the time-honoured arguments for Theism are clearly stated, elaborately criticised, and are all, with the exception of the one based on Instinct or Intuition, pronounced inadequate. Both of these papers deserve careful analysis and detailed examination, but this our space does not allow. They, as well as most of the remaining essays in the volume, are specially interesting to us, because, as we have said, they are written by one who appears to feel and understand the temptations which are now alluring so many cultured minds away from definite theology, but who has overcome, in part at least, these temptations, and shews himself a skilful and graceful advocate of a form of Theism which hits, he thinks, that happy medium necessary for the satisfaction of "modern thought" on the one hand, and the perennial cravings of man's religious nature on the other.

C. B. U.

## 2. Hebrew Philology.

1. *Das Trostschreiben des Apostels Paulus an die Hebräer, kritisch wiederhergestellt und erläutert von J. H. R. Biesenthal.* Leipzig. 1878.

The author has indicated in his title two of the principal points that his commentary emphasizes. First, from xiii. 22 he insists that this work is not an Epistle, which must be addressed to a definite person or community, but, as its author himself describes it there, a λόγος παρακλήσεως, a hortatory or consolatory oration: and secondly, he will not hear of any author but Paul. The study of the book is rendered rather distasteful by the excessive arrogance of the writer, who delivers his oracles as perfect wisdom, hidden till he came to exhibit it.* It is my first duty to tell him that he also is human, and to assign him his place among De Wette, Bleek, and the other critics who are objects of his contempt. Having done with the manner of the book, I am free to speak my opinion of the matter, as far as space will allow me. The argument hangs pretty well together if the Pauline authorship be allowed at the outset. At Rome Paul received news of the various Christian churches, amongst them of the Jewish ones which were especially in Palestine. The first enthusiasm which had founded them was growing cool; the members were beginning to look back fondly to the religion they had left, to regret the splendour of its services of sacrifice and song performed in a magnificent temple by bands of priests and levites. Under these circumstances, Paul could not be restrained from writing a memoir suitable for circulation among these hesitating and backsliding Jewish Christians, in which he maintained that the whole Levitical cultus was only a shadow or symbol of the future reality, and all its sacrifices only types of the one real sacrifice on Golgotha. But its effect would have been lost if it were known to come from the hand of the apostate Pharisee; he therefore wrote it anonymously. Moreover, it was not addressed to one community more than another; it was not strictly a letter at all, but an exhortation directed to Jewish-Christian congregations, and even to persons of Jewish descent and sentiment, wherever they might be dwelling; hence he abandons

* He alone knows the writer's meaning: "Getreu dem Vorbilde des Paulus (2 Cor. vii. 2) wollen wir kurz den Sinn der apostolischen Erörterung wiedergeben, unbekümmert darum, was die Hochgelahrten (!) dazu sagen werden."—P. 236.

his usual style of address at the beginning and end.* Thence he advances to his most remarkable and important thesis—that Paul wrote his exhortation to the Jews in their own language—the Hebrew of his age, which was the sacred language of the Scriptures used in treatises on religious subjects, developed indeed by the admission of peculiar forms and words of which traces are found in the latest books of the Scriptures, and which is freely used in the Mishnah, but essentially distinct from the popular Aramaic dialects called Chaldee (the language of the translations called Targums) and Syriac. He translates the work back into this language and gives a very full commentary upon it, in which his reasons for each peculiar phrase are explained, and no opportunity is lost of pointing out passages which seem to prove the Greek to be a translation. The argument is sufficiently striking, and carried out with enough learning, especially in the language of the Mishnah, to deserve careful consideration. It is obvious that it meets many of the difficulties with which the interpretation of this book has been hitherto beset. Whether it removes them altogether, and whether the theory here set up does not introduce any new and more serious ones, must be left to competent scholars to determine. My cursory examination does not entitle me to pronounce even my own final opinion, much less to control the judgment of others. As to the language, it is very ingenious and often less obscure than the Greek; and it is certainly sometimes successful in rebutting the most weighty arguments which have been used to prove the Greek the original. The author turns these round and makes the same passages to demonstrate the Hebrew to be the original, which has been misunderstood by the translator. For example, the use of the word διαθήκη in ix. 16, 17, has been held to be a quibble on the double meaning of that word, *Covenant* and *Testament*, which could not have been made in Hebrew. The Old and the New Covenants are compared (viii. 8, cf. Jer. xxxi. 31—34), with the view of shewing that the New must be the higher, introduced only because the old one had failed. So Christ, being the high-priest and therefore mediator of the second covenant, performs once for all that which the high-priest

* The word *letter* in xiii. 22 A.V. is not in the original. Biesenthal holds that the expression, "they of Italy" (οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας), so far from shewing whence the letter was written, proves that it was *not* from Italy, as it denotes those who have come *from* Italy, are of Italian origin; otherwise it would be οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ. The subscription, "Written to the Hebrews from Italy by Timothy," he, with Griesbach, &c., rejects as not genuine.

of the first had failed to accomplish, eternal redemption for us; but this was by the sacrifice of his own blood instead of that of goats and calves. Then the writer goes on to say, "For where a διαθήκη is, there is necessarily the death of the διαθέμενος. For a διαθήκη upon dead bodies is binding, whereas it has no strength while the διαθέμενος is living." If the διαθέμενος is (as seems almost necessary) one of the parties contracting the διαθήκη, then these sentences lead us into absurdity if διαθήκη means Covenant. God is the chief, or rather the only party to the covenant, since it is simply accepted on the other side. Can the writer mean that for a contract to come into force, one of the parties must have died? in this case, that God has died? This absurdity and the reference to death led critics to suppose that the sense of these verses must be restored by destroying the argument of the whole; by spoiling the analogy between Old and New Covenants, and giving to the word here the sense of *Last Will*, which does require the death of the testator to come into operation. Dr. Biesenthal clings to the sense Covenant, refers to the most ancient covenant in Gen. xv, and shews that something similar to the rites there detailed was common among ancient nations, and then understands the *death* in v. 16 of the animals which are killed and, according to this and other accounts, cut up in ratification of the treaty. In this case, v. 17 means "A covenant upon dead bodies (of sacrificial animals) is deemed binding; whereas so long as the animal is living it has no force." Hence the New Covenant is strictly analogous in legal form with the Old, and is ratified by the blood of Christ. The argument is admirable, and seems to be easily elicited from the text. But in such very simple discoveries there is generally a hitch somewhere; here the doubt rests over ὁ διαθέμενος, which is required to denote the beast which is not the agent but the *instrument* of ratification; whereas neither the gender nor the form (middle mood) make this very likely. It may also be very fairly questioned whether the sacrificial form of contract was sufficiently universal for the writer to be able to affirm that, without such killing, a contract was invalid. For the form relied on by Biesenthal, there is actually only the single instance to which he has referred; and one equally ancient is mentioned in Gen. xvii. without description of any rites of ratification.—A very ingenious interpretation is given to the words in x. 1, the drift of which is not clear: "For there was to the Law only a shadow, not the essence, of good things to come. They daily repeated the daily sacrifices, which (nevertheless) cannot satisfy the relays of Levites who come up from outside."

He points out that a *yearly* sacrifice cannot be meant here, which requires the high-priest to officiate, whereas here there is no mention of the high-priest and the verb is plural; besides this, it would be strange if the "daily (twice a day) offerings" were omitted. A slight misunderstanding of the Hebrew would convert *daily* into *yearly*.

The argument about the language does not depend, of course, upon the Pauline authorship. The book is clever and on some points original. The writer can write with facility in Hebrew, and the thoughts of this work have a strong Hebrew tinge—itself a temptation, to any one who has the power, to attempt the translation; but whether this exercise can be held to have proved anything further is a question not to be decided off-hand. On the other point, the Pauline authorship, Biesenthal seems to me weak. He can assume that Paul the Jew, addressing his own fellow-countrymen, would argue in a somewhat different style from that which he adopted towards Pagans. But still his personality must peep through; and his general conceptions must not be contradicted on any important subject. The former branch of the subject is well worked out here; this, somewhat neglected.

2. ספר דקדוקי הטעמים לפני אהרן בן משה בן אשר על ידי יצחק בן אריה יוסף בער וחערמאן לעברעכט שטריאק

*Die Dikduke ha-Teamim des Ahron ben Moscheh ben Ascher, herausgegeben von S. Baer und H. L. Strack.* Leipzig. 1879.

This is one of the earliest attempts in the middle ages to establish the laws of Hebrew grammar, especially in so far as relates to the vowels and accents. "It is one of the first attempts," say the present editors, "to group in rules a portion of the matter furnished by the Massorah, and makes us acquainted with the ideas prevalent among the learned concerning Biblical Hebrew before the classical period of its grammatical, lexicographical and exegetical study." Indeed, Aaron ben Asher, or Ben Asher as he is generally called, lived as early as the first half of the tenth century. His work has been dealt unkindly with, and manuscripts of it are rare. The two scholars who have produced this edition were each separately working on Ben Asher, each with insufficient material, when they fortunately met, and, throwing their labours together, have produced an excellent and complete edition, in reality the first ever printed, I presume, as that in the Rabbinical Bible of 1516-18 is described as containing only a portion.

The work has great intrinsic merit; it is written in clear and

simple Hebrew, and the arrangement well shewn by a table of contents. There is a list of variants and a good apparatus criticus, and the introduction, supplement, and list of Biblical verses quoted, leave nothing to be desired by the student of the Massorah. The notes refer to a copious mass of Jewish literature, and articles bearing on the subject, down to a very recent date. They are concise and to the point; and the whole work contains only 137 pages, of which the text occupies 77. Few will be found to undertake the labour of mastering these old works on the Massorah: yet to them only have we to look (independently of conjectural emendations based on the LXX. and other old versions) for settlement of the text of the Hebrew Scriptures. So much the more welcome ought editions like the present be, which by good print, careful notes and references, reduce the labour to a minimum.

RUSSELL MARTINEAU.

### 3. MISCELLANEOUS.

The seventh volume of "The Sling and the Stone"* strikingly justifies its name; it is throughout aggressive, and in some passages pugnacious. The series of discourses it contains seems to have been occasioned by the Rev. Brownlow Maitland's "Argument from Prophecy." Mr. Voysey replies to this work, and aims at shewing that the plea for Christianity arising from the supposed fulfilment of Old Testament prophecy in the life and words of Christ, is altogether unfounded. Many of his arguments are to the point and very cogent. He easily establishes the fact, with which most theologians are familiar, that the evangelists, and probably Christ himself, quoted Scripture somewhat loosely, and applied texts in a manner which, however customary among the Hebrews in that age, is altogether different from our method in the present day. As a polemical work, his stone is successful in hitting the mark and discomfiting his adversary. But its effect is marred by the unnecessary vehemence of the slinger, and by his wonderful want of accuracy. Take, as one instance of this, the reference made, on p. 78, to the passage in Luke iv., in which Jesus is described as reading from Isaiah. Mr. Voysey compares the quotation, as given by Luke, with Isaiah lxi., and pointing out that there are discrepancies, suggests that Jesus altered the passage in Isaiah, as he read it, to suit

* The Sling and the Stone. Vol. VII. On Prophecy. By the Rev. Charles Voysey, B.A. London: Williams and Norgate. 1879.

his own purpose. He says, "'proclaiming liberty' is certainly a happier expression than 'preaching deliverance' to captives, which might be only words; moreover, 'the opening of the prison to them that are bound' is a feature that Jesus never had any thought of adopting, not even to rescue his old friend and kinsman, John the Baptist, whom Herod cast into prison; so that clause is prudently omitted. Notice that the clause about 'recovering of sight to the blind' is inserted by Christ, and is not in the original." It is scarcely to be credited that in seeking foundation for such a charge as this, the author was contented with simply comparing the passages as they occur in the English Bible, never taking the trouble to inquire whether there could be any other cause found for the discrepancies than the intentional alteration and bad faith he is so ready to attribute to Jesus. Had he gone to the Septuagint, he would have discovered that all the peculiarities to which he calls attention, in the quotation as given by Luke, exactly occur there in the Greek version of Isaiah. Whatever the words were which Jesus read in the synagogue, the evangelist in his account takes the quotation from the Greek version. This fact Mr. Voysey entirely overlooks; as he does also the further fact that the difference between "proclaim liberty" and "preach deliverance" is simply one of translation, a difference for which the translators only are accountable. He further dwells on the omission of the words, "and the day of vengeance of our God," saying, "Yes, this is the awkward passage at which Jesus stopped in his reading of the prophecy. The idea of vengeance would have grated harshly upon the assembly." But the evangelist does not profess to give the whole passage that was read. He merely says that Jesus "found the place where it was written," &c., and probably quotes the commencement of the section, meaning that the whole of it was read. Besides, in the Septuagint the final clause of the verse is, "and a day of retribution" or "of reward," for so the Greek word ἀνταπόδοσις is translated in Col. iii. 24. The whole fabric of accusation and insinuation against Jesus founded on this passage thus falls to the ground. We have dwelt on this instance, because it is only one out of many in which inaccuracy of statement, looseness of expression and intemperance of language, are found. Even in spoken addresses, such as these were in the first instance, these characteristics in the speaker are not complimentary to his hearers; but they are more pardonable there than on the printed page, where they seriously diminish the influence and permanent value of a book.

Another blemish in this volume is the persistence with which Christianity is identified with a dogmatic system. Thus (p. 138) we are told that "Christianity, as presented in the New Testament and in the creeds and dogmas of the Christian Churches, gives as its abiding elements" the orthodox doctrines of the Trinity, the atonement, eternal torments, and so forth. But surely the writer can see something in the spirit and power of Christianity, as manifested in all its various forms, beyond the dogmas of the creeds. It is a question that may be well debated, whether those dogmas are to be found in the New Testament. But however that may be, a preacher who aims at being something more than a controversialist, should recognize the spiritual essence of the gospel, which is to a large extent independent of dogma, and is the purifying salt that has never wholly lost its savour, however from age to age Christianity may have been corrupted.

Manuals of domestic worship are so numerous, and many of them are so excellent, that some doubt may be felt as to the necessity for another. But the one before us* has such merits of its own as will gain for it a hearty welcome. The spirit in which the work has been performed is indicated in the Preface. "To construct a series of devotional forms that shall be solemn, earnest and fervent, yet simple and natural in diction—it is above all things necessary that the subject matter of the prayer be general, not special; the thought outlined, but not filled in; and details suggested, rather than expressed. Hence the form must be undogmatic. . . . . The ideal form of the collect (and of every prayer) is one which combines simplicity with depth, and sententious brevity with fervour. It should unite fulness and force of thought with compactness of form and directness of expression." It is no small praise to say that the high ideal so well expressed in the above sentences is to a large extent attained to in this volume. The collects of the Anglican Prayer-book are arranged in a series of short services in one section; the original prayers of the other sections are not unworthy of a place along-side of these collects. Many of them are fitted for use, not only in family worship, but also in private devotion or in the pulpit. A separate section presents forms for use in the Sunday-school. The book only needs to be known in order to be valued, and will, we sincerely hope, be found of service in many homes.

* Home Prayers (Suspiria Domestica). By Members of the Church Service Society. Blackwood and Sons. 1879.

Ecclesiastical history offers so wide a field, that most students who would do the work thoroughly must be content with investigating one period or one development. Such a course has been successfully adopted by the author of the "Study" on Montanism.* The task has been performed with careful research, united with a broad outlook and the preservation of a catholic spirit, which make the volume, comparatively small as it is, one of real value. The right key-note is struck at the beginning, when Montanism is spoken of as no isolated phenomenon, but one of a series of manifestations of the same tendency, which include, besides others, the Cathari and Waldenses of the middle ages, the Anabaptists of the Reformation era, Fox and his followers in England, Madame Guyon and her associates in France, the Pietists of Germany, Swedenborg and Edward Irving. The general result of the essay is to present the Montanists in more favourable colours than those in which orthodox writers generally have depicted them, and thoroughly to exonerate them from the foul crimes that have been attributed to them. In the Appendix, among other articles, is an interesting comparison of Montanus and Swedenborg.

The disciples of the last-named teacher are constantly presenting to the world illustrations and explanations of their doctrines, in translations of portions of the works of their leader. In "The Consummation of the Age,"† we have his interpretation of Matthew xxiv. It is preceded by a preface, which occupies nearly half the volume and bears the signature, "Augustus Clissold." Its object is to explain and defend the peculiar use of the Bible which finds in each verse a spiritual sense, and to shew that this method has advantages over those of the Catholic and Protestant Churches. The writer concludes with the caution, that when he speaks of the Bible, he means only certain parts of the Bible (which he enumerates), these only having a spiritual sense. The selection of these portions, and the decision as to what their spiritual meaning is, are alike arbitrary; and the conclusion arrived at can have no weight to those who do not take for granted the special inspiration of Swedenborg. To others, his interpretations seem far-fetched and

* Montanism and the Primitive Church. A Study in the Ecclesiastical History of the Second Century. The Hulsean Prize Essay. 1877. By John de Soyres, of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. Deighton, Bell and Co. 1878.

† The Consummation of the Age: being a Prophecy now fulfilled and interpreted in the Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg. London: Longmans. 1879.

fanciful. Thus he says that "Let them who are in Judæa flee to the mountains," means, "that they who are of the Church ought not to look elsewhere than to the Lord (thus to love to Him), and to charity towards the neighbour"—that "let him that is on the house-top not come down," means, "that they who are in the good of charity ought not to betake themselves thence to those things which are of the doctrinals of faith"—and so on, the peculiar English being, we presume, the style of the translator. It is evident that, by a little ingenuity in this plan of interpretation, any chapter may be made to teach any doctrines. The commentary is therefore useless to those who have not taken the great previous step of assuring themselves of the infallibility of the commentator. It may edify the disciple of Swedenborg; others cannot deal with it.

It is always cheering and useful when laymen of culture come forward to express their convictions, and to point out the grounds on which they hold them. We therefore rejoice to read the volume* in which Dr. Wild treats of the evidences of Christianity. But apart from the personality of the author, it has claims on our notice, for it is characterized by a union of devout feeling with liberal spirit. The absence of some of the advantages possessed by those who are familiar with the minutiæ of theological scholarship, is more than compensated by the freshness of treatment and freedom of handling to be expected from a thoughtful layman. After ably vindicating the use of reason in connection with religion, he shews how the Bible may be employed for purposes of spiritual edification, without there being attributed to it verbal inspiration. He then gives what he conceives to be the evidence of the genuineness of the historical books of the New Testament. Some points are here assumed as undoubted which might well be treated as open questions. But those who may differ from the author on matters of criticism, will none the less sympathize with him when he says—"Our catechisms tend to make religion not a matter of intercourse between the soul of man and God, but a sort of artificial puzzle. When a man therefore becomes concerned about his salvation, and, to use a common expression, wishes *to know that he is safe*, he addresses himself not to God, in whom alone is his safety, but to the Shorter Catechism; he goes to it to see if his faith is of the right sort. This is no caricature of our religious habits; it is a steady and constant practice

* Christianity and Reason: their necessary Connection. By R. S. Wild, LL.D., F.R.S.E. Edinburgh: David Douglas. 1879.

in our land. Christianity is not an intellectual puzzle or elaborate system; it is, on the contrary, a great soul-moving truth, spoken into the heart, or not apprehended at all. Christ's theology is simple; it commends itself at once to our reason and our best feelings."

The history of religion in England is an interesting theme, but it needs studying in reference to the people as a whole, and not in reference to any one particular ecclesiastical organization. Hence the title, "History of the Church of England"* seems not fitly to represent an attempt to trace the progress of Christianity in this island from its first planting here. What Dr. Boultbee desires seems to be to give a popular history of the Church *in* England, and in the present volume this includes the religion of the nation as a whole. In later periods, he will have to choose between making his chronicle wider than his title, and neglecting much that deserves to be chronicled. The History is written in a fair and candid tone, and without manifestation of party spirit, though the author avows that his sympathies are warmly anti-papal. He appears not to have spared labour in accumulating materials and consulting authorities, but he does not possess the faculty, peculiar to the born historian, of imparting a charm to the narration by the manner of telling it. Some portions of the thick volume are tiresome, and if less space had been allotted to the periods which are acknowledged to be shrouded in obscurity, and to the legends which writer and reader alike consider fabulous, the work would have been smaller, but not less attractive or less useful.

Mr. Wright's little volume† consists of twelve lectures originally delivered to his own congregation in the winter of 1878. Starting from Human Nature, the testimony of Consciousness and of History, the author examines the grounds of belief in God, of Nature and Providence, and the problems suggested by the existence of Pain and Sin. The nature of communion between God and man is treated under the heads of Inspiration, Revelation and Miracles; and three lectures on Immortality, Salvation and Christianity, conclude the series. Mr. Wright's power of calm and concise statement is nowhere seen to greater advantage than in these lectures. Though the ordi-

* A History of the Church of England. Pre-Reformation Period. By T. P. Boultbee, LL.D. London: Longmans. 1879.

† The Grounds and Principles of Religion. By John Wright, B.A. Williams and Norgate. 1879.

nary limit of a lecture is hardly in any case exceeded, the treatment of the subjects is by no means superficial; but without ignoring difficulties or contemporary discussions, the author does not allow the progress of his own thought and argument to be confused by them. The reader feels that Mr. Wright must have an ample stock of illustrations and references in reserve, and is inclined to wish that the notes had been a little extended in this direction. In the hands of a teacher, and especially of one who could supply this deficiency for himself, the book may be made a most interesting and valuable manual of connected and reasoned instruction.

Mr. Wright's candour in the statement of difficulties, and modesty in dealing with them, are perhaps most conspicuous in his treatment of the great problems of Pain and Sin. He thus states the dilemma which forced itself with such abruptness upon Mr. J. S. Mill: "It is often said, the reason God does not put an end to human suffering must be either that He *cannot* or that He *will not:* in the former case He is not all-powerful, in the latter He is not all-loving." Mr. Wright is disposed to adopt the former alternative, though by no means in the same sense or in the same way as Mr. Mill adopted it. He says:

"Some theologians are shocked when it is suggested that there is any limitation to the power of God; yet on examination it will be found that every one believes in some such limitation. It is generally said He is self-existent, eternal, necessarily existent; if so, to cause the cessation of his own being is beyond his power. When we speak of moral qualities, such as holiness, purity, truth, we attribute these to Him in perfection. If it be so, He cannot alter these qualities, or make his own attributes other than they are. Moral distinctions are not a divine ordination, but a condition of the divine personality, and can be no more reversed by God than his own attributes. The more the matter is looked into, the more it will be seen that in the customary language in which we speak of 'the Almighty,' we are generally regarding his instrumentality in material things. In that sphere of activity his power is absolute, because everything is simply the manifestation of his will; but in the moral and spiritual world, there is no reason why we should refuse to acknowledge there may be bounds to his power. In the spiritual as in the material world, He is powerful; but it may be that in the former He is not *all*-powerful. Even in the realm of intellect, we cannot conceive of the possibility of divine power reconciling contradictions, making a proposition at once true and false. Why then may there not be in the realm of morality necessities which his own nature forbids Him to overstep?"—P. 61.

Hence Mr. Wright would suggest that the connection between

the struggle and pain of moral warfare and the perfection of human character may be included among such necessities, the one being such a condition of the other that God himself cannot overstep the limitation. But here it seems to us that Mr. Wright has introduced a limitation into the nature of God which his argument does not require,—unless, indeed, he would suggest that the goodness of God is conditional upon the presence with Him, and His eternal rejection, of alternative evil. We judge that the purpose of God as manifested in the condition and experience of man, is, as Mr. Wright says, to produce beings of high moral power and noble character; and that these must be produced by slow growth and travail of soul. We cannot use our moral vocabulary at all without appealing to the conceptions of free choice, of the struggle of motives; nor could we freely give our highest meed of moral approbation to a character to which these were strange. Our idea of goodness depends on the admitted possibility of sinning, and the resolute refusal of the evil course. The possibility of sin may thus be conceived as a necessity in the moral "nature of things," or the moral nature of man; but we do not see the limitation thereby introduced into the nature of God. If, as we believe, this possibility of sin is postulated in the very predication of goodness, just as experience of danger and struggle must be implied in the attribution of the epithets "courageous" and "triumphant,"—then the fact that God does not cause goodness to be independent of this alternative possibility, is no more a limitation of his omnipotence on the moral side, than is the fact of the interdependence of *relative names* (such as *husband* and *wife*) a limitation of the Divine intelligence.

At the opening of the new Faculty of Protestant Theology of Paris in November, 1877, Professor Sabatier gave an interesting inaugural discourse on the "Origins of Biblical Criticism in France." This lead has been followed by M. Berger, an alumnus of that Faculty, who in his excellent little work, "The Bible in the Sixteenth Century,"* more minutely examines the position of "the men of the Renaissance" and the leaders of the Reformation with regard to the authority of Scripture and the finality of the Canon. This is preceded by an introductory essay on "L'Intelligence de la Bible à la fin du Moyen Age," in which M. Berger gives a sketch of his original researches among the exegetical and homiletical

* La Bible au Seizième Siècle. Etude sur les Origines de la Critique Biblique. Par Samuel Berger. Paris: Berger-Levrault, Fischbacher. 1879.

manuals and encyclopædias that were in vogue in the days of the "Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum,"—a line of bibliography, possessing however much more than a merely bibliographical interest, which he has pursued to a greater length in a separate dissertation published elsewhere, "De Glossariis et Compendiis exegeticis quibusdam Medii Aevi." The body of the work carefully records, and illustrates by well-chosen quotations, the views and labours of the founders of Biblical Theology and Criticism, including Ximenes and Erasmus, Luther (whose changes of attitude with respect to the authority and canonicity of certain books—or rather perhaps as to the desirability of raising such questions at all—are clearly noted) and Carlstadt, Calvin, Beza and the Stephens. We thank M. Berger for his very useful and readable manual, and hope to hear more from him, especially as to the Biblical studies of the old Protestant Academies of France.

Dr. Hecker's Lecture on the Israelites and Monotheism* is interesting in many ways, but especially as giving an estimate of Jewish national character and religion as a factor in general history, from the pen of a Professor, not of Theology, but of History, who has, however, made himself extensively acquainted with modern investigations of the antiquities of Israel. If any one desires to see Renan's celebrated Lecture, "De la Part des Peuples Semitiques dans l'Histoire de la Civilisation" (1862), briefly corrected to date, he cannot do better than read Dr. Hecker.

The fourth volume of Keim's "Jesus of Nazara"† in the Theological Translation Fund series, brings down the history to "the Galilean close." The rendering, by Mr. Arthur Ransom, is good and readable, and we especially commend the care which has been bestowed upon the notes and references. We can, from personal knowledge, most heartily concur in the few well-chosen words of eulogy upon the deceased author with which Mr. Ransom concludes his Preface.

Mr. N. S. Joseph's work‡ is published by the Trustees of the late Mr. J. A. Franklin, and is intended to serve as a text-book for

* Die Israeliten und der Monotheismus. Von Dr. W. Hecker, Professor der Geschichte an der Universität Groningen. Aus dem Holländischen übersetzt. Leipzig: Otto Schulze. 1879.

† The History of Jesus of Nazara, &c. By Dr. Theodor Keim. Translated by Arthur Ransom. Vol. IV. Williams and Norgate. 1879.

‡ Religion, Natural and Revealed. A Series of Progressive Lessons for Jewish Youth. By N. S. Joseph. London: Trubner. 1879.

the instruction of Jewish youth. It seems to us well fitted for that purpose. The first part, which treats of Natural Religion, displays a considerable amount of thought and aptitude of illustration. Much of the second part, Revealed Religion, is naturally caviare to the Gentile; but it has interest and value even for the casual reader, as shewing the significance attached to the festivals and observances of the Hebrew faith, and the warm patriotic feeling which is still poured around traditional rites and commemorations. The position assumed is that of orthodox but moderate Judaism. The author displays some acquaintance with modern scientific procedure, but none with the results of Biblical criticism, and apologetics, where they occur, are of an antiquated type. Though we cannot take Mr. Joseph's view of the extermination of the Canaanites, or share the enthusiasm with which he speaks of the Book of Esther, we are bound to speak highly of the conscientiousness and the deeply religious spirit in which he has fulfilled his task. The most remarkable sign of the vitality of English Judaism is found in the fact that so many young and well-educated Jewish laymen devote themselves to the production of such good religious writing as is to be found in "Sabbath Readings" and in Mr. Joseph's little volume.

Mr. Hammond, the author of a work on "Liturgies, Eastern and Western," which we noticed some time ago, now publishes, in pamphlet form, an Appendix to it.* This contains, first, "A Liturgy from the Writings of St. Chrysostom;" that is to say, a conjectural reconstruction of the Liturgy of Antioch in use at the time of the eloquent preacher, effected by help of citations from his homilies. To this are added fragments of Egyptian, Syrian and Gallican Liturgies, collected from various scraps of MS. Those who are interested in these studies, and who possess Mr. Hammond's valuable work, will do well to place this Appendix at its side.

The 6th and 7th volumes of Montalembert's "Monks of the West," which have reached us in the authorized English translation,† can hardly, in strictness, be reckoned as part of that work, with which indeed they have little or no continuity. It appears that before 1848, "M. de Montalembert had prepared an introduction

* The Ancient Liturgy of Antioch and other Liturgical Fragments; being an Appendix to "Liturgies, Eastern and Western." By C. E. Hammond, M.A. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1879.

† The Monks of the West, from St. Benedict to St. Bernard. By the Count de Montalembert, &c. Authorized Translation. Vols. VI. VII. Edinburgh and London: Blackwood. 1879.

to the 'Life of St. Bernard,' which it was his intention to write after the 'Life of St. Elizabeth,' and the object of which was 'to make known the real character of the monastic orders and the work they had accomplished for the Catholic world.'" Almost the whole of the first volume was printed when the Revolution came, and plunged M. de Montalembert into politics. When, however, his brief adherence to the Second Empire had come to an end, he thought of resuming his work, but before doing so, submitted it to the judgment of Mgr. Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans. The Bishop did not approve: M. de Montalembert obediently bought back the printed sheets from the publisher, and set to work on a different plan—a labour from which issued "The Monks of the West." His literary executors, however, do not choose that his toil should be wholly thrown away, and, omitting such portions as were incorporated in the later work, have published the unfinished sketch. Such experiments are rarely successful, and we cannot say that this is an exception to the general rule. "The Monks of the West," properly so called, is a finer and more finished work than this irregular addition to it. M. de Montalembert who never possessed much historical sense of the critical kind, yet gathered insight as he went on, so that, as the last part of his work was written first, he is most credulous of marvels at a period when, in the dawning light of contemporary record, marvels are most conspicuously out of place. Never was a picture of any age so drawn in uniform and monotonous rose-colour as this. All monks are virtuous, all Bishops are learned, all benefactors of the Church pious, all Popes exemplary, and the Church the divine Bride of Christ, without spot or taint. The narrative is not history, but unmixed panegyric. Only the devoutest and least suspicious of believers could read it in simple faith. To others, whatever interest it possesses lies in the exhibition of what strange credulity is possible to a really accomplished and learned inquirer when once the Church has cast its spell on him.

"The Problem of the World and the Church re-considered, by a Septuagenarian,"* a volume which we noticed some years ago, has re-appeared in a third and cheaper edition, and now bears upon its title-page the name of its author, Mr. James Booth, C.B. The Introduction, which is new, indicates that Mr. Booth has now taken up

* The Problem of the World and the Church re-considered, &c. By a Septuagenarian. Third Edition. With an Introduction by James Booth, C.B. London: Longmans. 1879.

a position in advance of that which he previously occupied, if it be indeed an advance to have still more completely shaken off the restraints of traditional belief. He thinks that Christianity has played a useful part in the world in its day, but not obscurely hints his opinion that its day is drawing to a close. His belief also in a Personal God and in a future state have grown somewhat more than hazy; and he seems to look to Science, and the benefits which she confers upon mankind, for the happiness and welfare of the future. With this indication of the author's altered position, we refer our readers to the opinion which we formerly expressed on his book.

Another re-publication is that of Mrs. Harwood Holmden's translation of M. de Pressensé's work on Early Christianity.* Upon each volume, as it originally came out, we expressed a favourable judgment, and we are glad to see the series again offered to the public in a cheap and not inelegant form. It would be going too far to say that we entirely coincide with M. de Pressensé's way of stating and solving all the difficult literary and theological problems which belong to the period of which he treats; but his volumes contain much valuable information, well presented and well translated. We cordially wish for them a wide circulation. E.

* The Early Years of Christianity, &c. By E. de Pressensé, D.D. Translated by Annie Harwood Holmden. Vol. I. The Apostolic Age. Vol. II. The Martyrs and Apologists. Vol. III. Heresy and Christian Doctrine. Vol. IV. Life and Practice in the Early Church. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1879.

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